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ABSTRACT

Origins, Negotiations, and Implementation
of the Confidence-Building Measures of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

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This thesis examines the origins, negotiations, and implementation of the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) adopted at the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). More specifically, it traces the reasons for introducing the measures on the agenda of the Conference, and reviews their development to 1987 when they were replaced by a more comprehensive set of measures.

This thesis argues that, contrary to popular belief, the 15 NATO member states that proposed the negotiation of CBMs in the CSCE --and later took credit for their development-- had no clear view of what they wanted to achieve with the measures, and saw no intrinsic value in them either. Furthermore, fears that any measures negotiated in the CSCE framework might interfere with talks on force reductions led to the adoption of a negotiating strategy that called for only modest steps to be taken. This directly contributed to the failure of the Conference to achieve more comprehensive results in this field.

The thesis further argues that the compliance record of the Warsaw Pact nations --an area that was always very poor, selective and of questionable reliance-- leaves no doubt that the most prominent goals ascribed to the measures were never met in practice. Furthermore, the NATO member states never truly challenged the East for a better record of compliance, and neither did they rely on the measures to increase their own security in any way.

Taken together, these considerations lead to the conclusion that the implementation of the CSCE CBMs régime does not necessarily constitute the success story so often ascribed to this, the first attempt at introducing such measures in Europe.

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Also, I wish to extend a very special thanks to George Jacklin and Ken Ross, for always being there for me; your friendship is faithful, gracious and precious.

Last, but not least, to my mother, Pauline Desjardins: À toi qui m'a tout appris et tout donné. Merci de tes incessants encouragements, merci d'avoir cru en moi. Sans toi, rien de ceci n'eût été possible.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CBMs	Confidence-Building Measures
CDE	Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CSBMs	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (now OSCE)
DEA	Department of External Affairs (Canada)
EDC	European Defence Community
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee
ESC	European Security Conference
GDR	German Democratic Republic
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRHC	Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MLF	Multinational Nuclear Force
MPT	Multilateral Preparatory Talks
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NNAs	Neutral and Non-Aligned states
NSWP	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (nations)
NTMs	National Technical Means (of surveillance)
NWFZ	Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
TASS	Telegraphnaya Agentstva Sovetskovo Soyvza (Official Soviet News Agency)
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WPO	Warsaw Pact Organisation
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation

INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) have been eagerly endorsed world-wide as promising tools to help regulate political-military relations. Today, almost every region of the world is implementing or considering some form of CBMs. Judging by how the subject is filling the agenda of diplomatic negotiations, current efforts to implement CBMs are surpassing initiatives made during the Cold War to achieve arms control agreements. Considered as useful undertakings to help dispel unfounded fears of threats emanating from potential adversaries, the measures are believed to reduce tensions and suspicions between nations, enhance predictability, strengthen stability, and improve security.[1]

Unlike traditional arms control, CBMs do not aim at limiting military equipment or forces. The focus of the measures, rather, is on regulating military operations and providing reassurance about military intentions. Different forms of information exchanges, observation and inspections of military activities, as well as operational constraints imposing certain restrictions on military activities are the most common tools of this approach. Though there is yet no agreed theory of CBMs, the most widely acknowledged value of the measures is that they help reduce the possibility of accidental wars through miscalculation or failure of communication, and diminish the dangers of surprise attack.[2] There are a number of ways in which CBMs are said to fulfil these goals.

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[1] Although CBMs are currently considered for application in a number of fields, the present discussion relates to the military measures developed in the framework of the European experience during the Cold War, which is the subject matter of this study. Among the most significant attempts to define the European CBMs, and the basic references used in the following discussion on the main goals and objectives of the measures, see Johan Jörgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence-building Measures", *Survival*, XIX: 4, July-August 1977, pp. 146-154 [Hereafter: Holst and Melander, "European Security"]; Johan Jörgen Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", *Survival,* XXV: 1, January-February 1983, pp. 2-15 [Hereafter: Holst, "Confidence-building Measures"]; Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects", in Jonathan Alford (ed.), *The Future of Arms Control, Part III, Confidence-Building Measures*, Adelphi Paper 149, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979, pp. 4-13; F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds.), *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, East-West Monograph Series Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983, 221 pages; Allen Lynch (ed.), *Building Security in Europe*, East-West Monograph Series Number Two, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986, 181 pages; R. B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch (eds.), *Confidence-Building Measures and International Security*, East-West Monograph Series Number 4, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987, 157 pages.

[2] Though less extensively discussed in the literature, a third important task ascribed to the early European CBMs is inhibiting the use or threat of use of force for political intimidation. As argued by Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-building measures may contribute to the establishment of thresholds against military intervention into another participating state, as such transgression would constitute a

The risks of war can be decreased by reducing misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Because military activities are inherently ambiguous, they can easily be misinterpreted. A routine military training exercise, for instance, can be mistaken by another state as an offensive action and trigger an undesirable reaction, leading to unintended conflict. Advance notification of military activities, however, can help reduce such dangers by allowing states to recognise normal patterns of routine peaceful activities.

Observation of military activities can also play a useful role in reducing the risks of misunderstanding or miscalculation by allowing all parties the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of information previously given. In theory, military observers invited to monitor a military activity can provide a reliable assessment of its purpose and character.

Beside helping to avoid erroneous interpretation of peacetime activities, a requirement to notify military activities in advance and to accept observers can also reduce risks of surprise attack because any non-notified activities, or refusal of observation, would alert decision-makers of possible aggressive operations providing critical time to undertake necessary defensive measures.

In addition to volunteering information about military activities, the sharing of information about troop structures, training capabilities, military doctrines, weapon acquisitions or defence budgets can also contribute to reducing misperceptions. Increasing transparency in military matters lies at the core of the confidence-building approach. The lack of information about matters related to defence policies or armaments, for example, is strongly believed to create mistrust and tensions. Secrecy breeds suspicion, and when states do not communicate, or there is a lack of information about other states' military capabilities or activities, officials tend to make worst case analyses.

For proponents of CBMs, the importance given to the benefits of exchanging information does not only stem from the acquisition of raw data which, in some cases, can provide evidence that certain behaviour or actions do not constitute a threat, but from the expectation that once information is shared between CBMs partners, it can be opened to discussion and further clarification. In this later regard, another important aspect of CBMs, which has gained

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challenge to the integrity and purpose of the arrangements themselves." Holst, "Confidence-building Measures", p. 3. For a similar view suggesting that CBMs could raise the political cost of a decision to use military force in Europe, see Richard E. Darilek, "Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation: The Promise of the Helsinki CBMs", in Larrabee and Stobbe (eds.), Ibid, pp. 65-66. [Hereafter: Darilek, "Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation"].

ever more significance since the concept first came into being, is establishing regular contacts and consultations between military and defence officials.[3] Such regular exchanges of views between representatives involved in military planning are thought to contribute to greater mutual understanding. Consultations and dialogue on defence matters enable the parties involved to present and explain their views, discuss their positions, expose their goals and motives, and uncover each other's perceptions and interpretations. The result of these activities is believed to contribute to bringing a transformation in thinking, a reassessment of policies, and a redefinition of objectives, ultimately leading to the adoption of policies and behaviour more mutually profitable to all.[4]

Another value of CBMs is in establishing principles, rules, norms, or standard of conduct regulating states' behaviour.[5] At a general level, most CBMs applications are deemed useful by making behaviour of states more predictable. In this latter respect, most CBMs are also seen as helping to stabilise inter-state relations by making them more orderly. Over time, such an application could become a standard against which any deviation may be judged unlawful, thus contributing to the creation of new rules of behaviour in states relations. By accepting constraints on the operations of military activities, such a code of conduct is also expected to have immediate benefit. Limiting the number, scope or duration of activities that may give rise to apprehension reduces the risks that such activities may be misinterpreted. Restraining certain activities to certain areas, or prohibiting them close to borders, helps create additional barriers against surprise attack while also directly contributing to increase the sense of security of the parties by providing concrete evidence of non-aggressive intentions. Even if considered the most militarily significant arrangements, limiting, constraining or prohibiting activities are usually reserved for a second stage of application, after more modest measures have been tried.

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[3] This aspect of what CBMs should do has become more prominent in the early 1980s after the United Nations sponsored a meeting of government experts to undertake a comprehensive study on CBMs. Although recognising the usefulness of measures designed to address specific military concerns, many nations strongly argued that confidence building should be viewed more as a process aimed at improving understanding and co-operation in all fields of interstate relations. In line with this view, the study recommended that regular personal contacts at all levels of political and military decision-making could serve to enhance the goal of confidence building and should be promoted and encouraged. United Nations, *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures*, Study Series 7, New York: United Nations, 1982, 42 pages.

[4] For a discussion, see United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary-General, *Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies*, Study Series 26, New York: United Nations, 1993, pp.39-40 and p. 41. [Hereafter: UN, *Study on Defensive Security Concepts*].

[5] See United Nations, *Confidence-building Measures*, Disarmament Fact Sheet 57, New York: United Nations, 1989, p. 15.

Finally another important role ascribed to CBMs is that they can facilitate agreement on arms control and disarmament. Because CBMs involve less ambitious undertakings than traditional arms control,[6] it is believed that states may be more inclined to adopt them and, by doing so, that they can start to lay down the necessary conditions to achieve arms control.[7]

Justified or exaggerated, the high hopes placed in the measures only partly accounts for their current popularity. Equally, if not more significant, for explaining the ever-growing pre-eminence of the concept on the international scene is the European experience with the measures. The term "confidence-building measures" itself only came into common usage following the negotiation of a few modest measures during the first meeting of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki, in 1975. Marking the beginning of the longest and most comprehensive multilateral application of the measures to date, the development and evolution of the CSCE CBMs have been filled with a number of significant accomplishments, often considered as concrete evidence of their value.

When the Helsinki CSCE CBMs régime was negotiated in the mid-1970s, the European continent was divided into two roughly symmetrical military blocs opposing the largest concentration of military power in the world. Political mistrust and suspicion prevailed on both sides of the East-West divide, while the excessive secrecy shrouding all military matters of the Soviet-dominated Communist bloc only served to feed Western fears of surprise attack. In an era of bloc-to-bloc confrontation, the successful negotiation of measures to increase transparency in military affairs constituted a major breakthrough.[8]

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[6] See, for example, Michael Krepon, "The Decade for Confidence-building Measures", in Michael Krepon (ed.), *A Handbook of Confidence-building Measures for Regional Security*, 2nd Edition, Handbook No. 1, Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1995, p. 2. [Hereafter: Krepon, *A Handbook of Confidence-building*].

[7] The belief that CBMs can contribute to, or constitute the first step towards, arms control and disarmament has always been prevalent in the literature. One of the very first writings on CBMs, for instance, claimed that "by continuing to build confidence and diminish fear, a climate can be created that should enhance the chances of agreement in the efforts more directly to arms control and disarmament." J. D. Toogood, "Helsinki 1975: What Was Achieved in the Field of Confidence-Building Measures?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 5: 2, Winter 1975, p. 31. [Hereafter: Toogood, "Helsinki 1975"]. A more comprehensive explanation related specifically to the negotiation on force reductions suggests that "once the force postures have become transparent and States have been able to gain sufficient degree of confidence that the forces as a whole are organized largely for defensive postures, they may be willing to engage in a process leading to actual reductions in military equipment holdings. In many cases, agreement on force reductions cannot therefore precede the effective implementation of confidence- and security-building measures." UN, *Study on Defensive Security Concepts*, p. 46.

[8] As described by the British Foreign Office at the end of the CSCE, CBMs "bring the member countries of the Warsaw Pact into a system of obligations in the military field which would have seemed inconceivable before the conference began." G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton (eds.), *The*

Building upon this initial success, the Helsinki measures remained in place for more than ten years, despite a severe deterioration in East-West relations combined with serious deadlocks in arms control negotiations.[9] More significantly, the Helsinki measures only ceased to be applied when a new set of more ambitious and comprehensive measures, renamed Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), replaced them in 1987.[10] The negotiation of this "second-generation" of measures was of historic importance because, for the first time, the Soviet Union accepted the principle of mandatory on-site inspections, opening a new era in arms control.[11]

When the Cold War ended and a completely new set of security challenges emerged, the relevance of CBMs took on added significance. By the time the CSCE was institutionalised in 1995 to become the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), three other CSBMs agreements had been successively agreed and implemented, always improving and expanding on the previous one.[12] Today, the OSCE remains deeply committed to the full compliance and full implementation of a comprehensive set of mutually complementary and mutually reinforcing measures. In the view of its (now) 55 participating States, these measures greatly contribute to stability and security throughout the continent and, more significantly, now constitute the basis upon which Europe is developing a concept of collective security whereby states no longer define their relationship in a competitive fashion,

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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-75, Series III: Volume II of Documents on British Policy Overseas, London: The Stationery Office, 1997, p. 456. [Hereafter: Bennett and Hamilton: *The Conference*]. For similar comments emphasising the importance of the breakthrough, see Toogood, "Helsinki 1975", p. 28, and J. D. Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade: What Happened to the Confidence Building Measures", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 8: 2, Autumn 1978, p. 14.

[9] Following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, East-West relations took a sharp downturn. In addition, reacting to the 1983 NATO deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union broke off the negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and suspended the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR). For many observers, the continuation of CBMs during this period and the opening, in January 1984, of a new round of CSCE negotiations devoted to strengthening the Helsinki measures was of major significance. For a discussion, see Richard E. Darilek, "East-West Confidence Building: Defusing the Cold War in Europe" in Michael Krepon, Michael Newbill, Khurshid Khoja, and Jenny S. Drezin (eds.), *Global Confidence Building. New Tools for Troubled Regions*, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 288. [Hereafter: Darilek, "East-West Confidence Building"].

[10] Agreement on the new measures emerged from the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), held in Stockholm between January 1984 and September 1986. The Stockholm Document was adopted on 19 September 1986, but its provisions only came into effect on 1 January 1987.

[11] The precedent was immediately successfully applied in the superpowers agreement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe, signed in December 1987.

[12] Those talks took place in Vienna, and the documents approved became commonly referred to as the Vienna Document (or VD) 1990, 1992, and 1994. For background on these and earlier CSCE negotiations, see Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *OSCE Handbook*, Vienna: Secretariat of the OSCE, 2000, 197 pages. [Hereafter: OSCE, *OSCE Handbook*].

but "work together, achieving security together with others".[13]

The long and impressive record of the development of CBMs in Europe has left little doubt about their success. The most authoritative statement in this regard certainly comes from the OSCE itself who maintains that "the CSCE can be credited with reducing military tensions through its implementation of confidence-building measures which enhanced military transparency … at a time when many threats to security stemmed from mistrust."[14]

Sweeping endorsement of the experience has also characterised the assessments of most academic analysts and practitioners.[15] Some describe the inclusion of CBMs into the CSCE as "the starting point of another success story".[16] Others emphasise the "essential role" CBMs have played in "improving East-West relations".[17]

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[13] Ibid., p. 2.

[14] Ibid., p. 12.

[15] Even during the Cold War when the application of the measures was less than satisfactory and difficulties or failures often had to be openly acknowledged, scholars and practitioners concluded that CBMs had proven their validity and should be pursued. Presenting the view of the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, Ambassador Henning Wegener remarked in 1983 that "the unique capability of confidence-building measures to enhance stability … and to prepare and promote true measures of disarmament without immediate constraining effects on military hardware makes this new set of measures uniquely suitable for the Central European region. In an era of unprecedented density of armaments on either side of the strategic dividing line… confidence-building measures offer welcome assurances and appear to counteract effectively the possibilities of surprise and accidental attack. In that context, the Federal Republic of Germany has consistently stressed the usefulness of confidence-building measures, as agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act, and has generally refrained from expressing doubts or dissatisfaction about their actual application and scope." Representatives from the European neutral and non-aligned states as well as from the Warsaw Pact nations also found important positive aspects in the experience. Writing in 1987, for instance, Ljubivoje Acimovic noted that "the CBMs regime of the Final Act was a modest, but important initial step on the road toward fostering security in Europe. Some shortcomings in its implementation were of a marginal nature and do not affect the … positive assessment." Four years earlier, Polish analyst Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, highly critical of the Western approach to CBMs, nevertheless argued the "significance" of CSCE CBMs which he described as deriving "from the establishment of a new channel of East-West communication". For the above quotations see, respectively: Henning Wegener "CBMs: European and Global Dimensions", in Larrabee and Stobbe (eds.), *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, p. 166; Ljubivoje Acimovic, "The CSCE Process from a Yugoslav Perspective", in Hanspeter Neuhold (ed.), *CSCE, N+N Perspectives*, The Laxenburg Papers No. 8, December 1987, Vienna: Wilhem Braumüller, pp. 84-85; Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, "CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and Experience", in Larrabee and Stobbe (eds.), Ibid., p. 106. For other positive assessments presenting a variety of reasons, see Mike Bowker and Phil. Williams, "Helsinki and West European Security", *International Affairs* (London), 61: 4, Autumn 1985, p. 615; James E., Goodby, "The Stockholm Conference: Negotiating a Cooperative Security System for Europe", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.), *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 148-150; John J. Maresca, "Helsinki Accord, 1975", in Ibid., p. 120; Darilek, "Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation", p. 83.

[16] Hans Günter Brauch and Gerd Neuwirth (eds.), *Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe II. From Vienna 1990 to Vienna 1992 – Documents*, AFES-PRESS Report No. 28, Mosbach: Peace Research and European Security Studies, 1992, p. 7.

[17] Michael Krepon, *A Handbook of Confidence-building*, p.1.

Surprisingly, despite widespread recognition of the success of the CSCE measures, no one can explain precisely how this has been realised. Indeed, twenty-five years after their introduction on the continent, questions remain as to whether the CSCE CBMs régime served as agent of change contributing to diminishing mistrust and bringing a positive change in security thinking, or if it simply reflected a process of change already under way.[18] Was the application of the initial modest Helsinki measures necessary for the adoption of a second, or third, set of more demanding undertakings?[19] Did they contribute to the 1990 treaty on conventional arms control which had been eluding the parties for most of the later part of the 1970s and the 1980s?[20] To what extent, and in what fashion, did they increase European security, affect or transform the perception of the participating States towards one another, or bring about the drastic changes of the late 1980s?[21] How much of the European experiment, or what precise measures, could be successfully duplicated by other regions?

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[18] As noted by James Macintosh, "It *does* seem implausible … that the CSCE CSBM negotiations single-handedly caused the transformation in European security relations during the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand, it is very difficult to accept that there was *no* positive change in CSCE/OSCE security relations. …. Granting that there was a positive change, it is difficult to argue that the confidence building process played *no* role in facilitating that change." James Macintosh, *Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation View*, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies, No. 2, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996, p. 23. Although Macintosh does not really provide definite answers on the above, his study (highly critical of the current literature which he sees as avoiding taking a hard look at what precisely CBMs have accomplished and how) constitutes the most comprehensive attempt to explain how the development of a confidence building process can contribute to change relations.

[19] Writing in 1987, Heinz Vetschera argued that: "Building confidence requires time. It took a decade to take the step from the first generation of CBMs to the next, and it may have been *inter alia* the positive experience with the CBMs of the Final Act which paved the way for the next generation. Although further developments are desirable in a shorter period of time, negotiations on far-reaching further measures without any experience with the second generation of CBMs at all may not succeed." Heinz Vetschera, "Effects of Basket I: Security and Confidence-Building", in Neuhold (ed.), *CSCE, N+N Perspectives*, p. 122.

[20] According to Michael Krepon, "In the East-West struggle CBMs facilitated the negotiation of formal arms control agreements." Krepon, "The Decade for Confidence-building Measures", p. 2. For Richard Darilek, however, the issue is not as straightforward: "In Europe, a long process of CBM negotiations preceded force reductions. CBM agreements may not, however, inevitably lead to force reductions. While force reductions followed in the European case after two CBM agreements had already been implemented, there is no clear, direct connection between those agreements and the CFE treaty. Force reductions in Europe were far more directly tied to political revolutions in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The Helsinki and Stockholm accords had little to do with these revolutions." Paradoxically, Darilek concludes by noting that "nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine how force reductions in Europe could have somehow preceded CBM agreements in the East-West context." Darilek, "East-West Confidence Building", p. 286.

[21] For a discussion, see Cathleen S. Fisher, "The Preconditions of Confidence Building: Lessons from the European Experience", in Krepon, Newbill, Khoja and Drezin (eds.), *Global Confidence Building. New Tools for Troubled Regions*, pp. 291-312. For the view that CBMs were largely irrelevant in bringing the positive changes of the late 1980s, see James Macintosh, *Confidence and Security Building Measures: A Sceptical Look*, Working Paper No. 85, Canberra: Australian National University Peace Research Centre, July 1990, pp. 24-25.

While definite answers would go a long way in strengthening our understanding of this important security management tool, the purpose of this study on the origins, negotiations and implementation of the CSCE CBMs is much more limited. Its aim is not to seek new theoretical frameworks or draw lessons for other contexts of application, but to present the original practice in a more comprehensive and detailed manner than has been done before using key primary data once only available to a few government officials. More specifically, this thesis focuses on the motivations and objectives of the Western governments for introducing this new type of arrangement in the field of security, assesses their contribution to the negotiations, and reviews the practical record of implementation of the measures up to 1987.

The study

When, on 1 August 1975, thirty-five Heads of State or Government from European nations, the United States and Canada gathered in Helsinki to sign the Final Act of the CSCE, the event was of historical significance. Marking the high point of détente in Europe and the first ever East-West multilateral gathering of this kind in the century, the Summit also concluded three years of difficult negotiations. Composed of what was called "baskets" in Conference parlance, the Final Act defined a set of normative commitments in three main areas of inter-state relations: security; co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment; and human rights and human contacts.

The human rights provisions, included at the request of the West, represented a significant innovation in international relations. For the first time, an international document recognised that respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms were not just a matter of internal policy belonging exclusively to the internal affairs of any given state but were universal concepts impacting individuals in all participating States.

Another aspect of the CSCE, which represented an important innovation in international affairs, was the adoption of CBMs in the military field. Also requested by the West, the measures devised by the Conference were quite simple. The 35 participating States agreed to:

- give prior notification of military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, 21 days or more in advance;
- invite observers to these manoeuvres on a voluntary basis;
- voluntarily give prior notification of smaller military manoeuvres and major troop movements, and;
- promote exchanges among their military personnel.

As defined in the Final Act, the objectives of these measures were threefold:

- eliminate the causes of tension;
- promote confidence and contribute to stability and security, and;
- reduce the danger of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension.[22]

The visible discrepancy between these lofty objectives and the reality of the modest measures actually contained within the Final Act clearly suggested that the enunciation of these goals had more to do with conference rhetoric at a time of détente than with a clear statement of what was to be accomplished with the CBMs. In fact, as this study will examine, the motivations and objectives of the Western governments for introducing CBMs in the Conference had little to do with this somewhat idealised description of what CBMs could or should have accomplished and, in spite of the very real achievements recorded with subsequent régimes, the actual application of the Helsinki CBMs barely started to address the goals set forth for them in the Final Act.

Stated in its most elementary terms, the main hypotheses of this study are that, contrary to popular belief, the 15 NATO member states who proposed the negotiation of CBMs in the CSCE --and who later took credit for their development--[23] had no clear view of what they

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[22] This and all subsequent quotations of the Final Act included in this paper are from CSCE, *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act*, Helsinki, 1975, 61 pages.

[23] Despite the fact that the leading neutral and non-aligned participating States of the CSCE strongly endorsed CBMs throughout the Conference, the Western governments regarded their adoption as being mainly the product of their own initiatives. As noted in a 1976 US government document: "At the insistence of the Western participants the agenda had been greatly expanded to include ... certain limited 'confidence-building measures' in the military domain." Even before the Conference concluded, the British government claimed that the three confidence-building measures under consideration at the Conference were "a Western idea". The view that the CSCE CBMs emerged principally from the efforts of the Western states was also sanctioned by the Council of Europe in 1977: "Some Western democracies took the initiative of adding military measures to the political aspects of the [CSCE]; the so-called confidence-building measures. All other non-Warsaw Pact countries accepted the idea and became active partners in the discussions." Finally, writing in a different context (discussing the introduction of CBMs into the United Nations), German Ambassador Henning Wegener went even further arguing that CBMs had been "the intellectual property ... of a few Western European governments, and, subsequently, of a limited number of experts". For the above quotations see, respectively: *First Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act*, Report submitted to the Committee on International Relations, US Congress, 94th Congress, 2d Session, December 1976, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976, p. 3; Bennett and Hamilton: *The Conference*, p. 226; Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Twenty-Eight Session, 1976-1977, *Documents*, Volume II, Report on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament presented by the Political Affairs Committee, by Mr. De Koster, Rapporteur, 22 April 1976, Document 3768, 1977, Strasbourg, p. 1; and Wegener, "CBMs: European and Global Dimensions", p. 170. For other references giving credit to the West for the CSCE measures, see Ehni, Reinhard W., "Confidence-Building Measures: A Task for Arms Control and Disarmament Policy", *NATO Review*, 28: 3, June

wanted to achieve with the measures, and implementation was not necessarily the success story so often attributed to their application. This thesis argues that the initial objectives of the NATO partners for bringing the measures into the Conference had more to do with intra-alliance disagreement over what issues of European military security should be discussed in this forum than with any genuine interest for the adoption of measures to build confidence or security in Europe. Partly because of strong long-standing misgivings about the Soviet proposal for a Conference, the Western states only reluctantly agreed to consider the idea and slowly began preparations for the event. In this process, the decision to introduce a military content into the deliberations came very late, and CBMs even later, but only as a second "best-choice" that no NATO government was truly committed to. It is a strong contention of this thesis that the absence of genuine interest for CBMs, combined with fears that any measure negotiated in the CSCE framework might negatively impact on the negotiation of similar but more comprehensive measures in the parallel talks on Mutual and Balance Force Reductions (MBFR), was largely responsible for only a modest set of CBMs being proposed by the West and for the failure of the Conference to achieve more comprehensive results in this field. Another important contention of this thesis is that while the outcome of the CSCE in the field of security was the introduction of new procedures regulating the conduct of military activities in Europe, the NATO governments never relied on those procedures to increase their security and the measures never achieved their stated objectives.

The approach chosen to substantiate these hypotheses closely follows the chronology of the CSCE. As the study seeks to reconstruct the origins, the negotiations, and the implementation of the CSCE CBMs from a Western viewpoint, emphasis is placed on the development of the policies of the member states of the Atlantic Alliance.

Significant to the development of the Western approach to negotiating CBMs in the CSCE is the background to the Conference which, from its inception, was always a Communist project. Chapter 1 traces the origins of the CSCE from the first Soviet appeals in 1954 to NATO's first positive reply in April 1969. This period covers only (the first) two of the three different phases of the long Soviet campaign, highlighting the development of the deep-seated Western apprehensions toward a conference that strongly influenced their policies at a later stage.

1980, pp. 24-25; Maresca, "Helsinki Accord, 1975", pp. 110-111; and Bernd A. Goetze, *Security in Europe. A Crisis of Confidence*, New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 70-71 and p. 78.

The chapter also reviews in depth the background of NATO's first reply or "sign of movement" in April 1969. As the analysis emphasises, the development of détente in Europe continuously raised Western public expectations for a furthering thaw in the East-West confrontation, resulting in increased pressure on the NATO countries to abandon their purely negative stance toward the idea. Yet, even if the Western governments felt obliged to be more responsive to the Conference project, this did not mean that they were ready to enter such a gathering soon. At the time, the Allies continued to see the Conference as a one-sided project aimed at undermining the Western Alliance, and the key security preoccupation for them was negotiation of force reductions in Central Europe through which they hoped to diminish domestic pressure for unilateral troop cuts and strengthen their security. Western proposals to start MBFR negotiations, however, were unanswered by the Warsaw Pact, making NATO's "forced" reply on a Conference even more disconcerting for the Allies.

In Chapter 2, the difficulties emanating from the decision to consider the Communist project, despite continuing widespread apprehensions about Soviet intentions, are exposed. From the moment the West indicated readiness to explore potential issues and modalities of negotiations with the East in April 1969, until May 1972 when the NATO countries agreed to proceed to multilateral preparatory discussions for a Conference, the Allies found themselves responding to two competing considerations: on the one hand, trying to satisfy public opinion expecting improvements in East-West relations and, on the other, avoiding a Conference based on the Eastern plan. Throughout this three-year period, the Warsaw Pact nations continuously pushed for an early convening of the Conference, while at NATO every issue related to the project became a source of internal disagreement.

The chapter discusses how, after publicly committing themselves in April 1969 to identifying appropriate subjects for discussions with the East, before deciding on appropriate frameworks or forum for their negotiations, the Allies never managed to devise any comprehensive policy in this regard and experienced great difficulties in reaching consensus on how to move forward toward a process of negotiations. Differences concerning the establishment of pre-conditions for Western participation in a Conference; the pertinence, content, or timing of fresh overtures to the East; the identification of potentially useful subjects of discussions, or the most appropriate forum to start a process of discussion, always found the Allies in disagreement, resulting in the elaboration of only partially supported decisions hastily produced on the eve of the conclusion of a Ministerial Meeting of the Alliance.

In this continuing succession of last-minute compromise formulae, not always fully thought through, the Allies proposed in December 1971 that the CSCE should deal with "certain military aspects of security". As the historical record shows, the decision, taken during a difficult Ministerial Meeting for the member states, was not preceded by any extensive discussions as to why they should argue for introducing "certain military aspects of security" in the CSCE, or what precisely should be pursued under this general heading. The internal discussions at NATO, following the December meeting, disclose that when the Allies made their proposal no specific subject had been identified for consideration. Although a majority of Europeans nations were thinking of certain elements of the MBFR negotiations --negotiations still not accepted by the East-- other member states were completely opposed to the idea and it was only because the Allies found themselves deadlocked that they began to pay attention to confidence-building measures.

Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 cover in turn NATO's discussions and preparations on CBMs for the different phases of the CSCE and the negotiations. Chapter 3 begins after the NATO Ministerial Meeting of May 1972 when the Allies officially agreed to enter into Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) on the Conference, and traces their discussions to the opening of these talks in November of that year.

This period begins with the first consultations in Brussels specifically devoted to the possibility of introducing CBMs into the CSCE and concludes with a decision to present two measures. Throughout this period, European governments still argued for including certain elements of MBFR into the CSCE and, for this reason, only the United States, who strongly opposed the suggestion, submitted a paper on CBMs.

Of significance for the future development of the measures, the paper tabled by the Americans in July 1972 was not a thorough analysis of the subject, but a general discussion of advantages and disadvantages for introducing CBMs into the context of the Conference, accompanied by strong warnings about possible implications for the future negotiations of similar, but more exacting and desirable, measures in MBFR.

NATO's consultations during this crucial six-month period preceding the opening of the MPT indicates that the Allies spent most of this time criticising the US paper with nothing of substance being extensively reviewed or firmly agreed upon. Furthermore, fears that the Soviets might use the negotiation of CBMs in the CSCE to reject similar measures in MBFR led to a general agreement that the measures to be presented should be of a limited character

and not precisely defined. As a result, when the Allies entered the multilateral consultations on the CSCE, they were neither prepared nor willing to push for a thorough development of CBMs. No military or technical studies had been undertaken on any of the proposed measures, and the Allies only had one goal (a negative one): avoid a comprehensive discussion on, and elaboration of, CBMs in order to keep all options open for MBFR.

Chapter 4, which is entirely devoted to the MPT, held in Helsinki from 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973, presents the record of these first multilateral consultations on a CSCE, often considered as the "blue-print" for the entire Conference. After a brief overview of the overall meaning and results of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the analysis concentrates on the development of the negotiations discussing, first, how the NATO, Warsaw Pact and the Neutral and Non-aligned states (the three main groupings represented at the CSCE) entered the talks with completely differing views on the importance of discussing military issues at the Conference and, then, on what topics, if any, should be placed on the agenda. For reasons already discussed in the previous chapter, the proposals of the NATO delegations in the field of security were limited to only two modest confidence-building measures: the notification of major military manoeuvres and movements, and the exchange of observers at manoeuvres.

For the Neutral and Non-aligned states (NNAs), the Conference was seen as an opportunity to obtain a greater say in the "military affairs" of the continent and, in support of that objective, these states wanted a long list of CBMs, arms control and disarmament proposals dealt with by the CSCE, while also requesting that the Conference discuss force reductions.

The approach of the Warsaw Pact nations was fundamentally different from the other two groups. Although initially requesting a "security" conference, Moscow's main objective for a Conference after 1968 was only to obtain a symbolic high-level meeting which would endorse a political document recognising the political and territorial status quo in Europe and Soviet hegemony in its sphere of influence. Accordingly, the Eastern states arrived at Helsinki without any programme of military measures and took the position that none should be introduced in the Conference.

The chapter examines how, with a majority of participating States advocating consideration of a variety of issues in the military field, the Warsaw Pact countries found themselves completely isolated and in a position of weakness because they were the demandeur for the Conference. The analysis emphasises how the strong insistence of the NNAs for a maximum programme of military issues in the Conference eventually forced Moscow to accept

discussions of some CBMs, but that Moscow's reluctant acceptance of the measures only meant the beginning of the discussions because the positions of the parties were far apart. As the study details, months of debate were necessary to produce a compromise whereby, as defined in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations, the Conference was tasked to produce recommendations on both the notification of manoeuvres and on the exchange of observers, but was only requested to study the issue of the notification of movements. Despite the weaker commitment on movements, and a very vague mandate which could have allowed for a comprehensive or restrictive development of the measures at the CSCE, the chapter closes by highlighting that the final outcome of the MPT was a success for the Western states, but that in spite of this important achievement and the certainty that their proposed CBMs would be the focal point of the main negotiations in the field of security, the Allies did not enlarge the scope or nature of their preparations.

Chapter 5 returns to NATO's discussions on CBMs, focusing on the work in Brussels from the opening of the MPT, in November 1972, to the beginning of the Conference itself, in July 1973. Although overlapping and presented after the examination of the multilateral preliminary consultations, the Helsinki discussions had very little impact on the way the Allies conducted their preparations for the Conference. As the record clearly demonstrates, the NATO governments remained committed to having only a minimal development of the measures and did not undertake any study to further their knowledge or understanding of CBMs.

As hastily agreed before the MPT, the Allies believed the only strategy that could ensure that the CSCE discussions on CBMs would be kept simple was to seek comparison of illustrative lists of military activities which would exemplify what each side would be willing to notify. But, as discussed at length in this section, NATO's lack of prior studies on CBMs, and the absence of extensive discussions among Allies, resulted in difficulties developing an agreed package of Western lists. These initial difficulties pointed to the need for a more precise formulation of Western objectives for CBMs, implying much more detailed development and definition of the measures which not all NATO governments were willing to consider.

In addition to the problems in the development of their negotiating strategy, the Allies also began to experience difficulties with their own proposals because, four months into the negotiations, the United States began to raise concerns about the Western proposal for the notification of movements and demanded that it be taken out of the CSCE deliberations and considered only in the framework of the force reductions talks.

As the study of NATO's preparations for the Conference concludes, Alliance preparations throughout this period made no progress and, when entering the CSCE, the West still had no common agreement on many basic aspects of their own proposals.

Chapter 6 reviews, in turn, the three Stages of the CSCE beginning with the discussions of the Foreign Ministers in Helsinki from 3-7 July 1973; followed by the main negotiations held at expert-level in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975, and; concluding with a three-day Summit meeting of the CSCE Heads of State or Government, who signed the Final Act in Helsinki on 1 August 1975. As Stage I and III of the Conference were mainly procedural, the focus of the analysis is on Stage II where the real negotiations took place and where the parties had to give meaning to the decisions reached at the MPT. Despite agreement on the Final Recommendations and the definition of mandates for each agenda item, as soon as the main negotiations opened it immediately became clear that the compromises reached at Helsinki did not satisfy the NNAs and the Warsaw Pact nations.

The chapter traces the evolution of the position of the parties, the proposals and counter-proposals, the bargaining and trade-offs, and the necessary compromises allowing for a final agreement on a document of confidence-building measures. As for the MPT, the negotiating record of the Conference reveals that the Eastern bloc eventually had to accept more than they wanted to, while on the Western side the final results of the CSCE represented another success because they closely reflected their positions. But, as the next chapter explores in detail, this Western "victory" on CBMs can be questioned on a number of grounds.

Chapter 7 returns to several important aspects of the main negotiations focusing on the positions put forward by the West. The analysis reveals that on a number of crucial points the NATO states were equally, if not sometimes, singularly responsible for the meagre results of the Final Act.

The chapter begins by analysing why the only strategy developed at NATO for the negotiation of the notification measures never materialised and how the Western states arrived at the Conference with no agreed lists of military activities in hand and never managed to table one in the Conference room. More substantially, the chapter discusses how concentration on the illustrative lists only served to derail discussions on important aspects of the measures and prevent the development of a comprehensive Alliance policy on CBMs. Indeed, NATO's internal discussions on CBMs during the CSCE revealed many significant disagreements among the Allies which invariably resulted in the adoption of a negotiating

policy requiring only a minimal development of CBMs. Furthermore, as emphasised in this section, NATO's inability to develop and present comprehensive measures also stemmed from the opposition of some member states, especially France and the United States, who only wanted minimal development. As the chapter concludes, the NATO member states initially adopted CBMs only as a second "best- choice" that no one was truly committed to, and the Allies never agreed to develop measures that would be useful from a military point view, seeing them as having primarily political value.

Chapter 8 leaves the negotiations to concentrate on the application of the Helsinki CBMs régime. After a general review of the main provisions of the Final Act's CBMs Document, the study presents a detailed analysis of the implementation record of the measures for the three major groupings represented at the CSCE. General observations on the application of the CBMs divulges an obvious qualitative difference between the participating States, whereby in sharp contrast with the Western and NNAs who gave a liberal interpretation to the CSCE commitments and offered a forthcoming and rather comprehensive implementation of the measures, the pattern of application of the measures by the Warsaw Pact nations remained, throughout the entire period, very poor and of questionable reliance. In addition to an obvious sketchy and selective record of compliance, the Soviet Union openly violated the agreement during the political crisis in Poland in the early 1980s, bringing to light the inadequacies and failure of the régime.

After analysis of the application of the measures, the study reviews the most prominent goals ascribed to CBMs emphasising how the Eastern record of compliance with the régime never allowed for a fulfilment of the objectives set forth for the measures. The chapter closes by discussing how, fully aware of the many loopholes left in the Final Act, the Western states never truly challenged the East for a better record of compliance, preferring instead to argue for a new set of measures with strict provisions.

This thesis concludes that the existing positive outlook on the CSCE CBMs experience is overstated and needs to be further assessed in light of empirical evidence. The widely held belief that the Western governments did all they could to obtain the best out of the CSCE, or that only the Soviets were to blame for the meagre and vague results, is not as definite a case as usually assumed. Similarly, the idea that the implementation of CBMs may have improved trust and confidence between the parties, or increased predictability and stability, is very difficult to reconcile with the important breaches of the Warsaw Pact nations and the final conclusion of the Western countries which was to require measures with strict provisions,

including mandatory on-site inspections.

Notes on Background and Literature

The arguments contained in the body of this study sharply contrast with the vast literature discussing the CSCE CBMs experience. One of the main problems with existing literature is that it is not based on thorough examination of the historical record of the CBMs and, with very few exceptions, offers only a superficial and redundant treatment of the subject matter. In essence, it is common to suggest that because the CBMs were proposed by the West, and the Warsaw Pact nations adamantly opposed them throughout the negotiations, the measures embodied in the Final Act were the best Western negotiators could extract from the negotiations. Similarly, it is common to appraise the implementation of the Helsinki CBMs as a success because, despite weaknesses, they have remained in force for more than a decade and brought a more demanding and valuable set of measures at a later stage.

One reason explaining the superficiality and redundancy in assessments is that most writings on CBMs concentrate on the development of the Helsinki-type of measures to new applications.[24] With this focus in mind, it appears sufficient to relate as way of "background" that the CSCE CBMs were the first of their kind to be negotiated between rival states, and that they were implemented on the continent with the greatest concentration of armaments and forces in the world.

Another factor explaining the lack of attention given to the historical record of the negotiations is that a large section of the literature concentrates on the theoretical underpinnings of the measures.[25] When CBMs came into being in Europe in 1975 there was

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[24] From measures to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the North Pacific region to proposals for implementing maritime-specific CBMs in the Middle East, the variety of new security contexts where CBMs can be applied has attracted enormous interest with a large body of literature on the topic including official publications, reports from international and regional organisations, academic books, articles and pamphlets. For a good example of such work, refer to the work of the Washington-based Henry L. Stimson Center which has devoted many reports and papers to the broad range of application of CBMs world-wide. In addition, the United Nations serials entitled *Disarmament. Topical Papers*, and *Study Series* provide a good sample of such analysis.

[25] Several of the most prominent studies published in this regard have been used and are quoted in Chapter 8 in the section dealing with "the purposes of CBMs." Furthermore in addition to the sources suggested in the note above, which also contain several diversified studies on the concept of confidence-building and the objectives of CBMs, one can mention the excellent study produced by James Macintosh, in which he reviews and assesses the most important work and concludes that most academic literature on CBMs suffers from analytic oversimplification. See James Macintosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*,

no theory of confidence-building. In fact, as already noted, the term itself only entered the diplomatic language at the time of their negotiations.

A third, and, perhaps most important reason explaining why the historical record of the CSCE in general, and the CSCE CBMs in particular, has remained largely under-researched is the absence of substantive work it has generated, even at the time of the negotiations. One explanation for this is due to the nature and the length of the CSCE itself and the fact that apart from Stage I and III of the Conference, which only consisted of official pronouncements and speeches, no official record of the proceedings have been kept or have been published.[26]

When the preliminary talks started in Helsinki in late 1972 expectations were certainly very important for this first ever East-West multilateral encounter, but when the more than 200 delegates withdrew behind closed doors for almost six months of consultations, basically to only produce an agenda which did not even promise the reduction of any single weapon, enthusiasm for the enterprise greatly diminished. Furthermore, even if the presence of some 35 Foreign Ministers for the opening of the Conference offered wide publicity, immediately after the speeches were over, the proceedings again moved behind closed doors, for almost two years, with little filtrating from behind them. Finally, despite the fact that the signing of the Final Act was of historical importance, the event, in the eyes of many, was not to be remembered for its positive contribution to history. On the contrary, in the West, the Final Act was initially greeted with very severe criticism by a wide spectrum of the press who described it as a "deception in 30,000 words", and depicted the overall results of the CSCE as a shameful sell-out to the East, especially because of its provisions recognising the inviolability of frontiers.[27]

In short, the virtues of the CSCE, as we know them today, were not recognised at the time. In fact, as subsequently officially acknowledged, the merits of the Final Act were only recognised a few years after its signature, and only after groups of dissidents in the East brought world-wide attention to it. But, even if more (and more positive) interest was brought to the CSCE, the focus of attention remained primarily on human rights provisions. Although

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Arms Control and Disarmament Studies No. 1, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1985, 136 pages.

[26] See bibliography.

[27] For an interesting review of the reactions of many leading newspapers, commentators, and politicians in the West, see Hugo Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree: The East, the West, the Non-Aligned and the Neutrals at the Pan-European Meeting (CSCE)", *Res Publica*, 18: 1, 1976, especially, pp. 50-57. [Hereafter: Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree"].

confidence-building measures represented the only security issue seriously negotiated at the Conference, the measures were basically a "non-subject" at the start of the CSCE, and with negotiations in this field progressing at an even more excruciatingly slower pace than others, the subject was not conducive to bringing any attention to the measures. As one newspaper commented in May 1974 about the discussion on the notification of manoeuvres: "No one denies that these are basic matters of national interest, but it is still somewhat ridiculous that eight months of talks have led to one 114-word text in which only four words are not bracketed."[28]

This study does not claim to present the comprehensive history of the Helsinki CBMs. However, one of the motivations in undertaking this research has been to fill in an important gap in knowledge and to provide a more empirical analysis than has been previously available.

One of the main difficulties in carrying out this research was the overwhelming amount of documents currently available on CBMs and the CSCE and, ironically also, the paucity or absence of real substance on their introduction and negotiations, as well as (though to a lesser degree) on their implementation. Hence, numerous books and journals were consulted but very few provided any specific data. An exception to this trend are the published records of at least five direct participants to the CSCE negotiations from the United States, Italy, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Germany who, with their diversity of backgrounds and political affiliations, helped provide a good overview of the negotiations from different national perspectives, and very often filling in gaps.[29]

Another important source of information came in the form of books or articles written by government officials involved in the later CSCE negotiations. In this category, one can note the writings of US Ambassador James E. Goodby (first Head of the US Delegation to the

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[28] Alan Tillier, "The Labyrinthine Search for European Security", *International Herald Tribune*, 3 May 1974. [All future references to the *International Herald Tribune* are identified as IHT].

[29] John J. Maresca, *To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975*, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985, 292 pages. [Hereafter: Maresca, To Helsinki]. Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (ed.), *Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki, 1972-1975*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff and Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Genève, 1979, 439 pages. [Hereafter: Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*]. Lev Mendelevich, "Diplomatic Notes on the 1972-1973 Helsinki Multilateral Consultations to Prepare the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe", *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1983, pp. 88-111, and p. 132. [Hereafter: Mendelevich, "Diplomatic Notes"]. Ljubivoje Acimovic, *Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1981, 349 pages. [Hereafter: Acimovic, *Problems of Security*]. Of interest also, numerous articles published by Götz von Groll, a leading member of the West German delegation at the CSCE.

CSCE Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe --CDE); Carl C. Krehbiel (US delegation at the Stockholm CDE); John J. Toogood (Chairman of the NATO caucus on CBMs during the Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting); Bernd Goetze (Canadian delegation to the CSCE at Stockholm); Adam-Daniel Rotfeld (member of the Polish delegation to the CSCE Follow-Up Meetings in Belgrade and Madrid); Rolf Berg (Norwegian delegation at the CDE in Stockholm), and a number of others.[30] In comparison to the first group of authors who reported on the minutia of the CSCE proceedings as they evolved at the time or shortly after, the work of this second group of writers deals primarily with subsequent CSCE negotiations. Yet, the value of their work was of great significance for this study because these authors were involved in negotiations trying to improve the CBMs of the Final Act and had a keen interest in discussing a number of issues related to initial Western policies, including difficulties encountered, weaknesses, or mistakes made in the past.

A third crucial source of informed analysis was found in manuscripts written by academics who had access to their government's diplomatic archives. Here, one can note the comprehensive Canadian studies put together by Michael Spencer, as well as the one from Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann.[31] These authors, who were given unrestricted access to all records of Canada's Department of External Affairs, not only quoted extensively from them but offered a solid analysis based on the wealth of historical data they had found.

Also of great interest and of the highest standard are the numerous writings of Victor-Yves Ghebali who has followed the evolution of CBMs from the very start of the CSCE negotiations, and offered the only "paragraph-by-paragraph" analysis of the Final Act Document on CBMs.[32]

Lastly, for the section dealing with the goals and implementation of the Helsinki CBMs régime, the study has largely benefited from the writings of a number of authors specialising in the field of arms control. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, effective verification of arms

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[30] References to some of their writings can be found in the bibliography.

[31] Robert Spencer (ed.), *Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*, Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984, 440 pages. [Hereafter: Spencer, *Canada and the Conference*]. Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945-1988*, Montréal: McGill University Press, 1992, 663 pages. [Hereafter: Legault and Fortmann: *A Diplomacy of Hope*].

[32] Victor-Yves Ghebali, *Confidence-Building Measures Within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Régimes*, UNIDIR Research Paper, No. 3, New York: United Nations, March 1989, 108 pages. [Hereafter: Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*].

control constituted a major stumbling bloc to agreement. Growing disenchantment with the results of negotiations brought many analysts and practitioners to turn their attention to the potential of Confidence-building Measures, especially with regard to increased openness and transparency in military matters. Many of these writings remain today the most comprehensive attempts at explaining the merits of CBMs,[33] and provided very useful assessments helping form the background of the analysis. In this section also, extensive use has been made of the World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbooks published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which constituted one of the only open sources providing yearly data on the application of the régime.[34]

To palliate the insufficiency of what can be described as a rather thin existing published record of the negotiations of the CBMs, extensive use has been made of primary sources. First, a meticulous review of five leading newspapers from France (Le Monde), the United States (the International Herald Tribune and the New York Times), and from Great Britain (The Times and The Guardian) covering the entire period of the CSCE negotiations (1972-1975) and the previous three years of intense "East-West" dialogue (1969-1972) has been done. To ensure the greatest accuracy, almost without exception no newspaper reporting has been quoted without a parallel confirmation found in at least one other newspaper preferably from a different country. In fact, given the extensive use made of newspaper articles, it should be noted that the full citation is only provided the first time an article is quoted, after which only an abbreviated version is offered.

Another critical primary source of information from which crucial data has been obtained came from the archives of Canada's Department of External Affairs (or DEA) who provided virtually unrestricted access to all of the CSCE files from 1969 to 1979. With almost three years of negotiations and an additional three years of preparations to cover, the tasks of searching through the huge number of daily cables was daunting, though this proved an absolute necessity in providing a wealth of raw information forming the backbone of this analysis. Here, however, certain limitations should be noted. First, as is the case for all national archives, the primary focus of the documents found was on the reporting of implications for the national position, and/or request for instructions on evolving situations.

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[33] For a selected list of the most significant studies, see note 1. For a critical analysis of the concept of CBMs, written during the same period, see Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Control. Management or Reform*, Chatham House Papers 31, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, 102 pages.

[34] Full references are provided in the bibliography.

In this regard, the material emphasised the Canadian position rather than NATO's position which is the focal point of this study. A second limitation which, as in the first case, was certainly not unique to Canada was that the main interest of the Canadian government in the CSCE was not for CBMs. In fact, recognising that the measures were to be implemented on the European continent with lesser implications for Canada, Ottawa felt that it was preferable for its diplomats not to be too pro-active in this field and instructed them likewise. Although these limitations are important to note, they are not related here to suggest that the level or quality of reporting of the Canadian diplomats were affected in any way by these considerations, but simply to point out that, perhaps, in comparison to other areas of greater interest to Canada, less in-depth analysis of CBMs or thorough description of all the positions, moves and counter-moves of other partners and participating States was generated. This being said, it should be noted that Canadian diplomats in Geneva took a keen interest in the negotiations of CBMs, even coming up with important original initiatives of their own when the proceedings were deadlocked. In this sense, Canadian interest for CBMs can by no means be considered as negligible.

Another similar source of crucial information on CBMs that has been of great significance for the completion of this research came from the publication of a selective set of the CSCE archival material of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).[35] The word "selective" is not used here to describe the content of the information (because it is presented "as is"), but the choice made by the editors when putting the volume together, in that only a selection of documents dealing with CBMs have been incorporated. Despite this limitation, the published record of the FCO files has been of immense value especially since Great Britain was the Alliance floor leader on CBMs.

Primary source information on CBMs and the CSCE used to support the analysis also included a wide range of government reports, official speeches, communiqués, Senate Hearings, etc. Because the 1969-1972 East-West "dialogue" on the future Conference was primarily carried out by means of final communiqués of meetings of the political organs of the two military alliances, close scrutiny was given to all policy statements issued at the conclusion of the Ministerial Meetings of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with several excerpts incorporated.

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[35] G. Bennett and K. A. Hamilton (eds.), *The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-75*, Series III: Volume II of Documents on British Policy Overseas, London: The Stationery Office, 1997, 506 pages. [Hereafter: Bennett and Hamilton: *The Conference*].

Similarly, great use has been made of the semi-annual reports on implementation published by the US Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Although the primary interest of the Commission was for human rights,[36] considerable details were provided on the implementation of CBMs, representing one of the few official governmental publications to make such information public.

To complete the study, the author has also conducted several interviews with officials with CBMs responsibilities from the US State Department, the Pentagon, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Rand Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to collect information not available in open sources.[37] Some of these interviews were with serving government officials, and others were retired diplomats. Some were on the record while others were not for attribution. Outside the United States, the author has also benefited from several interviews with the Chairman of the NATO caucus on CBMs during the Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting (who was also involved in the initial CSCE negotiations), as well as a number of more informal discussions with former or current government officials from Germany, Britain and Poland who had in-depth knowledge of the subject or had been directly involved in the CBMs negotiations of the CSCE.

With 15 NATO partners involved in the development of Western policy, 35 participating States taking part in the negotiations, more than three years of preparations, three years of negotiations, and more than a decade of implementation, this study can by no means be considered as a definitive assessment of what has been done or what has been achieved. It is believed, however, to fill a gap in historical knowledge and to provide a more empirically-based treatment of the subject matter than has been done before, especially with regard to the Western contribution to the experience.

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[36] For an interesting discussion of the background to the creation of the Commission and the beginning of its work, see Richard Davy, "The United States", in Nils Andrén and Karl E. Birnbaum (eds.), *Belgrade and Beyond: The CSCE Process in Perspective*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980, pp. 3-5.

[37] See list in the bibliography.

CHAPTER 1

THE ORIGINS OF THE CSCE (1954-1969)

1. INTRODUCTION

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), signed in August 1975, marked the conclusion of the first multilateral East-West negotiations of the century. The gathering, attended by thirty-five Heads of State or Government, was a major diplomatic event. Yet, for many of the officials present at the Summit meeting the event was primarily a relief. Three years of difficult negotiations had been necessary to achieve agreement on the document which, until the very end of the proceedings, often seemed simply out of reach. More significantly, for many participating governments, the conclusion of the negotiations was essentially a great relief for ending many years of apprehensions toward the Conference.

The origins of the CSCE have always been associated with the Soviet Union who, as early as 1954, began promoting the idea of a European Security Conference to discuss post-war problems. For nearly twenty years, with few intervals, convening a conference remained a recurring theme in Moscow's proposals for security in Europe. Despite several formulations, reflecting changing circumstances, the Soviet project always raised fears in the West. For almost 15 years the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance completely refused to consider the conference until, in 1969, they finally agreed to look more favourably at the issue. The changed Western response did not mean, however, a change of opinion because the West continued to have only misgivings about the conference.

To understand Western apprehensions and the reasons why, as NATO was celebrating its twentieth anniversary, the member states felt compelled to consider the Communist proposal, it is essential to review Moscow's initiatives throughout this period. While highlighting Soviet security preoccupations, they also help to understand the development of Western attitudes toward the conference and recreate the context of their decisions. In many ways the origins of the CSCE, which began in the Cold War era, left an indelible impact on Western perceptions of the purpose, nature, and value of the conference, which not only affected the elaboration of Allied policies until the first NATO positive reply in 1969, but even afterwards when the Allies began to develop their positions for negotiations.

2. TRACING THE IDEA

The idea of a large European conference directly emerged from the difficult context of relations developing between the Soviet Union and the West after the Second World War. In the immediate post-war period East-West relations were dominated by the German question. In numerous discussions, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, the "Four Powers" of occupation having responsibility for defeated Germany, failed to reach agreement on a German settlement and on the mutual withdrawal of the troops left there at war's end. Between 1946 and 1949 a series of conferences of the "Big Four", convened to study plans for the demilitarisation, neutralisation and reunification of the country, repeatedly ended in deadlock over disagreements between Moscow and the three Western Allied Powers on every fundamental issue.[1] In May 1949, the three Allied Powers established the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and shortly after gave its first freely elected government, under Chancellor Adenauer, the right to administer its own internal affairs. Before the end of the year, the Soviet Union reacted by establishing the German Democratic Republic (GDR) but without self-determination and remaining under its tight control. Only Berlin (an enclave on the territory of East Germany), remained under Four-Power occupation, but clearly divided between the Eastern zone controlled by the Soviet Union (East Berlin) and the three Western-occupied zones of the Allied Powers (West Berlin).

As differences over occupied Germany steadily degraded relations between the four wartime allies, a series of events deeply alarmed Western leaders over Soviet intentions in Europe. During 1947 and 1948 Moscow consistently tightened its political control over a number of Central and Eastern European countries bringing fears that the Soviet build-up of a monolithic communist bloc would extend westward. The February 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, taking over the last government in Eastern Europe still not fully ruled by Communists, and the illegal Soviet blockade of all land routes leading to West Berlin which started in June that year, dramatically increased Western suspicions of Soviet willingness to find co-operative solutions to post-war problems. The large Soviet military presence in

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[1] For a useful discussion of the different proposals submitted at the Conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Four during this period, see John Van Oudenaren, *Détente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West Since 1953*, London: Duke University Press, 1991, pp. 6-15. [Hereafter: Van Oudenaren, *Détente in Europe*]; Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's*, New York: Dunellen Company, 1970, pp. 22-28. [Hereafter: Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy*]. For an examination of the proposals emphasising the issue of troop withdrawal, see William B. Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction: Issues and Prospects*, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978, pp. 2-6. [Hereafter: Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*].

Europe was also of increasing concern. Unlike the Western countries who had quickly reduced their defence establishments and demobilised their forces after the war, the Soviet Union had maintained its military forces at nearly full wartime strength[2] and was showing little interest in attempting to correct the imbalance with the Western powers.[3]

Reacting to a growing sense of a Soviet threat, Western democracies began to look at ways to strengthen their defence. In March 1948, five Western European countries (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) signed the Brussels Treaty aimed at developing a common defence system against outside aggression. A few months later, the United States and Canada joined the Brussels Treaty signatories in negotiations to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).[4]

Despite the establishment of NATO in April 1949, the Western governments remained apprehensive about Moscow's expansionist policies in Eastern Europe and the large Soviet military presence on the continent and, in June 1950, when the Communist North Koreans invaded South Korea, the event sent shockwaves throughout the West. Fearful that a similar surprise attack could take place in Europe, the NATO partners quickly agreed to increase their military strength and to defend West European territory as far East as possible, including into West Germany.[5]

As originally conceived, the need to strengthen Western defences was to be achieved by the creation of a unified European army with West German contingents.[6] Negotiations between France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and West Germany culminated in May 1952 with the signing of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty. Two years later, however, the French National Assembly remained deadlocked over the question of German rearmament and voted against treaty ratification.

Although ending the ambitious plans for the establishment of a European defence community,

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[2] For different estimates, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970*, London: The John Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 10-11. [Hereafter, Wolfe, *Soviet Power*].
[3] Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, pp. 1-6.
[4] In addition to the North American countries and the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, the participating States in April 1949 were Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany joined in May 1955 and, in 1982, Spain also became a member.
[5] For a summary review of the discussions leading to this decision, see NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989, pp. 36-38. [Hereafter: *NATO: Facts and Figures*].
[6] See Ibid., pp. 15-16.

the collapse of the EDC Treaty in 1954 did not alter Western resolve to secure the contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to the future defence of Western Europe. At a conference held in London at the end of September that year, the Allies[7] expressed their determination to invite the FRG to join the Brussels Treaty Group (subsequently renamed Western European Union), and NATO. These decisions were approved at a meeting in Paris, in October, which concluded with the signing of the so-called "Paris Agreements", also recognising the FRG as a sovereign state.[8]

While the Allies proceeded with relative speed and great determination in building up their defence, the political and military developments taking place in the West were monitored with great concern by the Soviet leadership. Since the end of the war, fear of German resurgence and revanchism dominated Soviet security considerations and, for the Kremlin, the only assurance that Germany would never be able to wage another war was its reunification, neutralisation, and complete demilitarisation. Four-Power agreement on these issues remained elusive and when the West began reconsidering the military status of West Germany, Moscow felt pressured to alter its policy. In a note addressed to the three Western Allied Powers on 10 March 1952 the Kremlin proposed the negotiation of a peace treaty for Germany calling for the neutralisation of the country, but not as before its complete demilitarisation.[9] The proposed treaty suggested that a unified Germany would be allowed to have its own military forces. In return, the unified country would pledge not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against the Soviet Union.[10]

The new Soviet approach to a German settlement was not favourably received in the West. Presented only a few months before the signing of the EDC Treaty, the proposal was immediately discarded as a deliberate attempt to prevent its conclusion and to avert West

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[7] The countries represented were the five Brussels Treaty's signatories, the FRG, Italy, the United States, and Canada.

[8] The Paris Agreements contained some 20 separate documents on the status and character of the Federal Republic of Germany which, in the absence of a peace treaty with the USSR, regularised the relations between the FRG and the three Western powers of occupation and set the conditions for its accession to NATO. For a text of the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty and the Protocol on the forces of the Western European Union, see RIIA, *Documents on International Affairs, 1954,* London: Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 28-32. [Hereafter: RIIA, *Documents, 1954;* All future references to the Royal Institute of International Affairs are identified as RIIA].

[9] For a text, see, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, US, Department of State, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986, pp. 361-364. [Hereafter: *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*].

[10] See Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, pp. 5-6; and Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy,* pp. 23-24.

German rearmament.[11]

Two years later, still facing the prospect of West German rearmament and greater Western military integration, the Soviet leadership opted for another change of strategy whereby new proposals for a German settlement would be accompanied by proposals for the conclusion of a European Treaty of Collective Security to include both Germanies. As presented in 1954 and early 1955, the conclusion of the treaty necessitated convening at least one general European conference. Although very different from what was later presented on the eve of the CSCE in the 1970s, these first appeals for a gathering of European states nevertheless marked the beginning of the long Soviet campaign for convening a large European security conference.

3. THE FIRST SOVIET APPEALS: 1954-1955

The proposal for the negotiation of a "Treaty of Collective Security in Europe" was first introduced at the Four-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Berlin in January-February 1954. As presented by Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister, Viacheslav Molotov, the treaty aimed at bringing all the European states, including the two Germanies, into a common defence. Under its proposed terms, the signatory states would refrain from having recourse to the threat or the use of force and would agree not to participate in any coalition or alliance that would contradict the purposes of the treaty.[12] To implement the treaty's provisions, the Soviets envisaged convening periodic or special conferences and the establishment of a permanent consultative political committee and a military consultative body. More immediately, Molotov argued that the Four Powers should take the initiative for convening a conference to establish the treaty.[13]

This first appeal for a "Conference of European States" received no positive reaction in the West. Introduced in conjunction with a proposal for the negotiation of a peace treaty for Germany calling for the neutralisation of the country,[14] the most basic points of the Soviet proposals were unacceptable to the West. On behalf of the Allied Powers, British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, argued that a reunified Germany should be given full

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[11] See Bennett Kovrig, "European Security in East-West Relations: History of a Diplomatic Encounter", in Robert Spencer (ed.), *Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*, Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1984, p. 6.
[12] For a text, see *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 415-416.
[13] Ibid., p. 414.
[14] Ibid., pp. 411-413.

sovereignty to join future military arrangements and not simply as proposed by the Kremlin that, pending reunification, both East and West Germany could be parties to the Treaty of Collective Security.[15] Equally important to the three Allied Powers, the settlement of the German question required that it be initiated by free elections throughout the country; something the Soviets had completely ignored in their proposals and were not willing to consider.

In short, if Moscow had anticipated that offering West Germany a role in a common European security system would be a successful formula to prevent its integration into Western security arrangements,[16] the West interpreted the offer as an obvious attempt to hold up the ratification of the EDC Treaty, still in progress in signatory states.[17] Furthermore, the fact that the proposed fifty-year security treaty was to be opened only to European nations and relegated the United States to the role of observer suggested that Moscow was also aiming to separate the United States from Europe, thereby leaving the USSR as the predominant power on the continent.

Perhaps realising that its proposed treaty stood little chance in the West if it did not include the full participation of the United States, only two months after the failed Berlin conference, Moscow offered to reconsider American participation. As proposed in a note addressed to the three Western Powers on 31 March 1954,[18] the condition for US participation in the European security treaty was Soviet membership in NATO. Immediately discarded by the Allies as just another ploy to undermine Western security,[19] the proposal was subsequently followed-up, in July, by another Soviet appeal for a conference to be held "in the next few months".[20] In this latest invitation, Moscow noted that it was expanding its proposed treaty by including a provision for the development of trade and other economic relations among its participating states.[21] The theme, which would later become an important aspect of the CSCE negotiations

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[15] Better known as the first "Eden Plan", the proposal for German reunification tabled on 29 January 1954 suggested a five-stage process beginning with free elections throughout the country. For a text, see Ibid., pp. 408-411.

[16] See Wolfe, *Soviet Power*, pp. 74-75; and John G. Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 4. [Hereafter: Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*].

[17] See Michael Palmer, *The Prospects for a European Security Conference*, London: Chatham House, PEP, 1971, p. 9. [Hereafter: Palmer, *The Prospects*].

[18] For a text, see RIIA, *Documents, 1954*, pp. 39-43.

[19] See "Reply of the Three Western Powers, 7 May 1954", in Ibid., pp. 43-46. The response noted that "it [was] unnecessary to emphasize the completely unreal character of such a suggestion."

[20] For Extracts from the Soviet Note (24 July 1954), see Ibid., pp. 46-51.

[21] Ibid.

had no impact on changing Western evaluation of the Communist project, and the Allies continued to ignore the Soviet initiatives.

This was the case with the next Soviet offer made in November 1954 just after the Paris Agreements were signed, but still not ratified.[22] This appeal, addressed to 25 states, called for the immediate convocation of a conference to take place either in Moscow or in Paris. In the West, this renewed attempt at convening a large European conference was seen as "openly and explicitly aimed at delaying or preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements."[23] As noted in the Allied reply, the essential basis for a useful conference did not exist and depended, at least partially, on the clarification of the Soviet position on the question of free elections in Germany.[24] Then, as the reply noted, a wider conference could be envisaged, but not before the ratification of the Paris Agreements.[25]

Undeterred by its failure to gain Western approval, the Soviet Government went ahead with its conference. Attended only by Moscow's closest allies, the conference of eight Communist states, held in Moscow in late November 1954, underscored their disapproval of the Paris Agreements and threatened the adoption of "joint measures in the organisation of their armed forces and commands" if the Agreements were ratified.[26]

In March 1955 the Allies proceeded with ratification of the Paris Agreements, opening the way for the accession of West Germany to NATO on 5 May. Moscow reacted within days by calling another conference which quickly concluded on 14 May with the signing of the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance", the basis for the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).[27] Significantly, as not to close the prospect for a future agreement on a European security system, the treaty stressed that the WTO would cease to be operative from the day a general European treaty of collective security would enter into force.[28]

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[22] The Soviet Note of 13 November 1954 can be found in Ibid., pp. 58-61

[23] US Reply to the Soviet Union (29 November 1954) in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 438-440.

[24] For a text, see RIIA, *Documents, 1954*, pp.61-64.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Text of the "Eight-Power Declaration" (2 December 1954) in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 441-442.

[27] The signatory states were Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the USSR. For a text, see Ibid., pp. 445-448. East Germany joined the Treaty in January 1956.

[28] This point is noted by Lawrence L. Whetten in *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries*, London: Oxford, 1971, p. 67. New archival evidence from

Until the accession of West Germany to NATO, the Western governments had widely interpreted Moscow's objectives for the negotiation of a treaty of collective security and convening a European conference as aiming to prevent the rearmament of the FRG and its integration into Western military arrangements. Failure to achieve these goals, however, did not diminish Soviet interest in a conference. From this point on, with two opposing military alliances on the continent, Soviet security proposals began to emphasise the abolition of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to be replaced by an all-European security system that would be negotiated at a large conference of European states.

4. 1955: MORE OF THE SAME

The new Soviet security proposal was presented to the West at the Summit of the Four-Power Heads of Government held in Geneva in July 1955. The plan, introduced by Soviet Premier, Marshal Bulganin, consisted of a revised general European treaty of collective security, established in two stages.[29] In the first phase, NATO and the Warsaw Pact would negotiate a non-aggression pact and freeze their armed forces at existing levels; in the second phase, the two military alliances would be replaced by the proposed all-European security system.

Like Molotov's proposal presented eighteen months earlier in Berlin, Bulganin's plan foresaw the need for convening regular or special European conferences and the establishment of some consultative machinery to review the implementation of the treaty. Bulganin's proposed treaty also included Molotov's idea of greater economic co-operation between participating states while adding, as a new theme, the expansion of cultural ties.

As for the economic dimension of East-West relations, the issue of closer cultural relations became an important element of the CSCE negotiations but, in the context of the mid-1950s, did not change the attitudes of the Western states toward the Soviet initiatives. Differences

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the former Warsaw Pact nations suggests that the signing of the treaty was "firmly within the context of Khrushchev's effort to bring about a new European security system, dominated by the Soviet Union", and that this new system was to be established by "an all-European security conference from which the United States would be excluded and the agenda of which would be set and controlled by Moscow posing as the main guarantor of European security". See Vojtech Mastny, ""We Are in a Bind' Polish and Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956-1969", Cold War International History Project, Bulletin 11, *Cold War Flashpoints: New Evidence on Warsaw Pact Military Planning*, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 1999. [Hereafter: Mastny, ""We Are in a Bind"", CWIHP, 1999].

[29] The text of the Soviet proposal (20 July 1955) is reproduced in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, US, Department of State, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1960, pp. 481-484. [Hereafter: *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*].

over the German question remained unchanged and clearly entrenched at the core of the East-West discussions. Fearful that the Western proposal for a reunified Germany to have the right join any military grouping would lead to a decision to choose membership in NATO, the Soviets insisted that their proposed security treaty be established before considering the issue of German unification; a sequence of events unacceptable to the three Allied Powers, who insisted that the Soviet proposals could only be considered after German reunification based on free elections.[30] However, in recognition of Moscow's expressed concerns that "a unified Germany, rearmed and exercising its choice to join the NATO alliance would constitute an increased threat" to Soviet security, Sir Anthony Eden (then Prime Minister) presented a second version of his Berlin proposal including the possibility of negotiating a security pact between East and West.[31] In addition, Eden proposed, as "an experiment in arms control", the establishment of a demilitarised zone between East and West, and called for discussion on the number of troops and armaments on each side in Germany and in the neighbouring countries.[32]

Although the Summit concluded without agreement, the Four leaders instructed their Foreign Ministers to further consider the German question, and the following arms control issues:

- a security pact for Europe, or for a part of Europe;
- limitations, control, and inspection of armed forces and armaments and;
- the establishment of a zone between East and West in which the disposition of armed forces would be subject to mutual agreement.[33]

When the Foreign Ministers met to discuss these issues in the fall of 1955, the West presented a more comprehensive version of Eden's plan including a draft "Treaty of Assurance on the Reunification of Germany".[34] As the title implied, the proposed treaty was designed to reassure Moscow against possible aggression once Germany would be reunified and, to this end, incorporated several elements of the Soviet collective security proposal. Elaborating on Eden's earlier arms control proposals, the Western proposed treaty also suggested that "in a zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the Eastern European countries, levels for

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[30] See the "Statement by President Eisenhower" (20 July 1955) in RIIA, *Documents on International Affairs, 1955,* London: Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 34-35. [Hereafter: RIIA, *Documents, 1955*].
[31] Prime Minister Eden's proposals and statements at the Conference can be found, respectively, in *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*, pp. 448-451, and *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,* pp. 478-480.
[32] Eden's statement (18 July 1955), in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Ibid.*
[33] Text of the Geneva Directives to the Foreign Ministers (23 July 1955) in Ibid., pp. 492-494.
[34] Text of the Tripartite Proposal (27 October 1955) in Ibid., pp. 529-532.

armed forces would be specified so as to establish a military balance".[35] In addition, the Allies proposed that in a zone closer to the line of demarcation special restrictions on the deployment of forces and installations could be implemented.[36] Finally, under the heading of "Inspection and Control", the Western draft treaty proposed that the parties could provide information on their armed forces, and that mutual inspections could take place to verify such data and to warn against any preparation for surprise attack.[37]

In spite of the fact that both sides agreed to consider a non-aggression treaty and, as the Soviets had also proposed at the Summit, the creation of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe,[38] no progress could be made on these issues in Geneva. The Soviet Government was adamant that the question of German reunification should be considered after the establishment of a collective security treaty, while the West continued to insist that the main basis for progress was the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections.[39] Another important area of disagreement related to the withdrawal of occupation forces. Previous Soviet proposals had called for withdrawal of occupation forces from Germany only, but in line with Bulganin's Summit proposals, Moscow insisted on the "withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European states and the re-establishment of the situation which existed prior to the Second World War" which, by direct implication, meant the removal of American troops from Europe.[40]

Another revised treaty dealing with the establishment of a European system of collective security, submitted by the Soviet Government, received no positive attention from the Western powers[41] and, whether the Kremlin then realised that any further attempts for establishing such a treaty and convening a conference would be futile, Moscow left aside these topics in the decade following these initial initiatives.[42]

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[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Molotov's statement (31 October 1955), in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,* pp. 532-538.
[39] For a discussion of the different proposals introduced by both sides at the Geneva Summit, see United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Selected Documents Relating to Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1954-77*, Miscellaneous No. 17 (1977), Cmnd. 6932, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, pp. 2-3. [Hereafter: UK, FCO, *Selected Documents*]. See also Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, pp. 5-6; Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 74-75; and Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, pp. 7-10.
[40] As quoted in Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, p. 10.
[41] Text in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,* pp. 532-538.
[42] This point is made by Acimovic in *Problems of Security*, p. 74. Acimovic also notes one exception to this new policy. On 15 July 1958, Moscow proposed the conclusion of a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Among the States of Europe", which included several elements of the conference project it will later advertise from the mid-1960s. See Ibid., pp. 75-76.

5. DISENGAGEMENT, PARTIAL DISARMAMENT, AND EARLY CBMS

While the promotion of a pan-European Conference completely disappeared in the aftermath of the Geneva Summit, one agenda issue of the Foreign Ministers' Conference that received significant attention in the late 1950s related to the question of controlled zones of armaments, or so-called "disengagement" plans. Actively promoted by the Soviet Union, the idea enjoyed great popularity in the West. Among the many prominent Western observers who put forward proposals extending Eden's concept of zonal arms control, one could note Hugh Gaitskell (leader of the British Labour Party), Henry Kissinger, as well as George Kennan, who took up the theme in his famous BBC Reith Lectures.[43] Yet, the proposal which attracted the most attention was put forward by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki. His first plan, introduced at the United Nations in October 1957, called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone encompassing the two Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia.[44]

Immediately challenged by the Western governments because it did not deal with conventional armed forces in the area, Rapacki put forward, the following year, a second version of his plan giving more emphasis to this aspect. However, in spite of a number of revisions in the next few years (including those made by the Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, in 1964), Rapacki's plan was never seriously considered by the Allies. First presented at the time when NATO was introducing American-controlled nuclear weapons in Western Europe to compensate for Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces, the initiative was seen as an attempt to prevent their deployment.[45] Furthermore, another aspect which gave the plan little chance of success was that it involved the recognition of the GDR at a time when the Federal Republic, under Adenauer, not only refused to consider the issue but would not even attend international gatherings where the GDR was represented.

During the same period, though more importantly in the early 1960s, another issue which attracted considerable attention was safeguards against surprise attacks. The Soviets were the first to raise this issue in the context of arms control negotiations. Their comprehensive disarmament plan put forward at the United Nations on 10 May 1955 included provisions for

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[43] The most comprehensive discussion of the many proposals put forward after 1955, along with an excellent summary of the main recommendations, is presented offered by Eugène Hinterhoff in *Disengagement*, London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1959, 445 pages. For another extensive discussion of the issues, see also Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961, 641 pages.

[44] For a discussion of this and subsequent plans, see Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, pp. 7-9.

[45] See for instance, UK, FCO, *Selected Documents*, p. 3.

the establishment of ground control posts to provide information on the troop concentrations and movements that were expected to accompany preparations for a surprise attack. However, the Soviets immediately rejected President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal of July 1955, which called for reciprocal aerial inspection of the United States and the Soviet Union and the exchange of military blueprints between the two countries.

The idea of safeguards against surprise attack was examined again at the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Prevention of Surprise Attack.[46] But the meeting, which lasted just over a month, failed to reach any agreement because of fundamental differences between Eastern and Western participants over adopting inspection measures without any disarmament programme.

Proposals on the issue continued to be introduced in the early 1960s, especially in the context of wide-ranging discussions on General and Complete Disarmament at the United Nations. At the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) in 1962, the United States proposed, amongst other measures, the prior notification of military movements and manoeuvres (seven days in advance), the establishment of mobile ground observation teams, and the exchange of military missions, all considered as suitable means to help reduce war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack.[47] In its amended version of a Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, also presented in 1962, the Soviets argued for the same measures, even proposing the outright prohibition "of substantial joint military movements or manoeuvres of armed forces of two or more States".[48]

However, despite the apparent agreement of the superpowers on most of these measures, the Soviet Union remained unwilling to negotiate these proposals outside the framework of general and complete disarmament.

Soon most of these proposals were left aside, but they remain worth noting because, with the idea of mutual inspections, exchange of information on armed forces and special measures related to the deployment of military forces first discussed at the Geneva Summit, they were the forerunner of the "Confidence-Building Measures" introduced in the CSCE, and of the so-

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[46] The documents of the "Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might be Useful in Preventing Surprise Attack", Geneva, 10 November-18 December 1958, are reproduced in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,* pp. 1213-1319.
[47] The US Working Paper of 12 December 1962 is reproduced in Ibid. pp. 1214-1224.
[48] Text of the *Soviet Proposal (16 July 1962),* in Ibid., pp. 658-659.

called "collateral" or "associated" measures discussed in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.[49] Similarly, proposals for the limitation of forces and armaments not limited only to Germany but also including countries of Central Europe, and the establishment of a military balance in the region (first proposed by Eden but widely discussed afterwards in the 1950s), were themes to be later exploited in the MBFR negotiations.[50]

6. RENEWED INTEREST FOR A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE: 1964-1968

Renewed interest for convening an all-European conference surfaced in December 1964 when Poland, not the Soviet Union, raised the issue at the United Nations. Addressing the General Assembly, the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, noted that "the time [was] ripe for examining the problem of European security in its entirety" emphasising "the advisability of convening for this purpose a conference of all European States."[51]

Unlike the earlier Communist appeals for a conference, the Rapacki proposal was not directly linked to the resolution of the German problem. Although Rapacki's proposal had different characteristics than its Soviet precursors --even welcoming the full participation of the United States-- its reception in the West was not fundamentally different than toward Moscow's appeals nine years earlier. At the time of the Polish initiative, the Atlantic Alliance was considering an American proposal for the establishment of a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) which involved drawing the Federal Republic of Germany closer to NATO's nuclear planning. Because the project was strongly opposed by the Warsaw Pact, the Allies interpreted Rapacki's initiative as a scheme designed to influence the outcome of the MLF negotiations.[52] The fact that the subsequent Eastern call for a conference came out of a meeting of the Warsaw Pact almost entirely devoted to criticising the MLF reinforced that belief. Indeed, the January 1965 meeting of the WTO, which endorsed the Polish proposal, was much more eloquent in its criticism of the American project than in its support of a

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[49] The similarity with the CSCE CBMs is noted in John Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference*, London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, pp. 3-5. [Hereafter: Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*]. See also Jonathan Dean, *Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986, pp. 95-97. [Hereafter: Dean, *Watershed in Europe*].

[50] The similarity with the negotiations on MBFR is noted by Prendergast in *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, pp. 9-10.

[51] Rapacki's Address (14 December 1964) is reproduced in *Documents on Disarmament, 1964,* US, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 523-527. [All future references to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are identified as ACDA].

[52] See Palmer, *The Prospects,* p. 9. Palmer also notes that the initiative was viewed as an attempt to disrupt the Western Alliance and to question the United States presence in Europe.

conference, which was only addressed in one sentence in the final communiqué.[53]

The Pact's obvious lack of enthusiasm for a conference reflected Moscow' similar lack of interest for its own original proposal.[54] However, in early 1966, the Soviet leadership once again fully endorsed the idea of a European conference. In his opening statement to the 23rd Soviet Communist Party Congress in late March that year, Party leader Leonid Brezhnev proposed "to convene an appropriate international conference … to discuss existing proposals … concerning a military détente and the reduction of armaments in Europe".[55] This first indication that Moscow was slowly regaining interest in its previous plan was followed by a much more important proposition formulated on the occasion of the next meeting of the WTO held in Romania in July 1966.

The Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact concluded with the adoption of a long "Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe". Described as absorbing "virtually all the separate concrete proposals on disarmament and security in Europe which had ever been put forward",[56] the Declaration did not offer any ready-made treaty. Rather it introduced an extensive programme of measures in the military, economic, technical and cultural fields, which all member states of NATO, the WTO, as well as countries not participating in any military alliance, could undertake. Specific proposals included:

1) the development of good-neighbourly relations among European nations on the basis of the principles of national independence and national sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and closer economic, technical, scientific and cultural contacts;
2) the simultaneous dissolution of military alliances;
3) the adoption of partial measures leading towards a military relaxation on the European continent, including the dismantling of foreign bases; the withdrawal of all troops from foreign territories to within their national frontiers; a phased reduction of the armed forces of the two Germanies; the creation of nuclear-free zones;
4) the prevention of West Germany's access to nuclear weapons;
5) the recognition of the immutability of existing frontiers, including the Polish frontier on

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[53] The Communiqué issued on 20 January 1965 can be found in Western European Union Assembly, *The proposed European security conference, 1954-1971*, Brief prepared by Mr. E. Nessler (Rapporteur), Paris: General Affairs Committee, Western European Union Assembly, Seventeenth Ordinary Session, December 1971, pp.13-14. [Hereafter: WEU, *The proposed conference*].

[54] See Wolfe, *Soviet Power*, p. 286 note 21. Wolfe notes an earlier mention by Brezhnev during a visit to Poland, in April 1965.

[55] "Brezhnev's Report to the 23rd Party Congress", in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XVIII, No. 12, 13 April 1966, p. 13. For a discussion, see Mojmir Povolny, "The Soviet Union and the European Security Conference", *Orbis*, 18: 1, Spring 1974, pp. 203-204. [Hereafter: Povolny, "The Soviet Union"].

[56] S. Beglov, "Dialogue Goes Ahead", *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1967, p. 45.

the Oder-Niesse line and the frontiers between the two German states, and;

6) the conclusion of a German peace settlement proceeding from the recognition of the fact of the existence of two German states.[57]

The seventh point of the Bucharest programme formally proposed convening a general European conference to discuss questions of "security and co-operation" in Europe. The specific purpose or agenda for such a conference was not clearly defined. However, the statement noted that "the accord reached at the conference could be expressed . . . in the form of an all-European declaration . . . which should be open for all *interested* states to join [emphasis added]."[58] Furthermore, this "all-European declaration" was to provide undertakings by the signatories to settle disputes by peaceful means, to hold consultations and exchange information on questions of mutual interest, and to contribute to the development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations.

Despite the comprehensiveness of the Bucharest Declaration and its relative ambiguity concerning possible North American participation in a conference, which it did not expressly exclude,[59] NATO refused to explore its content. As most Eastern bloc statements of the time, the Declaration began with a virulent attack against NATO, the United States and West Germany; all identified as the main threats to European peace and security. More significantly, many of its provisions were simply not acceptable to the Alliance. From a Western perspective, the dissolution of NATO and the WTO, and "the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries' territories to within their national frontiers" would have no impact on the several bilateral arrangements Moscow had signed with its satellites since the mid-1950s,[60] while the withdrawal of American forces from the continent would contribute to "create a vacuum which the Soviet Union would inevitably fill".[61]

Also, the demand for recognition of the existing borders in Europe and the conclusion of a

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[57] Text in WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 17-19.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Although the Declaration did not exclude any country, it clearly emphasised that the Europeans were able to solve their own problems without any outside interference. For a discussion on the numerous ambiguities included in the policy statement, and how the West interpreted them as an attempt to divide the United States from Europe, see Palmer, *The Prospects*, p. 12; Wolfe, *Soviet Power* Ibid., p. 311; and Wolfgang Klaiber, Laszlo Hadik, Joseph Harned, James Sattler, and Stanislav Wasowski, *Era of Negotiations: European Security and Force Reductions*, Lexington Mass.: Lexington Books for the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1973, p. 26. [Hereafter: Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*].

[60] See Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy*, p. 53, and p. 164 note 20; and Palmer, Ibid., pp. 11-12. Furthermore, new archival evidence from the former Warsaw Pact nations strongly reinforces these earlier assessments. Commenting on the importance of these bilateral agreements, Vojtech Mastny, who has reviewed internal documents of the WTO, suggest that "the added chain of command [of the Warsaw Pact] was largely superfluous". See Mastny, "'We Are in a Bind'", CWIHP, 1999.

[61] Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 40.

peace settlement with Germany that would ratify its permanent division simply contradicted Western policies. After the entry of East Germany into the WTO in January 1956, the Soviet-controlled Eastern bloc had completely abandoned plans for the reunification of Germany, concentrating instead on assuring the viability of the GDR as a separate state. In the West, the Allies remained strongly committed to the reunification of the country and never contemplated recognising East Germany which they considered as an artificial creation of the Soviets, established without self-determination. In March 1966, Adenauer's successor, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, offered to negotiate bilateral non-aggression pacts with the East European countries. The Erhard "Peace Note", however, was not even extended to the GDR, nor did it include recognition of any post-war borders. Discussions on the later issue was another "non-starter" for the West because both the West German government and its NATO partners considered the 1945 Potsdam agreement, compensating Poland with German territory up to the Oder-Niesse line, strictly provisional pending a peace treaty with Germany. From a Western perspective, accepting discussion on the issue of the permanence and legitimacy of borders outside the framework of a final settlement of the German question only amounted to recognition of the division of Europe and to giving up on the reunification of Germany.

Finally, another element of the Bucharest programme which did not escape Western attention was the reference to the development of closer economic ties among the European nations, which was interpreted as having the ultimate motivation of disrupting greater West European economic integration.[62]

As NATO chose to ignore the Bucharest proposals, Moscow redoubled efforts to try to gain support for a conference. In late 1966 and early 1967 the top Soviet leadership actively advocated the idea in several Western European capitals[63] and, in April 1967, another critical appeal was made on the occasion of a Conference of sixteen European Communist and Workers' Parties held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. One of the main purposes of the gathering, attended by leaders of both ruling and non-ruling Communist parties from Western

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[62] Klaiber and others argue that "the Soviet bloc countries object[ed] to the barriers which the West European countries, especially in the Common Market, [had] erected to limit the inflow of agricultural products, traditionally an important component of the bloc's export to the West." Ibid., p. 62. See also Marshall D. Shulman, "A European Security Conference", *Survival* XI: 12 December 1969, pp. 375.

[63] This included appeals by Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in Paris and Ankara in December 1966, and in London in February 1967. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* 1967, London: Keesing's Limited, 1967, pp. 21879-21883. It also included appeals by President Nikolai Podgorny in Vienna in November 1966, and in Rome in January 1967. See, respectively, Wolfe, *Soviet Power*, p. 325 note 47; and *Keesing's*, Ibid., p. 21901.

and Eastern Europe, was to gain "support in every possible way for the proposal for the convening of a conference of European nations".[64] Another important objective of the Karlovy Vary meeting was to seek the abolition of NATO on the eve of its twenty years of existence. As Brezhnev himself told the Conference:

> In weighing the possibilities opened up by evolving events in Europe, we cannot ignore the fact that in two years the governments of the NATO countries will have to decide whether or not NATO is to be extended. In our opinion, it is quite correct that Communists and all progressive forces should try to use this circumstance to develop still more widely the struggle against the preservation of this aggressive bloc.[65]

Like the Bucharest Declaration, the strong anti-Western stance and propagandistic tones of the Karlovy Vary meeting were not conducive to a favourable Western reply. Most of its basic themes were also familiar to the Allies and were believed to be designed to exploit the weakening of American influence on the continent and growing internal difficulties within NATO regarding the future of the Alliance.[66]

Since the beginning of its massive involvement in Vietnam in 1965, the American leadership and future role in Europe were viewed with increasing scepticism by its NATO Allies. The Europeans did not endorse the US policy in Vietnam and, as American troops were being taken out of the old continent to support the war in Asia, Washington's partners felt that the Americans were being distracted by their commitments outside Europe.[67] Defence spending had also become a steadily growing source of irritation between the Western partners, with Washington repeatedly urging the Europeans to do more to reach a more equitable sharing of the burden of resources devoted to Western defence.[68] The mid-1960s also found the Atlantic Alliance facing its most serious challenge since its creation in 1949. In March 1966 French President, Charles de Gaulle, announced his decision to withdraw French forces from NATO's integrated military commands and requested that the headquarters of the Alliance be moved out of France. In parallel to these decisions, de Gaulle was actively engaged in promoting "*détente*, *entente* and *coopération*" on the continent, often questioning the

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[64] For a text of the Karlovy Vary final statement (26 April 1967), see WEU, *The proposed conference*, p. 24.

[65] "Speech by Head of CPSU Delegation Comrade L. I. Brezhnev", *Izvestiia*, 26 April 1967, quoted in Wolfe, *Soviet Power*, p. 326. Wolfe notes that Brezhnev was incorrect in stating that the NATO member states would have to decide on the extension of the Alliance at the time of its twentieth anniversary in April 1969, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization contains no provision requiring a decision on its extension. See Wolfe, Ibid., p. 326 note 54.

[66] Shulman, "A European Security Conference", p. 376.

[67] See Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, p. 15.

[68] For a discussion of the burden sharing issue within NATO, see Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy*, pp. 58-62.

American role in these matters. During a two-week visit to the USSR in June 1966 the French President upheld the view "that the problems of Europe should be considered first of all in a European framework"[69] Although the statement was later qualified as not "denying in any way the vital role which the United States must play in the pacification and transformation of the world",[70] it clearly underscored the serious questioning of American involvement in Europe and the growing strains within the Alliance. De Gaulle's actions also raised fears that at the end of the first initial twenty-year term of the Atlantic Alliance France might withdraw altogether from the organisation.[71]

NATO's internal difficulties provided a good opportunity for Moscow to promote a European conference as an important step toward establishing a new security system for the continent. However, the initiatives that were to have a greater impact on changing the response of the Western governments towards a conference came from the small East European states who, in a series of small steps, began to obtain official Western recognition of the idea.

7. THE INDEPENDENT EASTERN APPEALS

In parallel to the initiatives of the Warsaw Pact, the mid-1960s saw most of the small Eastern European states (apart from the GDR) independently promoting the idea of a conference. In clear contrast to the Pact's endeavours, these national efforts were neither propagandistic nor directed against the West.

From the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and more vigorously after 1964, East-West bilateral contacts had steadily increased and, for the small East European states, these bilateral exchanges held the prospect of many important benefits in a number of fields, especially in commerce and technology where they could benefit greatly from Western co-operation. Interstate co-operation outside the rigid bloc structure of the two military alliances also represented rare occasions for those states to increase their role in European foreign policy and gain greater independence from the Kremlin.[72] As conceived by the small Eastern

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[69] "Text of Soviet-French Declaration on Intent to Collaborate on Leaders in Europe", *New York Times*, July 1, 1966, quoted in Wolfe, *Soviet Power*, p. 290. For other similar statements, see Philippe Devillers, "La sécurité en Europe en 1974", *Défense nationale*, February 1974, p. 42.

[70] De Gaulle's Kremlin's toast of June 20, 1966, Grosser, *Franco-Soviet Relations Today*, pp. 44-45, as quoted in Wolfe, *Soviet Power*, p. 290.

[71] See Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 19. According to Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given..."

[72] For an assessment, see Palmer, *The Prospects*, p. 18 and p. 40.

nations, the promotion of a conference provided further justification to the expansion of their bilateral contacts outside the Warsaw Pact, which could be supported by Moscow.[73]

Of all the Eastern governments who independently engaged in the promotion of a conference in the West, Poland and Hungary were the most active, and Poland's exchanges with Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom proved particularly noteworthy because they returned the first official Western recognition of the Communist proposal. As early as February 1965, the final communiqué issued after a visit of Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki to Belgium stated that the Belgian Government had "taken note of the project."[74] Later in the year, accounts of Polish-British bilateral discussions were noting the interest of the British government in the idea[75] and, in September, the Foreign Minister of Denmark was publicly acknowledging in Warsaw and Prague that a conference would be useful if it was well prepared.[76]

The idea of a pan-European conference was also explored multilaterally in the framework of the so-called "Group of Nine".[77] Composed of representatives from Eastern, Western, and Neutral and Non-aligned European states, this informal grouping had, at its origins in 1965, no known connection with the conference project.[78] It was at the initiative of Romania that eight other small European states of all allegiances (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Sweden and Yugoslavia) were asked to support a United Nations resolution on "Relations Among European States Having Different Social and Political Systems" aimed at promoting co-operation between small states outside the bloc structure.[79] Between 1965 and 1968, the Group of Nine (which subsequently became the "Group of Ten"

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[73] Analyses of Soviet views on this matter vary greatly. For an analysis asserting that Moscow probably encouraged the initiatives of its satellites, see Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 19; and Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, p. 13. For an analysis arguing that the initiatives by the small East Europeans nations were basically independent, see Jeanne Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition: la position des pays de l'Europe de l'Est à l'égard de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe: 1965-1972", *Études internationales*, IV: 1-2, March-June 1973, especially p. 97. [Hereafter: Kirk-Laux, "Divergences ou coalition"]. For an argumentation listing a number of reasons why Moscow probably did not pay any attention to the issue at the time, see Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, pp. 69-71.

[74] Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition", p. 94.

[75] See Ibid.

[76] See Ibid.

[77] For a comprehensive analysis of the origins and the work of the Group, see Jeanne Kirk Laux, "Prélude à la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe: l'expérience du groupe des Neuf comme exemple de diplomatie indépendante des petits États", *Politique étrangère*, 38: 6, 1973, pp. 675-696. [Hereafter: Kirk Laux, "Prélude à la conférence"].

[78] See Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition", p. 99.

[79] For a discussion, see. Kirk Laux, "Prélude à la conférence", pp. 676 –677; and Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 81.

after the Netherlands joined in March 1968) developed a loose association through *ad hoc* consultations between their representatives in different international organisations and by convening annual meetings of their Foreign Ministers in New York after the fall session of the United Nations (1966-1967).[80] The decision to endorse the conference project was reportedly adopted at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in 1966.[81] More specifically, the Nine would have then agreed to use the idea of a conference as a means to justify their co-operative diplomacy[82] claiming, in this regard, that a pan-European conference required intensive preparation both through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic exchanges.[83] But as the Group became increasingly more active and prominent,[84] it was also to be of short duration, and would never really reconvene after the military intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968.[85]

Following the Karlovy Vary meeting of April 1967, Soviet interest for a European conference diminished significantly. Relations within its own bloc were quickly deteriorating and "externally" the Soviet government showed less interest in its own original project.[86] The increased pace of liberalisation and reform introduced in Czechoslovakia, and the continuous problems with Romania, but also Albania and Yugoslavia --the so-called "deviationist" states-- threatened Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Soviet-style communist rule. Moscow's difficulties with its Communist allies were such that they even extended to the conference project. The eighteen months of almost complete silence on the issue, which elapsed between Rapacki's appeal of December 1964 to the WTO's full-fledged endorsement of the idea in Bucharest in July 1966, was due to disagreement among the WTO nations, especially Romania, over the definition of the project.[87] Later on, in Karlovy Vary, neither the Romanians, the Albanians nor the Yugoslavs attended the meeting, thereby directly challenging Moscow's objective to present a unified Communist front in favour of a conference and, significantly for the Kremlin, the abolition of NATO.[88]

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[80] For background, see Kirk-Laux, "Divergences ou coalition", p. 99; and Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 81-82.
[81] See Kirk-Laux, Ibid., p. 99.
[82] See Ibid., p. 91.
[83] For this and other similar statements by members of the Group, see Ibid., p. 99.
[84] For an analysis of the influence of the work of the G-9 on the later definition of the Conference project after 1969, see Ibid. p. 105; and Kirk Laux, "Prélude à la conférence", pp. 684-685.
[85] For background on a last meeting organised in 1969, but without any concrete actions being undertaken, see Kirk Laux, "Prélude à la conférence", pp. 694-695.
[86] For a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet position, see Kirk Laux, Ibid., pp. 689-690; and Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition", p. 103.
[87] See Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 18.
[88] See Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 73; and Povolny, "The Soviet Union", p. 209. On the importance of the meeting for Moscow, see also Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 81-82.

Probably as a sign that Moscow no longer approved the independent diplomacy of its satellites and the work of the Group of Nine, no communiqué was issued after the Group's meeting of Foreign Ministers in October 1967, and limited publicity was given to its activities throughout that year.[89] Another critical indication that Moscow was reconsidering the advisability of calling for a large conference to discuss issues of security and co-operation in Europe, at a time when it experienced increased difficulties within its own bloc, came from the next meeting of the WTO held in Sofia, in March 1968, which failed to mention the conference.[90]

Soviet endorsement of a conference ended almost completely in 1968. In one of the few official statements referring to the project that year, Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, noted in June that the Soviet Union would be ready to enter preliminary discussions "with those governments of European states which understand the need and urgency of co-ordinating and pooling efforts for this purpose."[91] Significantly, and as an indication of the kind of changes Moscow would make to its conference project after the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Gromyko made no mention of the mutual dissolution of the blocs.[92] At the time when the support of troops from other WTO nations proved necessary to help maintain the "gains of communism" in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the military alliances became much less attractive for Moscow. But while this long-standing demand virtually disappeared from Soviet security proposals after 1968, Moscow's aspirations for a large European conference only took on more significance.

8. THE 1969 BUDAPEST APPEAL

The third and most intensive phase of the Soviet diplomatic campaign for a large European conference began only seven months after the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.[93] At a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in Budapest, on 17 March 1969, the Eastern nations called for a meeting of all European states to establish the

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[89] See Kirk-Laux, "Divergence ou coalition", pp. 103-104. For a discussion tracing the difficulties and the demise of the Group, see Kirk Laux, "Prélude à la conférence", pp. 688-695.

[90] This point is made by Povolny in "The Soviet Union", p. 209.

[91] As quoted in Wolfe, *Soviet Power*, p. 332. See also Shulman, "A European Security Conference", p. 377.

[92] This is noted by Wolfe in *Soviet Power*, p. 332. Wolfe further observes that "from mid-1967 on, as Soviet concern over developments in East Europe grew, references to dissolving the opposing alliances had disappeared from Soviet propaganda."

[93] Marshall D. Shulman notes an earlier reference to the conference made by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, on 3 October 1968, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. Shulman, "A European Security Conference", p. 378.

procedures for convening a conference and to determine its agenda.[94]

The Budapest Appeal was much less polemic and much more business-like than previous Pact declarations on the issue.[95] Noting that détente was to be based in great part on the establishment of new relationships in the social and economic sectors among all European countries "irrespective of their social system", the Appeal indicated the possibility of carrying out combined large-scale projects in a number of fields, including power production, transport, environment and health. The statement from Budapest also drastically toned down the familiar demands for the recognition of the European post-war status. The inviolability of the existing frontiers in Central Europe, the division of Germany, the recognition of the German Democratic Republic, and the separate status of West Berlin were presented as simple "preconditions for safeguarding the security of Europe."[96] In the field of security, the Budapest statement was noteworthy because it did not put forward any concrete military or security proposals but simply upheld the validity of the 1966 Bucharest Declaration without naming any of its specific provisions. The statement also did not reiterate the long-standing request for the simultaneous dissolution of the military alliances, but only vaguely suggested that the conference could make it possible "to find ways and means of doing away with the division of Europe into military groupings".[97]

Probably as an attempt to encourage Western support for the proposal, two weeks after the Budapest Appeal the Soviet government privately informed the Americans and the Canadians that it would not object to their participation. On 3 April, in Ottawa, the Soviet Ambassador stressed that it was not a matter for the Soviet Union alone to decide, but that Moscow would (probably) not object.[98] The same day, in Washington, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, delivered a similar message to the US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, also emphasising that the Budapest Appeal had dropped the previous requirement for the dissolution of the bloc system in Europe. As interpreted by Kissinger, however, these changes did not amount to much:

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[94] Text in WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 27-28.
[95] For different assessments of the nature and purpose of the Document emphasising separate sections of the text, see Shulman, "A European Security Conference", pp. 378-379; Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 75; Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 83-84; Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy*, pp. 32-33; Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, pp. 27-28; and Povolny in "The Soviet Union", pp. 210-211.
[96] This point is noted by Povolny in "The Soviet Union", pp. 210.
[97] Text in WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 27-28.
[98] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 36, in Spencer, *Canada and the Conference*.

> I was not prepared to treat the withdrawal of two absurd preconditions as a concession. Writing to the President on April 4, I pointed out that 'anyone who is serious about making progress on European problems knows that we must be a party; we should not make the Soviets think that they are doing us a favor if they agree to such an obvious fact of life.'[99]

As suggested by Kissinger's reaction, the modifications introduced in Moscow's proposal did not impress all the Western governments. Yet, even if most NATO partners believed that the Budapest Appeal was predominantly aimed at easing public opinion after the Prague intervention, or at distracting attention from the Sino-Soviet dispute which had erupted into border clashes at the beginning of the year,[100] they were beginning to feel compelled to answer to the Eastern call for a conference.

9. NATO'S INTEREST IN DÉTENTE: HARMEL AND MBFR

With the development of détente that characterised the mid-1960s, pressure on the NATO governments to be more forthcoming in improving relations with the Warsaw Pact nations had been building for years. Western public opinion expected more progress in East-West relations and, for some Allied governments, this situation had long called for NATO to become more active in the pursuit of détente. As early as 1964 Canada had expressed concern about the "comfortable immobility" of NATO and had "urged that the alliance be used as a forum for dialogue with the East."[101] The following year, probably in recognition that prospective East-West negotiations could no longer simply be ignored, a number of Western leaders began to acknowledge the Communist proposal for a conference, and Western recognition of the proposal continued unabated throughout 1966. In one of the most positive comments, the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, noted that "the sooner a security conference could be held the better, provided the conditions were created in which it stood a good chance of succeeding."[102] Also in 1966, the Danish delegation at NATO organised an informal meeting of Alliance representatives for the sole purpose of gaining their

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[99] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979, p. 414. [Hereafter: Kissinger, *White House Years*].

[100] Among the many references suggesting the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations as a motivating factor for Moscow's renewed appeals for a European conference, see Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree", p. 39; Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy*, p. 32; Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 21 and p. 40; and Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, p. 19. As argued by these analysts, the Soviets were extremely concerned with the developments on their Eastern front and felt the need to "pacify" their relations with the West in case a war would erupt with China.

[101] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 23.

[102] UK, FCO, *Selected Documents*, p. 6. The report notes that Mr. Stewart also suggested that the conference must include Canada and the United States.

support for an East-West conference.[103]

The Danish initiative was examined at the semi-annual meeting of the North Atlantic Council in June 1966, but was not supported by the European partners on the grounds that it was too vague. The proposal was also opposed by the United States, who argued that the Alliance needed to adopt a common policy on East-West relations. By 1966, East-West bilateral contacts had become too numerous to count[104] and, perhaps as a means to find ways to co-ordinate their individual exchanges with the East,[105] the Allies decided to undertake a study on East-West relations. As described in the final communiqué of the meeting, the goal of the study was to examine "the prospects of healthy developments in East-West relations" and should deal with all possible initiatives including European security.[106]

Six months later, at the December Ministerial Meeting, the NATO governments reviewed the recommendations. They confirmed their intention to continue efforts to secure better relations with the East, welcoming, without naming any, the wide range of suggestions made in the report.[107]

Despite this step forward, dissatisfaction continued in Brussels over the Alliance's lack of concrete commitment for a rapprochement toward the East. Some delegations argued that NATO should demonstrate its determination to work towards a European settlement and should "make clear in a public document the interest of individual members and, to the extent possible, of NATO itself, in the improvement of East-West relations."[108]

At the initiative of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, NATO agreed to undertake an analysis of international developments since its inception "to determine the influence of such developments on the Alliance and to identify the tasks which lie before it."[109] The "Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance", completed under Harmel's chairmanship,

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[103] See Kirk Laux, "Prélude à la conférence", p. 689.
[104] Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 19.
[105] This point is made by Lawrence Whetten in relation to the development of the Harmel Report. See Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 73.
[106] Communiqué issued after the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 7-8 June 1966, in NATO, *NATO Final Communiqués, 1949-1974*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, n. d., pp. 170-174. [Hereafter: *NATO Final Communiqués*]. All subsequent references to the communiqués issued at the conclusion of a Ministerial Meeting only include the place and date of the meeting.
[107] Paris, 15-16 December 1966. *NATO Final Communiqués,* pp. 177-184.
[108] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 27.
[109] "The Future Tasks of the Alliance". NATO *Final Communiqués,* pp. 198-202.

defined two main functions: "to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression" and to "search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues [could] be solved."[110] As further suggested in the document, improving East-West relations was to be a paramount task of the Alliance noting, in this regard, that "each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe."[111]

The "Harmel Report" (as it became known) made no reference to a conference, although the subject was deliberated during the drafting process. At the North Atlantic Council meeting held in Luxembourg in June 1967 (i.e. during the completion of the report) the Allies agreed that "the question of a security conference should form part of the Harmel study".[112] At the request of the French and German governments, however, no mention of a conference was made in the final communiqué,[113] and very little transpired from these discussions.

Whatever the conclusions of the Council on the subject, soon after the adoption of the Report in December 1967, the idea of a conference continued to be acknowledged by some Western governments. During a visit to Moscow in January 1968, British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, declared that such a conference "could be valuable, subject to the necessary preparation"[114] and, reportedly, only Soviet unwillingness to say whether the United States would be invited to such a conference had "left the British wary of giving it unqualified endorsement."[115] One month later, discussions in the Dutch Parliament were urging for "more active steps be taken in this direction."[116] Meanwhile, the European Neutral and Non-aligned nations began to demonstrate increased interest for the project, with Austria agreeing "in principle" to the idea of a pan-European conference.[117]

The continuing and growing flow of official public declarations favouring consideration of an East-West conference ensured that the subject would find its way on the agenda of the next North Atlantic Council meeting in Reykjavik in June 1968. According to one account of the

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[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 29.
[113] Ibid.
[114] "Joint Soviet-English Communiqué", *Pravda*, January 25, 1968, quoted in Wolfe, *Soviet Power*, p. 331.
[115] Wolfe, Ibid.
[116] Ibid., p. 332.
[117] See Ibid. Wolfe notes that, like the UK, Austria was displeased with the exclusion of the United States. Another problem in the way of a full endorsement of the conference project was the participation of the GDR because this raised the question of its recognition.

meeting, the Council concluded that caution concerning a European security conference was appropriate."[118] More substantially, the Allies concluded the Reykjavik meeting by inviting the Eastern countries to negotiate Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe; a project very often described later as NATO's counterproposal to the Eastern conference.[119]

10. MBFR

The idea of implementing force reductions in Europe was not new. Since World War II both East and West had made numerous and various proposals. From the mutual withdrawal of forces of occupation in Europe, to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, to Eden's 1955 proposal to create a military balance in the Central Region, the subject had been discussed extensively.[120] In the mid-1960s, however, the Western governments began to demonstrate increased interest for "mutual and *balanced* force reductions" in the Central Front. Paragraph seven of the final communiqué of the December 1966 Ministerial Meeting noted that the Allies hoped "to bring about conditions which could permit a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides."[121] Six months later, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg, the Allies re-stated their interest in the subject by noting that "if conditions permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the East and West could be a significant step toward security in Europe."[122] This was followed, in December 1967, with the pronouncement in the Harmel Report that the Alliance was intensifying its study of arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions.[123] Finally, in Reykjavik in June 1968, the 14 NATO countries participating in the Alliance defence programme declared that "a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated".[124] "To that end", the communiqué noted, the 14 agreed "to make all necessary preparations for discussions on this subject", and to call upon the Warsaw Pact nations to join them in this

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[118] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 31. See also, Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 73.

[119] See, for instance, Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, p. 16; and Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 27. As acknowledged in a 1983 report prepared for the United States Congress: "The West saw its proposal [on MBFR] as a response to Soviet proposals for a European Security Conference". US, House of Representatives, *East-West Troop Reductions in Europe: Is Agreement Possible?*, Report prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C.: G PO, 1983, p. 5.

[120] For a comprehensive review of the post-war proposals on the issue, see Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, pp. 2-12; and Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, pp. 3-15.

[121] Paris, 15-16 December 1966. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 177-184.

[122] Luxembourg, 13-14 June 1967. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 188-192.

[123] Text reproduced in Ibid., pp. 198-202.

[124] "Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions" (Reykjavik, 24-25June 1968) *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 209-210.

process.

Although NATO presented its willingness to discuss force reductions as an indication of goodwill to pursue genuine détente in Europe, few doubted that the Western appeal for negotiation was prompted by growing domestic pressures in many Allied countries.[125] With détente steadily rising, Western public opinion increasingly insisted on a diminution of the military confrontation on the continent, and often blamed their own governments for not doing enough in this regard. Increased inflation also created additional pressures on many Western governments to implement cuts in defence spending. By 1966-1967, no less than five NATO partners (the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, the United Kingdom and West Germany) were announcing or implementing plans for unilateral troop reductions;[126] while in the United States, the debate over the issue was growing ever more serious. The war in Vietnam had created a strong anti-military sentiment and the increased troop commitment to Asia had only created greater pressures on the Johnson Administration to implement substantial force reductions in Europe. In July 1966, Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield, began arguing for a minimum reduction of 75,000 troops and dependents from Western Europe.[127] In August of that year, Mansfield tabled a resolution calling for a "substantial" reduction of US forces permanently stationed in Europe, which he reintroduced in January 1967 as an "Expression of Sense of Senate" and which gained the support of more than forty Senators.[128] A few months later, unilateral troop reductions had become the subject of protracted hearings by a special Senate Committee.[129]

The prevailing view in the Johnson Administration was that a massive American unilateral force withdrawal from Europe would leave the Soviet Union in a preponderant military position on the continent and would destabilise Western security. Another fear of the US Administration was that a unilateral withdrawal would diminish the credibility of the

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[125] The origins of the MBFR talks have been well documented. For a good accounting of the developments at the time, including a discussion of Western motivations for proposing the talks, see Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction,* pp. 13-17; Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, especially, pp. 13-15; Dean, *Watershed in Europe*, pp. 99-103; and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985, especially pp. 114-116 and pp. 479-480. [Hereafter: Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*]. See also the views of Henry Kissinger in *White House Years*, especially pp. 399- 402.

[126] See Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, p. 16; and Dean, *Watershed in Europe*, p. 100.

[127] See Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, p. 14.

[128] Ibid.

[129] For a good review of the debate in the Senate over the Mansfield resolutions, see Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, especially, pp. 13-15, and Prendergast, *Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction*, p. 17.

American commitment to European defence and, as a result, Allies' confidence in it, possibly leading to a diminished American *droit de regard* on European affairs.[130] The idea of "negotiating" troop reductions (as opposed to simple unilateral withdrawal) was seen as a useful, if not only, means to halt or reverse support for unilateral cuts. The main assumption supporting this view was that Congress would be reluctant to endorse unilateral moves on reductions if the United States and NATO were engaged in negotiations with the Warsaw Pact that could result in reciprocal reductions.[131] Negotiations with the East could help satisfy an increasingly hostile public opinion towards military spending and troop commitments without negatively affecting Alliance cohesion.[132] For the European Allies, fearing the consequences of a massive unilateral US withdrawal from the continent and the pressure such a move could place on them to fill in the gap, negotiations on force reductions also became an interesting proposition.[133]

Whereas one of the primary motivations in launching the Reykjavik appeal may have been to undercut support for unilateral troop reductions, the initiative had the additional benefit of helping "counter the vague but seductive proposals of the WTO for a security conference".[134] Critics of the MBFR talks claimed that the 14 members of NATO's integrated command who proposed force reductions had no illusions about the response the appeal would have in the East because they anticipated a refusal.[135] The MBFR initiative, according to them, allowed the West to register a tactical gain by "cornering" the Warsaw Pact nations into a refusal, while providing a demonstration of Western willingness to disarm.[136]

How much the Reykjavik proposal for negotiations on force reductions reflected a desire to prove that the Western states were also preoccupied with the security of Europe and that, like the East, they could come up with proposals of their own on the matter is difficult to judge. Certainly, the increasing number of Western public acknowledgements of the Communist conference project suggested that several Allied governments were beginning to feel

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[130] See Jean Klein, *Sécurité et désarmemen en Europe*, Paris: Economica for l'Institut français des relations internationales, 1987, p. 59. [Hereafter: Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*].
[131] Henry Kissinger makes this point in *White House Years*, p. 400.
[132] See Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 59.
[133] See Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 400.
[134] See Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 31.
[135] See Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 60.
[136] Ibid. Klein claims that the French representative at NATO warned the Allies about the consequences of such a move, stressing that it was not desirable that the NATO countries attempt to give the impression of making a positive overture towards the East only to be able to better denounce their subsequent refusal. See also Michel Vincineau, "La position belge sur la sécurité européenne", *Politique étrangère*, 37: 6, 1972, pp. 746. [Hereafter, Vincineau, "La position belge"].

compelled to be more receptive to the Eastern appeals and, according to Henry Kissinger, domestic pressure on Western governments to ease their opposition to a conference was already evident by the end of 1967.[137]

Suggestions that the Reykjavik signal was motivated, at least partially, by tactical objectives as a means to divert attention from the conference is also supported by the fact that not all governments fully endorsed the initiative. The studies on force reductions undertaken at NATO following the recommendations of the Harmel Report were not completed at the time of the Reykjavik meeting, and several Western governments were wary of the appropriateness of launching an appeal for negotiations at a time when the implications of reductions were not fully known.[138] Furthermore, as noted by the MBFR critics, there were a number of reasons why Moscow could be expected to refuse any offer to open negotiation on the subject.[139] First, the Soviet Union depended on its massive military presence in Eastern Europe to ensure that governments favourable to the Kremlin could remain in power and, therefore, it was impossible to conceive of any reason why the Soviets would accept a diminished military presence and risk losing their hegemony in the region. Second, if the Soviet Union was also aiming to increase its military superiority over the West, as many Western analysts believed at the time, then why would Moscow accept negotiations on force reductions while the West was engaged in unilateral disarmament?

If Moscow had no predisposition or motivation for negotiations, there were additional inherent problems in the Western idea for "balanced" reductions. One difficulty was that the Warsaw Pact had many more numerous troops along the Central Front than NATO and, as Henry Kissinger explained, "its initial advantage would grow rapidly once mobilization began, particularly because of the proximity of Soviet divisions in European Russia."[140] If equal reductions were to be applied with both East and West reducing proportionally, the Allies would only find themselves in worse conditions because the US forces would withdraw across the Atlantic Ocean, while Russian forces could simply be re-deployed to the Western districts of the USSR, in close geographical proximity to the Central Region. Hence, from a Western perspective, the only "safe" or advantageous negotiating formula, that could eventually be presented to the East, was that of asymmetrical reductions, which meant that the

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[137] See Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 413.
[138] See Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, pp. 110-111.
[139] The following two arguments were noted by Michael Palmer as early as 1971. See Palmer, *The Prospects*, pp. 21-22.
[140] Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 947-948.

East would have to reduce a larger number of troops than NATO. Such a negotiating position had not yet been agreed upon at NATO when the Allies launched the Reykjavik appeal, but the fact that Western military planners were strongly convinced of the Pact's numerical superiority in the region certainly did not augur well for any reduction scenario that the Pact might find attractive or ever agree to consider.[141]

Another important weakness of the Western position was that France strongly opposed the idea. For the French government, then deeply involved in promoting a European policy of "*détente, entente* and *coopération*" based on the rejection of the bloc structure in Europe, any negotiations between military alliances could only contribute to perpetuate the division of Europe. Another concern of the French government was that any alliance-to-alliance negotiations would be led by the superpowers and that they would not pay sufficient attention to the interests of the other states. Finally, the fact that French troops stationed in Germany could be limited by an international agreement with the Soviet Union also created difficulties for Paris who wanted to preserve the right to increase its stationed forces there, if necessary.[142] As clearly demonstrated by its refusal to sign the Reykjavik appeal, Paris would not associate itself with any subsequent decisions on the matter and would not hesitate to continuously break NATO's unity on this issue.

Taken together, the above considerations certainly raised doubts about the uniqueness of purpose behind the Reykjavik signal.[143] But while it is clear that the Allies attached great

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[141] At the time of the Western Reykjavik signal for negotiation on troop reductions in June 1968, internal studies on the issue were only beginning at NATO. As noted by Garthoff, the studies made in Brussels in 1968-1969 were "predicated on proportional reductions" but they "were not accepted by the Alliance as a basis for later NATO negotiating positions". Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, p. 481. Furthermore, as explained by Jonathan Dean, the key word "balanced" which was used by the Alliance as early as June 1967 "represented an early NATO determination to try to achieve parity with the Pact in arms control negotiations and not to sign any agreement with the Warsaw Pact that would contractualize in treaty form any Warsaw Pact numerical advantage. Put another way, it represented NATO's determination, understandable given NATO's conviction that the Warsaw Pact had numerical superiority in men and weapons, to make the arsaw Pact give more than they received in any agreed troop reductions." Dean, *Watershed in Europe*, p. 100.

[142] For background on the French opposition to MBFR, see Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, pp. 59-60; Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 41; and Dean, *Watershed in Europe*, pp. 105-106.

[143] As argued by a high-level US official in 1973: "NATO countries, but principally the United States initially, advocated force reduction talks for two negative reasons. First, their insistence on MBFR talks before an ESC [European Security Conference] served to brake the Soviet conference proposal. Second, and very importantly, the imminence of negotiations was intended to forestall U.S. critics who called for unilateral troop withdrawals". Benjamin S. Rosenthal, "America's Move", *Foreign Affairs*, 51: 2, January 1973, p. 383. Rosenthal was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, who held Hearings on the Conference on European Security in 1972.

importance to providing a counter-proposal to the Communist conference project and probably hoped to derail it, this did not change the fact that many Western governments were still under pressure to provide some sort of a "measured response" to the Eastern overtures. After Western indignation over the military intervention in Czechoslovakia began to subside, and only one month after the conciliatory Budapest Appeal, NATO provided its first "official" reply.

11. NATO'S FIRST REPLY: NOT ACCEPTING, NOT REJECTING

On 10-11 April 1969 the Allies met in Ministerial Meeting in Washington to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Alliance. According to Henry Kissinger, his recommendation to President Nixon on the eve of the meeting was that "to turn down the Soviet overture completely would leave us isolated within NATO".[144] Kissinger remarked that "the apparent conciliatory Soviet tone [had] evoked enormous eagerness within the Alliance",[145] whereas the Italians, Germans, British and French all favoured consideration of the project.[146] Kissinger noted that:

> While visiting Washington for Eisenhower's funeral, Mariano Rumor, then Italian Prime Minister, told Nixon that despite the propagandistic intent of the Soviet proposals the Italian political situation required a forthcoming response . . . . [German Foreign Minister] Brandt favored a European Security Conference for the strange reason that it would legitimize the American presence in Europe. [French Prime Minister] Pompidou embraced it as a means of avoiding separate German overtures toward the East and absorbing them in a multilateral framework. British leaders advocated it as a means to transcend the Cold War.[147]

As Kissinger suggested, most US NATO partners displayed a more favourable attitude toward the Eastern initiative than Washington but this did not mean that they were ready to accept the Communist conference proposal "as is", or to enter into any such type of gathering in the immediate future. There was, in fact, varying degrees of enthusiasm for the idea, and even at national levels the positions were not always clear or unified.[148] The Germans, for

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[144] Kissinger, *White House Years,* pp. 414-415.
[145] Ibid., p. 414.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.
[148] For a useful discussion of the views of several NATO partners, prior to 1971. See Palmer, *The Prospects*, pp. 35-39. For the positions of Italy, Canada, Belgium, France, and the FRG at the time of the NATO Washington Ministerial Meeting, see "M. Brandt: l'appel de Budapest ne doit pas être rejeté 'à priori'", *Le Monde*, 12 April 1969; and "M. Debré; la détente n'est pas un voeu pieux mais une idée politique sérieuse", *Le Monde*, 12 April 1969. On Italy arguing for a positive initiative to be undertaken towards the East, see "L'Organisation atlantique va s'engager prudemment vers la préparation des négociations avec l'Est", *Le Monde*, 13-14 April 1969. For an official assessment of

instance, were divided over the issue and sent mixed signals.[149] In Washington, Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, argued that the Budapest Appeal demonstrated a change of tactics on the part of the Soviets and that the underlying motivations should be explored, while the idea of a conference should not be discarded "*a priori*".[150] In Bonn, at the same time, Chancellor Kiesenger was publicly criticising the Budapest Appeal as just another attempt by the socialist countries to gain the recognition of the GDR and Western acceptance of the *status quo* in Central Europe.[151] Furthermore, Brandt's endorsement of the conference idea was far from unconditional. Addressing the Bundestag a few days after the Washington meeting, Brandt argued that four points were essential for a successful conference: it should be adequately prepared; include North American participation; present reasonable prospects for success, and; no pre-conditions, such as the recognition of the GDR or territorial borders, should be attached.[152] Additionally, while in Washington, Brandt had also contended that convening a conference would require improvements between the two parts of Germany.[153]

In France, still under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle at the time of the Washington meeting, the position on a large East-West conference was also far from being one of unconditional support. In line with Gaullist's views on how détente should unfold in Europe, France favoured state-to-state relations and privileged bilateral contacts over multilateralism. Hence, under de Gaulle, France was rather cool to the idea of a conference.[154] Although publicly not opposed in principle, the French government had stressed that the proposition was premature so soon after the events of Czechoslovakia.[155] Furthermore, like Bonn, Paris

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the views of the NATO countries three years later, in April 1972, see Benneth and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 40-43.

[149] On the differences in the Grand Coalition, see "Bonn entre deux politiques étrangères", *Le Monde*, 12 April 1969. See also Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 76.

[150] Ibid.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

[153] See Willy Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975*, London: Collins, 1978, p. 187. [Hereafter: Brandt, *People and Politics*].

[154] See Pierre Hassner, "The Politics of Western Europe and East-West Relations", in Nils Andrén and Karl E. Birnbaum (ed.), *Beyond Détente: Prospects for East-West Co-operation and Security in Europe*, East-West Perspectives 3, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1976, p. 30. Even after Prime Minister Georges Pompidou replaced Charles de Gaulle as President after April 1969, his initial reaction to the project was less than enthusiastic. According to André Fontaine, the French were rather annoyed to see their policy of "*détente*, *entente* and *coopération*" advocated by other nations and Pompidou himself did not display any enthusiasm for a conference. See André Fontaine, "Détente-Entente-Coopération", in Frans A. Alting von Geusau (ed.), *Uncertain Détente*, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979, p. 33.

[155] See Daniel Colard, "La Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe: ses origines et la position du Gouvernement français", *Chronique de politique étrangère*, 26: 5, September 1973, pp. 543-544. [Hereafter: Colard, "La Conférence"].

also argued that numerous obstacles would have to be surmounted before a conference could take place and that it would have to be carefully prepared.[156] In the meantime, as the French maintained in Washington, bilateral East-West contacts remained the best way to proceed forward.[157]

The attitude of the smaller NATO countries was in general quite supportive, but not without reservations or apprehensions. Canada, for example, went into the Washington session determined to press "the case for a positive Western response."[158] As argued by its Foreign Minister, Mitchell Sharp, "we shall know to what extent the Warsaw Pact interest is genuine only if we are prepared to explore thoroughly the intent behind their recent declaration."[159] This position, however, did not imply acceptance of the WTO proposal. Indeed, if Ottawa suggested that a "measured response" would be appropriate,[160] the Canadian government was well aware that any Western initiative or sign of movement on the issue would deprive Moscow of a propaganda advantage.[161] In this regard, an important motivating factor behind the positive attitude of Canada with respect to a conference was that the initiative for the development of East-West contacts should not be left to the Eastern states alone.[162] As noted in Ottawa's instructions sent to its NATO Mission one month after the April Ministerial Meeting, it was imperative that it not be assumed that the conference was necessarily undesirable, in principle, to the Western countries.[163]

In varying degrees, this consideration was also a predominant factor explaining the "positive" position of the other NATO partners. Only the United States took a clearly negative attitude towards the idea of a conference considering that "the net result" of such a gathering "would tend to set back prospects for an eventual resolution of European issues."[164] Yet, as Kissinger himself acknowledged on the eve of the Washington Ministerial Meeting, the majority in NATO believed that the Alliance could no longer simply refuse to examine the issue. Accordingly, the April 1969 Ministerial Meeting concluded by providing the first Allied reply to the long-standing Eastern proposal. As noted in the meeting's final communiqué:

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[156] See "M. Debré…", *Le Monde*, 12 April 1969.
[157] See Ibid.
[158] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 37.
[159] As quoted in Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 37
[160] See Ibid., p. 36.
[161] Ibid., p. 41.
[162] Ibid., p. 37 and p. 41.
[163] As quoted in Spencer, Ibid., p. 40.
[164] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 415.

> The Allies propose, while remaining in close consultation, to explore with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution. Consequently, they instructed the Council to draft a list of these issues and to study how a useful process of negotiation could best be initiated, in due course, and to draw up a report for the next meeting of Ministers. It is clear that any negotiations must be well prepared in advance, and that all Governments whose participation would be necessary to achieve a political settlement in Europe should take part.[165]

As implied in the first Western response, which made no reference to a conference, the Allies believed that it was imperative to first determine which specific issues would be useful to discuss with the East before deciding on the type of forum that would be most appropriate for their negotiations. The cautious response clearly underscored that even if many Western governments were pressured by domestic public opinion to improve their dialogue and relations with the East, they were not willing to start a conference anytime soon. If helping to gain time, the Alliance commitment from Washington to start looking at possible subjects of discussions nevertheless opened the dialogue with the East which, in the following three years, was to be pursued through a regular exchange of communiqués and declarations issued, almost clockwise, every six-months at the conclusion of Ministerial Meetings of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

12. CONCLUSION

By the time the Western governments provided their first sign of movement on the Soviet project for a conference, fifteen years had elapsed since the issue first appeared on Moscow's agenda of European security proposals. Throughout this period the West only accumulated misgivings for the project.

The first wave of Soviet appeals of the mid-1950s has always been interpreted as attempts to prevent the rearmament of West Germany and its integration into NATO and, after failing on both those counts, to seek the abolition of the Atlantic Alliance. In the mid-1960s, when the Eastern states renewed their interest in a European conference, the aims of the initiatives were not interpreted much differently. At the time, the Soviet campaign was believed to be seeking the division of the NATO partners, to gain the elimination of the political and military presence of the United States from the continent, to achieve the abolition of the Atlantic Alliance, and to pressure the FRG to accept the post-war borders.

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[165] Washington, 10-11 April 1969. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 218-221.

Throughout both these periods, a prevailing goal ascribed to the Soviet initiatives was the establishment of a European system of collective security. In spite of varying formulations over the years, and even if more formally and forcefully pursued in the mid-1950s when it was presented in the form of a treaty, the idea had consistently raised apprehensions in the West, where the aims and consequences of such a system were feared to be "the political, military, and economic domination of the Soviet Union in Europe."[166] Not surprisingly, Western reaction, for more than a decade, had been to simply ignore the appeals for a conference. But, as Henry Kissinger commented on the long Soviet campaign for its initiative:

> Soviet diplomacy has one great asset. It is extraordinarily persevering; it substitutes persistence for imagination. It has no domestic pressures impelling it constantly to put forward new ideas to break deadlocks. It is not accused of rigidity if it advances variations of the same proposals year after year. . . . Like drops of water on a stone, Soviet repetitiveness has the tendency sooner or later to erode the resistance of the restless democracies."[167]

Probably more than Soviet perseverance, it was the development of détente and strong public expectations in the West for a further warming-up of East-West relations that eventually forced the NATO partners to change their response. As acknowledged in an internal document of the British Foreign Office in early 1972:

> Unpalatable though it may be to have to admit it, Western countries have had to accept [the Conference] largely because of domestic political pressure: they have had, in effect, to accept the Soviet thesis that support for a Conference [was] the only acceptable evidence of willingness to work for *détente*.[168]

But while the Western governments had to yield to the demand of their public constituencies, they continued to only have apprehensions for the project and some, especially the United States, were strongly opposed to it. Although recognising signs of progress in the offer made from Budapest in March 1969, most governments believed that the first initiative for a conference after the military intervention in Czechoslovakia was a scheme predominantly aimed at restoring the image of the Soviet Union as a peace-loving nation. The fact that all military aspects, along with the dissolution of the bloc system, had basically disappeared from the proposal went largely unnoticed at the time. For Western officials, the conference proposed by the Soviets continued to be seen as a "security" conference with a primary goal of establishing a new European security system based on the dissolution of the military

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[166] Palmer, *The Prospects*, p. 23.
[167] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 413.
[168] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 4.

alliances, especially NATO.

In the immediate aftermath of the Washington reply, the situation was particularly disconcerting for the Western governments because the key security issue for them was force reductions, and the Eastern states had paid no attention to their appeals for negotiations. Furthermore, while the West was forced to start recognising the possibility of a conference, they did not believe that the Soviet Union was really interested in true negotiations that could help solve outstanding East-West problems. Hence, from the moment the Western governments publicly committed themselves to look at possible issues for discussions with the East, they were facing competing considerations. On the one hand, to continue to try to satisfy public opinion by making progress on the issue; on the other, avoid being dragged into a conference on the basis of the Communist proposal.

CHAPTER 2

CSCE, MBFR, AND THE EMERGENCE OF CBMS (1969-1972)

1. INTRODUCTION

When the NATO member states provided their first positive signal on the Communist conference, the Allies only knew that they could no longer simply discard the proposal. Indeed, if they all agreed that the project, as presented by the Warsaw Pact, was unacceptable, and that anything else would be better than the proposed Communist scheme, they had no strategy on how prospective talks should unfold. Divided over the appropriateness of the reply from Washington, and with those having supported it having done so only to satisfy public opinion, the Alliance had no plan on how to move forward. The NATO policy statement of April 1969 suggesting that the Allies would first look at subjects before considering forums could certainly help to gain time, but the Western governments had no alternative framework to propose, no subject to put forward, nor was there any commonality of views on possible objectives or desirable outcomes. Agreement on all these aspects --forum, topics and even conditions that would justify moving further down the road of negotiations-- created enormous difficulties for the NATO member states who, in the following three years leading to the opening of preliminary consultations on the CSCE, in November 1972, were continuously challenged by the East to start the conference.

Throughout this period, the Allies constantly struggled to reach common policies. In this process, the West proposed, in December 1971, that the conference should consider military issues. Despite the fact that the move was made more than two years after NATO began its examination of potential subjects of discussion at a conference, the issue immediately developed into the most difficult aspect of NATO's preparations for the CSCE, which was only to be resolved by a decision to sponsor the introduction of confidence-building measures in the conference.

2. FIRST SIGN OF MOVEMENT

The Allied reply from Washington, in April 1969, only noted the readiness of the Western governments "to explore which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiation and an early resolution", and only committed them to draft a list of these issues in time for the

next Ministerial Meeting scheduled for December.[1] The statement, meant to signal that the Allies would only be willing to advance with great caution on the issue via some step-by-step approach was, however, immediately misinterpreted.

Two weeks after the Washington meeting, the Finnish government took the issue of a conference a step further. On 5 May, following a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Nordic countries, Finland distributed a memorandum to all governments concerned including the FRG, the GDR, Canada and the United States, offering to host a conference on European security matters.[2] The initiative, apparently motivated by the fact that Finland had interpreted "the attitude of the NATO countries as indicating that the West was now prepared in principle to join a security conference"[3] was not warmly welcomed in the West. In the United States, in particular, the Administration was concerned that it "had created a presumption that the conference would in fact take place."[4]

For the East, however, the Finnish memorandum presented an excellent opportunity to push the conference project forward. At a meeting of the Warsaw Pact, held in Prague on 31 October 1969, the Eastern states welcomed the positive reception of their proposal "on the part of the majority of European States", noting that their governments had given a positive reply to the Finnish initiative.[5] More substantively, the WTO meeting formulated, for the first time, two specific agenda items for a conference:

1. the creation of security in Europe and the renunciation of the use of force and the threat of force between European States, and;
2. the expansion of commercial, economic, technical and scientific relations based on the principle of equal rights.[6]

Particularly noteworthy, the communiqué made no reference to any specific military measures, confirming that the Kremlin had abandoned all immediate aspirations to make the large gathering of European states a "security" conference which could be used as an instrument to establish a system of collective security in Europe, based on the dissolution of the military blocs. Moscow's most immediate concern in late 1969 was the quick preparation

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[1] Washington, 10-11 April 1969. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 218-221.
[2] For a text of Finnish Memorandum (5 May 1969), see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 30-31. For a discussion, see Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 85.
[3] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, pp. 5-6.
[4] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 40.
[5] For a text, see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 31-33.
[6] For a text of the Communiqué (31 October 1969), see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 31-33.

of such a conference. In this regard, the Prague meeting revealed a sense of urgency on the part of the Eastern bloc by noting that the WTO nations were "ready to examine any other proposals which serve the preparation … of the all-European conference", and emphasising that a conference could be held in Helsinki in the first half of 1970.

Eastern impatience for holding a conference within a few months did little to change the views of the NATO states who were barely beginning their consultations on this issue in Brussels.

3. NATO'S PREPARATIONS: SUBJECTS BEFORE FORUMS

In line with the instructions of the Washington April Ministerial session requesting that a report be prepared for the December meeting of the Alliance, the US State Department immediately initiated work on a list of potential issues for negotiation.[7] Reflecting the difficulties the Allies were to experience in identifying potential subjects for discussion with the East, the list produced by Washington in late April 1969 was, in the words of one of its drafters, "nothing more than a rehash of everything under the sun that the Soviets have been telling the West and what the West have been telling them in the past many years, including almost everything from previous arms control negotiations like those in London in 1957 or the ENDC [Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee]."[8] In addition to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions --to which NATO was already committed since its June 1968 Reykjavik appeal for negotiations-- the list contained a number of so-called "confidence-building measures", such as the prior notification of military exercises, the observation of military manoeuvres and the establishment of observation posts; all themes previously discussed in the disarmament negotiations of the 1950s and 1960s.[9]

After being massaged by the Bureau of European Affairs of the State Department, the list was sent to Brussels where it was introduced as a working paper to form the basis for work by the NATO Council. Efforts were then made in the Senior Political Committee to catalogue the issues in terms of what could be right for negotiations, what needed more study, and what would probably never be ready for negotiations.[10]

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[7] Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D.C., 14 February 1992.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid. In his 1971 monograph, Michael Palmer notes that NATO had examined: "The exchange of advance warnings of the holding of manoeuvres, the exchange of observers at manoeuvres, the establishment of observation posts, and the discussion of strategic doctrines and of diplomatic or military 'warning lights'." See Palmer, *The Prospects*, p. 52.
[10] Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D.C., 14 February 1992.

On 5-6 November, at a special meeting of the Deputy Ministers of the North Atlantic Council, convened to prepare the December meeting, the Council streamlined the list from fifty to twenty-six issues.[11] Along with some unspecified economic, cultural and technological aspects, MBFR and confidence-building measures remained on the list as possible "negotiable" topics.[12]

Officially, the Alliance remained committed to the policy outlined in the April Washington final communiqué which called for determining "issues" before deciding on "forums" for their discussions. After the meeting, NATO Secretary-General, Manlio Brosio, re-emphasised this point by noting that the session had "examined the various issues from the point of view of their possible negotiation with the East." According to the Secretary-General, the "discussion [also] revealed the readiness of Alliance members to consider all possible procedures for negotiation of these issues, including a conference or series of conferences, provided these should be constructive and appropriate to the subject discussed." In short, as Brosio concluded, "there was no desire to hold a conference for conference's sake, but rather a strong determination to promote the careful preparation of all kinds of possible negotiations and the resolution of the serious problems dividing Europe".[13]

While NATO's consultations appeared to be proceeding smoothly, with good Alliance unity, this was not necessarily the case. The first Allied discussions exclusively devoted to potential negotiations with the East uncovered important differences among the NATO partners. On the "List of Issues", for instance, the Allies were divided on whether to allow the Eastern states to choose from their list of negotiable subjects (like a "*repas à la carte*"), or to propose all the questions they themselves would want to see resolved (like a "*menu de table d'hôte*").[14]

In addition, no agreement could be reached on how, if at all, to move forward on the issue of a conference. Denmark and Belgium, for instance, argued that the idea of a conference should be kept alive.[15] Others, more inclined to go forward with concrete proposals, maintained that

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[11] "Nato Review Today of East's Policy", *The Times*, 5 November 1969; and Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, 1971, p. 78.
[12] Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D.C., 14 February 1992. According to Robert Spencer, the list also included cultural, technological and economic aspects. See Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 40.
[13] For a text, see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 33-34.
[14] See "Les alliés durcissent leur attitude à l'égard du projet de conférence sur la sécurité européenne", *Le Monde*, 7 November 1969.
[15] Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 78.

NATO should not appear "passive, slow, unduly concerned with mere studies, or on the defensive", and that the Council "should support the idea of an eventual conference".[16] The United States, however, adopted an unequivocally negative attitude toward any suggestion that might imply movement toward convening a conference. Presenting the American position, Under-Secretary of State, Elliott Richardson, argued that the Soviet Union was not serious about negotiating European security and that the West should not make any concessions that could lead to "illusory détente."[17] Richardson further maintained that three issues should be regarded as a test of Soviet willingness to promote a genuine détente in Europe: "the Warsaw Pact's attitude towards the German problem, the status of Berlin, and the mutual reduction of forces."[18] In other words, Washington was not willing to bow further to pressure and intended to make these three subjects pre-conditions for NATO's acceptance of a conference.

Such a "hard-line" position,[19] as characterized at the time, was in keeping with the views of the US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger who, just before the NATO spring meeting in Washington, had recommended to President Nixon to make US agreement in principle "depend on progress on concrete European issues, especially Berlin".[20] The suggestion that progress on Berlin should be made a pre-condition before NATO agreed to move forward had been supported by Willy Brandt, who had argued a similar position in Washington while also adding improvement in the relations between the two parts of Germany.[21] But, if the Americans could find support by suggesting some pre-conditions linked to the German question, US determination to make talks on force reductions a pre-requisite to a conference was a completely different matter. US insistence on the issue at the November meeting had apparently "diverted the council from framing a positive answer"[22] to

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[16] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 45.
[17] "Warsaw Pact Bid Causes Shift in Gears", *IHT*, 10 November 1969.
[18] See Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 46; and Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 78.
[19] "U.S. Sees Force Reductions as Key to East-West Detente: Detente Tied to Arms Cut", *IHT*, 6 November 1969.
[20] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 415.
[21] As acknowledged by Brandt: "Speaking in Washington in April of the same year, I said that the scheme for an all-European conference should be carefully prepared, not left to hang fire on principle. We could not dispense with the participation of the United States and Canada. I received brickbats from the East and a mixed reception in the West when I said that the Federal Republic's presence at a European security conference would serve no purpose unless relations between the two parts of Germany were regularized beforehand. . . . Our allies accepted this attitude. They adopted our demands and later linked them with the conclusion of a quadripartite agreement on Berlin." Brandt, *People and Politics*, p. 187.
[22] "U.S. Sees Force Reductions as Key to East-West Detente: Detente Tied to Arms Cut", *IHT*, 6 November 1969.

the Eastern proposal, creating widespread dissatisfaction among allies, most notably France, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Belgium.[23]

NATO's immediate difficulties in agreeing on what specific pre-conditions the East should meet before the Allies would consider a conference were compounded in the following months by divergence on a host of other related issues. Meanwhile, a number of important initiatives were launched for easing East-West relations that would indirectly help bring the conference closer to realisation.

In the summer of 1969, following a degradation of the Western position in Berlin with the imposition of new visit and travel restrictions for Berliners and harassment of access to the city by the East German Government, France, Britain and the United States invited the Soviet Union to join them in quadripartite discussions aimed at improving the situation and defining the rights and responsibilities of the Four-Powers as well as those of the German people on both sides.[24] More significantly, in September, a general election in the FRG brought to power a new coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats, headed by Willy Brandt. The change of government in Bonn was to have a decisive impact on resolving outstanding post-war issues and, eventually, in removing the "German question" as an obstacle to reconciliation and negotiation with the East.

Committed to broaden Germany's Eastern policy, Chancellor Brandt's coalition was to carry on its *Ostpolitik* in ways preceding governments, led by Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger, had not succeeded. Previous efforts to improve relations with the East and reach binding agreement on non-use of force had faltered in the face of strong reactions that the proposals did not include recognition of the GDR. Hence, Chancellor Erhard's Peace Note of March 1966, suggesting a negotiation of non-aggression pacts (less East Germany), and exchanges of observers at military manoeuvres, had been met with the demand that the FRG first recognise the "reality of Europe" and accept the post-war political and territorial *status quo*.[25] After the Great Coalition of Chancellor Kiesinger took office in December 1966, the Federal Republic had renewed the offer for exchanging declarations on the renunciation of force, but

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[23] See Ibid. Also "Warsaw Pact Bid Causes Shift in Gears", *IHT*, 10 November 1969; and Povolny, "The Soviet Union", p. 214.

[24] For the events leading to the Western appeal for negotiations, see Jonathan Dean, "Berlin in a Divided Germany: An Evolving International Regime", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin (eds.), *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, especially pp. 93-96. [Hereafter: Dean, "Berlin"].

[25] For a text, see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 14-17.

without more success although the proposal was then also extended to the GDR.[26] In the final months of the Great Coalition, the Federal Republic slowly began to abandon its opposition to attend any international gatherings which also included the participation of the GDR[27] but, despite past efforts at reaching reconciliation and normalising relations with the East, the initiatives remained in vain because they did not include the recognition of East Germany and the acceptance of the territorial changes emanating from the Second World War.

Signs that Brandt's coalition was to take bold steps in this direction were given as early as 28 October when, presenting the program of his coalition, the Chancellor acknowledged the existence of "two states in one Germany".[28] Indication that the new coalition also intended to establish a *modus operandi* with the GDR (and, eventually, also to recognise it as a separate state), included abandonment of the "Hallstein doctrine" which, for 15 years, had called for the Federal Republic to break diplomatic relations with any country that recognised the East German state. More immediately, however, the priority of the new government was to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and Poland. Hence, on 16 November, a note was sent to Moscow proposing negotiation of a bilateral agreement on the renunciation of force and, later in the month, a similar offer was made to Poland with the aim of achieving agreement on the Oder-Niesse frontier.

Indications that the East would soon agree to join these talks came during the December meeting of the WTO, which positively acknowledged the West German initiatives. Surprisingly, the Pact's meeting added nothing new to the conference proposal and did not even reiterate previous appeals for an early convening. This change of attitude toward the conference reportedly ensued from a Pact decision to accept Western reticence on the matter "as momentarily insurmountable".[29] But, while the Warsaw Pact nations felt it advisable to retract momentarily from the discussions, the NATO states were beginning to feel just the opposite. Indeed, the presentation of an agenda, schedule, and site for a conference, introduced in the WTO Prague Declaration of 31 October, had heightened Western views, including the United States, that the initiative needed to be taken away from the East.[30] A few days after the Prague Declaration and the special November meeting of the Alliance, the

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[26] See Wolfe, *Soviet Power,* p. 349.
[27] See Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik,* pp.76-77.
[28] As noted by Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy*, p. 33, the statement, along with a later similar declaration and pledges to respect the territorial integrity of the GDR, amounted to "de facto recognition that two Germanies exist[ed], at least as 'an enforced reality'."
[29] Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik*, p. 80.
[30] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 45.

American Administration privately acknowledged that it would be risky to be entirely critical of the conference idea and that time had come to regain the high ground.[31] Believing that the best way to proceed was to put forward counter-proposals, the American Secretary of State, William Rogers, authorised the US Mission at NATO to participate in the drafting of a declaration on European security.[32] For the many NATO partners who were concerned that the Alliance should not be seen as dragging its feet on the matter, the decision was very timely, and the Alliance December Ministerial Meeting swiftly endorsed the initiative.

4. DECEMBER 1969: SETTING CONDITIONS

The Declaration on East-West relations, released from Brussels at the end of the Ministerial Meeting on 5 December 1969, set out to counter the agenda items proposed by the WTO.[33] For the Allies, the issue of renunciation of force, proposed by the Warsaw Pact in the Prague communiqué, was "difficult to reconcile" with the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty developed after 1968 to justify the intervention in Czechoslovakia.[34] Hence, and in an implicit reference to it, the NATO Declaration opened by outlining a lengthy "code of conduct" for inter-state relations underlining that the essential basis of European security rested upon the respect of certain principles including territorial integrity, non-intervention in the internal affairs of any state, and the right of peoples to shape their own destinies, while emphasising that "past experience has shown that there [was], as yet, no common interpretation of these principles".[35] On the issues of economic, scientific and technical exchanges (the second agenda item proposed by the WTO in Prague), the NATO Declaration endorsed the issues and added the theme of cultural exchanges. Here again, however, the Western states underscored their views on the matter by stressing that "in these fields more could be achieved by freer movement of people, ideas, and information between the countries of East and West".[36]

To ensure that NATO's discussion of these issues would not be construed as proposed agenda items for an eventual conference, the Declaration stressed that they were simply "subjects lending themselves to possible discussions or negotiations".[37] Furthermore, in keeping with

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[31] Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D.C., 14 February 1992.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Brussels, 4-5 December 1969. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 229-232.
[34] UK, FCO, *Selected Documents*, p. 9.
[35] Text in *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 229-232.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.

the strategy adopted in Washington whereby "forums should follow content",[38] the Declaration noted that the Allies would continue to intensify their contacts through all channels, bilateral or multilateral, believing that progress was "most likely to be achieved by choosing in each instance the means most suitable for the subject."[39] Further indications that NATO was not prepared to enter a conference anytime soon was made clear in the Declaration:

> Ministers consider that, as part of a comprehensive approach, progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations which have already begun, or could begin shortly, and which relate to fundamental problems of European security, would make a major contribution to improving the political atmosphere in Europe. Progress in these discussions and negotiations would help to ensure the success of any eventual conference in which, of course, the North American members of the Alliance would participate, to discuss and negotiate substantial problems of co-operation and security in Europe.[40]

Though vaguely written, the statement left little doubt that Western approval for a conference was premised upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. In addition to North American participation, NATO appeared to expect progress in the Four-Power negotiations to improve the situation with respect to Berlin and in the establishment of working agreements to normalise relations between East and West Germany. These "pre-conditions" were made somewhat more explicit in another part of the Declaration discussing Western initiatives with regard to a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and the efforts of the FRG to reach a *modus operandi* between the two parts of Germany. In this section, entitled "Germany and Berlin", the Allies remarked that they were "bound to attach great weight to the responses to these proposals in evaluating the prospects for negotiations looking toward improved relations and co-operation in Europe."[41]

While the Alliance's policy statement seemed to link the prospects of an eventual conference with North American participation, progress on a Berlin agreement and the talks between the two Germanies, other pre-conditions were not as clearly expressed. Indeed, even if the Declaration underlined Allied support for Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and the West German initiatives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Poland, it was unclear whether the conclusion of the renunciation of force treaties with Moscow and Warsaw were also to be considered as pre-

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[38] Interview with US Ambassador James E. Goodby, Washington D.C., 14 February 1992.
[39] Text in *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 229-232.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

requisites for a conference. Similarly, given the overall vague formulation of the NATO statement requesting "progress in the bilateral and multilateral discussions and negotiations which have already begun, or could begin shortly", several newspapers interpreted the Western pre-conditions as also including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a positive reply to NATO's invitation for negotiation on MBFR.[42]

Such ambiguity over precisely what the Warsaw Pact would have to deliver before NATO would agree to a conference certainly suited the most sceptical NATO partners, especially the United States who resisted any action that might signal endorsement of the initiative. Yet, this did not mean that full Allied agreement existed on the issue of pre-conditions. Similarly, while the Alliance seemed to have regained the initiative by laying down its position on possible subjects of discussions with the East, and some "ground rules" for what appeared to be a step-by-step approach to some process of negotiations, other ambiguities of the December Declaration suggested NATO did not have such a plan. Although the Alliance remained committed to finding subjects before deciding on forums, the last paragraph of the December Declaration made reference to the possibility of "one general conference or conferences."[43] Apart from a similar comment made by Manlio Brosio at the conclusion of the November extraordinary meeting of the Alliance, NATO had avoided making any mention of a "conference" in its policy statements because no agreement existed in Brussels regarding the type of forum that would be most appropriate to initiate East-West discussions. Without wanting to accept the Communist conference proposal, several Allies, including Belgium, Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands wished for movement on the issue.[44] Dissatisfied over Western inaction, Denmark argued at the December meeting that "the important thing was to get the process of talks started with NATO making an active contribution."[45] Concrete proposals were also presented during the Ministerial Meeting. Denmark and the Netherlands, supported by Belgium, suggested that bilateral and multilateral contacts could lead to a series of conferences or a series of preliminaries.[46] The United

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[42] See, for example, "NATO Wary on Security Talks", *The Guardian*, 6 December 1969; "Cautious Welcome from NATO for Security Talks", *The Times*, 6 December 1969. *The Times* suggests that Brosio himself had mentioned SALT, Germany's initiative towards East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, and Four-Power Agreement on Berlin.

[43] Text in *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 229-232.

[44] Vincineau, "La position belge", pp. 743-744; and "U.S. Rebuffed on Condemning Brezhnev Doctrine in NATO", *IHT*, 8 December 1969.

[45] See "U.S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", *IHT*, 5 December 1969.

[46] See Ibid.; and Vincineau, "La position belge", p. 744.

Kingdom suggested the establishment of a Standing Commission on East-West Relations involving nations from NATO, the WTO, and the European neutrals and non-aligned, which could be used "to develop positions on issues for a forthcoming all-European meeting".[47] The United States, however, maintained its negative stance toward any action that might encourage early convening of a conference. Summarising the American position, Secretary of State Rogers cautioned:

> We must be careful not to confuse the process of negotiation with real progress toward agreements, and we must not lull ourselves into a false sense of *détente*. What is proposed [by the East] cannot properly be described as a security conference at all. . . . We are opposed in practice to an unrealistic and premature exercise which could lead to disappointment and quite possibly a deterioration in East-West relations. We would favor a negotiation that holds out realistic hope for a reduction of tensions in Europe. But we will not participate in a conference which has the effect of ratifying or acquiescing in the Brezhnev doctrine.[48]

Clearly implied by Rogers' statement, not all Western governments were ready to consider "one or more conferences" as suggested in the December Declaration. Furthermore, as reported at the time, the only agreement existing at Brussels on the issue of a framework, or forum, for possible talks was that almost anything would be better than the Eastern proposal for a grand conference.[49] Whether the NATO statement on "one general conference or conferences" was meant to convey this message to the East, or constituted a concession to those within the Alliance who wanted NATO to present a concrete initiative in response to the Pact's proposals,[50] the Allies had no plan of action with regard to how, or when, East-West discussions could be initiated, nor could they agree on any future course of action to that end.

During the December Ministerial Meeting, the Scandinavians and the British argued that the Alliance's final communiqué should include language on the WTO Prague Declaration emphasising that it needed clarification.[51] The Americans strongly opposed the idea claiming that NATO had to be careful not to get into a situation where it would be bargaining over a

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[47] "U.S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", *IHT*, 5 December 1969. See also Palmer, *The Prospects,* pp. 46-47; Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy*, p. 15; and "La session ministérielle de l'OTAN. Les pays atlantiques considèrent avec prudence et méfiance les projets de conférence européenne", *Le Monde*, 6 December 1969.

[48] "Address by Secretary of State Rogers to the Belgo-American Association at Brussels, December 6, 1969", in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, US, ACDA, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970, pp. 628-633. [Hereafter: *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*].

[49] See *Le Monde*, 6 December 1969.

[50] Italy considered the reference to a "conference" as a victory. See "NATO Supports Bonn in Overtures to East", *IHT*, 6-7 December 1969. For the views of other NATO partners, see "U.S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", *IHT*, 5 December 1969.

[51] "U.S. Rebuffed on Condemning Brezhnev Doctrine in NATO", *IHT*, 8 December 1969.

conference agenda.[52] The Americans "won the day" and the only reference or phrasing related to the WTO proposal was dropped from the communiqué.[53] For Henry Kissinger, the December meeting was a success in that "euphoria for a conference for a conference's sake was contained."[54] Yet, the Allies remained without any clear position on how to move forward.

The Americans came to the December meeting prepared to push their three pre-conditions for a conference. As described by US Secretary of State, William Rogers, a "reply to a conference should be conditioned" upon "constructive responses" with regard to Brandt's initiatives toward German reconciliation; a "demonstration of Soviet willingness toward improving the situation in and around Berlin", and a "positive Warsaw Pact response to our repeated proposals" for MBFR.[55] Some of these demands were brushed aside by a number of Allies including France, Canada, Italy and the Scandinavian countries.[56] On the Berlin question, for instance, France refused to consider a text asking for "success" in the talks and only agreed to lend its support for the formulation calling for "progress".[57] On MBFR, the French position was even less compromising. Paris flatly refused any suggestion that might imply that these talks could be considered a pre-condition for a conference, and the French delegation even delayed agreement on the Declaration over this issue.[58]

In addition to difficulties in determining what pre-conditions should be set for Western agreement on a conference, what type of forums would be most appropriate for East-West discussions and the desirability of fresh overtures to the East, the content of any East-West prospective discussions was also beginning to be a source of disagreement at NATO. In his opening remarks to the December Ministerial Meeting, the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, noted that force reductions would not be an appropriate subject for an eventual conference.[59] In the absence of any call from the East for considering such a topic at the conference, the statement probably referred to internal discussions at NATO, and may have

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[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 416.
[55] Address by Secretary of State Rogers to the Belgo-American Association at Brussels, December 6, 1969", in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 628-633. See also Stanley and Whitt, *Detente Diplomacy*, p. 35; and "U.S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", *IHT*, 5 December 1969.
[56] Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp.88-89; and Vincineau, "La position belge", pp. 743-44.
[57] See *Le Monde*, 6 December 1969.
[58] "Nato Sets up its Warsaw Bloc Buster", *The Sunday Times*, 7 December 1969. "Les Occidentaux n'ont pas fermé la porte à la réunion d'une conférence sur la sécurité européenne", *Le Monde*, 7-8 December 1969.
[59] See *Le Monde*, 6 December 1969.

been made public by the French in order to discourage any further consideration of the issue.

5. 1970: MORE SECURITY OR NATO'S INSECURITY?

While NATO's first six months of deliberations on a prospective conference yielded few concrete decisions, in early 1970 important progress in East-West relations would help push the issue forward.

In December 1969, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union began discussions on a bilateral agreement on the renunciation of force and similar talks with Poland opened in early February 1970. In March, Moscow joined the three Western powers having special responsibility for Germany for quadripartite talks on Berlin while, following an historic meeting between Willy Brandt and the East German Prime Minister, Willi Stoph, that same month, the FRG and the GDR initiated dialogue on the establishment of a *modus operandi*. Finally, in April, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks between the superpowers officially opened and were expected to enter a more substantive phase.

When the Allies met again for their semi-annual Ministerial Meeting in Rome, on 26-27 May 1970, they could only express their "satisfaction over the launching or continuation of the whole range of talks and negotiations."[60] The Ministers noted that "in so far as progress [was] recorded as a result of these talks and in the on-going talks --in particular on Germany and Berlin-- the Allied Governments would be ready to enter into multilateral contacts with all interested governments."[61] As further explained in the final communiqué, "one of the main purposes of such contacts would be to explore when it [would] be possible to convene a conference, or a series of conferences on European security and co-operation."[62]

NATO's statement of readiness to enter into multilateral contacts once progress on Berlin and Germany was registered represented an important step forward. Yet, several issues remained unsettled. Indications that negotiations on force reductions were still linked to Western approval of a conference had not completely disappeared. In the following paragraph of the communiqué (not signed by France) the 14 Allies stated that they "attach[ed] particular importance to further exploration with other interested parties of the possibility of mutual and

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[60] Rome, 26-27 May 1970. *NATO Final Communiqués,* pp. 233-237.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.

balanced force reductions."[63] Also, the 14 released a Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in which they renewed their invitation for the East to join them into negotiations.[64]

Another unresolved issue related to the framework in which multilateral talks could take place. In another section of the final communiqué, the Western governments suggested that "the establishment of a permanent body could be envisaged as one means, among others, of embarking upon multilateral negotiations in due course."[65] What NATO had in mind, or hoped to achieve, by suggesting the possibility of creating a permanent body as a vehicle to a conference was unclear. As for the reference made in the December communiqué to the possibility of having "one or more conferences", the suggestion appeared to have been the result of a compromise between divergent views, or a concession made to those who wanted a decision on a forum. In December 1969, the United Kingdom formally introduced the idea of creating a Standing Commission on East-West Relations. Although London's proposal for the establishment of such a Commission had not been retained at the time, British diplomats had nevertheless secured the approval of the Council to set up a special committee of the Alliance to look at the issue of modalities for negotiations with the East and to report at the next meeting in May.[66] In this intervening period, a number of proposals were advanced including one for the formation of a group of interested states, or preparatory committee, that would be responsible for determining a method of discussion and preparing an agenda, and one for a "*salon ouvert*" of ambassadors.[67]

In Rome, the British asserted that the Alliance should undertake a new initiative on East-West relations, arguing that the idea was not necessarily to accept the Eastern project for a

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[63] Ibid.

[64] "Declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions", Rome, 26-27 May 1970. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 237-238.

[65] Rome, 26-27 May 1970. *NATO Final Communiqués,* pp. 233-237.

[66] See "NATO Wary on Security Talks", *The Guardian*, 6 December 1969; and *Le Monde*, 6 December 1969.

[67] See "NATO Views Differ on Talks with East", *The Times*, 19 May 1970. Written a few days before the opening of the Rome meeting, the article reported that the proposals advanced included "a three member group --Poland, Finland and Belgium- to work out a method of discussion and an agenda, and a proposal that a similar multilateral group be formed from any Nato and Warsaw Pact country, wishing to be represented, and from neutrals with an interest in the questions involved". Another proposal made by the Belgian Government in December 1969 was to have a "*salon ouvert*", whereby Ambassadors of interested countries would meet in a neutral country for informal discussions to gradually work out an agenda. See Palmer, *The Prospects*, p. 47; and Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree", p. 42. The most comprehensive review of the proposals made at the time can be found in Palmer, *The Prospects*, pp. 46-50.

Conference "as is", but to begin multilateral exploratory talks that would not commit the Allies to any negotiation. This, as previously proposed in December, could take the form of a Standing Commission that would be given the task of identifying possible subjects for future negotiations and to work out modalities.[68] As in December, however, the British suggestion failed to secure sufficient support.[69] During the meeting, Denmark and Norway argued for a less structured approach to the process,[70] while the United States rejected the idea outright claiming that there was no need to create new institutions which, in the words of Henry Kissinger, would only "add their momentum to the already excessive pressures for a relaxation of tensions based on atmospherics".[71]

As clearly evidenced by Kissinger's comment, the NATO suggestion for the establishment of a permanent body was not fully endorsed by all partners. This issue underscored a much more serious problem at NATO, namely that in spite of a public commitment to move forward on East-West negotiations, the desirability of initiating multilateral discussions anytime soon was still not supported by all delegations.

The United Kingdom pushed hard at the Rome session for the Alliance to make some form of a concrete commitment or firm proposal to the East. According to news reports, Britain and Belgium jointly proposed that multilateral exploratory talks should start right away, and a majority in NATO supported this view.[72] The United States and Germany, however, opposed the suggestion arguing that a new round of negotiations with the East could disrupt the discussions already under way.[73] Moreover, Bonn argued --as the United States had done before-- that the opening of negotiations on force reductions should be made a pre-condition for a conference.[74] But this too was not acceptable to all member states, most notably France

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[68] See "Stewart Calls for Nato Talks with East Block", *The Times*, 27 May 1970; "NATO to Test East on Peace Talks", *FT*, 28 May 1970; and "Nato's New Approach to Warsaw Pact", *The Guardian*, 28 May 1970. See also, Vincineau, "La position belge", p. 745.
[69] "NATO Views Differ on Talks with East", *The Times*, 19 May 1970.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 534.
[72] See *FT*, 28 May 1970; and *The Times*, 27 May 1970. *The Times* noted that the suggestion to make a firm proposal to the East had "received the support of seven of the smaller NATO countries and some of the larger ones". For a discussion of the joint Belgian-UK proposal, see also Vincineau, "La position belge", pp. 745-747.
[73] See "NATO to Test East on Peace Talks", *FT*, 28 May 1970.
[74] Christopher Bluth, "The Origins of MBFR: West German Policy Priorities and Conventional Arms Control". Paper presented at the Ford Foundation Conventional Arms Control Project Workshop, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 11 February 1992, (unpublished paper), p. 22 [Hereafter: Bluth, "The Origins of MBFR"]. Other countries may have supported the proposal. Just after the Rome meeting, for instance, Canada instructed its embassies in Moscow and other East European capitals that "the decision to move to multilateral talks would also rest on the reaction to NATO's precise invitation on MBFR." Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 54.

who rejected it outright.[75] French opposition to the proposal was such that Paris only agreed to sign the final communiqué after having gained assurances that the MBFR would not be made a pre-condition for East-West talks.[76]

While the absence of a common position on pre-conditions, timing and appropriateness of fresh proposals, and the framework in which any future East-West discussions could be initiated continued to characterise NATO's approach to a conference, the content of any prospective talks with the East was also becoming a subject of growing internal dissent in Brussels. In the Rome final communiqué the Allies mentioned two possible topics for consideration: "the principles which should govern relations between states, including the renunciation of force", and "freer movement of people, ideas and information". NATO's presentation of its preferred "subjects of discussions" did not mean, however, that all details related to these two topics were agreed upon by all the members states,[77] nor that these two subjects exhausted the list of issues some partners wanted to see considered. In Rome, Germany proposed that a "tangible link be created between the CSCE and MBFR";[78] something later described by Foreign Minister Scheel as including the political aspects of MBFR in the CSCE.[79]

How much was debated in Rome on the issue of incorporating certain elements of force reduction talks can not be readily assessed. However, indications that the issue was already creating difficulties at NATO can be found in a Canadian government document sharply criticising a draft study, produced by the Secretariat of NATO, analysing the results of the NATO Rome Ministerial Meeting with that of the Eastern reply to it, released one month later in Budapest.[80]

The Budapest Memorandum, adopted on 22 June at the conclusion of a meeting of the WTO Foreign Ministers, was of great interest to the Alliance. First, the document formally accepted

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[75] See "A l'issue de sa réunion de Rome. Le conseil atlantique va présenter de nouvelles propositions pour le dialogue avec l'Est", *Le Monde*, 29 May 1970.
[76] See Vincineau, "La position belge", p. 747; and Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 90.
[77] Almost two years later, in March 1972, both France and Germany argued that the topic of "freedom of movement", aimed at providing the peoples of Eastern Europe more possibilities to travel freely outside the Soviet bloc, should not be an independent agenda item of the Conference because of fear of confrontation with the Soviets. For a discussion, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 19.
[78] Legault and Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, p. 429.
[79] See "M. Maurice Schumann a plaidé pour une préparation rapide de la conférence de sécurité", *Le Monde*, 11 December 1971.
[80] All forthcoming discussion of, and quotes from, the Canadian document is from Canada, DEA, 24 July 1970.

the participation of the North American NATO member states in the conference, putting an end to a long-standing ambiguity in the Pact's proposals and a source of constant frustration for those more willing to move towards East-West discussions but would not do so because of this enduring ambiguity. Second, the Budapest Memorandum put forward a new agenda item, described in the document as "the setting up at the all-European conference of a body to deal with questions of security and co-operation in Europe."[81] Third, and of more immediate interest to many at NATO, the Memorandum provided the first indication that the Eastern states might endorse the idea of force reductions in Europe. As stated in the document:

> The governments which adopted the present memorandum believe that a study of the question of reducing foreign armed forces on the territory of European States would serve the interests of a détente and security in Europe. In order to create in the shortest possible period of time the most favourable conditions for the discussion of appropriate questions at the all-European conference and in the interests of securing fruitful results from the study of the question concerning the reduction of foreign armed forces, this question could be discussed in the body which it is proposed to set up at the all-European conference or in another manner acceptable to interested States.[82]

Even if this first positive indication that the WTO might consider MBFR fell short of NATO's expectations to have both national and stationed forces included in future negotiations, it represented a first step in this direction. At the same time, however, the Pact's Declaration also raised a number of important questions. For instance, was the reference to "*another manner acceptable to interested States*" indicative of a willingness to begin preliminary talks at an early date, devoted exclusively to MBFR? Were the "*interested States*" concerned only those nations that had troops in Central Europe?[83]

The thrust of the Canadian contention with the NATO Secretariat draft study analysing these questions, in the light of the Rome communiqué, was that it revealed a "tendency to treat MBFR on the same basis as such topics as cultural relations, environmental questions, freer movement of peoples, etc." The Canadian paper contended that to mingle both sets of issues was a false reading of the Rome communiqué, which gave great significance to force reductions by a separate Declaration. Furthermore, according to the Canadians, paragraph 6 of the Rome communiqué stipulating that NATO was exploring which issues would best lend themselves to fruitful negotiations in order "to reduce tensions and promote co-operations in

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[81] For a text of the WTO's Communiqué and Memorandum, Budapest, 22 June 1970, see in WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 53-55.
[82] Ibid.
[83] See Canada, DEA, 24 July 1970.

Europe" was clearly meant to delineate two general areas for discussion: "'*co-operation*' which would include such topics as cultural relations, environment, economic and technical co-operation, and; '*other means of reducing political tensions*' to complement the effort to negotiate a reduction of the military confrontation through MBFR [emphasis added]."[84]

For Ottawa, the issue of MBFR had to be separated, as far as possible, from the general discussion of agenda topics for an eventual conference, in the hope that separating the two would ensure that force reductions "would not be buried in general aspects of co-operation . . . or negotiations that treat less urgent or less essential aspects of NATO's security interests." Failing to do so, the paper warned, could ultimately leave NATO no more knowledgeable about the Pact's desire for a genuine détente. As emphasised in the memorandum:

> Almost two years of intensive technical studies have been carried out in the preparation of the proposal for MBFR. These studies . . . were predicated on the need for a concrete, specific initiative that NATO Ministers had decided to take in order to discover whether or not the WTO countries are interested in a European Security Conference for propaganda purposes, or whether they can be seriously interested in discussing a realistic approach to the most vital aspects of European security.

For Canada, Eastern willingness to discuss force reductions in an "organ" or in any "*other form suitable to interested states*"[85] indicated that the WTO envisaged some framework other than a European security conference for the discussion of MBFR. Ottawa argued that while the "organ" should be discarded, NATO should treat the any "*other form suitable*" as an open invitation to contemplate the possibility of negotiations taking place in a different forum and possibly at a different time, and that the Alliance should pursue this line more positively and aggressively. If the opportunity was lost and NATO did not clearly separate MBFR from the conference context, the paper concluded, "time may well see this NATO initiative frustrated through Soviet evasive tactics aimed at making MBFR part of an ESC [European Security Conference] package that would be unacceptable to NATO."

Whether the Canadian criticism of the NATO brief was primarily, or only, motivated by an apparent tendency emerging within the Alliance to give the same relative prominence to

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[84] This point was not made as explicitly in the Rome communiqué. Paragraph 6 read: "At their April 1969 meeting in Washington, Ministers agreed to explore with the Soviet Union . . . which concrete issues best lend themselves to fruitful negotiations in order to reduce tension and promote co-operations in Europe and to take constructive actions to this end." See, *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 233-238.

[85] The Canadian translation of the Budapest Memorandum read "*any other form suitable to interested states*", and not to "*another manner acceptable to interested States*".

MBFR than to the other conference topics (as if the agenda of the conference could be broadened to include force reductions), is difficult to ascertain. Certainly, before the Budapest Declaration of June 1970, none of the policy statements put forward in the final communiqués of the two military alliances suggested that NATO and the Warsaw Pact envisaged dealing with any military issue in the prospective conference. Since the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the WTO had completely abandoned such plans. In the West, however, as evidenced by the wide use of the title "European Security Conference", a strong presumption had remained that the prospective conference would involve some military matters. In fact, the idea had been raised before by some European NATO partners. When presenting its project for a Standing Commission on East-West Relations, the British Government had maintained that it envisaged military questions to be dealt with by its proposed Commission. As described by Prime Minister Harold Wilson, in January 1970, the project envisaged a "permanent machinery for dealing with all the problems in Europe that we could solve, economic as well as political and military and the rest".[86] In Rome, Britain had also contended that NATO should enlarge the conference agenda proposed by the East to incorporate topics such as force reductions.[87] Finally, as clearly implied by the statement of the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, in December 1969, that MBFR would not be an appropriate subject of discussion for an eventual conference, the issue had already surfaced at NATO.[88]

Regardless of the extent to which the idea of inserting a military content in the conference had already taken root at NATO, what the Canadian comments underscored was that one year into examining potential topics, the Allies were still without any definite policy on what they wanted to consider at the conference. Also, as implied in the idea that MBFR and the CSCE

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[86] As quoted in Palmer, *The Prospects*, p. 47. A few months later, the Conservative government, headed by E.R.G. Heath, continued to advocate the idea. In July 1970, the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Holme (who replaced Mr. Stewart), "indicated that he thought the idea of establishing standing machinery concerned with force reductions in Europe merited careful study." Later, in February 1972, the British Foreign Office advocated the creation of a Commission which could be used "to examine the security aspects of East/West relations during the Conference." As envisaged, the function of this body could be "to serve as a forum for negotiating, and subsequently supervising, an MBFR agreement". Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference,* p. 15 note 38.

[87] See "Stewart Calls for Nato Talks with East Block", *The Times*, 27 May 1970. The article reported that "Mr. Stewart [had] suggested that Nato should take up, with reservations, the two ideas put forward by the Warsaw Pact . . . . but [that] it should also add topics of its own, such as force reductions in Europe, freedom of movement, human relations, a code of conduct, and cultural exchanges."

[88] See *Le Monde*, 6 December 1969.

negotiations could be combined in some way, the Allies were going backwards on the issue of forum. In short, while the Alliance had committed itself to defining subjects before determining forums, the Allies were without a clear policy on both issues and, immediately after Rome, this confused situation created great embarrassment for the West.

As noted, the WTO Budapest Memorandum recommended that the conference establish a permanent body which could carry out the talks on force reductions. Having been a fixture of all initial Eastern conference proposals, the idea of a permanent body was certainly not new to Moscow. Yet, the Soviet Union had long abandoned this topic, and it was certainly not accidental that its reappearance surfaced in a Pact policy statement only after NATO mentioned it in its Rome communiqué. Similarly, it was no coincidence that the permanent body was presented as the potential negotiating forum for force reductions. The Soviet Union had no interest in MBFR but was under repeated pressure to provide a reply to the Western appeals for negotiations. Whether Moscow concluded that a positive response would enhance the prospect for a conference,[89] the permanent body, first proposed by the West in Rome, provided a unique opportunity to respond positively to the MBFR appeals, while, concurrently (by using the idea of a permanent body), also postponed their negotiations until after a conference was convened.

In November 1970, NATO Secretary-General, Manlio Brosio, strongly criticised the Pact's proposal for a permanent body and warned about the fundamental differences between the Western proposal of Rome and the Soviet Budapest proposal. For Brosio, "the two bodies or committees or commissions may mean quite different things."[90] "The body suggested by the Warsaw Pact countries", according to Brosio, "may be understood as the first organ of a new security system in Europe, or of its beginning."[91] Furthermore, the WTO proposal "could lead to an acceptance of a European conference along the communist pattern, that is, a move towards the dismantling of the Atlantic Alliance."[92]

Later in the month, the Secretary-General expanded upon his remarks by suggesting that NATO could accept a "permanent consultative machinery" which could consist "of a group

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[89] In his analysis of the Soviet position toward MBFR, John Van Oudenaren argues that the move was "further evidence that Brezhnev viewed MBFR mainly as a way of advancing the European security conference". Van Oudenaren, *Détente in Europe*, p. 212.
[90] Statement to the North Atlantic Assembly, The Hague, 9 November 1970, quoted in Palmer, *The Prospects*, p. 56.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid., p. 57.

or commission responsible for preparing, promoting, and even beginning negotiations".[93] This belated "clarification" of the Western suggestion for the establishment of a permanent body did little to rid the subject of confusion as few observers could really differentiate between the two proposals, or clearly understand Western policy on the matter.[94]

More problematic for NATO (and eventually also for Moscow) was that the proposal for the establishment of a permanent body, and the idea that MBFR could be part of the conference, were to remain well entrenched in all discussions leading up to the CSCE and well beyond the beginning of its preliminary deliberations in November 1972. Only one month after the Budapest meeting, these ideas were immediately endorsed by some European Neutral and Non-aligned nations, like Austria, who issued a declaration specifically requesting that MBFR be dealt with by the conference.[95] Furthermore, given the intricate nature of the subject matter, Austria also suggested that agreement be reached "to convene not only one but several conferences", and that any unresolved question arising from the first conference could be solved "by the formation of mutually-agreed organs or working parties in between conferences."[96] The advocacy of numerous negotiating East-West bodies certainly alarmed those at NATO (and, especially, the US) who could not agree to holding one conference, or to the beginning of multilateral talks for that purpose. Not surprisingly, after Rome, NATO never reiterated the suggestion for the establishment of a permanent body.[97]

6. FROM ROME TO LISBON: 1970-1971

While NATO remained on the defensive, divided over what its next step should be, the remainder of 1970 saw important East-West developments. The treaty on the renunciation of force between Bonn and Moscow was signed on 12 August; the initialing of a similar treaty with Poland took place on 18 November, and; the exchange of views between the FRG and the GDR on a negotiated settlement of their mutual relations was well on the way. Only on Berlin were obstacles noted, with a stiffening of the Soviet position and the harassment of

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[93] Statement to the WEU Assembly, Paris, 17 November 1970, quoted in Palmer, *The Prospects*, p. 56.
[94] For a comprehensive treatment of the issue and review of the many proposals concerning possible framework for negotiations, see Palmer, *The Prospects*, pp. 45-55 and pp. 56-63.
[95] For a text of the Austrian government memorandum on the convening of a European security conference (23 July 1970), see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 60-61.
[96] Ibid.
[97] According to Vincineau, the British push for consideration of its proposal on a permanent body may have been motivated by electoral purposes on the eve of elections in Britain. See Vincineau, "La position belge", p. 745.

traffic on the access route to the city.[98]

Disregarding these later difficulties, the Warsaw Pact meeting held in East-Berlin on 2 December 1970 endorsed the position that there were "no reasons whatsoever for delaying the convocation of the conference or for putting forward any preliminary terms."[99] The Pact's final communiqué also accepted a Finnish invitation, sent to all interested governments on 24 November 1970, to start multilateral consultations and to instruct their ambassadors a in Helsinki accordingly.[100]

Meeting in Ministerial session two days after the WTO, the Atlantic Alliance ended their December meeting affirming:

> the readiness of their governments, as soon as the talks on Berlin have reached a *satisfactory conclusion* and in so far as the other on-going talks are proceeding favourably, to enter into the multilateral contacts with all interested governments to explore when it would possible to convene a conference, or a series of conferences, on security and co-operation in Europe [emphasis added].[101]

The change in NATO's position requesting "satisfactory conclusion" of the talks on Berlin (as opposed to the Rome formulation demanding "progress" in the talks) was not only motivated by the lack of progress encountered in the Berlin talks, but also by existing problems with the East German government, in particular, concerning access to Berlin and circulation within the city.[102] After the session, NATO Secretary-General Brosio contended that "there had been no change in NATO policy and that no new conditions had been added to those set in the past."[103] While formally true because NATO had never clearly formulated its pre-conditions, the statement glossed over a number of important issues. Internally, the Allies were at odds over what precise pre-conditions the East had to meet before the Alliance would give its clear assent for proceeding to multilateral preparations for a conference, and numerous issues related to its convening and content continued to divide the member states.

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[98] See "East-West Conference Not Yet Justified --NATO", *FT*, 4 December 1970.
[99] For a text, see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 66-67.
[100] For a text of the Finnish memorandum, see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 65-66. The Finnish invitation was sent to 34 nations, including the United States and Canada. For a discussion, see Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree", p. 37; and Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 94.
[101] Brussels, 3-4 December 1970. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 243-253.
[102] See Acimovic, *Problems of Security,* p. 91; and Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", pp. 56-59.
[103] As reported in "Nato Makes Berlin Settlement Condition for European Talks", *The Times*, 5 December 1970.

During the December Ministerial Meeting, several governments asserted that the time had come for the Alliance to move toward accepting preparations for the conference[104] arguing, like Denmark, that enough progress had been made to justify beginning a multilateral exploratory phase of the conference.[105] For others, however, including the United States, France, Britain and the FRG, the settlement of the German question was still a pre-condition for moving forward.[106] In this later group unanimity of views was far from absolute. Germany, the US, and Britain contended that a satisfactory solution meant both the Berlin question (which involved a Four-Power agreement, an intra-German agreement, and a final protocol), and the inner-German talks on the establishment of a *modus operandi* between East and West Germany.[107] France, however, held the view that there was no need to add the inner-German talks as a pre-condition for a conference since any arrangement on Berlin would presuppose serious improvement between East-West Germany, and that only one firm condition should be imposed before "active preparation" for a conference should take place.[108]

In addition to the German question, it was unclear whether SALT and MBFR were not also to be considered as pre-requisites for a conference. Asked about what the Allies had in mind when referring to favourable developments in the "other on-going talks", NATO Secretary-General Brosio stated that they were thinking of the talks between East and West Germany and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between Moscow and Washington.[109] In contrast, the American Secretary of State, William Rogers, had emphasised during the session that agreement on MBFR would have to precede rather than follow a European conference;[110] a comment that caused France to argue again against any implication that would make force reductions a pre-condition for a conference.[111] Furthermore, if, as Rogers' comments suggested, the question of imposing some "linkage" between talks on force reductions and

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[104] See "Les conférences de l'Est et de l'Ouest. L'OTAN et le pacte de Varsovie souhaitent un arrangement sur Berlin", *Le Monde*, 5 December 1970; "Les ministres du Conseil atlantique s'interrogent sur l'évolution des rapports Est-Ouest", *Le Monde*, 4 December 1970; and "Time for Russia to Make Concessions Says Sir Alec", *The Daily Telegraph*, 4 December 1970.

[105] See "East-West Conference Not Yet Justified -NATO", *Financial Times,* 4 December 1970; and "Allies Agree to Wait for Russian Move on Europe", *The Guardian*, 4 December 1970. Future references to the *Financial Times* may be identified as *FT*.

[106] See *FT*, 4 December 1970.

[107] See *Le Monde*, 5 December 1970.

[108] See Ibid.; and "NATO Allies Put Off Europe Security Talks", *IHT,* 4 December 1970.

[109] See *The Times*, 5 December 1970. As reported by the British FCO, the statement involved:"a satisfactory conclusion of the talks on Berlin . . . and the favourable development of other "on-going talks" (i.e.: the inner-German talks)". UK, FCO, *Selected Documents*, p. 13.

[110] See *Financial Times*, 4 December 1970.

[111] See *Le Monde*, 5 December 1970.

convening a conference remained unsettled, the rather different question of establishing a "link" between the two sets or subjects of negotiations also remained unresolved as some countries advocated discussing MBFR in the preparatory phase of a conference.[112] This issue became especially important in early 1971 when NATO accelerated preparation for the prospective conference and requested the views of its member states on the following issues:

1. Principles governing relations between states;
2. Economic co-operation;
3. Freer movement of peoples;
4. MBFR --insofar as a conference would deal with it;
5. Other issues (probably drawn from the 1969 List of Issues) and;
6. Scope and nature of a possible machinery for dealing with East-West relations.[113]

As evidenced by the list of topics, few decisions were made in Brussels regarding the most basic aspects of a prospective conference, including what precise topics NATO wished to raise with the East. According to Western participants, the review was "very timely" because "NATO countries had not given much thought to the subjects to be discussed at a conference since the major exercise in 1969 devoted to the consideration of a "List of Issues for Possible Negotiations with the East."[114]

7 1971: MOVING FORWARD

As the Allies accelerated their consultations, at a meeting held in Bucharest in mid-February 1971, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers intensified their criticism of delays in convening the conference and the decisions of the Brussels meeting.[115] More importantly, at the end of March, Leonid Brezhnev gave a first serious indication that the East might be willing to accept the principle of MBFR negotiations. Addressing the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 30 March, Brezhnev stated: "We stand for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where the military confrontation is especially dangerous, above all, in Central Europe."[116] This important declaration was followed in May by another major policy statement delivered by Brezhnev, in Tbilisi, where he challenged the West to reply to the 24th CPSU Congress and to start negotiations on force reductions.[117]

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[112] See Ibid.
[113] Canada, DEA, 26 January 1971. See also Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 61.
[114] Canada, DEA, 27 January 1971.
[115] For a text of the communiqué (Bucharest, 19 February 19710, see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 75-76. For background and analysis of the content of the communiqué and its intent, see Povolny, "The Soviet Union" p. 218; and Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 95.
[116] As quoted in Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, p. 25.
[117] See Ibid., p. 26; and Van Oudenaren, *Détente in Europe*, pp. 210-212.

Whether Brezhnev's endorsement of the Western proposal for negotiations on force reductions was primarily motivated by a desire to speed up the conference is unclear. Soviet timing for this action has often been interpreted as motivated by fears of a possible withdrawal of American forces from Europe in the face of an impending vote on the issue, which was to be taken in the US Senate five days after the Brezhnev's Tbilisi speech.[118] According to this analysis, the timing of the Soviet appeal was to prevent a positive outcome of this vote. Whatever motivated Brezhnev at the Party Congress and in Tbilisi, it ensured that the main subject of Allied discussions at their next Ministerial Meeting, in early June 1971, was on MBFR.

8. LISBON: MORE DIVISION

The meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Lisbon from 3-4 June, found the NATO partners at odds over how to respond to the Eastern overture on MBFR.[119] The United States argued that NATO should react positively to the new Soviet expression of interest for MBFR.[120] Other delegations asserted that caution was necessary. The positions of Great Britain and Germany were particularly noteworthy in this regard because they appeared to be much less supportive of the MBFR process than before.[121] One of Germany's misgiving about the proposal was that any formal meeting on MBFR would involve some recognition of East Germany, something Bonn was not willing to do while still engaged in talks on Berlin.[122] More significantly, the Germans were concerned that the Soviet Union was trying to avoid an agreement on Berlin and reports that the Americans might start the MBFR talks without waiting for the completion of a Berlin agreement added to this concern.[123]

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[118] Much debate took place over the meaning and, more importantly, the timing of the speech. For the view that the timing of the endorsement of the Western proposal was designed to help prevent a positive outcome on the vote in the US Senate, see Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, pp. 115-116. For different assessments claiming that the Soviet intent was either to accelerate progress on the Four-Power negotiations on Berlin, or to advance the prospects of a European Security Conference see, respectively, Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 947; and Van Oudenaren, *Détente in Europe*, pp. 210-212. For a comprehensive review of the debate in the Senate at the time, see Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, pp. 25-29.

[119] See "Les participants, à l'exception de la France ont décidé de sonder les intentions soviétiques sur la réduction des forces en Europe", *Le Monde*, 6-7 June 1971. "NATO Split on Force Reductions", *FT*, 21 May 1971. "Divided NATO Ponders Reply to Russia on Arms Reductions", *IHT*, 1 June 1971.

[120] "NATO Approves Bilateral Talks on Forces Cuts", *IHT*, 5-6 June 1971; "Nato Call for Caution on Soviet Force Cuts Plea", *The Times*, 4 June 1971; See "Compromise by NATO on Approach to Russia", *The Times*, 5 June 1971; and Vincineau, "La position belge", p. 750.

[121] See *The Times*, 5 June 1971; and *The Times*, 4 June 1971.

[122] See "Berlin Still Blocks the Way", *The Times*, 5 June 1971.

[123] See "La session du Conseil atlantique sera dominée par les perspectives de négociation sur une réduction des forces en Europe", *Le Monde*, 3 June 1971; Vincineau, "La position belge", p. 750;

The caution of the British Government also reflected concerns that the United States might consider moving towards MBFR without waiting for the conclusion of the Berlin accords.[124] Additionally, the British increasingly questioned the value of MBFR negotiations in light of continuous negative results coming out of the NATO studies on force reductions.[125] As acknowledged a few months later, London's net assessment was that "every model of an MBFR agreement so far constructed works to the military disadvantage of the Alliance."[126]

Given the important gap in positions, the final communiqué of the Lisbon meeting did not reiterate the call for negotiations but simply suggested the continuation of bilateral contacts on the subject, with the recommendation that the results be reviewed later at a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers. Also, and perhaps as a means to gain time for the Berlin talks to proceed,[127] the Allies announced "their willingness to appoint, at the appropriate time, a representative or representatives who would be responsible . . . for conducting further exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and other interested governments."[128]

In addition to the divergence on MBFR, differences were also recorded on how to proceed toward a multilateral phase of a conference. The FRG believed that movement on the issue should be made only after the completion of the three-stage Berlin agreement and the inner-German talks which were expected to follow.[129] France remained opposed to adding new conditions and insisted that it should only be the Berlin settlement and no other pre-conditions.[130] Paris worked hard to secure the most favourable language on the future conference.[131] As eventually agreed, the final communiqué noted that the Ministers expressed the hope that "before their next meeting the negotiations on Berlin will have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and co-operation in Europe may then be undertaken."[132] "In this

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IHT, 1 June 1971; "Nato to Consider Troop Cuts", *The Times*, 3 June 1971; and *The Times*, 4 June 1971.

[124] *The Times*, 4 June 1971; *IHT*, 5-6 June 1971; and *IHT*, 1 June 1971.

[125] For indications that the British and Germans were beginning to have reservations about MBFR, see "NATO Wary on Troops", *The Guardian*, 29 May 1971.

[126] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 17.

[127] See "Berlin Still Blocks the Way", *The Times*, 5 June 1971.

[128] Lisbon, 3-4 June 1971. *NATO Final Communiqués,* pp. 258-263.

[129] See "Le conseil ministériel du pacte atlantique se préoccupe du problème de Berlin et de la réduction des forces en Europe", *Le Monde*, 4 June 1971.

[130] Ibid.; and *Le Monde*, 6-7 June 1971.

[131] See *Le Monde*, 6-7 June 1971.

[132] Lisbon, 3-4 June 1971. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 258-263.

spirit," the communiqué further noted that "they invited the Council in Permanent Session to continue … its periodic review of the results achieved in all contacts and talks relative to security and co-operation in Europe so that it could without delay take a position on the opening of multilateral talks".[133]

While the Alliance's policy statement was noteworthy because it only referred to Berlin, without reiterating demands for progress in "other on-going negotiations", it was also significant because for the first time a NATO communiqué referred to the possibility of having only one conference. Discussion on the issue had focused on two proposals: one made by France for a single conference held in several stages, and one made by Italy for a series of conferences.[134] France strongly argued for only one conference held in stages, describing its proposal as a compromise between a single conference which would be too short and too general, and the Italian proposal for a series of conferences that could drag on.[135]

Despite some advancements on procedures, the question was not totally settled. As reported before Lisbon, an issue of particular importance was "the clarification by the Alliance of the relationship between a European security conference and MBFR."[136] Progress on this question was not substantial in Lisbon. At the time of the meeting, Germany reiterated its interest in having "a political extension of the MBFR talks to establish concrete links between the MBFR process and the CSCE",[137] while France publicly re-stated, soon after the meeting, that force reductions should not be part of the agenda.[138]

9. DECEMBER 1971: INTRODUCING SECURITY INTO THE AGENDA

With the Lisbon decision, committing NATO to move to a multilateral stage once the Berlin question was resolved, intensive work took place in Brussels in the autumn of 1971. In this process greater difficulties emerged. On the Berlin pre-condition, the initialling on 3 September 1971 of the Quadripartite Agreement raised "fears that the West might find itself under pressure to initiate multilateral talks before the next two stages of the Berlin

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[133] Ibid.
[134] See "M. Rogers suggère de poursuivre les contacts bilatéraux avec l'Est", *Le Monde*, 5 June 1971. See also Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 96.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 61.
[137] See Legault and Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, p. 431.
[138] See Jean Klein, "Désarmement ou 'arms control': la position française sous la Ve République," *Etudes Internationales,* III: 3, September 1972, pp. 383.

arrangements --the supplementary intra-German agreements and the conclusion of the final four-power protocol-- were completed."[139]

Difficulties were also noted with devising a policy on freer movement of people, the drafting of a declaration on principles to govern relations between states, and on future possible procedures.[140] Divergence also extended to the future co-ordination of Alliance policy with a majority of states favouring an agreed negotiating position, but with France contending that no Alliance papers could be collectively binding.[141] Also noteworthy, problems were recorded on accepting a conference title. As one analyst explained:

> Over the years, a confusing variety of titles and initials had been used in referring to the projected conference. As it became increasingly clear that a conference might actually take place, both Canada and the United States insisted on a title which would not prejudice their right to full participation . . . and eventually succeeded in securing the insertion into the NATO Lisbon communiqué . . . of 'Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe'. The problem thereafter was to make 'CSCE' stick. The French persisted in references to 'European', arguing that in a Europe which extended 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' there was no room for United States or Canadian involvement in the 'co-operative activity' which was emerging as the central focus of an exercise originally envisaged as dealing primarily with 'security'.[142]

Another area of difficulty for the Allies related to MBFR, or more precisely, the appropriateness of launching a new initiative in this regard. In line with the Lisbon statement recommending sending an envoy to Moscow to carry out exploratory talks on MBFR, NATO's Deputy Foreign Ministers met, on 5-6 October, to appoint the then recently retired NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio. The decision to proceed with the appointment was, apparently, only pursued by Washington.[143] The opening statements by the European NATO

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[139] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 66.
[140] See Ibid., pp. 70-71.
[141] See Ibid., pp. 69.
[142] Ibid., p. 68. It can be noted that the December 1970 Brussels' final communiqué referred to "*a conference, or a series of conferences, on security and co-operation in Europe*". Previously, NATO's communiqués described the project as "*a conference on European security*" (Brussels December 1969), and *"a conference, or a series of conferences on European security and co-operation*" (Rome, May 1970). The Eastern bloc almost invariably referred to the conference as "*the all-European conference*". Even after accepting North American participation at their June 1970 Budapest meeting, reference to this title is found alongside that of "*a European conference*". Afterwards, it is again the "*all-European conference*" (Moscow, August 1970), and "*an all-European conference on questions of security and co-operation*" (East Berlin, December 1970). It is noteworthy that in the Finnish aide-memoire of 24 November 1970, the invitation was made for a "*Conference on European Security*" and, for many years after, Western commentators and officials almost invariably used this title (or its variant of *European Security Conference* --ESC) to describe the Soviet project.
[143] See "Views of NATO Allies Differ on Negotiating Cut in Troops", *IHT*, 6 October 1971.

countries suggested that "several of the allies regard[ed] MBFR as an American scheme to bring home U.S. troops, and that they [were] only going along with the idea because if mutual force reductions [were] not achieved greater pressure would build up within the U.S. Congress for unilateral reductions."[144] British diplomats, in particular, suggested that they were "acting as the brakes" on the matter, admitting that any force reductions formula likely to be accepted by the East would be harmful to NATO.[145] To complicate matters further, a few weeks after the meeting, newspapers reported that France, who never participated in any decision on force reductions and, for that matter, in Brosio's appointment, tried to convince the Soviet Union not to receive the former NATO Secretary-General and to postpone MBFR until after a CSCE.[146]

Finally, while little headway was made on MBFR, one of the most difficult issues in Brussels was "the relationship between the proposed conference and negotiations on force reductions."[147] In late September, the disagreement between France and Germany on this question was publicly acknowledged by Georges Pompidou. At a press conference, the French President noted that he could see "but one divergence in this matter between the German Government and ourselves and that is on the problem of what is called the balanced reduction of forces".[148] Moreover, Pompidou had also taken up the issue with Leonid Brezhnev during his visit to Paris in late October 1971, when he reiterated French opposition to having MBFR dealt with by the conference.[149] On this latter point, France was no longer alone at NATO in opposing force reductions in the conference. During the October meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers, the Americans tried to convince their NATO partners that the MBFR talks should be kept as separate and distinct as possible from the CSCE because the security conference would already be sufficiently complicated.[150] As reported, however:

> The United States views clashed with those of both Britain and Italy, which suggested their general reluctance over MBFR by indicating that it should be tied into the security conference. Joseph Godber, the British representative, said that progress toward MBFR could be determined by the Warsaw Pact's attitude at the security conference. The Italian representative . . . took the same view.[151]

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[144] Ibid.
[145] See "Britain to be Brakes Rather than Engine in East-West Talks", *The Guardian*, 4 October 1971.
[146] See "French May Scuttle NATO Approach on Force Reduction", *The Guardian*, 4 November 1971; and Colard, "La Conférence", pp. 545-546.
[147] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 68.
[148] For a text of Pompidou's press conference (23 September 1971), see WEU, *The proposed conference*, pp. 96-97.
[149] See Colard, "La Conférence", pp. 545-546. Also Povolny, "The Soviet Union", pp. 220-221.
[150] "Views of NATO Allies Differ on Negotiating Cut in Troops", *IHT*, 6 October 1971.
[151] Ibid.

Such a position contrasted sharply with the positions of other member states like Canada who, a few weeks after the October meeting, was advising its Mission at NATO to "take the view that the prospects for the success of an eventual conference would be determined by the extent of the forward movement on the key security problem of force reductions."[152] For Canada , "this could take the form of a commitment by the WTO to discuss matters of substance concerning force reductions in a specific forum --either in a separate negotiating body or in a select committee set up by the CSCE".[153]

Given the important divisions on key issues related to both MBFR and the CSCE, no draft communiqué could be prepared in advance of the December Ministerial Meeting.[154] In fact, as a result of NATO's difficulties with MBFR, the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council meeting, held in Brussels on 9-10 December, was to simply note with regret that the Soviet Union had not yet agreed to initiate talks with Brosio and to express the hope that he would "soon be able to go to Moscow."[155]

On the CSCE, which occupied most of the deliberations,[156] sharp discussions were reported over the Berlin question. France insisted that multilateral preparations for a conference should start as soon as the second stage of the Quadripartite Agreement (involving a series of intra-German agreements on transit traffic, travel and visits) were initialled. The United States and Germany, supported by Britain, argued that the condition for forward movement towards the initiation of multilateral discussions remained the Final Protocol --the third and last stage of the Berlin Agreement.[157]

As evidenced by the wording of the final communiqué, the only agreeable compromise formula was to retain the Lisbon formulation on pre-conditions. Hence, the December meeting simply reiterated the willingness of the Allies "to undertake multilateral conversations intended to lead to a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as soon as the negotiations on Berlin had reached a successful conclusion."[158] Obviously, given the persisting differences over what should constitute the "successful conclusion" of the negotiations on Berlin, the communiqué did not elaborate on the issue even if, ultimately, this would mean all three stages of the Agreement. Meanwhile, the Allies also acknowledged the

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[152] Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 68.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid., p. 70.
[155] Brussels, 9-10 December 1971. *NATO Final Communiqués,* pp. 266-272.
[156] See *Le Monde*, 11 December 1971.
[157] See "Western Allies at Odds Over Security Talks", *The Guardian*, 11 December 1971.
[158] Brussels, 9-10 December 1971. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 266-272.

Finnish invitation of 24 November 1970 for the Heads of Mission accredited in Helsinki to start multilateral conversations, noting that the NATO governments appreciated the invitation and that they would keep in touch on this matter. With regard to potential agenda items, the December final communiqué noted the existence of a report prepared by the Council in Permanent Session, who had reviewed four areas of discussions:

1. Questions of Security, including Principles Governing Relations between States and certain military aspects of security;
2. Freer Movement of People, Information and Ideas, and Cultural Relations;
3. Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, Applied Science and Technology, and Pure Science; and
4. Co-operation to Improve the Human Environment.[159]

Of significance from this list was that under the general heading of "Questions of Security" the Allies were introducing an entirely new theme: "certain military aspects of security". Apart from the still unresolved issue of establishing a "link" between MBFR and CSCE nothing had transpired prior to the December meeting on any discussions at NATO concerning "certain military aspects of security". As the communiqué did not elaborate what the subject might entail, this new topic could have easily been understood as involving the inclusion of MBFR, or certain components of it, into the conference. In another part of the communiqué dealing exclusively with force reductions, the Ministers representing countries participating in the Alliance's integrated defence programme (which did not include France) appeared to back such a course of action when they emphasised "the importance they attach[ed] to measures which would reduce the dangers of military confrontation and thus enhance security in Europe", and "noted that a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should deal with these aspects in a suitable manner."[160] In addition, several official statements made after the Ministerial Meeting appeared to support the notion that the 14 NATO states who had signed this part of the communiqué were now favouring having force reductions (or some aspects of it) dealt with by a conference. Responding to a question in the Canadian Parliament requesting clarification on the meaning of the Brussels final communiqué with regard to the relationship between MBFR and CSCE, Canada's Foreign Minister remarked in somewhat nebulous terms that:

> The Alliance [was] not making negotiations on MBFR a precondition to the holding of a conference, but ministers noted that if a conference was to address itself effectively to the problems of security in Europe it should deal in a suitable manner

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[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.

with measures to reduce the military confrontation.[161]

More significantly, given previous opposition to the issue, the United States was also not completely discarding the possibility. Asked whether it would be possible to hold a CSCE without taking up the matter of troop reductions, the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, noted that the Allies "had a good deal of discussion" about the issue and that, in his opinion, it would be difficult:

> to imagine a conference on European security, labeled as such, which does not deal with security matters, and certainly the question of mutual and balanced reductions is a very important security matter. Whether that forum is the most appropriate forum to use to actually negotiate them --mutual and balanced force reductions-- or not I think is questionable. Whether there would be some reference to it in the conference or not we haven't really focussed [sic] on that. But I think any realistic negotiations involving mutual and balanced force reductions would have to be done in another forum.[162]

While Rogers' statement did not completely brush aside the possibility of discussing force reductions at the conference, his final comment clearly indicated that no agreement had been reached at NATO, suggesting that the vague language inserted in the communiqué by the 14 NATO partners was perhaps only introduced as a means to maximise pressure on the East to provide a reply on MBFR. Since Lisbon, the Allies were committed to start preliminary talks on CSCE as soon as the Berlin question was resolved and while progress was being recorded on this front, Moscow remained silent on MBFR. The Soviet Union had not invited Manlio Brosio to Moscow to "initiate exploratory talks" on the issue, and the official position of the WTO remained, as stated in the Budapest Memorandum of June 1970, that these talks should be initiated in the permanent body to be created by the conference. The prospect of having MBFR conditional to the convening and, possibly also, the success of the CSCE deeply concerned some at NATO, especially the Americans who then considered the prospective conference as nothing more than a "mammoth" gathering.[163]

If the main statement supported by the NATO 14 was simply meant to put pressure on the East to make a positive move toward MBFR,[164] it did not elucidate the reference to "certain

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[161] Statement form the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the House of Commons on 13 December 1971, quoted in Canada, DEA, 12 January 1973.

[162] "Text of Secretary Rogers' Press Conference, Brussels, December 10", London: United States Information Service, American Embassy, London, 13 December 1971, p. 2.

[163] As reported in "U.S. Takes Hard Line on East-West Meeting", *IHT*, 5 December 1969.

[164] According to a Canadian account of the December meeting based on official documentation, the main intent of the statement may indeed have been to encourage the Soviets to reply to NATO's invitation to start negotiations on force reductions. As explained by Robert Spencer:

military aspects of security" as a possible subject of discussion at the conference which, unlike the vague statement sponsored by them, was signed by France.

According to official documentation, the subject referred to the issue of establishing a "link" between MBFR and the CSCE, and the vague title proposed by the Belgian Foreign Minister was simply a means "of getting around French reluctance to mention MBFR in the CSCE context."[165] In this later regard, the idea that the conference could also consider some confidence-building measures under this heading was apparently floated during the discussions in an attempt to appease French reluctance to the subject.[166]

Although no studies existed in Brussels for consideration of confidence-building measures in the framework of the prospective conference, these measures were not necessarily unfamiliar to the Allies. Similar proposals had been advanced in the disarmament negotiations of the 1950s-1960s and, for this reason, had found their way on the list of possible subjects for discussion developed at NATO in the fall of 1969. Moreover, in December of that year, the 14 NATO partners supporting MBFR agreed to study a number of measures, such as advance notification of manoeuvres and movements, exchange of observers at military manoeuvres, and the establishment of observation posts as potential useful means of verification. Notwithstanding this past record, the introduction of CBMs into the CSCE was not really discussed during the December meeting and, while the Western governments had just officially proposed that the conference should deal with "certain military aspects of security", they had no clear view what the subject might entail.

"On MBFR the ministers were confronted with the 'worst case' scenario. Despite Mr Brezhnev's assurances to the contrary given to Prime Minister Trudeau in October, the Soviet Union failed to respond to the Lisbon 'explorer' proposal. None the less, Ottawa continued to stress the linkage between MBFR and the CSCE. 'By one means or another', Mr Sharp argued, 'talks on force levels will have to move in parallel with other steps towards détente.' While MBFR should not be a precondition for multilateral preparatory talks, "we must avoid agreeing to a formal conference intended to deal with security problems, while allowing the most important security question from our point of view (namely MBFR) to be ignored. In the face of Soviet silence, the Brussels communiqué of 10 December 1971, whose relevant paragraphs were a slightly modified version of a Canadian text and were not as clear as Mr Sharp had wished, merely reaffirmed the Brosio mission and urged that a CSCE should deal with force reductions "in a suitable manner"." Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 71.

[165] Ibid., p. 76.

[166] Robert Spencer suggests that "the vague title expressed the alliance's interest in exploring the novel 'so-called confidence-building measures'." Spencer, Ibid. However, there is no indication that the topic had been considered by capitals before the meeting, or that the subject had been formally discussed at NATO. Indeed, even if the West had already looked at similar measures in the context of force reductions, official records clearly establish that, as far as the CSCE was concerned, the Alliance only took the issue under consideration after the December meeting.

10. FROM SECURITY TO CBMs: DECEMBER 1971-MAY 1972

Evidence that "certain military aspects of security" was a hastily devised formula with no preparation can be found in the fact that it was only in mid-March 1972 that the NATO Senior Political Committee, in charge of the ongoing examination of potential agenda items for the conference, accepted it as a possible subject of discussion at the CSCE.[167] More significantly, during the Committee's examination of the issue great confusion arose over what precisely the item was meant to describe, or what it should include, and it was only in mid-March that two subjects began to emerge:

> (1) MBFR or, more precisely, a general declaration on MBFR to which all Conference participants could appropriately subscribe, and;
> (2) 'stabilization measures' to encompass a series of measures such as exchange of observers.[168]

A Canadian report covering the Committee's deliberations observed that it was only recently that several European Allies began to express the view that a security conference which did not deal "with some meaningful aspect of security could be counter-productive."[169] However, while "the only significant security related issue they have been able to identify [was] MBFR … they [had] really not thought the matter through very carefully'', and the reasons why they were insisting on the fact that MBFR could only be pursued in the context of the conference were "often not very precise" while "varying a good deal". As depicted in the report, the Danes and Belgians were preoccupied with the idea that MBFR should "not be [the] exclusive preserve of NATO and [the] WPO" and, even though they were accepting that the actual negotiations on force reductions should be concluded by a small group of states, they felt "under some obligations to give the neutral and non-aligned countries 'a piece of the action', and saw this being done by dealing with MBFR in [the] conference context". The Italians, who would not be part of the actual MBFR negotiations because they had no forces in the Central Region, expected that their participation in the drafting of a declaration would give them some degree of control over the negotiations. The Greeks and the Turks, who had never been keen supporters of MBFR, anticipated that if the subject would be taken up in the CSCE, progress would not be made in the foreseeable future. Finally, while the British had no strong opinion on the matter, the Germans were described as displaying the most complex position of all the NATO partners.

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[167] Canada, DEA, 10 March 1972.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Unless cited otherwise, the following discussion on the Committee's deliberations and the different positions of the NATO partners on the issue is from Canada, DEA, 17 February 1972.

Although committed to the idea of MBFR, the Germans wanted the talks to be pursued via a step-by-step approach, whereby a declaration on MBFR principles would constitute the first step toward actual reductions, the fifth step. Furthermore, the Germans were arguing that a general declaration on principles and criteria for MBFR should constitute a "necessary link with CSCE" and that the process of developing such a declaration would constitute an "effective test of Soviet interest in MBFR and willingness to make concessions before there was a commitment to enter into negotiations." The German position was difficult to understand for the other delegations because, as noted in the Canadian paper, it would only ensure that practical initiation of meaningful discussion of MBFR would be postponed for the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, it was also noted that the FRG appeared to be in no haste to start the difficult MBFR negotiations, because it wanted to see many issues resolved before getting into the tricky process of reductions.

At German request, in mid-February, the Senior Political Committee started to look at the kind of declaration which might emerge from the CSCE. As soon as the examination began, however, it immediately became clear that the kind of declaration the Germans wanted to see emerging from the CSCE discussions included a number of considerations that could only be relevant for those states who would actually be involved in the force reductions negotiations. As later remarked by participants in the discussions: "We are at a loss to understand how … countries such as Finland and San Marino could embrace any declaration calling for force reductions attuned to differences arising from geographic and other considerations".[170]

In the light of these initial problems, the Germans agreed to recast their proposal in a form that could be produced at the CSCE. Endorsement by NATO, however, was very doubtful. France was rejecting the idea outright and the United States, although then willing to discuss the issue in theoretical terms, was "reluctant to see the matter addressed in specific terms of either a declaration for the CSCE or one which might be produced by potential participants in the actual force reductions."[171] More troublesome yet, even those delegations supporting the idea of a declaration were "unable to come up with any clear argumentation on the matter", and their thinking on the issue was most notable "primarily for their lack of precision regarding what was desirable and why". As the Canadian report concluded, "the principal value of the discussions had been to demonstrate to those who have been supporting the idea of a draft declaration that they have really not thought the matter through carefully."

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[170] Canada, DEA, 8 June 1972.
[171] Information on France is from Canada, DEA, 26 May 1972.

In early March 1972, the Senior Political Committee began the review of a document tabled by Belgium suggesting the consideration of the following confidence-building measures:

- the establishment of observation posts on each side of the demarcation line;
- the notification and limitation on movement of forces of a certain size in zones to be determined;
- aerial observation;
- the exchange of observers at manoeuvres, and;
- various surveillance measures.[172]

Significantly, this "endorsement" of CBMs by Belgium was made in the context of a paper dealing with the relationship between the conference and force reductions. In this paper, dated 29 February, Belgium argued that the first three of the following five topics on MBFR should be dealt with by the CSCE:

1) definition of objectives and principles for force reductions;
2) stabilization measures;
3) establishment of force ceilings;
4) balanced reduction of forces, and;
5) establishment of new force ceilings after reductions.[173]

Despite the fact that Belgium's intent was clearly to lift-out several components from MBFR to move them to the CSCE, after examination of the paper, the Allies started to discuss the issue of "certain military aspects of security" as possibly including two elements: a declaration on force reductions, and confidence-building measures. More precisely, as the UK delegation to NATO reported to London on 5 April: "To meet French susceptibilities we have moved from speaking about a link between CSCE and MBFR and instead refer to confidence building measures and to general principles relating to force levels in Europe unconnected with any particular geographical area."[174] As further explained, the French were opposed to discussing any link between CSCE and MBFR, but "could probably agree to discuss confidence building measures".[175] According to the British diplomats, the argument which was "most likely to move" the French closer to their position on the 'security' content of a CSCE was "the thought that it [would] be useful to put up some ideas as bargaining counters which would not be damaging to [the West] to withdraw in exchange for Soviet concessions."[176] A similar argument had been used with the American delegation which was then claiming in early April to have agreed that the security item of the CSCE should include

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[172] Canada, DEA, 10 March 1972. The paper was dated 29 February 1972.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 38.
[175] Ibid., p. 38 note 4.
[176] Ibid., p. 38.

both a joint declaration relating to the level of armed forces in Europe and confidence-building measures, and that they would be pressing this view on Washington.[177] According to the British, the arguments which had been the most effective with the Americans were:

> 1. that the Alliance needed bargaining counters;
> 2. that if, surprisingly, there was an East/West agreement this would put the Allies in a favourable position at the outset of any subsequent MBFR talks, and;
> 3. that discussion of security in a CSCE might help to hold off both Mansfield and real MBFR talks. The latter on the grounds that it would not be useful to get into more details until such time as comparatively simple things like a joint declaration and confidence-building measures have been agreed.[178]

Interestingly, while the British delegation at NATO was pushing CBMs as a means to delay real negotiations on MBFR, or as bargaining chips that could be exchanged at some point during the CSCE, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, reminded his delegation that more studies were needed on CBMs "which often look better than they are".[179] Such a "review" of CBMs was in fact to be carried out at NATO by an *Ad Hoc Committee* set up to look at the Belgian proposals.[180] Perhaps as an indication of the overall lack of interest for the topic, the work of the Committee only consisted of ascertaining "advantages and disadvantages of various measures without coming to any definite conclusion."[181] Furthermore, as another indication of the absence of interest for CBMs, when the Senior Political Committee adopted a report including a section on CBMs based on the work of the *Ad Hoc Committee*, the United States recommended that the group reconvene, but most other states were not in favour, even though they agreed that more work needed to be done on the measures.[182]

Given NATO's inability to agree on a topic that could fill in the "security" aspects of the conference, the issue of the relationship between MBFR and the CSCE remained, through April and May, "one of the most complicated aspects of . . . alliance preparation for a CSCE."[183] France continued to oppose the issue and, contrary to the belief of its delegation at NATO, the US Administration would also not compromise on this point.

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[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid., p. 39.
[179] Ibid., p. 38 note 5.
[180] Available information does not reveal precisely when the *Ad Hoc Committee* was set up; what was its mandate; or how many times it convened. However, it is known that the Committee presented its conclusions to the Senior Political Committee on 24 April. Canada, DEA, 24 April 1972.
[181] Ibid., 9 May 1972.
[182] Ibid., 24 April 1972.
[183] Ibid., 21 April 1972. See also Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 37 note 1.

On 23 May, or one week before the opening of the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Bonn, the British reported that the Alliance was "much exercised with the problem of how far there should be a direct link" between the CSCE and MBFR.[184] The British noted three different sets of considerations which led individual members of the Alliance to adopt differing positions. As described in an internal memorandum dated May 26:

> (a) The Americans do not want the rate of progress towards East/West exploration of MBFR to be impeded by any procedural complication, of the kind which a link between MBFR and the CSCE might entail. This is for well-known domestic political reasons. Nor do they want countries not directly concerned (and particularly neutrals) to exercise any jurisdiction over the course of negotiations;
>
> (b) Members of the Alliance who do not have troops or territory on NATO's Central Front (and whose claim to participate directly in the detailed negotiation of MBFR is therefore rather small) nevertheless fear that the negotiation would affect their interests. They evidently believe that a clear link between MBFR and the Security Conference (in which they would participate with full rights) would help to ensure that they could take some direct part in the negotiation of force reductions. The Italians, Norwegians, Greeks and Turks have all expressed firm views about the desirability of a clear link (so have the Germans, for reasons which are obscure);
>
> (c) We and the French fall into neither of the previous categories. We both dislike the idea of MBFR because of the military disadvantages. The French choose to opt out entirely. We believe that the domestic political pressures on both the Americans and the flank members of the Alliance (i.e. the countries motivated by the considerations in (b) above) are strong. In the interests of Alliance unity, both need to be taken into account.[185]

At the same time as the British were assessing the complexities raised by the issue of an MBFR-CSCE link, the United States distributed a paper on CBMs at NATO. In it, the Americans noted that "evidence [was] insufficient for a judgement as to whether or not the Soviets would agree to address [confidence-building] measures in a CSCE."[186] As explained in the document, the "Poles [had] discussed for possible negotiation at a CSCE such measures as exchanges of observers at manoeuvres and movements, advance notification of exercises and troop movements, and a limitation of maneuvers in borders areas".[187] But, as the Americans maintained, "Moscow would probably prefer not to discuss any security issues beyond renunciation of force at the CSCE, and to leave confidence-building measures to be addressed --along with reductions-- in an organ to be created by the CSCE." Furthermore, the paper concluded that if the West insisted on discussion of a security item, Moscow might

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[184] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 43.
[185] Ibid., pp. 43-44.
[186] Canada, DEA, 23 May 1972.
[187] Ibid.

"accede rather than jeopardize or delay the CSCE", however NATO could expect the Soviets to "follow [the] Polish suggestion on limitation of exercise (e.g. an effort to restrict areas in which NATO conduct exercises), or raise some propagandistic proposals of their own, such as [the] non-use of nuclear weapons."[188]

In spite of this rather pessimistic assessment of the likely ramifications of introducing CBMs at the CSCE, three days after circulation of the US paper in Brussels, official reports noted that some Allies were beginning to see the "certain military aspects of security" as being the CBMs.[189] However, as further reported, "no country was committed to the item and, although many of the measures which had been suggested for inclusion were familiar to the Alliance, not much work had been done on them recently".[190]

11. ACCEPTING MULTILATERAL TALKS: DECEMBER 1971-MAY 1972

While NATO struggled over reaching agreement on a security content for the CSCE, a Warsaw Pact meeting held in Prague, in January 1972, made another appeal for an early convening.[191] More significantly for the Alliance, the WTO declaration noted the Eastern approval of the principle of including in a force reductions agreement all armed forces, both foreign and national; a proposal advocated by the Alliance ever since it put forward its call for MBFR negotiations. Less positively, the Pact's Declaration emphasised that the "ways toward solving the question of force reductions "should not be the prerogative of the existing military alliances in Europe".[192] The statement which might imply the participation of all CSCE nations, while not excluding the conference as the likely forum for the MBFR negotiations, was not a welcome proposal at NATO. Despite continued wrangling about introducing some elements of MBFR into the CSCE, no partner advocated the precise details of force reductions to be negotiated within the framework of the conference. Furthermore, the Pact's communiqué provided no firm commitment concerning the beginning of any negotiations on the question.

As no progress was recorded on MBFR, events having a more direct impact on the advancement of the CSCE rapidly unfolded with the last obstacles toward a resolution of the

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[188] Ibid.
[189] Canada, DEA, 26 May 1972.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Text of the Communiqué (Prague, 25-26 January 1972) can be found in Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, pp. 181-185.
[192] See Klaiber and others, *Era of Negotiations*, p. 36.

German question being quickly removed one after the other. On 17 May, the Bundestag approved the two renunciation of force treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, and ratification by the Bundesrat quickly followed.[193] A few days earlier, the last of the intra-German agreements and arrangements implementing and supplementing the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin concluded, and an arrangement was made to sign its Final Protocol which would bring the entire Berlin Agreement into effect on 3 June.[194]

With the assurances of the "successful conclusion" of the entire Berlin Agreement, the NATO Ministers, meeting in Bonn on 30-31 May, could only stress the willingness of the Alliance "to enter into multilateral conversations concerned with preparations for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe".[195] The Ministers also accepted the proposal of the Finnish Government of November 1970 to hold such talks in Helsinki --though, significantly, provided no time-schedule for the opening of the multilateral talks. Regarding possible agenda items for the multilateral consultations, the Bonn communiqué only indirectly reiterated the validity of the four topics previously mentioned in the Alliance December communiqué by noting a report of the Council in Permanent Session which had examined the issues. Surprisingly, given the obvious lack of emphasis on potential agenda items and the absence of agreement in Brussels over what topic, or topics, could fill in the item of "certain military aspects of security", the final communiqué devoted one full paragraph to the latter issue stressing that:

> "Ministers considered that, in the interest of security, the examination at a CSCE of appropriate measures, including certain military measures, aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability would contribute to the process of reducing the dangers of military confrontation".[196]

Privately described by the British as another "formula … to which the French could subscribe", and apparently meant "to distinguish military measures which would be accepted

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[193] The Treaties recognised the frontiers of all states in Europe as inviolable, hence providing informal recognition of the post-war territorial changes and the geopolitical status quo in Europe. Only the recognition of East Germany remained unsettled, but negotiations between the FRG and the GDR, aimed at normalising their relations and opening the way for their mutual accession to the United Nations were already well on the way and, concluded five months after the entry into force of the Eastern treaties and the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

[194] This was the same day the West German bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland entered into force. For background on the Soviet request to sign the Final Protocol at the same time, or before, the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties by the FRG, and a previous request by the West German government to wait for the conclusion of the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement, see Dean, "Berlin", pp. 99-100.

[195] Bonn, 30-31 May 1972. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 276-279.

[196] Ibid.

at the Conference itself (i.e. confidence building measures) and MBFR",[197] the vagueness of the NATO statement left doubts about what the Allies were trying to accomplish. With almost no work at hand on CBMs and, as reported only one week prior to the Ministerial Meeting, with no member state committed to the issue, NATO's emphasis on "*certain military measures*" could only have been made to satisfy the Alliance nations most committed to the establishment of a link with MBFR. The importance some countries, especially Germany, attached to this issue had become even more significant at the time of the Bonn Meeting. On 25 May, Chancellor Brandt told a press conference that the subject of force reductions must be included in the CSCE, and that this meant not only the stationing of troops on the territory of Allied countries, but comprehensive defence problems.[198] Three days later, the West German Defence Minister, Helmut Schmidt, contended in a radio interview that he could not "conceive of a conference about the security of Europe at which there was no discussion whatever about mutual troop reductions".[199] During the Ministerial Meeting itself, Walter Scheel, the West German Foreign Minister, argued that the link between the two sets of talks should be "optimum".[200] Hence, at the time when NATO was formally suggesting, once again, that some military issues should be considered at the conference, and was committing the Alliance to take the lead in this field, no agreement existed on what subjects should be proposed.

Of more immediate concern for some member states during the Bonn meeting was the issue of timing between the multilateral preliminary talks on a conference and the opening of talks on force reductions. In this regard, the final communiqué of May 1972 included a statement, signed by the 14 NATO partners supporting MBFR, noting that "they regretted that the Soviet government [had] failed to respond to the Allied offer of October 1971 to enter into exploratory talks"[201] and, therefore, were now proposing "that multilateral explorations on mutual and balanced force reductions be undertaken as soon as practicable, either before or in parallel with multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe".[202] The statement, opposed by France and only weakly supported by other countries like Denmark and Norway who did not wish any more delay in the convening of the preparatory talks on the conference,[203] followed Washington's preference for MBFR over

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[197] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 43 note 2.
[198] "Brandt's hope for security talks", *FT*, 25 May 1972.
[199] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 44 note 4.
[200] "U.S. and allies clash over date for MBFR talks", *FT*, 31 May 1972.
[201] Bonn, 30-31 May 1972. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 276-279.
[202] Ibid.
[203] "Rogers Reports to NATO on Summit", *IHT*, 31 May 1972. Also "NATO Ready for Europe

CSCE, and its insistence for two separate sets of negotiations to be held in parallel or, most preferably, for MBFR to start before the CSCE.

One week prior to the Bonn Ministerial Meeting, President Nixon traveled to Moscow to sign the first SALT agreement. During his Summit meeting with Brezhnev, Nixon discussed the CSCE and MBFR. The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit noted a common agreement on the opening of the conference multilateral talks after the signature of the Final Protocol of the Berlin Agreement, as well as an understanding that a conference should be convened "at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay."[204] On MBFR, the two leaders agreed that "appropriate agreements should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum."[205]

Despite initial reports suggesting that the Brezhnev-Nixon talks had reached agreement for two separate conferences to begin in parallel (probably in the fall of 1972),[206] the details of such a deal were not agreed upon. During the meeting Brezhnev had apparently given no indication of the kind of talks Moscow would like on MBFR,[207] and had only reiterated the view of the Warsaw Pact, stated in Prague in January, that MBFR should not be a matter for the military alliances alone, while also explaining that Moscow had not received the NATO's emissary for MBFR, Manlio Brosio, because the Soviets did not want MBFR negotiations between blocs.[208] Moreover, although Kissinger claimed after his visit that the Soviets had agreed for the "immediate explorations on MBFR",[209] Moscow remained silent on the issue

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Security Parley", *IHT*, 1 June 1972.

[204] "Texts of Nixon-Brezhnev Declaration and of Joint Communique at End of Visit", reproduced in the *New York Times*, May 30, 1972. [Future references to the *New York Times* are identified as *NYT*.]

[205] Ibid.

[206] See *IHT*, 31 May 1972. Numerous accounts have been written about the results of the Nixon-Brezhnev discussion on CSCE and MBFR. Many observers, using the final communiqué of the Summit as the basis of their analysis, suggest a tentative deal on the issue. See, for instance, Dean, *Watershed in Europe*, p. 105; and Coit D Blacker, "The MBFR Experience", in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.), *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 126. Discarding press reports that a deal had been struck, see Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, pp. 31-32. Recognising that the issue has never been fully documented, Raymond Garthoff carefully concludes that "in neither of their memoirs do Kissinger or Nixon comment on the trade-off --the United States' acceptance of the European Security Conference in exchange for Soviet agreement to MBFR-- but there was such an understanding." Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, p. 304.

[207] *FT*, 31 May 1972; and *IHT*, 1 June 1972.

[208] *FT*, 31 May 1972; and "Nato ministers agree to Helsinki talks in autumn to prepare for European security conference", *The Times*, 1 June 1972.

[209] *IHT*, 31 May 1972.

for several months after the Summit. In short, if Brezhnev had agreed on separate forums for the CSCE and MBFR, he had not indicated what would be the most appropriate framework for force reductions, nor had he committed to any date for them. Certainly the Americans wanted separate MBFR negotiations to start before the CSCE and largely publicised this view at the time of the Summit and the Ministerial Meeting,[210] but that Nixon had reached such a deal with Brezhnev was doubtful as evidenced by the US request in Bonn for including the statement calling on force reductions to start "before or in parallel" with the CSCE.[211]

The Bonn statement on MBFR was the closest the Allies ever came to making negotiations on force reductions a pre-condition for the convening of the CSCE, and whether Washington then made it clear that its assent for convening conference preparatory talks was conditioned upon some firm Soviet reply on MBFR, all the NATO partners, including France, subsequently agreed not to move further on the CSCE. In mid-July 1972, the Finnish Government proposed that the exploratory talks on the CSCE should begin in Helsinki on 22 November,[212] but the Alliance as a whole delayed replying to the Finnish government during the summer "while the Americans sought to persuade the Russians to agree to the start of MBFR explorations at roughly the same time".[213]

12. THE END GAME

Final agreement on the CSCE and MBFR was only achieved in mid-September, when Henry Kissinger went to Moscow to meet with Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko to explain "that the two conferences need not run exactly together, but fairly close".[214] During the meeting, the Russians handed a paper to Kissinger suggesting that the multilateral talks on the CSCE should begin, as Finland had proposed, on 22 November, and that the conference itself could open in June 1973. The Soviet paper also proposed that the preparatory talks on MBFR could

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[210] Reports on this issue can be found in the *Financial Times*, 31 May 1972; *IHT*, 31 May 1972; *IHT*, 1 June 1972; and *The Times*, 1 June 1972.
[211] Ibid.
[212] The Finnish invitation for the MPT to start on that date was only officially submitted to the Western countries on 9 November after the NATO governments informally conveyed they were ready to accept an invitation. See Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", pp. 80-81; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 58.
[213] Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 58.
[214] Ibid., p. 58 note 4. According to John J. Maresca, a senior member of the US delegation at the CSCE: "To force a positive response from the Kremlin, Kissinger linked U.S. acceptance of the opening date of the CSCE to Soviet acceptance of the opening of MBFR during his visit to Moscow in September 1972, and the Soviets finally accepted." Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 11.

start in January 1973 "followed by negotiations 'on a non-block basis' in October."[215]

With a provisional timetable in hand, the Allies were finally able to accept the Finnish invitation for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT) on the CSCE to open in Helsinki on 22 November, but not before, and almost simultaneously, the seven NATO governments planning to take part in MBFR sent an invitation to five Warsaw Pact countries to begin exploratory talks on the matter on 31 January 1973.[216] As Kissinger had noted on his return from Moscow: "Unless these two conferences take place in some related time frame … it will be very difficult for us to agree to … the 'Helsinki tea party'."[217]

13. CONCLUSION

The final results of the three-year East-West discussions leading to agreement on the parallel beginning of MBFR and CSCE represented a remarkable turn of events for the West. A close associate of Henry Kissinger described the Western gains against the Soviet repeated attempts for the quick convening of a conference as follow: "First we sold it for the German-Soviet Treaty, then we sold it for the Berlin Agreement, and we sold it again for the opening of the MBFR."[218] The Alliance as whole, of course, never formally supported MBFR as a pre-condition for the CSCE, but the statement by Henry Sonnefeldt was not necessarily inaccurate. US agreement for the CSCE was always premised upon Eastern acceptance of MBFR, and this fact was eventually well understood by the Soviet Union and accepted by the Allies who, in the last few months before the opening of the preliminary talks on the CSCE, came to support the US request for separate MBFR negotiations held in parallel.

In retrospect, the statement by Sonnefeldt was a good illustration of Western achievements, but it said nothing about how the Allies managed to achieve such results, nor did it say anything about where they were to go from there. The reality was that throughout the three-year period of East-West bargaining over future negotiations the Allies had always been on the defensive and greatly divided over every significant policy issue related to this matter. When the West first addressed subjects for future discussions it was initially only to 'recycle' the Eastern proposals in a way more palatable to Western liking. When pre-conditions were

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[215] Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 58 note 4; and Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 81.
[216] See Spencer, Ibid., pp. 81-82.
[217] United States, *Department of State Bulletin 67*, 9 October 1972, p. 394, quoted in Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 81.
[218] Comment from Helmut Sonnenfeld, *Newsweek*, 11 August 1975, quoted in Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree", p. 40.

put forward for participation in a conference, Allied capitals and NATO headquarters had to explain what they meant and almost invariably came up with different explanations. When discussions occurred on the "when", or "how", to move forward on the conference they invariably resulted in last-minute compromises quickly formulated on the eve of the conclusion of a Ministerial Meeting and, only too often, were later questioned or reformulated by one partner or another. Worse, as was the case of the Rome suggestion for the establishment of a permanent body (which was immediately adopted by Moscow to try to postpone MBFR to until after the convening of a conference), the Alliance, through its Secretary-General, had to embark on a public campaign to explain that what had been proposed by NATO was not really what had been proposed, and that, in any case, it was not what the other side had proposed.

Overall, the Allies never developed a comprehensive strategy to deal with the conference project and never managed to do much more than to develop policies on an *ad hoc* basis and to hastily produce piecemeal compromise formulae never fully thought through by all the partners. Particularly telling in this regard, and of great significance for explaining NATO's initial interest for CBMs, was how the West came to propose that the conference should consider 'certain military aspects of security'. As clearly established by official documentation, the decision to propose this topic in December 1971 was not accompanied by any agreement on what the subject might actually entail. The fact that such a proposal could be made public while the Allies did not even know what it precisely meant was not only characteristic of the way other important decisions regarding the CSCE were made at NATO, but can only be explained by the fact that a majority in Brussels could not find a reason to oppose it. At the time, the Allies were under pressure to move toward the CSCE while nothing was happening on MBFR and, if they could not agree to formally request a Soviet reply on the issue (for reasons that had more to do with increasing questioning of the desirability of MBFR than with the CSCE), they could all agree on a vague formulation asking for consideration of some aspects of security at the conference. For the Europeans, then wanting some elements of MBFR in the CSCE, the statement represented a way to get around French reluctance to MBFR while allowing the subject to be studied further at NATO. For the US and France, the countries most opposed to discussing any MBFR aspects in the CSCE, they could both find a reason to accept.

France had been unsuccessful in discouraging the West Germans from raising the issue of MBFR in the CSCE and probably believed that the vague formula on "certain military aspects of security" --which could have meant anything-- might be the only way to get rid of the force

reductions. At the time of the December meeting, the French were also anxious to move toward the CSCE and, in this respect, probably only accepted the vague statement in order to remove any further obstacles to an early convening.

For the United States, the main concern was just the opposite. The Americans were afraid that the CSCE might take place without MBFR, but they had had no success in convincing the Allies to support their views that force reductions should be made a pre-condition for the CSCE. Given the absence of Allied backing for their position, the US could certainly go along with a vague formula on certain "military" issues that could be used to convey to the Soviets that there would not be a conference without some movement on MBFR. Undoubtedly, the Americans (as well as the Canadians) used the vague statement afterwards to make this point.

The paradox, which also explains how NATO first came to look at CBMs for the CSCE, was that the Europeans who proposed the vague formulation on "certain military aspects of security" at the December meeting did it to obtain agreement on the discussion of some elements of force reductions in the CSCE. The fact that the European partners had different motivations for wanting the establishment of a link between the two forum and that these reasons were not compatible certainly did not augur well for an agreement to be reached in Brussels, and it was only because of the enduring deadlock on these discussions that the Allies began to pay more attention to CBMs.

Obviously, the fact that CBMs only began to be considered at NATO because of a persistent lack of agreement on how MBFR should be negotiated did not look very promising for any comprehensive policy to be developed on the subject. However, as things stood in May 1972, no one was too concerned about this. CBMs were only beginning to be discussed, and were only seen as a possible option which could allow the Alliance to enter the negotiations with one topic agreeable to all. Furthermore, CBMs was not the only conference issue on which the Allies had no clear policy and no forward vision. As noted in a memorandum from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in February 1972:

> The Alliance has done a great deal of work in preparation for a Conference. Voluminous studies have been completed over the past three years: on 'Issues for Possible Negotiations with the East'; on 'Possible Procedures for Negotiations with the East', on the economic and cultural aspects of a Conference; on a possible document on principles governing the relations between states. This mountain of work has not, however, yet produced clear or agreed policy directives: a vast number

of possibilities has been analysed, but few conclusions drawn.[219]

As the Foreign Office concluded then, this situation was not surprising because "the Alliance [was] notoriously unable to make up its mind except under the extreme pressure of events."[220] But, perhaps, more discouraging for the future development of CBMs was the general Western perspective on the CSCE. As remarked in another document of the Foreign Office of the same period:

> We believe that no really interesting points are likely to be negotiated in a conference of more than thirty states . . . . In three years of bureaucratic activity NATO has been unable to identify any serious issues which might yield to negotiation in such a forum. Nor have the Americans suggested any. If events were to prove us wrong, and a conference led to practical agreements of genuine value to the West, nobody would be more pleased than ourselves.[221]

Another aspect with, perhaps, more important long-term implications was that after obtaining satisfaction on all of their pre-conditions for a conference, the United States would find few reasons for the CSCE. In the view of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon, the United States never wanted a conference and, if they could have found the support of two or more Europeans states, they would have prevented it.[222] For Henry Kissinger, "such a meeting would only obscure the real issues, hamper the relationship between the Super-powers and 'clutter the stage with irrelevant demands by minor countries'."[223]

Hence in the period immediately preceding the opening of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks on the CSCE, the West still had no interest for a conference and, in the more specific field of security, the Allies were still without any firm agreement on what topic they should propose for negotiation.

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[219] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 2-3.
[220] Ibid., p. 3.
[221] Ibid., p. 37.
[222] Ibid., p. 56.
[223] Walschap, "The Great European Jamboree", p. 40.

CHAPTER 3

NATO'S PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE MPT: (MAY-NOVEMBER 1972)

1. INTRODUCTION

The events leading to NATO's proposal for consideration of "certain military aspects of security" in the CSCE revealed that the Alliance's decision to propose this issue at the Conference was not preceded by any serious consultations. As clearly evidenced by the discussions taking place in Brussels after the Ministerial Meeting, the Allies had no agreed position on which matters of European military security could be suitable for consideration at the CSCE. For several months, the item could best be described as involving a declaration on MBFR, CBMs, or both.

By May 1972, reports suggested that a consensus was beginning to emerge on CBMs.[1] This consensus, however, was not a clear or unequivocal mandate in support of the negotiations of CBMs in the CSCE, but more of a weak understanding that, while the discussions on the establishment of a link with MBFR continued, CBMs could be looked at as a possible topic to be introduced at the Conference. Hence, during the Ministerial Meeting in Bonn, when the Allies officially announced their willingness to enter Multilateral Preparatory Talks on the CSCE and, at the same time, reiterated their interest in discussing military issues in this forum, no decision existed at NATO on what precise topic should be proposed.

Discussions on the establishment of a link with MBFR continued in Brussels for months, though no consensus was ever reached to make this topic part of the NATO programme for the CSCE.[2] Meanwhile, NATO's preparations leading to the opening of the MPT in November 1972 increasingly focused on CBMs. However, because the main interest for the consideration of "military" issues in the CSCE remained directly related to the issue of a declaration on force reductions, work on the measures only belatedly started and progressed

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[1] Canada, DEA, 26 May 1972. See also Spencer, "Canada and the Origins", p. 77.

[2] Although never accepted as part of NATO's proposals for the CSCE, some European NATO partners individually argued in favour of the issue throughout the MPT and most of the CSCE. For an official reference noting the continuation of inconclusive discussions on the issue at Brussels, at the beginning of the MPT in November 1972, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 76 note 14. For Allied proposals and divisions on this issue at Helsinki during the months of February and May 1973, see Ibid., pp. 95-96 note 6, and p. 125.

very slowly. Moreover, significant differences over which measures should be presented in this forum, and how to present them, ensured that the Allies arrived ill prepared at the pre-conference talks.

2. JULY: THE FIRST CONTRIBUTION

Until the Bonn Ministerial Meeting in May 1972, very little work had been done at NATO on CBMs. Previously, the Allies had listed advantages and disadvantages for some measures but no substantive discussions took place and no effort was made to reach conclusions on any of the measures.[3] Almost two more months elapsed after the Bonn meeting before the United States introduced the first national contribution exclusively devoted to the inclusion of CBMs in the CSCE.

Presented under the heading *Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs*, the document noted that certain general objectives could be achieved by a discussion of confidence-building measures at the Multilateral Preparatory Talks.[4] In addition to providing a more balanced agenda for the Conference, discussion of CBMs in the CSCE could strengthen the Western posture by focusing discussion --and public opinion-- on one of the major sources of insecurity in Europe, namely Soviet willingness to exert military pressure on other states in Europe, including military intervention. Western proposals on CBMs, the paper also noted, could serve to challenge Soviet professions of interest in European security by requesting that the Eastern states match it with greater openness concerning their military activities. Finally, because the measures were of particular interest to a number of East European states, Washington noted that discussion of CBMs in the CSCE context could encourage a more active and independent participation of these states in the Conference.

Although recognising certain advantages for having CBMs, the US paper also cautioned about a number of problems that could result from a discussion about them at the Conference. A declaration on CBMs, it was noted, could contribute to a false sense of security leading to the impression that the Alliance could reduce its defence effort. Also, the Soviet Union could use the discussions on CBMs to argue that agreement on the matter represented a sufficient

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[3] As noted in the previous chapter, the only document prepared at NATO was made by an *Ad Hoc Committee* who submitted a paper to the Senior Political Committee on 24 April 1972. Canada, DEA, 24 April and 9 May 1972.

[4] Unless cited otherwise, information on the US contribution of July 1972 is from Canada, DEA, 31 July 1972.

substitute for negotiations on broader security issues. Furthermore, the Soviets could come up with their own propagandistic proposals, such as the non-use of nuclear weapons or the imposition of limitations on military exercises --the latter with a view to restrict areas where the Alliance might conduct exercises.

Another concern noted by Washington was determining how the negotiation of CBMs in the CSCE could affect the concurrent negotiations of similar but more detailed and desirable measures in an MBFR forum. Avoiding actions in the CSCE that could reduce prospects for agreement in MBFR was an important consideration the Allies needed to keep in mind before proceeding with CBMs. Finally, when contemplating what measures the Allies might wish to consider for the Conference, Washington suggested that the following five criterion be used:

1. The measures should be consistent with the principle of undiminished security for all Allies, taking into account where appropriate the disparities arising from geographic and other considerations;
2. They should be consistent with actual measures the West might want to propose in the MBFR negotiations;
3. They should be of general applicability to the whole of Europe and should not necessarily exclude the Western USSR, nor by their nature imply any reference to specific regions or forces within that area;
4. They should not imply such protracted discussion as to render it impracticable to deal with them in a meaningful way at a CSCE, and;
5. They should not be prejudicial to negotiations of constraints in an MBFR forum.[5]

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[5] The reference to "constraints" in MBFR referred to the negotiation of measures calling for limitations on movements of forces within and toward the reduction area, as well as limits on the size, location, number and duration of major military exercises, that the West envisaged introducing in those talks. Information on the elaboration of NATO's policies on these measures is extremely sketchy. In the communiqué issued after the December 1969 NATO Ministerial Meeting, Ministers of the Alliance's integrated command (which did not include France) suggested that "further studies should be given to measures which could accompany or follow agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions", and that such measures "could include advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, exchange of observers at military manoeuvres and possibly the establishment of observation posts." Studies on the issue, however, only progressed slowly. According to Henry Kissinger, by the fall of 1970, the Allies had "not been able to identify negotiable 'collateral constraints' which would inhibit Pact mobilization and reinforcement without harming NATO at the same time. We have just scratched the surface in thinking about verification problems." The most comprehensive account of NATO's discussion leading to the development of a first package of measures tabled in 1974 can be found in Legault and Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, especially pp. 440-441 and pp. 475-478. For background emphasising that the Allies experienced considerable difficulties in reaching agreement on the issue, before and after the tabling of a first package of proposals, see Dean, *Watershed in Europe*, pp. 157-158; Keliher, *The Negotiations on MBFR*, p. 135; and US, House of Representatives, *Status of the MBFR Negotiations*, Report of the MBFR Panel of the Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, December 14, 1978. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978, p. 6 and p. 9. The quotes from the NATO communiqué and from Henry Kissinger can be found, respectively, in *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 229-232; and Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 402.

The US paper went on to discuss two illustrative measures:

1. Advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres, and;
2. Exchange of observers at military exercises announced in advance.

As suggested in the American "guidelines", the principal objective for the prior notification of military activities would be to obtain Soviet acknowledgement of the value of such a measure for strengthening stability and mutual communications in Europe. For the exchange of observers, the paper suggested that in addition to ensuring that the manoeuvres were only training exercises, the measure could help develop experience for other arms control efforts and provide opportunities to gain better insight into relative force capabilities.

The procedures and modalities suggested by Washington for the application of the two measures were quite simple. For advance notification, Washington recommended that it could include only the general time-frame and the area of the movements or manoeuvres, and that each party could determine for itself what constitutes a "major" movement, what types of forces it would include in its notification, and what (if any) further details --such as unit designation, border crossing point or destination-- it would incorporate in the notification. For the exchange of observers, the paper suggested that it could be left to the parties to decide to which manoeuvres, and to whom, invitations would be issued. These exchanges, however, would have to be carried out "on a generally equitable basis" meaning that the number of observers would be kept within reasonable limits, equitable treatment would be given to all parties, and reciprocity would apply.

Emphasising the value of adopting a general approach to the CSCE CBMs, the US paper concluded by noting two advantages for keeping the measures simple. First, such an approach would facilitate agreement at the Conference. Second, it would prevent the involvement of other CSCE participating States in the details of Allied military activities.

In the absence of any forthcoming contribution by other member states, the *Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs*, presented by Washington in July, became the basis for Allied discussions on CBMs.[6] However, initial reactions among the NATO partners were not all positive.

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[6] By mid-August, no other national contribution was anticipated. Canada, DEA, 17 August 1972.

3. AUGUST: THE FIRST DISCUSSIONS

In the first exchange of views on the US CBMs paper, a few weeks after its introduction at NATO, the discussions immediately showed that not all Allies shared Washington's views. Recognising that the American approach to CBMs probably derived from their concern to avoid including anything in the CSCE that would be considered more appropriate for MBFR, some Allies argued that in order to convince other CSCE participating States to accept CBMs, the case for the measures would have to be made much more meaningful.[7] With only two short paragraphs devoted to the rationale for the inclusion of the measures in the Conference and an overall contribution of less than five pages, the US treatment of the subject was considered so thin and brief that it was "neither attractive nor convincing".[8] Moreover, the general approach recommended by the United States was considered risky because it could actually serve to encourage other states to propose their own CBMs which the West might not find attractive.[9]

At a more detailed level, the idea that each party could determine for itself what would constitute a "major" movement or manoeuvre and what it would include in its notification was considered an approach so vague and permissive that it was unlikely to generate any improvement of confidence.[10] Similarly, the modalities proposed by the Americans for the exchange of observers were treated in such cursory fashion that it was difficult to know what problems might be encountered, much less how they might be resolved.[11]

4. SEPTEMBER: WIDENING DIFFERENCES

NATO's first discussions on CBMs yielded no concrete result. By September, reports indicated that the Allies were split into two groups with many delegations supporting the US position for adopting only general wording for the measures, while others argued that this would make the measures meaningless. In addition, some delegations expressed reservations about the usefulness of the two illustrative measures suggested by Washington. As argued, the development of a system of observers that would ensure equitable treatment for some 30 parties or more (whether among large and smaller states, or between members of different

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[7] Ibid. The US contribution on CBMs was divided into two parts: a "Draft Agenda Paper" consisting of two paragraphs, and a "Draft Guidelines Paper" totalling just over three pages.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

alliances or within the alliances) could be an unworkable proposal.[12] Also, a system of exchange of observers without any precise ground rules (as would probably be the case in MBFR) could result in a destabilising rather than a confidence-building measure, especially in situations where permission to observe may not be granted.[13] Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact countries could use the establishment of such a system in the CSCE to argue against NATO proposals for the establishment of a verification régime in MBFR which would also involve the exchange of military observers.[14]

On the issue of notification, concerns were expressed that without any provisions allowing for challenge and response, non-notified military activities could be seen as tantamount to an escalation of threat. Also, the idea of trying to apply the measures to "the whole of Europe" was seen as unrealistic. Such a requirement would not only raise questions of resources needed to verify and monitor on such a large scale but, by suggesting such a large area of application for the CSCE CBMs, the Allies would probably prejudice their negotiating position on "movement constraints" in MBFR. The specific concern in this later regard related to NATO's plan to introduce in the force reductions talks a measure on movement constraints to be applied to both movements of troops taking place within the area of reduction (i.e. limited to parts of Central Europe) and on movements of troops toward the area.[15] Although the MBFR negotiations were not planned to begin for another two months after the opening of the CSCE, the concern was that if the Eastern states were to agree with the "all of Europe" concept as the area of application for the CSCE CBMs, they could use this as a pretext in the MBFR to refuse a constraints area larger than the reduction area.[16]

To complicate matters, while some delegations raised doubts about the feasibility and usefulness of the CBMs suggested by Washington, others argued that the two measures were not going far enough. Belgium, for instance, proposed that the NATO CBMs proposals should include the exchange of observers to *all* notified major military manoeuvres, and a limitation on the movement of forces of a certain size within and/or into a certain area.[17] The

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[12] Canada, DEA, 20 September 1972.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] By June 1972 the Allies were considering the following measures: advance notice of military movements; calendar year list of planned movements, manoeuvres, and exercises; advance notice of changes in this calendar; exchange of observers at military exercises; notification and/or limitation of movements of forces in certain areas. Canada, DEA, 16 June 1972.
[16] Ibid., 20 September 1972.
[17] Ibid., 29 September 1972.

latter suggestion, of course, directly contradicted Washington's criteria for the CSCE CBMs to be of general applicability to the whole of Europe and to avoid any reference to specific regions. Also, the idea of placing limits on the number or size of military movements went far beyond the simple notification measures under discussion at NATO, as such measures were deemed by a majority of Allies to be more appropriate for the MBFR forum.

5. OCTOBER: CONFUSION OVER DIFFERENCES

Given the wide range of views on the confidence-building measures, the Allies decided to produce a new *Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs* encompassing all the comments and suggestions on the issue in the previous months.[18] The paper, prepared in mid-October, included several modifications or additions to the original US document. In addition to the five criterion previously proposed by the Americans, some Allies also wanted to ensure that the measures:

1) should help strengthen mutual confidence and stability, promote détente and improve relations among the CSCE participants;
2) should not inhibit NATO's reinforcement plans, nor necessary exercises, such as Reforger;
3) should be of such a nature that compliance with the agreement could be effectively ascertained without an onerous requirement for verification;
4) should not necessitate the creation of a new permanent international body for their implementation, and;
5) should be defined with sufficient precision so as not to create misunderstanding among the parties over the implementation of the agreement.[19]

On the procedures outlined by Washington for the application of the notification measure,

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[18] Information on the NATO *Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs* dated 12 October is from Canada, DEA, 12 October 1972.

[19] Ibid. This list circulated at NATO on 12 October presented a total of 12 criteria which included the original five proposed by the United States plus an additional seven, either new or variants of the same ones. After further discussion, the list finally agreed by NATO on 19 October contained only nine criteria identified as follow: "1) Undiminished security; 2) Strengthened confidence and stability, promotion of détente, improvement of relations among the CSCE participants; 3) Consistency with measures that may be agreed in MBFR; 4) Applicability to all of Europe, not selected areas; 5) Sufficiently simple to obviate lengthy negotiation; 6) Non-interference with NATO reinforcement plans and exercises; 7) Minimal verification requirement; 8) No follow-on machinery; 9) Clarity of wording to avoid misunderstanding." Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973. Presentation of this list in the open literature can be found in Legault and Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, p. 479. However, it should be noted that the authors erroneously attributed the list of nine criteria as being part of the US paper of 31 July 1972. The list of five additional criteria presented above are from the NATO list of 12 October and, apart from duplicate language which has been excluded, the only noteworthy difference with the final list of nine criteria agreed upon by the Allies on 19 October is the suggestion that the CBMs should "not be prejudicial to negotiation of measures such as collateral constraints, force reductions, or measures of verification in an MBFR forum". This language was not acceptable to France.

discussion of the Alliance's *Draft Agenda/Guidelines* indicated that some delegations strongly believed that the lack of clarity on questions such as the size of forces or the area of applicability of the measure could create misunderstanding over the implementation of the agreement. To prevent such an outcome, a suggestion was made that while negotiating CBMs at the Conference, NATO seek to reach an understanding on how a "major" movement and manoeuvre should be defined, how much advance notice should be given, and what information should be contained in the notification. To achieve such an understanding, some Allies suggested that the CSCE participating States could compare recent annual calendars of military activities to help illustrate the kind of information they would be willing to provide. Furthermore, the Allies could table "selective lists" of their own past force movements and manoeuvres and invite other participants to do the same. If the Warsaw Pact nations refused to provide similar information, the lists could then be withdrawn and, as previously suggested by Washington, each party would then determine for itself what constitutes a "major" movement, what types of forces it would include in its notification, and what (if any) other information it would provide in its notification.[20]

Finally, with regard to exchange of observers, the October paper noted only two additions to the original US proposal, namely that equal freedom of movement should be accorded to observers by all parties and that there should be an approximate balance between NATO and the WTO in the numbers and kinds of manoeuvres offered for observation.

Although the principal aim of the Alliance's *Draft Agenda/Guidelines* was mainly to register the different views of the NATO countries and not to provide any definite answers, it revealed that the member states were far apart on CBMs and that few concrete results had arisen from the initial discussions. Some of the additional criterion advanced for judging CBMs proposals were either too vague to allow any informed decision as to whether any measure would fulfil their stated requirements, or contradicted other criterion already proposed. This was the case, for instance, for the new recommendation calling for precision in the definition of the measures, which went against the principle of generality previously suggested by the Americans. Also, concerning the two CBMs previously proposed by Washington, specific comments on how these measures could be presented at the Conference indicated that the

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[20] As noted in the October *Draft Agenda/Guidelines*: "A general proposal such as this would avoid involvement by CSCE participants in the details of Allied military activities. It would be easier for participants in a CSCE to reach agreement on this general measure rather than on a more detailed measure of a type most suitably treated in MBFR".

discussions had not solved many issues. The same arguments against the US position were simply re-introduced while new comments, such as those concerning the exchange of observers, did not answer any of the doubts previously raised about the usefulness or the applicability of such a measure in the CSCE context. With regard to additional measures that NATO might wish to consider for the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the third and last section of the October paper listed three CBMs:

> 1. the notification of movements of forces of a certain size within and/or into a certain area;
> 2. the exchange of observers at any military manoeuvre that has been previously notified, and;
> 3. the limitation of movements of forces of a certain size within and/or into a certain area.

Although included in the *Draft Agenda/Guidelines*, these measures were simply presented as additional measures "certain" delegations wished to see introduced in the CSCE and were not commented upon by other delegations. As noted in the October document, only the exchange of observers and the notification of manoeuvres were then acceptable to all delegations.

While preparing the report, Allied thinking on negotiating approaches for CBMs was influenced by a number of considerations. First, informal discussions with the Soviet Union indicated that Moscow had no willingness to discuss CBMs at the CSCE.[21] Second, some of the additional measures suggested during Allied discussions were essentially similar to "movement constraints" envisaged for negotiation in the MBFR. Finally, "not all confidence-building measures contained in [the] guidelines paper [had] been fully studied from a military and technical point of view."

Although the Allies were in agreement on these basic facts, they drew different conclusions from them. Most delegations considered that by tabling simple measures, such as those proposed by the Americans, the Soviet Union could not argue that the CBMs would require the establishment of a new body for implementation, or that they could only be agreed after the CSCE. These delegations also considered that more detailed and far-reaching proposals (such as those on the limitation of movements) could make it more difficult to obtain Soviet agreement on any CSCE agenda item dealing with military aspects of security and that it could prejudice the negotiations of movement constraints in MBFR. These delegations also

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[21] For the Soviet comments on the issue made on 15 and 18 September, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 61.

believed that by beginning with relatively permissible proposals, the possibility of suggesting broader proposals at a later time was not excluded.

For other delegations, the absence of perfect parallelism in time between the CSCE preliminary talks and the MBFR explorations, and the uncertainty about the results of the latter, created the necessity to safeguard the possibility of increasing the substantive content of "certain military aspects of security" to be discussed at the Conference. These states believed that once minimal CBMs would be proposed it would be difficult to later introduce more comprehensive measures. Therefore, they argued for maintaining the option of putting forward broader measures at the preliminaries by introducing a proposal entitled "limitation of certain major military movements".

Despite the continuing wide gap between the different positions, the opening of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks was approaching and, as the October paper noted, the only course of action which would allow the Western states to enter the preliminary consultations with a unified position was to confine themselves to the general identification of the two confidence-building measures acceptable to all. Such a course of action was sanctioned in Brussels in late October.[22] However, as previously experienced in NATO discussions on CBMs, confusion immediately surfaced over what exactly had been agreed upon.[23] Indeed, the day the decision was taken, two opposing views were recorded. Countries including Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands spoke in favour of tabling precise definitions of the two measures; the United States, supported by France, Italy and Great Britain argued for a general approach.[24]

6. NOVEMBER: PATCHING-UP DIFFERENCES?

Following this important setback in the preparations, Washington circulated a paper in early November warning about the serious difficulties which could arise from attempts at developing precise definitions of the terms "movements" or "manoeuvres", "especially if such definitions deal[t] with geographic area or size of forces".[25] Recognising that precision of these terms would be necessary for the measures envisaged for the MBFR talks, the

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[22] Canada, DEA, 8 November 1972.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid., 31 October 1972.
[25] The paper was circulated at NATO on 8 November. Canada, DEA, 8 November 1972.

Americans warned that efforts to reach agreement on such details at the CSCE would only serve to open these issues to wider debate and could prejudice subsequent discussions of constraint measures in MBFR. Washington maintained that when introducing the notification measure in the Conference, the Allies should not try to define what constitutes a "major" military activity because the issue could be highly divisive. Washington argued that if protracted and detailed discussions of CBMs were anticipated, this could strengthen Eastern resolve to resist further discussions of the topic in the CSCE. Moreover, Washington was concerned that if the Warsaw Pact nations were to agree to such criteria they could use this in the MBFR to argue that the issue of constraints had already been adequately discussed in the CSCE.[26]

As recommended by Washington, one way to avoid these dangers would be for NATO and the WTO to engage in a dialogue on past military activities which have been, or could have been, announced in advance, as this could serve as indicators of what both sides understand the term "major" to mean in this context. Also, as first introduced in the October Alliance draft guidelines, the Allies could table their own illustrative lists of recent military activities and invite other participants to do the same. If the WTO refused, the West could then decide to provide a list of recent Eastern European military activities as examples of what the Western governments would expect them to notify in advance noting that all, or some, of these activities were announced by the Pact either immediately before, during, or upon completion of the events.

7. A NEGOTIATING STRATEGY?

Perhaps because of the non-conclusiveness of the discussions and the limited time before the opening of the Conference's preliminaries, the Allies agreed just before the opening of the MPT to develop "illustrative lists" of manoeuvres and movements to be pursued internally at NATO.[27] Each NATO member state participating in the CSCE would develop a list reflecting only its national contribution to recent NATO military activities. These lists would be tabled on an individual basis at an appropriate time during the negotiations.

As argued by Washington earlier in the month, the primary rationale for developing such lists

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[26] Another concern was that the issue could raise questions on the Baltic or the Mediterranean. Ibid.
[27] Ibid. 25 June 1973. The exact date of the decision to start developing illustrative lists is unknown. However, reference to completed national lists being studied at NATO in February 1973 can be found in Ibid., 15 March 1973.

was to try to reach an understanding during the negotiations on what should be notified, while avoiding long and complex discussions which many feared might ensue from efforts at reaching precise definitions. The main reason for trying to circumvent defining the measures in the CSCE was to avoid any development in this forum that could impact on MBFR. Such a consideration, of course, was based on a number of uncertainties. The MBFR explorations would not open for another two months after the CSCE, and no one could predict if anything of substance would emerge from these negotiations. Yet, on the eve of the opening of the MPT, Washington's concerns over MBFR prevailed and the Allies agreed to opt for caution in the Conference.

8. CONCLUSION

Almost one year after publicly suggesting the consideration of "certain military aspects of security" in the CSCE, the Western governments had finally found a topic that could fill in this agenda item. As noted in a Draft Brief prepared for the United Kingdom delegation on the eve of the MPT, no common understanding existed at NATO regarding "the nature or desirability of a joint declaration" on force reductions.[28] However, the Allies agreed that the NATO delegations at the CSCE should propose: "(1) the advance notification of manoeuvres and troop movements; and (2) the invitation on a generally equitable basis of observers to military exercises."[29]

Despite the fact that Alliance discussions on the security aspects of the Conference had finally yield one topic agreeable to all, no state was truly committed to CBMs and the Allies knew very little about the measures they were to sponsor at the MPT. Since the tabling of the US document on CBMs in July 1972, most of the discussions in Brussels had been spent on criticising its content with nothing of substance being thoroughly examined or firmly agreed upon. Measures including the notification and limitation of movements of a certain size within and/or into certain areas, the invitation of observers to any notified manoeuvres, as well as the installation of radar and sensors, and aerial observation had also been proposed but were rejected by a majority because they did not meet one, or more, of the criteria.[30] At the end of this process only the notification of major manoeuvres and movements and the exchange of observers at manoeuvres gained the approval of all. But, the Allies had no clear

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[28] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 76 note 14.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973 and 12 October 1972.

view on how they envisaged the operation of these two measures. No comprehensive study had been undertaken[31] and while the criterion agreed upon may have been judged sufficient to determine the suitability of any measure, it was evident that their vagueness and many contradictions would make them of little use for defining objectives to be pursued during the negotiations or help in the development of a comprehensive NATO policy on CBMs. If anything, the consultations in Brussels also revealed an important split between the Allies, with one group of states favouring a more serious or comprehensive development of CBMs and another, the majority then, favouring keeping the measures to a minimum and very general. Furthermore, because of concerns that the CBMs might prejudice the development of parallel measures in MBFR, the only negotiating strategy formulated by the Allies to deal with the measures was to concentrate on developing illustrative lists of military activities and this strategy had the primary (if not only) purpose of avoiding defining the measures they were to propose. The net result of this decision was that the Allies arrived at the CSCE preliminary talks with no working definition of the terms "movements", "manoeuvres" or "exercises", nor did they have any agreement or clear understanding on what the expression "major" should describe in relation to these terms.

Another striking feature of NATO's preparations for CBMs was that the United States had provided most of the preliminary work on the measures with little input from the Europeans. While this state of affairs may have been indicative of an overall lack of interest for the measures existing at NATO, it may not necessarily have been accidental. Indeed, it is plausible that the Europeans feared that by presenting anything on CBMs, this might diminish their chances to convince the United States and France, the two NATO countries clearly opposed to the establishment of a link with MBFR, to change their position on the issue. Incidentally, this may also have been the reason why, of all the NATO partners, the United States provided the first study on CBMs. From Washington's perspective, the advancement of Allied preparations on this issue may have been seen as the only means to ensure that the topic of "certain military aspects of security" would be filled in by something else than MBFR. But, regardless of the main reason for the absence of any substantial European contribution on CBMs, NATO's preparations for the pre-conference consultations had achieved very little to prepare the West to sponsor the measures in this forum. Apart from the fact that the measures should be kept simple and that they should not jeopardise MBFR, the NATO governments had no clear view of what they wanted to achieve with the CBMs.

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[31] The October Alliance *Draft Agenda/Guidelines* was based on comments made in the course of only two meetings. Canada, DEA, 12 October 1972

CHAPTER 4

THE NEGOTIATION OF CBMS AT THE MPT (NOVEMBER 1972 – JUNE 1973)

1. INTRODUCTION

The Multilateral Preparatory Talks for the CSCE opened at the Technical Institute of Dipoli, near Helsinki, on 22 November 1972. At the invitation of the Finnish government, representatives from thirty-two European nations, the United States and Canada attended the consultations.[1] Although the purpose of the talks was to address the many preparatory aspects related to the organisation of a full-scale Conference, the multilateral talks did not automatically entail the convocation of such a Conference. As clearly enunciated by NATO in the Bonn communiqué of May 1972, the Western states only agreed to enter multilateral consultations "to establish that enough common ground existed among the participants to warrant reasonable expectations that a Conference would produce satisfactory results."[2] Concerned that the Soviet Union would use the CSCE "for propaganda of all kinds",[3] the Allies would not commit to attend a full-scale Conference unless the results of the consultations in Dipoli yielded sufficient evidence that issues of importance to them would be carefully reviewed at the Conference.[4] In line with this position, the Western states entered the MPT requesting a thorough preparation of the organisation of the CSCE and a clear formulation of all Conference agenda items, including agreed "terms of references" or mandates for their consideration.[5]

The approach of the Soviet Union to the Helsinki consultations was diametrically opposed. In the years immediately preceding the opening of the MPT, Moscow's predominant objectives

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[1] Albania was the only European country to abstain from the CSCE, while the participation of the Principality of Monaco was decided during the MPT so that it could only take part in the Conference itself. Hence the 34 participating States of the MPT were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.

[2] Bonn, 30-31 May 1972. *NATO Final Communiqués*, pp. 276-279.

[3] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 59.

[4] See Ibid. pp. 73-74 and p. 79. For an official discussion of the Western aims for the MPT, Ibid., pp. 70-80.

[5] See "La Roumanie demande que la conférence européenne traite le problème de la réduction des forces", *Le Monde*, 3-4 December 1972; "Agenda Issue Next at Talks in Helsinki", *IHT*, 6 December 1972; "Helsinki Plea for Free Movement of Ideas", *The Times*, 5 December 1972; and "U.S. Sees Hope for Amity in Europe Security Parley", *NYT*, 5 December 1972.

for a Conference was to obtain greater recognition of the postwar borders in Europe, legitimise Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and provide a general acquiescence of its hegemony in the region.[6] By November 1972 some of these objectives had been partially achieved.[7] West German treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland legitimised the territorial gains made by the Communists during World War II, and the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR conferred international respectability on East Germany.[8] Therefore, Moscow's main goal for the MPT was only to secure the early convening of a symbolic high-level meeting, which would endorse a general document furthering its objectives.[9] The Soviets were not interested in detailed agreements in the CSCE and did not wish its preparations to stall on details. Accordingly, the opening Soviet position in Dipoli was to request agreement only on the date and place of the main Conference and a broad definition of its agenda.[10]

Given the fundamental different objectives of NATO and the WTO, as soon as the MPT opened differences between East and West emerged on almost every aspect of the Conference and progress was very slow, requiring four rounds of talks which, including recesses, lasted more than six-months.[11]

2. MULTILATERAL PREPARATORY TALKS: A BRIEF HISTORY

In the first round (22 November to 15 December 1972) the discussion focused on a number of procedural questions and concluded with a general debate in which the delegations presented their basic approaches to the CSCE. During the second round (15 January to 9 February 1973) the participants formally submitted recommendations for the agenda of the Conference and began discussing some of the proposals. In the third round (26 February to 6 April 1973)

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[6] This view was widely held by Western officials and governments. For a comprehensive review of the assessment of the British government relating to Moscow's main objectives for a Conference, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 4-5, pp. 24-25 and pp. 181-182. For a discussion by a senior member of the US delegation at Helsinki, see Maresca, *To Helsinki*, pp. 24-25. For similar opinions expressed at different times, see Palmer, "*The Prospects*", p. 18; Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 89-90; and Povolny, "The Soviet Union", p. 201.

[7] For a discussion, see. Maresca", *To Helsinki*, p. 24. See also, "Playing to win at Helsinki", *The Times*, 7 February 1973, and "Not Exactly a Meeting of Minds", *NYT*, 5 December 1972.

[8] The Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR was signed on 21 December 1972. However, it had been initialed on 8 November 1972, a few weeks before the opening of the MPT.

[9] See Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 169, and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, especially p. 213.

[10] See Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 117.

[11] For an overview of the first three rounds of negotiations, see Götz von Groll, "The Helsinki Consultations", *Aussenpolitik*, 24: 2, 1973, pp. 123-129.

the work of the MPT shifted from plenary sessions to working groups and drafting committees where serious consideration was given to the agenda items and to the terms of reference within which the Committees and Sub-Committees would draft decisions. In the fourth and final round (25 April to 8 June 1973) efforts were made to settle all outstanding matters, allowing for the conclusion of the consultations on 8 June 1973.

The results of the MPT were contained in a document entitled "Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations" (FRHC). Often referred to as the *Blue Book*, for the colour of the cover chosen for its publication, the twenty-seven-page document contained 96 recommendations on several organisational and procedural aspects of the Conference. Regarding the organisation of the CSCE, the *Blue Book* outlined the agreement of the parties for a Conference to be held in three stages. After the MPT, Stage I of the CSCE would convene in Helsinki at foreign minister level for a short meeting to adopt the work of the MPT and hear the views of the participants. Stage II, to be held in Geneva at the level of diplomats and experts, would carry the substantive negotiations in different Committees and Sub-Committees, and prepare draft decisions, recommendations, resolutions or any final documents. At Stage III, to be held again in Helsinki on a date and at a level (Foreign Ministers or Heads of Government) to be determined before the end of the second stage, the Conference would conclude by formally endorsing the work of Stage II and its final documents.[12]

With regard to rules of procedure, the *Blue Book* registered the desire of the participants to have most meetings of the CSCE closed to the public and to have all the decisions of the Conference (substantive and procedural) taken by consensus.[13] Concerning the agenda of the CSCE, the Dipoli consultations determined that four main issues, or "baskets" as they came to be known during the preliminaries, would be discussed:

1. Questions relating to security in Europe:
   - principles of relations between participating States;
   - confidence-building measures;
2. Co-operation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment;
3. Co-operation in humanitarian and other fields;
4. Follow-up to the Conference.

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[12] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 14.

[13] As described in paragraph 69, this meant "the absence of any objection expressed by a Representative and submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question".

With almost half of the 96 Final Recommendations (paragraphs 13 to 53) devoted to the mandates of the different agenda items and defining in relative detail the problems to be discussed at the Conference, the work of the MPT has been described as the "key to the entire subsequent negotiation".[14] In the field of CBMs, the Helsinki Final Recommendations consisted of only one short paragraph, but adoption of a programme in this field was one of the most difficult aspects of the pre-conference talks, with the parties starting with completely opposite views on the importance of addressing military issues in the negotiations.

3. THE MPT DELIBERATIONS ON SECURITY AND CBMS

3. 1 *First Session (22 November - 15 December 1972)*

Proposals for the consideration of confidence-building measures at the Conference were introduced very early on in the first round of the consultations during the general policy debate. Supporting previous interventions from the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark,[15] Canada took the floor on 1 December to suggest that the Conference "seek to reach agreement on certain military aspects of security, including, perhaps, advance notification of military movements and observations of manoeuvres as steps that would help to build confidence between countries and help to enhance stability."[16] This was followed, on 4 December, by a similar statement made by the United States suggesting that the Conference consider unspecified "measures which could build confidence that military maneuvers [would] not create instability or misunderstanding."[17]

The general low-key approach of the Western nations towards CBMs reflected the agreement reached at NATO, prior to the consultations, that the Allies would limit themselves to a broad description of the measures. With no Western government strongly committed to the issue, and with concerns about possible implications for the MBFR negotiations scheduled to start after the opening of the MPT, the overall objective of the Allies was only to provide "a cautious encouragement of CBMs".[18] Furthermore, the confidence-building measures were

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[14] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 7. Members of other delegations agreed with this assessment. For commentaries from Soviet and Yugoslav delegates, see, respectively, Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", p. 193; and Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 117.

[15] See François Carle, "Les pourparlers exploratoires d'Helsinki (première partie)", *Études internationales*, IV: 3, September 1973, p. 339. [Hereafter: Carle, "Les pourparlers " (première partie)].

[16] As quoted in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, *Statements and Speeches*, No. 73/3.

[17] *NYT*, 10 December 1972. See also Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), p. 340.

[18] Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973.

only one of many topics the West wished the Conference to address. In addition to the security questions (which included both the CBMs and the principles of inter-state relations), the Allies wanted to discuss human contacts, as well as co-operation in the field of economic exchange, science, technology, and the environment.[19]

The Soviet position on what subjects should be discussed at the Conference differed from the West. As presented by Ambassador Victor Maltsev, on the first day of the general debate, Moscow believed that the Conference should consider the following three topics:

1. guarantees for European security and the establishment of principles governing relations between European states;
2. the extension of economic, commercial, scientific and cultural links, and collaboration in protecting the environment;
3. the establishment of a permanent organ to deal with the application of the Conference decisions.[20]

The absence of any provision on "human contacts" clearly underlined the Soviet opposition to discuss what the West conceived as an agenda point for the consideration of the "freer movement of people and ideas". Similarly, the absence of any reference to CBMs underscored that the Eastern states were not prepared to enlarge the discussion of "guarantees for European security" to any other topic than the consideration of "principles of inter-state relations" through which they hoped to achieve the general recognition of the political and territorial *status quo* in Europe by including provisions on the non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers.[21] With the sole exception of Romania, who took a completely independent stand from the other Warsaw Pact nations, the position of Moscow and its close allies was that the Conference should not deal in any way with "military" issues. Such a position was widely publicised in a number of commentaries published in the East at the opening of the consultations,[22] and the view that CBMs belonged to the list of "military" subjects to be excluded from the CSCE was clearly underscored by criticism from the government-run Czech newspaper, *Rude Pravo*, of the opening speech of the Head of Delegation of the United Kingdom.

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[19] Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), p. 323.
[20] Ibid.
[21] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 181 and p. 250.
[22] For a discussion, see J. P. Jain, "Romania and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe", *India Quarterly*, 29: 4, October-December 1973, pp. 331-332. [Hereafter, Jain, "Romania and the Conference"].

In his opening statement to the preliminaries on 30 November, British Ambassador T.A.K. Elliot addressed the question of European security maintaining that, in his opinion, the issues related to SALT or MBFR were "rightly separated" from the Conference but that the CSCE -- being a Conference on Security in Europe-- should nevertheless not ignore the problem of military security and should consider measures "designed to increase mutual confidence."[23] Despite the Ambassador's unequivocal assertion that force reductions or nuclear issues would be better dealt with elsewhere, and that the Conference should limit itself to some CBMs, advocacy of this more modest recommendation was ill received in the East. As described in the *Rude Pravo*:

> This British stand [was] contrary to the spirit of the conference preparations, since to agree to negotiations on military matters means to complicate the preparation of the conference and, in effect, to delay the convening of the conference longer than a considerable number of delegations in Helsinki would like.[24]

The "considerable number of delegations in Helsinki" referred, of course, to the Warsaw Pact nations whom, with the exception of Romania, were the only delegations clearly opposed to considering any "military" aspects of security in the CSCE. All the NATO countries, with the backing of a majority of participating States, were endorsing the inclusion of CBMs, while many of the NNAs, supported by Romania, were also proposing that the Conference address several other subjects affecting European military security.

Even before the Multilateral Preparatory Talks opened, the Romanian government stated that its delegation would underline the problem of military disengagement, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the dismantling of foreign bases.[25] In the opening days of the MPT, President Ceaucescu issued a statement in Bucharest declaring that his country was not opposed to MBFR provided the CSCE participants could ensure the desired outcome.[26] Then, on 1 December, the Romanian Head of Delegation in Helsinki said that his country expected the CSCE to discuss "ways of negotiating the reduction of troops on foreign soil",

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[23] See *Statement by H. M. Ambassador in Helsinki, Mr. T.A.K. Elliot to the Multi-lateral Preparatory Talks on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 30 November 1972*, in *Verbatim Service* 383/72, 1st December 1972, London Press Service.

[24] "*Rude Pravo* Correspondent Rovensky Reports on Talks", Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0800 GMT, 1 December 1972 L, in FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), *Daily Report*, Monday, 4 December 1972, No. 234, p. A4. The Bulgarian, Polish and Soviet press made similar attacks on the West, linking their proposal on security with the force reductions talks. For the respective commentaries, see FBIS, *Daily Report*, 14 December 1972, No. 242, pp. A1-4; FBIS, *Daily Report*, 4 December 1972, No. 234, p. A-8-9; and FBIS, *Daily Report*, 15 December 1972, No. 245, p. I1-2.

[25] Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), p. 337.

[26] Ibid.

East-West troop reductions, and some disarmament issues.[27] As presented by the Romanian delegate:

> It would be necessary to discuss, within the European conference, the modalities and forms under which the negotiations would have to proceed for the reduction and withdrawal of those troops on the territory of other states, of the national troops and armaments, as well as other measures of military disengagement and disarmament in Europe. Since all the European states are interested in the achievement of such measures, they have the right and must have the actual possibility of directly participating, of having their say and of defending their legitimate interests within any disarmament negotiations referring to Europe, the reduction of the armed forces and armaments included.[28]

Romania's call for a thorough examination of military issues at the Conference was endorsed by a number of other participating States. When the general debate began in late November, Yugoslavia and Sweden, for instance, also requested that force reductions be taken under consideration by the CSCE.[29] Similarly, a number of NATO countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark advocated that the Conference be given a greater role in military matters.[30] Highlighting the fact that the debate within the Western Alliance regarding the establishment of a link between the CSCE and the MBFR was still unresolved, the Netherlands suggested that such a link be accepted by the Conference.[31] Norway supported this and proposed that the negotiations on force reductions be put on the agenda of the CSCE and that the Conference be entitled to adopt certain "guidelines" on MBFR.[32]

On confidence-building measures, the position of the leading neutral and non-aligned countries, Sweden and Yugoslavia, supported by Romania, was that the CSCE should try to reach conclusions on a large number of proposals. These states not only favoured the notification of military manoeuvres and force movements, but also constraints to be placed on the movement of troops.[33] Yugoslavia also envisaged that the Conference should consider

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[27] See "Rumania Continues Jab at Russia", *The Times*, 2 December 1972, and *Le Monde*, 3-4 December 1972.

[28] "Romanian Delegate Speaks in General Debate", Bucharest International Service in English, 1922 GMT, 1 December 1972 L, reproduced in FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), *Daily Report,* Monday, 4 December 1972, No. 234, p. A-10.

[29] See "Three-stage Security Talks Idea Favoured", *The Times*, 1 December 1972; "La Norvège, le Danemark et la Yougoslavie approuvent le plan français d'une conférence européenne en trois phases", *Le Monde*, 2 December 1972; and Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), p. 337.

[30] See *Le Monde*, 2 December 1972; "More Than a Document on Security Needed --Britain", *FT*, 1 December 1972; and "La Grande-Bretagne et la Yugoslavie exposent leurs vues sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe", *Le Monde*, 1 December 1972.

[31] See *Le Monde*, 1 December 1972.

[32] See *FT*, 1 December 1972.

[33] Canada, DEA, 25 June 1973. Among the various open sources discussing the proposals of the NNAs at the MPT, see Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), pp. 338-341; Acimovic, *Problems of*

limitation on certain forms of military activities, such as the size of manoeuvres, demonstrations of armed forces, and escalation of the level of military forces on foreign soil.[34] Endorsing these proposals, Romania further advocated the withdrawal of troops stationed on the territory of other states; the reduction of national troops; the dismantling of foreign military bases, and; the reduction of military budgets.[35] Finally, while Sweden indicated an interest for adopting military constraint measures for the Baltic region,[36] a number of other participating States supported the idea of applying CBMs in the Mediterranean region.[37]

By the time the first session of the MPT concluded for Christmas recess on 15 December, it was clear that the remainder of the talks related to the security aspects of the Conference would involve much more than the principles of inter-state relations and the two confidence-building measures proposals envisaged by NATO.

3. 2 *Second Session (15 January - 9 February 1973)*

When the talks resumed on 15 January, the Western states formally tabled their proposals for the agenda of the CSCE along with terms of reference for its working bodies.[38] The Western documents also dealt with procedural matters, suggesting that the Conference set up three main Committees and ten working Sub-Committees to consider the main topics previously suggested by them, as well as various sub-headings. With regard to the security aspects of the CSCE, Italy, who presented the Western document on this issue, proposed the creation of a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Security to study the question of the notification of military manoeuvres and movements, and the exchange of observers to manoeuvres.[39]

Soviet reaction to the Western agenda items and the formal proposal for consideration of two CBMs at the Conference was cool. Speaking on the same day, the Soviet Head of

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Security, pp. 216-217; Jain, "Romania and the Conference", pp. 330-332; and Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 22-23.

[34] Canada, DEA, 25 June 1973.

[35] See Jain, "Romania and the Conference", pp. 330-332.

[36] Canada, DEA, 25 June 1973.

[37] See Ghebali, *La diplomatie de la détente*, p. 371; and Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 22-23.

[38] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 88 and pp. 78-79. See also "West's Proposals for Agenda of Security Conference", *The Times*, 19 January 1973, "Barriers Come Down as Helsinki Meetings Resume", *The Guardian*, 16 January 1973; "Community Presents Plans for Security at Helsinki", *The Times*, 16 January 1973; and "La préparation de la conférence européenne. Les Neuf ont déposé à Helsinki un projet d'ordre du jour", *Le Monde*, 17 January 1973.

[39] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 88; "Barriers Come Down as Helsinki Meetings Resume", *The Guardian*, 16 January 1973; and Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), pp. 323-325.

Delegation, Ambassador Maltsev, made no reference to the Western propositions and, in the following few days, Moscow's close allies adopted a similar silence on the issue.[40] The absence of any reaction by the East European countries to the Western agenda items was soon explained by an unannounced meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the WTO countries in Moscow.[41] The meeting had reportedly been called to assess, in view of the tabling of the Western agenda, the Pact's strategy in Dipoli and to prepare for the upcoming MBFR talks which, according to the schedule proposed by the West, were to open on 31 January.[42]

Although Maltsev and the other East European representatives offered no official comment on CBMs at the plenary sessions of the MPT,[43] a commentary published by *TASS*, the same day Italy tabled the Western proposals on security matters, left no doubt about Moscow's position. Not only did the Soviets oppose the consideration of any "military" topics in the Conference and questioned the link between military security and CBMs, but they also concluded that the theme had been proposed only to complicate and delay the preparatory talks.[44] In the following few days a number of commentaries from the Eastern bloc countries echoed the Soviet opposition to having any military issues addressed at the CSCE and their resentment of proposing that they should discuss the question at the MPT.[45]

Interpreted as a hardening of the Eastern position,[46] the criticism of the WTO nations was probably not specifically, nor predominantly, in reaction to the formal inclusion of CBMs in the Western agenda items. Since the opening of the Dipoli consultations, appeals for the CSCE to deal with military security issues had become increasingly more numerous and significant. At the beginning of the consultations, several neutral and non-aligned states, supported by Romania and a number of NATO countries, had requested that the CSCE be given a greater say in military matters and that a link be established between the force reductions talks and the Conference. Yet, in spite of the initial strong Eastern opposition to these ideas, such proposals continued to be advocated at the start of the second round of talks

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[40] See *Le Monde*, 17 January 1973; and Carle, Ibid., p. 325.
[41] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 15; and Carle, Ibid. Carle also notes that many East Europeans delegates were not present at the Conference.
[42] See "East Europeans Begin Strategy Session", *NYT*, 16 January 1973. As reported in this article: "Western diplomats suggested that because of the complexity of the issues and the relatively limited preparations so far, the Warsaw Pact countries needed to agree upon a unified position for the first East-West talks on the reduction of military forces in Central Europe."
[43] As a result of the lack of any reaction from the Eastern countries because many of their delegates were absent from the Conference room, a suspension of the meetings was called from 18 to 22 January. See Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 15.
[44] See Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), p. 340; and *NYT*, 16 January 1973.
[45] "East Hardens Line at Helsinki", *FT*, 18 January 1973.
[46] Ibid.

in Dipoli in mid-January 1973. On 17 January, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland proposed placing military security issues, including troop cuts, on the agenda of the Conference.[47] Sweden and Switzerland also requested the establishment of a special Sub-Committee of the Committee on Security to study arms control and other military measures.[48] On 18 January, the Netherlands argued that the relation between the military and political aspects of security (which, in the MPT language, meant the link between the CSCE and MBFR) should be underlined by the Conference.[49] In addition, Belgium and Romania were still on record for requesting a link between the CSCE and the proposed negotiations on MBFR by demanding that the heading "military aspects of security" include a specific commitment by both military alliances to the principles of troop reductions.[50] In fact, even after the conclusion of the WTO meeting in Moscow, which had reportedly been arranged to get Bucharest in line with the Pact's position at Dipoli, Romania continued to advocate the consideration of military issues, including military disengagement and troop cuts.[51]

As evidenced by the Soviet and Eastern press during this first week of the second round of deliberations at Dipoli, the Kremlin and its close allies remained strongly opposed to any such consideration. For them, "all questions of military disengagement and disarmament should be dealt with at separate talks" and "no military matters at all should be linked with the Helsinki talks."[52] Furthermore, arms control and troop reductions were "separate, independent questions" which "should become the subject of talks between the states concerned elsewhere than at the all-European conference".[53]

Given Moscow's strong opposition to discussing any military aspects of security in the CSCE and particularly, it seems, those related to arms control and disarmament, it is most likely that the hardening of the Eastern position, apparent in January, was primarily due to the repeated and increasing number of appeals for consideration of these topics at the Conference, and

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[47] See Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 15; "Long-term Security", *The Guardian*, 18 January 1973; "Europe's Neutrals Want Voice on Arms Cut at Security Talks", *IHT*, 18 January 1973; and *FT*, 18 January 1973.
[48] *Financial Times*, 18 January 1973.
[49] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 15.
[50] "Helsinki to Hear NATO View", *The Guardian*, 15 January 1973.
[51] See the *FT* of 18 January 1973:
[52] See Ibid., 18 January 1973. Commentaries from the *Pravda* editions of 4 and 9 February 1973 can be found, respectively, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [CDSP], XXV: 5, 28 February 1973, p. 25; and CDSP, XXV: 6, 7 March 1973, p. 18.
[53] As reported in the *IHT*, 18 January 1973.

especially those related to the establishment of an MBFR-CSCE link.[54] Indeed, in a complete reversal of position, when the Soviet Ambassador addressed the MPT for the first time after the WTO meeting, he put forward an amended agenda for the Conference, which included a reference to confidence-building measures. [55] As presented by Maltsev, on 22 January, the Soviet Union was now ready to consider adding to its first agenda item the consideration of "certain measures for strengthening stability and confidence".[56] Furthermore, although Maltsev did not describe the nature of these measures or elaborate further on the subject,[57] he emphasised in his speech that there was no longer any need to discuss military matters in Helsinki because the WTO had now officially proposed separate talks on force reductions, open to all interested states, where these issues could be discussed.[58]

Maltsev's comments on MBFR referred to the long-awaited reply of the Warsaw Pact nations to NATO's formal invitation to start exploratory talks on force reductions on 31 January. The WTO reply, released on 18 January after the conclusion of the Moscow meeting, noted that the talks should be held in Vienna, and not Geneva as proposed by the West, and that they should be opened to all interested nations. The Pact's suggestion for the MBFR to be opened to all interested states surprised many Western governments who believed that the issue of participation in the MBFR had previously been settled --during the visit of President Nixon to Moscow in May and that of Henry Kissinger in September 1972-- and that the talks would only involve those states who had troops in the Central Region.[59]

Several motivations were attributed to the Soviet announcement on the enlargement of participation in the MBFR. As many reports suggested, the decision had been "inspired by France and arranged during President Georges Pompidou's visit" to Minsk earlier in the month (10-12 January).[60] During the visit, Pompidou and Brezhnev discussed MBFR and,

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[54] By February 1973, 16 proposals on security issues had been advanced at the MPT, and seven of these had been made by neutral or non-aligned nations. See Legault and Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, p. 480, and pp. 623-624 note 18. Furthermore by 23 March 1973, no less than five texts had been submitted on the issue of MBFR. See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 92.

[55] See "Moscow Modifies Helsinki Proposals", *The Guardian*, 23 January 1973; and "Soviet Agenda Put Forward in Helsinki", *The Times*, 23 January 1973. The new agenda item proposed by Moscow related to the expansion of cultural co-operation and dissemination of information; a concession to the request of the NATO countries to address the issue of "human contacts".

[56] See Ibid.

[57] See "Russia Makes General Reply to West at Security Talks", *IHT*, 23 January 1973.

[58] See *The Guardian*, 23 January 1973; and "Soviet Union Proposes a Four-Point Agenda for Planned All-Europe Security Conference", *NYT*, 23 January 1973.

[59] "Les pays de l'Est proposeraient que la négociation sur les réductions de forces soit ouverte à tous les Etats", *Le Monde*, 18 January 1973; and "Western Camp 'Confused, Worried': Soviet Bid Rattles Security Talks", *IHT*, 20 January 1973.

[60] *IHT*, 20 January 1973; Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 67; and *Le Monde,* 18 January 1973.

while Pompidou maintained French reservations to such negotiations, he had apparently hinted that he might reconsider his country's position on participation. Since France's main objection to MBFR was its bloc-to-bloc approach, many observers believed that the Soviet objective in proposing that the negotiations should be opened to all interested states (and not only to the members of both alliances) was simply to obtain French acquiescence to the talks.[61]

Another motivation suggested for the Soviet announcement on MBFR was that Moscow was trying to disrupt the harmony that was developing between the Western states and the neutrals at Dipoli by forcing the Allies to take a stand against the inclusion of the former in MBFR.[62] Such interpretation would be consistent with the view held by many at the time that the Soviet move was mainly for propaganda purposes.[63] Indeed, most Western governments believed that the Soviet Union did not really want the MBFR negotiations to be held at some thirty-five nations, because the Warsaw Pact nations would find themselves in a minority and would be vulnerable to pressure from the NNAs.[64]

A third motivation attributed to the announcement was that the Soviet Union believed that by inviting all interested states to participate in MBFR it could avoid the consideration of all "military" issues in the CSCE.[65] Indeed, if all "interested nations" agreed to join the MBFR, Moscow could have argued that there was no longer any need to discuss such topics at the CSCE because negotiations of these issues were being held in another forum. Undoubtedly, and as clearly evidenced by Maltsev's comments in Dipoli on January 22, the Kremlin believed that its proposal on MBFR participation would completely close the debate on the introduction of military issues in the CSCE, and the fact that Maltsev had also accepted, in the same speech, the consideration of some unspecified measures to strengthen confidence would not necessarily be inconsistent with this goal. It is plausible that Moscow believed that if a number of "interested nations" agreed to join the MBFR it would be relatively easy to discard the modest CBMs from the CSCE on the grounds that similar measures were being dealt with in another forum. Meanwhile, probably waiting for reactions to their announcement, the

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[61] For a discussion, see Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 67. Also *Le Monde*, 18 January 1973, suggests that the reason why Pompidou left open the issue of participation in MBFR was that there were already rumours during his visit in Minsk on 12 January that the Soviets were considering opening the talks to all interested states.

[62] See Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 67.

[63] See Maresca, *To Helsinki*, pp. 53-54.

[64] Canada, DEA, n.d.

[65] See Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 67.

Soviets were reluctant to provide details on what their proposal on "certain measures for strengthening stability and confidence" really entailed. In fact, in an important speech delivered by Maltsev on 29 January, presenting the list of items Moscow would like to discuss under the heading 'Security', he did not even mention CBMs.[66]

Whatever objectives the Kremlin had hoped to achieve with its announcement on the enlargement of MBFR participation and the vague statement on the consideration of certain unspecified measures to strengthen security, these proposals had no impact on the discussions in Dipoli.[67] The same day Maltsev delivered his speech on these questions, many delegations spoke to denounce the Soviet position,[68] and argumentation in favour of the consideration of military issues continued unabated until the conclusion of the second round of talks.

On 24 January, the Netherlands, supported by Italy and later by Spain, argued for the CSCE to discuss the political aspects of disarmament, another reference to the link between MBFR and CSCE.[69] At the beginning of February, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia reiterated their demand for the CSCE to be given a greater say in military matters.[70] And, before the MPT adjourned for its second recess on 9 February, the question of the link between the CSCE and the MBFR continued to be argued by the Netherlands who, with the support of the neutrals and non-aligned, requested its consideration by the Conference.[71]

Meanwhile, perhaps having realised that the CSCE could not avoid dealing with some aspects of military security and that CBMs represented the most innocuous programme in this field, the East Germans provided the first clear indication that the WTO nations were ready to move forward on CBMs. In a document tabled by them on 5 February, reference was made to "certain measures for strengthening stability and confidence having in mind mutual notifications about large military manoeuvres in stipulated areas and the possibility of the exchange of observers according to an invitation at such manoeuvres."[72]

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[66] "La sécurité Européenne. M. Maltsev (U.R.S.S.) a abordé la discussion de fond", *Le Monde*, 31 January 1973. Maltsev only mentioned two points: the principles governing relations between states, and measures to promote their implementation.

[67] In mid-February 1973, the British delegation at Helsinki noted that the neutrals had "resisted the Soviet suggestion that they should transfer their attention to Vienna". Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 95.

[68] See Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), p. 340.

[69] Ibid., p. 338.

[70] *The Guardian*, 2 February 1973.

[71] See "Seule la sécurité européenne a fait l'objet d'un examen approfondi", *Le Monde*, 9 February 1973.

[72] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 92 note 5. The report also noted that by the end of the second session of the Dipoli consultations the Soviets "had still not given formal support to this formula."

3.3 *Third Session (26 February - 6 April 1973)*

The third round of consultations opened with most delegations being concerned about the slow pace of progress registered in the first three months of talks, and France successfully proposed the creation of a Working Group to examine in greater detail the numerous proposals which, by then, had been grouped into four broad subject areas, or "baskets".[73] As conceived, the Working Group would discuss all proposals in each of the four baskets in turn, before proceeding to define mandates or agreeing on a title for each category.[74] Although the Soviet Union had initially opposed the development of terms of reference for the different agenda items (and still did not specifically agree to it), Moscow accepted the establishment of a Working Group, having complained during the second session that the plenary meetings were too burdensome.[75]

On 1 March, the Working Group convened at expert-level to study the principles of inter-state relations, the first item registered in Basket One.[76] By 14 March, sufficient progress had been made on the issue for the Working Group to begin discussing confidence-building measures.[77] Meanwhile, the delegations had agreed that unofficial drafting committees, or "Mini-Groups", could start recording texts on the most important points of the agenda[78] and, following a Swiss proposal, a Mini-Group to consider only the military questions of Basket One had started under Swedish chairmanship.[79]

As soon as the delegations began their closer examination of the different proposals on military issues, it became evident that a very important part of their deliberations would have

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[73] For background, see Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 13 and p. 16; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 89 and pp. 91-92.

[74] See "Le représentant de la France a fait de nouvelles propositions sur la procédure", *Le Monde*, 28 February 1973, "French Proposal for Helsinki", *FT*, 27 February 1973; and Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 104 and pp. 98-99.

[75] See Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 19; and Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 104. For a discussion of the evolution of the Soviet position on the issue, see Ferraris, p. 16; and Bennett and Hamilton, pp. 91-92 and p. 98.

[76] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 20; and "La Suisse propose de créer un sous-groupe sur les questions militaires", *Le Monde*, 4-5 March 1973.

[77] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 105.

[78] For a discussion of the working structure adopted in March, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 104-105; Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", pp. 96-97; "Major Step Forward at Helsinki Negotiations", *The Times*, 10 March 1973; "Helsinki Security Talks Make Further Progress", *FT*, 13 March 1973; "La rédaction d'un ordre du jour de la conférence européenne a commencé", *Le Monde*, 14 March 1973; and "Augury Silence", *The Guardian*, 14 March 1973.

[79] For background on the Swiss proposal, see *Le Monde*, 4-5 March 1973. For the beginning of the work of the Mini-Group on military issues, see "Les consultations d'Helsinki seront suspendues du 7 au 25 avril", *Le Monde*, 18-19 March 1973.

to be devoted to what was then largely described as the question of the "indivisibility, or interdependence, between the political and military aspects of security". In concrete terms, this phrase provided a justification to the numerous proposals advanced by the NNAs and underlined the dissatisfaction of these states that military issues in Europe were being dealt with exclusively by the military alliances and carried out in parallel negotiations, such as MBFR and SALT, while such negotiations could impact on their security.[80] The ambitious aim of the NNAs in arguing for recognition of the interdependence between the political and military aspects of security remained, as before, that the Conference provide them a greater role in the decisions affecting the security of all states on the continent. In this regard, the NNAs wanted the CSCE to recognise their right to participate in defining guidelines for arms control and disarmament negotiations, to advance recommendations in these negotiations, and to be kept informed about their developments. As argued more forcefully than during the general policy debate, the NNAs believed that these objectives could be achieved by establishing some institutional connection between MBFR and CSCE whereby (perhaps as a form of a Sub-Conference to the CSCE) the MBFR would report to the Conference, or by the CSCE elaborating the principles for the pursuit of these negotiations as well as other disarmament talks in which they were not involved.[81] In line with this objective Sweden tabled, on 15 March, a document requesting that the mandate of the Committee on Security include the issue of "other aspects of security".[82] The proposal was immediately supported by the Yugoslav delegation who stated that it was necessary that the CSCE define the general principles of the MBFR negotiations.[83]

Until the opening of the third session and the beginning of drafting of mandates, opposition to the NNAs proposals had mainly been raised by the Eastern bloc countries. However, in early 1973, a number of Western countries including France, the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain also began to express their disapproval.[84] From then on, France became one of the most reluctant participants to accept any language on the subject, arguing that "the

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[80] For a discussion of the relationship between the political and military aspects of security, see Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 226-227.

[81] See "Neutrals Seek a Military Détente", *The Guardian*, 16 March 1973; Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 24; Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", p. 107; and Acimovic, Ibid., pp. 226-227.

[82] Ferraris, Ibid., p. 24. Ferraris notes that these aspects "were none other than the link of the MBFR with the CSCE."

[83] Ibid., p. 24.

[84] See *The Guardian*, 16 March 1973; and Ferraris, Ibid., p. 24. For earlier reports on French disapproval of the issue, see "Seule la sécurité européenne a fait l'objet d'un examen approfondi", *Le Monde*, 9 February 1973; and Carle, "Les pourparlers" (première partie), pp. 337-338. Carle also notes a disapproving statement of the British Ambassador on 2 February in response to a Dutch intervention requesting the establishment of a link with MBFR.

Conference should, in no way, be pushed into facing a real debate on military problems or to promote a connection of a structural nature with the MBFR, even if only for the sake of information."[85]

While the debate on "other aspects of security", or the "indivisibility of political and military détente", slowly came to a standstill, discussion on CBMs had to tackle a wide range of proposals reflecting different interests in the matter. In addition to the notification of major manoeuvres and movements, and the exchange of observers put forward by NATO, the Working Group had to consider the Romanian and NNAs' requests for a large number of measures, including establishing constraints on movement of troops, limiting demonstrations of armed forces, prohibiting manoeuvres near border areas as well as several proposals relating to nuclear-weapons-free zones.

In spite of the wide range and number of proposals, the delegations made considerable progress by reaching agreement on a provisional draft text which, although containing several brackets indicating disagreements, represented a major step forward. The text, accepted *ad referendum*, on March 30, stipulated that:

> … appropriate proposals (of a preliminary nature) shall be submitted to the conference including measures such as the prior notification of major (movements and) manoeuvers on a basis to be specified by the conference (restraints on such movements and manoeuvers) and the exchange of observers at military manoeuvers under mutually acceptable conditions.[86]

As indicated by the absence of brackets, all participants had accepted the principle of prior notification of manoeuvres and the exchange of observers, but had not yet reached agreement on the issue of notification of movements, strongly opposed by the Warsaw Pact nations. Furthermore, judging by the overall content of the text (and its bracketed portions), most of the CBMs proposals put forward by the neutrals and non-aligned had either been greatly diluted in the overall discussions or had simply been ignored. This was the case, for instance, of the request made by Malta for the Conference to discuss aerial and naval manoeuvres taking place in the Mediterranean.[87] Similarly, Yugoslavia repeated suggestions for the consideration of measures to limit the number or size of manoeuvres, or prevent their holding near border zones were then reduced to a general discussion on "restraints". The same

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[85] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 24.
[86] Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973.
[87] Proposals made in March. For background, see Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 22-23.

applied to the Romanian proposal for identifying the CBMs to be adopted at the Conference as preliminary measures that could be followed-up at a later stage. All these proposals were opposed by Moscow and its close allies and went far beyond what the majority at NATO was willing to discuss at the CSCE. The lack of details in the text further revealed that the participants had not tackled the substance of the CBMs and, in fact, the consultations were already moving towards deferring the discussion on the substance of the measures and their parameters to the Conference proper.[88]

3. 4 *Fourth Session (25 April - 8 June 1973)*

The last session of the MPT opened with the unresolved questions of the "other military aspects of security" and, especially, the issue of a link between the CSCE and MBFR. Surprisingly, by mid-May, this latter question was mainly debated between two NATO countries, France and the Netherlands.[89] The Dutch delegation re-emphasised, with some neutral support, that the CSCE should "discuss the indivisibility of the military and political aspects of security and produce a declaration on force levels in Europe which would enable those not directly involved in MBFR to express their views".[90] France strongly argued against the proposal but was the only delegation to do so. Indeed, both the Soviets and the Americans had previously indicated willingness to accept some reference to disarmament and MBFR and, by May 12, the informal drafting group had even began to produce a compromise formula on the issue.[91] The French delegation, however, wanted no reference to any specific negotiations and remained adamant they could not accept "anything more than a passing reference to disarmament".[92]

One week later, "the difference between the Americans and Russians on the one hand and the Dutch, Yugoslav and Romanians on the other" was fairly narrow, and a possible compromise appeared in sight, but the French remained intransigent.[93] During discussions between the Soviets, the Americans, and a number of other delegations an agreement had almost been reached for adopting a text stipulating that the Conference was in favour of disarmament and of ending the arms race, and was in support of negotiations on these issues.[94] These

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[88] See Ibid., p. 26.
[89] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 125.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid.
[92] See Ibid.; and Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 34.
[93] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 129.
[94] Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", pp. 107-108.

formulations, however, were not supported by the French,[95] and the question relating to the concept of the indivisibility of the political and military aspects of security turned out to be one of the last issues to be solved by the MPT.

On June 7, following a compromise between France and Yugoslavia, acceptance was made for the Final Recommendations to note that "efforts aimed at disarmament complement political détente".[96] Agreement was also reached for the *Blue Book* to recognise the particular interest of the participating States to be informed about relevant developments from the point of view of their own security.[97] The phrase, which did not specifically refer to any negotiations or negotiating forums, was all that was left from the attempts of the NNAs and Romania, supported by a number of NATO countries, to link MBFR to the CSCE.

On CBMs, the last session of the MPT opened with the same three outstanding issues recorded in the provisional text of March:

> 1. Eastern opposition to accept the notification of military movements;
> 2. a Romanian proposal that CBMs were 'measures of a preliminary nature', and;
> 3. a Yugoslav proposal for 'restraints' on movements and manoeuvres.[98]

As in previous sessions at Dipoli, the issue of "restraints" on military activities (whether more generally defined or greatly diluted) continued to be rejected by a majority of NATO and WTO delegations and was eventually abandoned. Similarly, the Romanian suggestion for describing the measures to be adopted at the Conference as being only of a preliminary nature had to be considerably watered down mainly because of American, French and, to a lesser extent, Soviet opposition.[99]

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[95] Ibid., p. 108.

[96] See Ibid.; Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 129; Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 35; and "Two Compromises Clear Path for European Security Talks", *IHT*, 10 June 1973. Paragraph 22 of the FHRC read in full: "The Committee/Sub-Committee shall have regard to the fact that the participating States are desirous of eliminating any causes of tension that may exist among them and of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world, bearing in mind the fact that efforts aimed at disarmament complement political détente and are essential elements in a process in which all participating States have a vital interest."

[97] Paragraph 24 of the FHRC read: "The Committee/Sub-Committee shall pay due attention to the views expressed by participating States on the various subjects mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, on the particular interest they attach thereto, especially from the point of view of their own security and of their desire to be informed about relevant developments."

[98] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 116 note 2.

[99] Ibid., p. 116. The possibility of a further development of CBMs was left relatively vague in the Document. In the provisions dealing with "other confidence-building measures", for instance, the Document noted that the participating States recognised that "the experience gained by the

On 11 May, a new text emerged from the drafting committee, with the last main stumbling bloc being the Eastern opposition to the inclusion of "movements" in the draft Sub-Committee mandate covering the military aspects of security.[100] As later described by a leading member of the Soviet delegation, Moscow's opposition to the measure was mainly due to a lack of experience with CBMs:

> A number of delegations proposed to include in the assignment for the first agenda item a third --and quite important measures: namely, preliminary notification of large movements of troops not linked with military exercises. Neither the Soviet Union, nor any other country could have objections in principle against considering such a measure in the future, too. But it was clearly premature to tackle the problem at that particular time: no experience whatsoever had been yet accumulated in carrying out the first two confidence-building measures, and those measures had not yet been elaborated.[101]

Soviet arguments against the notification of movements were not shared by the other participating States and, with the NNAs gradually being denied all their proposals in the field of security, the issue took on greater significance in the Conference room. Clearly isolated on the question, Moscow eventually accepted a compromise formula whereby the notification of movements could be studied by the Conference.[102] At the same time, the Soviets insisted, as a last-minute request, that the text on the exchange of observers at major manoeuvres include the proviso that any exchange would be "by invitation".[103]

As finally registered in the *Blue Book*, the conclusions of the Helsinki consultations on CBMs consisted of only one short paragraph explaining the general purpose for discussing CBMs at the Conference and providing different instructions for the notification of manoeuvres, the exchange of observers, and the notification of movements. Paragraph 23 read in full:

> In order to strengthen confidence and to increase stability and security, the Committee/Sub-Committee shall submit to the Conference appropriate proposals on confidence-building measures such as the prior notification of major military manoeuvres on a basis to be specified by the Conference, and the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions. The Committee/Sub-Committee will also study the question of prior notification of major military movements and submit its conclusions.

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implementation of the provisions set forth [in the Document], together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence."

[100] See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 125.

[101] Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", pp. 106-107.

[102] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 128-129.

[103] See Ibid.; Mendelevich, "Diplomat's Notes", p. 107; and Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 35.

4. CONCLUSION

Despite the seemingly meagre results of the Helsinki consultations, the Multilateral Preparatory Talks of the CSCE had produced important accomplishments. When the consultations opened in November 1972 few could have expected that the discussions would result in a final document detailing all the problems to be considered at the Conference. In the field of security, the large gap in the opening positions of the parties regarding what issues of European military security should be introduced at the Conference (if any at all) raised serious doubts that consensus could emerge on this subject.

Of all three main groupings represented at Helsinki, the Alliance was the most satisfied with the outcome of the consultations. Unlike the NNAs, who came with great expectations for the adoption of a large number of proposals in the military field, and the Eastern bloc nations who were determined not to accept any such issue in the CSCE, the West had entered the preliminaries with only two CBMs to advocate and, apart from the fact that the notification of movements and the notification of manoeuvres had been separated and given different mandates, the conclusions of the proceedings were virtually a complete endorsement of the Western programme.

Whether this success could be repeated at the Conference and how the main negotiations would evolve was less certain. The six months of pre-conference talks left little doubt that even if the NATO CBMs programme had been accepted, the compromises reached did not necessarily satisfy the other participating States. The neutrals and non-aligned wanted more comprehensive measures and had failed to gain support for any of their other proposals in the field of security. The Eastern states did not want any CBMs and had conceded on the issue only to secure the beginning of the Conference. These considerations would certainly complicate the main negotiations, but they also presented clear opportunities for the West. Indeed, on the one hand, the Allies could count on the Warsaw Pact nations to reject any new or too demanding proposals put forward by the neutrals; on the other, they would also be able to count on the NNAs to put pressure on the East to accept CBMs. What was left for the Allies to decide was whether they would choose to take the lead for the development of concrete and effective measures, or whether they would be satisfied with only a general agreement on the issue.

CHAPTER 5

ALLIANCE WORK ON CBMs DURING THE MPT

1. INTRODUCTION

The preliminary consultations on the CSCE were a great success for the West. The two measures sponsored by the Allies were accepted by all participating States and a mandate closely following the Western programme had been drafted. These achievements were particularly noteworthy because the NATO delegations had arrived at the talks ill-prepared to discuss the measures, having given only minimal consideration to the issue beforehand.

One important reason for the absence of any far-reaching preparations at NATO was uncertainty that the Soviets would accept CBMs at the CSCE. In the months preceding the opening of the Dipoli consultations, Moscow had warned the West that it would not accept any discussion of military issues at the Conference. Initially, in May, the Soviets had argued that the measures should be dealt with in the framework of a permanent body created by the CSCE.[1] Then, in September, they maintained that "if the military aspects of security were touched upon at a CSCE, even minimally, this would surely divert the Conference from its proper course and overload its agenda."[2] Soviet diplomats strongly argued that it would be "more expedient, logical and useful to discuss such confidence-building measures together with proposals for arms reductions",[3] and that the issue should "be lumped together with MBFR and dealt with separately".[4] The repeated Soviet warnings against CBMs raised serious doubts that the Allied proposals would be accepted, which was not conducive to the development of a comprehensive policy at NATO. But this was not the only explanation for the absence of Western preparations.

Another important reason was that no Allied government was truly committed to CBMs. Reflecting the different national interests of the NATO partners, initial discussion on the introduction of "certain military aspects of security" in the CSCE was monopolised by the debate over the establishment of a link between MBFR and CSCE. CBMs only surfaced as a bi-product of these discussions and as a clear second "best-choice" that no one conceived as a

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[1] Canada, DEA, 26 May 1972. .
[2] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 61. The Soviets had also noted that they would oppose the discussion of CBMs at the CSCE because they should be dealt in a permanent body. Canada, Ibid., 30 September 1972.
[3] Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid.
[4] Ibid.

matter of primary importance.

Another reason hampering detailed planning was that the early discussions on CBMs at NATO had revealed quite opposite views on what types of measures should be proposed and how the measures chosen should be presented. As a result, the Allies were able to agree hastily on the consideration of just two measures. Furthermore, Washington's concerns that the negotiations of CBMs in the CSCE could harm the introduction of similar measures in MBFR led to a general agreement that the measures to be presented at the Conference should be left largely undefined, and the policy dictated that no further effort be made at NATO to try to define specific modalities, or "parameters", for the CBMs.

Certainly, the Allies had good reasons to enter the MPT with only a general understanding of their proposals, but it is less clear why this situation was not reviewed during the negotiations, especially after it became clear in early 1973 that their CBMs would likely be accepted for negotiation at the Conference. Indeed, inquiry into NATO's deliberations on CBMs, from the beginning of the preliminary talks in November 1972 to the opening of the Conference in July 1973, shows that the Allies did not increase or expand the pace or scope of their work. In fact, in addition to a continuing lack of interest in the subject, the Allies also appeared unconcerned about a number of problems developing with regard to their initial approach to the negotiations.

2. PROGRESS ON EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS?

The suggestion for the CSCE participating States to exchange observers at major military manoeuvres was a Western idea. Yet, when the NATO delegations introduced the measure, they had no clear view on how such a system of exchange of observers could be equitably established for some thirty nations of different size and capability. Furthermore, even though the measure was one of the first to be informally accepted by all delegations, as early as March 1973, the Alliance did not accelerate examination of the measure nor undertake any study of future application. Throughout the six months of Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the Allies made only one decision concerning exchange of observers, and this decision was clearly precipitated by an ambiguous comment made in the East German media in early 1973 which had raised questions about how the WTO nations might envisage application of the measure.

The East German media report, which followed the vague statement made by the Soviet Ambassador in Helsinki on January 22 indicating the possibility of discussing "certain measures to strengthen security", noted that Moscow's proposal included "the prior notification of major manoeuvres and the exchange of observers 'on such occasions'."[5] Short of any official explanation in the Conference room, the latter formulation raised concern at NATO because it might imply that the East was thinking of establishing some sort of automatic link, or obligation, between the notification of a manoeuvre and the invitation of observers. Indeed, the suggestion that observers could be invited "on such occasions" could imply on "*any* occasion when a manoeuvre is notified", and this created problems for some Allies.[6]

Prior to the MPT, Belgium had made a similar proposal at NATO but the Alliance had not accepted it as a suitable measure for the CSCE.[7] As argued in Brussels after the East German media report, such application of the measure could result in missed opportunities for the smaller states who may not have the resources to participate in all the exchanges.[8] More significantly, the suggestion could entail an obligation on the part of the NATO states to invite Eastern observers to manoeuvres the Alliance would rather not, especially those simulating chemical and nuclear warfare, or involving classified equipment.[9]

After further consideration of the issue, the Allies agreed they would reject any suggestion at Dipoli to create an obligation to invite observers to all notified military activities.[10] This constituted the first, and only, decision by the Alliance during the preliminary talks concerning exchange of observers. At the end of the Dipoli consultations in June 1973, no work was in progress on the measure in Brussels and the Alliance had no position on when observers should be invited, who should be invited, to what types of manoeuvres they should be accepted, or what conditions should govern the observation.[11]

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[5] Canada, DEA, 2 February 1973. See also Jain, "Romania and the Conference", p. 333, referring to an interview given by the GDR Ambassador on 23 January 1973.
[6] As later described by the GDR representative in early February, the Eastern position was that there could be mutual notifications in "stipulated areas" and the possibility of exchange of observers according to an invitation at such manoeuvres. Canada, Ibid., 6 February 1973.
[7] The proposal to permit observers to attend *any* notified military manoeuvres was included in the original paper Belgium submitted at NATO on 29 February 1972. The proposal was also resubmitted on 29 September, and was mentioned in the October Alliance *Draft/Agenda Guidelines on CBMs*. See, respectively, Canada, DEA, 10 March, 29 September, and 12 October 1972.
[8] Ibid., 21 February 1973.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Canada, DEA, n.d. (The document was drafted between the conclusion of the MPT on 8 June and 13 July 1973).

3. PROBLEMS WITH NOTIFICATION

Progress on the notification measure was equally unsatisfactory. When the Dipoli discussions concluded, only one paper was under development in NATO and no other studies were contemplated.[12] More significantly, the study, which dealt exclusively with the "illustrative lists" of military activities, raised more questions than answers concerning the potential scope and future application of the measure and cast doubts over the pertinence of the negotiating approach chosen by the Alliance.

As originally conceived, the illustrative lists were meant to circumvent the need to provide precise definitions of several key-terms such as "movements", "manoeuvres", or "major", and avoid discussing other potential contentious issues like "area of application" or "level of troops" involved.[13] By tabling illustrative lists of Western military activities, the Allies wished to exemplify the scale and type of military activities they would be prepared to notify hoping that the WTO would reciprocate with similar lists and that this would be sufficient to reach agreement on the undertaking. As agreed before the consultations, each NATO member state was to develop a list reflecting only its national contribution to recent NATO military activities. However, initial efforts in Brussels to come up with an agreed package of national lists for presentation during the negotiations indicated important difficulties with the scheme. With no comprehensive study on CBMs, and no clear guidance as to what would be desirable to notify and why, the Allies found themselves locked in long discussions over how to proceed with finding proper examples agreeable to all. During the discussions, for instance, most European partners maintained that only large military activities should be notified, but could not agree, or define, what should qualify as a "major" activity. Some delegations then suggested that the military activities should be quantified and perhaps start at one or more divisions, but for another group of states, an attempt to evaluate "major activities" in terms of quantity would be difficult to do, and could be of little value.[14] These states argued that in addition to the strength of the forces involved there were a number of other concomitant factors, such as the purpose of the activity, the type of material involved and the level of opposing forces in the area in question, which would greatly impact on the significance of an activity.[15]

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[12] Ibid., 23 May 1973.
[13] Ibid., 8 November 1972.
[14] Ibid., 1 February 1973.
[15] Ibid., 9 February 1973.

As discussions on the lists continued, it became clear that more precision about the scope of the measure would be needed and that definition of some key-terms could probably not be avoided. This, however, was precisely the reason why the Alliance had opted to develop such lists and not all partners were willing to concede to having a greater definition of the CSCE CBMs. This latter issue was to take on particular significance when the Americans began to reconsider their position on the notification of movements, suggesting that the topic should be kept for the MBFR talks.

4. CONFUSION OVER TERMS: MOVEMENTS, MANOEUVRES, OR EXERCISES?

The first indication that the United States was reconsidering the notification of "movements" came in early March 1973 when the Americans told their Allies in Brussels that they were "prone" to agree with the Soviets that movements should be kept for the MBFR.[16] At that time, the discussions in Dipoli had clearly established that several CSCE participating nations were not only favouring the notification of movements, but also wanted the Conference to develop measures to place restrictive limits, or restraints, on them. Given Washington's early concern that the CSCE CBMs should not prejudice the negotiation of similar measures in the MBFR --and in particular those related to movement constraints-- such suggestions might have been sufficient to bring a reassessment of the US policy on the notification of movements. Yet, assuming that the attempt of the NNAs to enlarge the NATO proposal on the notification of movements also to include restraints on them was an important factor in triggering the reassessment of the initial US policy, this would not explain why Washington had proposed the notification of movements in the first place, nor would it explain why the Americans did not withdraw their proposal before the MPT began in November and, thus, possibly avoid any discussion of the issue at the preliminaries and prevent NATO from becoming the primary sponsor of such measure in the CSCE. Indeed, it is paradoxical that in their first contribution, tabled at NATO in July 1972, the Americans suggested the notification of movements, while also insisting that the CSCE measures should not interfere with movement constraints in MBFR.[17] More significantly, in September 1972, or two months before the opening of the MPT, Belgium argued that the Alliance's package of CBMs for the CSCE should include a measure on the limitation of all movements of a certain size within

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[16] Ibid., 9 March 1973.

[17] Of the five criteria listed by the Americans in July, two specifically related to MBFR. As noted in the paper, the measures to be presented at the MPT should be "consistent with actual measures the West will want to propose in the MBFR negotiations", and they should "not be prejudicial to negotiation of constraints in an MBFR forum." Ibid., 31 July 1972.

and/or into a certain area.[18] Certainly, if such measures could be advocated by an Allied government, Washington should have expected that similar, if not more comprehensive, proposals would be advanced by other states at the MPT, especially in view of the well known aspiration of some of the NNAs to expand, as much as possible, the security content of the Conference.

5. ERROR OR OVERSIGHT?

It is plausible that in line with Washington's policy to adopt a general approach toward the CSCE CBMs, its initial description of the notification measure, which included the use of the terms "movements" and "manoeuvres", was not meant to underscore any precise type of military activities but to describe a general concept that would encompass most, if not all, of the "major" military activities in Europe. In their draft *Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs* presented at NATO in July 1972, the Americans clearly appeared to place emphasis on this aspect, more than on the specific activities themselves, by consistently placing the term "major" into quotation marks.[19]

This emphasis on the magnitude of the military activities to be notified, as opposed to their types, would also explain the numerous inconsistencies found in the initial US contribution on CBMs and in most other documents prepared, or submitted, at NATO during the next few months. Indeed, important confusion can be noted as to precisely what the notification measure should apply to, or what exactly was being described when using the terms "manoeuvres", "movements", or "exercises". Repeatedly, these terms and, in particular, "manoeuvres" and "exercises", were used inter-changeably. In their July paper, the Americans entitled their proposed notification measure the "Prior Announcement of Major Military Movements and Manoeuvres in Europe". In the accompanying description of the proposal, however, they never referred back to "manoeuvres", but used instead the term "exercises". Similarly, when the comments from all member states were gathered in Brussels

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[18] Ibid., 29 September 1972. This proposal was also included in the first paper Belgium presented at NATO on the subject. Ibid., 10 March 1972.

[19] When recommending that each party determine for itself what constituted a "major" movement, the term "major" (in contrast to *movement*) was placed in quotation marks. Ibid., 31 July 1972. Also, in the paper submitted to NATO by Washington in November 1972 warning against lengthy discussions on definitions, the United States insisted that the illustrative lists of exercises to be prepared by the CSCE participants could serve "as indicators of what both sides understand 'major' to mean in this context", clearly emphasising again that the main concern was more with the magnitude of the military activities than with their specific types. Quotation from the November paper is from Ibid., 8 November 1972.

in October 1972 in a new *Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs*, the document referred to the notification measure as being a measure for *movements* and *manoeuvres*.[20] Yet, in the narrative of the problem, the Allies suggested that NATO should attempt to gain an understanding on how to define the terms "movement and *exercise*" by recommending that NATO table a selective list of its own "force movements and *manoeuvres*".

As was established later on, "manoeuvres" have connotations that go beyond those of "exercises",[21] but while most of the confusion seemed to apply predominantly to the terms "manoeuvres" and "exercises", other problems could be noted. In their paper, the Americans suggested that the notification of "movements and manoeuvres" would strengthen stability because it would enhance the predictability of "movements". Yet, it is evident that if a manoeuvre is held in proximity to the area where the participating troops are already deployed, no significant "movement" of forces would be involved. Also, a "manoeuvre" does not necessarily describe all the activities that could be involved in a "movement" of troops, because movements are often conducted for reasons other than supporting manoeuvres.[22]

It is conceivable that in its paper Washington did not want to draw clear distinctions between the different military activities that took place in Europe but simply wanted to attract attention to the destabilising effects of large non-notified military activities. In this regard, the

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[20] Information on the NATO draft report of October 1972 is from Ibid., 12 October 1972.

[21] The CSCE never adopted any definition of the terms. However, as suggested in the first Alliance Guidelines paper for the Geneva negotiations.

> "The words "manoeuvres" and "exercises" are not interchangeable since all manoeuvres are exercises but not all exercises are manoeuvres. Nor should the words "manoeuvres" and "exercises" be used automatically as including "movements". In general terms, the distinctions are that movements have many aspects --movement of troops, equipment, into, out of, or within areas, temporary or permanent, land, sea or air, etc.; manoeuvres are normally two-sided activities of real forces trained and equipped; exercises include manoeuvres but could also refer to exercises of contained or paper forces. In general, a movement need not be a manoeuvre but any manoeuvres imply movement of forces."

This paper was adopted at NATO on 15 October 1973. Ibid., 23 November 1979. In 1978, the British Government published the following definitions which it then suggested using in relation to the provisions of the Final Act: "manoeuvres involve the tactical deployment, for training purposes, of one or more formed military formations to oppose a hypothetical "enemy" within a specific area for a specific time. Movements differ from manoeuvres in that they are not primarily for training and do not necessarily involve tactical deployment." United Kingdom, *Fifth Report from the Expenditure Committee- Session 1976-1977. Progress Towards Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Observations by the Government,* Miscellaneous No. 3 (1978), Cmnd. 7112, 1978, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1978, p. 4.

[22] A movement can simply be a redeployment of troops from one location to another. It can be noted, however, that most Western military commanders will often use some part of every military movement as an opportunity for a movement exercise. Troop movements towards a manoeuvre area therefore can take the form of an exercise. Canada, DEA, 15 March 1973.

imprecise use of the language could be explained as simply reflecting this approach. Yet, it is also possible that the confusing use of the language resulted from the fact that the distinction between the different terms was not recognised at the outset. Indeed, even if the United States provided many of the initial ideas on CBMs,[23] Washington's enthusiasm for the measures was never described as being more than simply "not noteworthy".[24] Moreover, given the fact that the Americans wanted to keep the CSCE discussion on confidence-building measures the least technical as possible,[25] not much consideration was given to the precise meaning of the terms. Judging by the superficial treatment of the subject in the July document, it seems very likely that no military or technical analysis had been made for its preparation.[26] In fact, the US paper was largely based on the spring report of the Alliance *Ad Hoc Committee*, which had simply reviewed advantages and disadvantages of the measures without arriving at any definite conclusions.[27]

Another consideration supporting the view that the full distinction between the different terms was not recognised at the outset is that during the early discussions on CBMs, it was apparently not uncommon within some Alliance circles to use the terms "manoeuvre" and "exercise" inter-changeably.[28] Presumably, before the CSCE began, there was no real need to use the terms with great precision. As such, the imprecise (though not inconsequential) use of the language in the July paper may not have been recognised at all.

6. CHOOSING A (NEGATIVE) STRATEGY

While Washington's initial suggestion for the notification of movements may have been the product of a roughly drafted policy aimed at emphasising "large" military activities, or the result of simple oversight, it is less clear why the proposal was not withdrawn before the MPT opened in November 1972. By that time, the consultations at NATO had clearly underscored

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[23] As acknowledged by a senior member of the US delegation at the CSCE: "The U.S. position [on CBMs] . . . was lukewarm, despite the fact that many of the ideas originated with the United States", Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 169.
[24] Canada, DEA, 31 October 1972.
[25] Ibid., 9 March 1973.
[26] Ibid., 24 April 1972.
[27] This fact was noted in the covering page introducing the US paper on CBMs where it was stated that "the paper derived from the report of the *Ad Hoc Committee*". Ibid., 2 August 1972. The work of the *Ad Hoc Committee*, in turn, was probably based on an earlier paper drafted in Washington in early March 1972, at the time when the Allies began considering the meaning of the December 1971 Ministerial decision to propose the consideration of "certain aspects of military security" in the CSCE. Mention of such a study being carried out in early March is made in Ibid., 10 March 1972.
[28] "The terms were often used to mean the same thing." Ibid., 1 February 1973.

the possibility that any discussion of movements at the CSCE could become quite detailed and could be enlarged to include restraints. This was particularly evident from the recommendations of a number of NATO partners requesting more precise definitions for the CBMs, and from the September request by Belgium for the consideration of restraints to be included in the NATO CBMs package; a proposal the United States then objected to on substantive grounds.[29] Yet, rather than clarifying the issue or withdrawing the proposal, the strategy chosen to deal with the notification measure was to advocate the development of illustrative lists of military activities.

Whether the United States was the first country to introduce the idea of illustrative lists in Brussels, in October, when it first appeared in the NATO *Draft Agenda/Guidelines Paper on CBMs*, cannot be assessed with certainty. Nevertheless, by November, the idea was strongly advocated by Washington as a means of getting around the contentious question of the definition of the terms "movement" and "manoeuvre".[30]

One of the most immediate results of this undertaking was increased confusion at NATO. Indeed, all throughout the preliminary talks, and even after the MPT concluded, reference to the illustrative lists by member states differed considerably with regard to exactly what the lists should be, and why they were being developed. As can be noted from different documents, the lists were believed to be either for "manoeuvres",[31] for "exercises"[32] or, alternatively, "for exercises involving the major movement of troops".[33] The purpose for developing the lists was also given different interpretations, sometimes being described as a way to avoid determining what "movements" might be eligible for notification,[34] or what "major" should mean in the CSCE context.[35]

Probably because of this enduring and expanding confusion and the related difficulties in agreeing upon what the national lists should contain, an increasing number of governments began to reassess their previous stand on definition and demanded that NATO agree on exact definitions of the terms "movements", "manoeuvres", and "exercises".[36] This was the case

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[29] Ibid., 29 September 1972.
[30] Ibid., 8 November 1972 and 3 July 1973.
[31] Ibid., 23 May 1973.
[32] Ibid., 21 February and 15 March 1973.
[33] Ibid., 25 June 1973.
[34] Ibid., 23 May 1973.
[35] Ibid., n.d. (The document was drafted between the conclusion of the MPT on 8 June and 13 July 1973).
[36] Ibid., 15 March 1973. Canada was one of the nations requesting exact definition of the terms.

for Great Britain, who initially sided with the United States in arguing that the measures should be kept as general as possible but, by mid-March 1973, circulated definitions for the different terms suggesting, for instance, that manoeuvres were "large two-sided troop exercises"; an exercise could "be large or small and is often one-sided", and a movement was "simply a movement of troops from one place to another."[37]

Perhaps not accidentally, this is when the United States first indicated that it was reconsidering the notification of movements in the CSCE.[38] The attempts by an increasing number of Allies to provide greater precision to the measure may have alarmed Washington over the way the discussions of CBMs in the CSCE could evolve and what impact this might have on MBFR. Furthermore, the definitions suggested by the United Kingdom, in March 1973, would more clearly differentiate the different military activities taking place in Europe and would also (as described above) emphasise the issue of movement of troops not necessarily connected with any manoeuvre or exercise. As was later revealed, US concerns with "movements" being discussed in the CSCE were not only related to the possible implications for the MBFR negotiations, but also to the potential implications on its own troop movements. As one American negotiator explained, several reasons underscored US reluctance to include movements in the CSCE:

> First, maneuver notification seemed to satisfy the need for 'military content' and anything more would have complicated things. Second, movement notification is a degree more serious and substantive than maneuver notification, and I believe there was a feeling that it was better to limit the negotiation in this unfamiliar and unwieldy group to the most elementary military subjects. Third, of course, was a reluctance among our military, and other U. S. officials, to enter into any obligations regarding movements. The feeling was that this could open the door to restrictions of some kind on our movements either to reinforce Europe in a crisis, or to transit Europe with forces in a Middle East crisis. This was without doubt a 'material omission from the perspective of military significance,' but you must remember that the military aspects were not our top priority in CSCE --the concept of 'freer movement' was, that is to say the human rights aspects. We did not want the military component to dominate CSCE, because we believed that would shift its focus to the kind of European Security Conference which the Soviets wanted.[39]

Precisely at what moment Washington clearly formulated such specific concerns about the notification of movements in the CSCE is unclear. US preoccupation with the issue was not fully discussed among the Allies during the MPT. Whether this was because the Americans

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[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid., 9 March 1973.
[39] John Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, London: Pergamon Brassey's, 1988, p. 13.

had not fully realised all the above implications, or because final acceptance of a mandate on the measure in the MPT remained uncertain until the very end of the Dipoli consultations, cannot be assessed with certainty. It is plausible that Washington, perhaps fully aware of the potential problems, wanted to wait for the final results of the MPT before deciding to pursue the issue further with its Allies. After all, any formal reconsideration of the proposal on movements would have serious implications for the Western states who had sponsored the measure at the very beginning of the preliminary talks. On the other hand, it is also plausible that Washington truly believed that the tabling of illustrative lists was a good strategy to ensure that the negotiations of the measure at the Conference would be kept very simple, especially if based primarily on Western examples. Yet, regardless of the extent to which Washington had then realised the potential difficulties with movements, no decision was made at NATO, during the MPT, to provide further precision to the measure. And, at the end of the multilateral talks, the Allies continued to try to develop selective lists of activities "as an alternative to grappling with the thornier issues of areas of applicability, details of notification, what "movements" might be eligible for notification, etc."[40]

7. CONCLUSION

Allied performance at the MPT never fully revealed the absence of serious preparations on the two CBMs sponsored by NATO, nor did it expose the growing difficulties in Brussels in advancing preparations for the main negotiations. The insistence of the neutral and non-aligned delegations for the CSCE to consider a wide-range of military issues ensured that a great part of the preliminary talks was devoted to this question. In addition, the large number of proposals on CBMs tabled during the consultations ensured that the delegations never had occasion for detailed discussions on any one of them. But, while the MPT provided more time for the Allies to prepare for the Conference, they made little progress. At the end of the preliminary talks the Alliance had not reviewed any possible terms and conditions for the exchange of observers. Similarly, none of the basic modalities, or "parameters", for the prior notification of manoeuvres and movements had been worked out. If anything, the Alliance only seemed to be going backwards in its preparation for the negotiations. The United States began to raise doubts about the inclusion of the notification of movements; a measure considered by many as the most important measure proposed by the West at the CSCE. Also, early attempts at devising illustrative lists of military activities, then NATO's only negotiating

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[40] Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973.

strategy to deal with the notification measure, ran into difficulties. These difficulties were significant because they highlighted fundamental inherent problems with the approach. Indeed, if the main goal for developing the lists was that they could be used as a substitute for defining areas of application, working out details of notifications and various other matters related to the scope and the operation of the measure, initial work at NATO revealed, that short of a better and more precise formulation of these issues, no progress could really be made on them. But several Allies, and especially the United States, continued to favour only a vague formulation of the CBMs, and no decision was made to reconsider the viability of the approach and no further study on the measure was undertaken.

Hence, while the MPT concluded with acceptance of the two measures sponsored by the Allies (which, by then, had become three measures because of the different mandates given to the issue of manoeuvres and movements), the West was no more knowledgeable about them than at the start of the consultations. Furthermore, resolution of the problems that had emerged during Allied consultations was simply postponed to the next stage of negotiations, where time to develop any new, or comprehensive, strategy or policy would be even more limited.

CHAPTER 6

THE NEGOTIATION OF CBMS AT THE CSCE (JULY 1973-AUGUST 1975)

1. INTRODUCTION

When the CSCE officially opened, the thirty-five participating States had a mandate to consider only three confidence-building measures. As agreed during the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the Conference was tasked to:

> (1) submit appropriate proposals on the prior notification of major military manoeuvres;
> (2) submit appropriate proposals on the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions, and:
> (3) study the question of prior notification of major military movements and submit its conclusion.

Although the six months of preliminary talks in Dipoli had successfully circumscribed the confidence-building measures to only these measures, the mandate laid down in the *Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations* was extremely vague. Examination of the wording suggested that the proposals that could be advanced at the Conference could be very detailed or very general, and could emphasise a thorough development of CBMs or, alternatively, important restrictions on their application. Concerning the measure on the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, for example, the mandate did not specify what "notifying" really meant or what it entailed. To whom, how, or when to notify was not addressed. The details the notification should contain had also not been included and the notification could be extensive or simply embracing a general announcement that the activities would be carried out. The question of what constituted a "major" manoeuvre was not defined and could be either large or small. Even the type of manoeuvres the parties should discuss was not specified: land, sea or air manoeuvre; single or combined; any; or all types?

On the exchange of observers, the mandate only mentioned that the Sub-Committee should submit proposals "on the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions". Who should be invited, what they should be allowed to see, how and for how long, were only a few of the many practicalities that had not been addressed in the mandate. Should the observation include predominantly large or small manoeuvres, large or small areas, large or small units, and what "mutually acceptable conditions" entailed

was also not defined. Certainly, no single CSCE state expected to observe all military manoeuvres of all 35 participating nations, and while some "system" would have to be devised either for the measure to be applied bilaterally or on a restrictive multilateral basis, proposals in this regard could aim at maximising or minimising exchanges.

Finally, on the notification of movements, even though the Final Recommendations gave it some pre-eminence by separating it from the measure on the notification of major manoeuvres, the mandate only suggested that they be studied by the Conference. This formulation opened a range of options if the issue of "movements" remained throughout the negotiations. Proposals on movements could involve movements of forces, weapons and/or equipment; they could concern land, sea or air; they could be movements in specific areas or, again, they could simply be left undefined.[1]

Given the numerous unsettled points at the start of the negotiations, and the wide range of options available, it was clear that the Conference would have to decide the real meaning of the agreement reached during the MPT. But, while the delegations knew that the Conference, with its pre-agreed three-stage process, would be of considerable length, no one expected that two full years of negotiations would be necessary to reach a final document.

2. STAGE I: HELSINKI (3 - 7 JULY 1973)

Stage I of the CSCE opened in Helsinki on 3 July 1973 at foreign minister level. The main purpose of the meeting was formally to approve the *Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations* and to agree on a date for the opening of Stage II, at which time the real negotiations would take place. The gathering also provided an opportunity for the Foreign Ministers to present the views of their governments on the Conference and, in the field of CBMs, the statements immediately highlighted the wide gap in the opening position of the parties.

One of the first speakers to address CBMs during Stage I was Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union, Gromyko made it clear that Moscow had no interest in long discussions on CBMs. In just one sentence, also reproduced in a "General Declaration" outlining the Kremlin's views on what the final results of the CSCE should be,

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[1] Canada, DEA, 23 May 1973.

Gromyko suggested that the Conference adopt the following text:

> The participating states deem it of great importance that the States concerned, in the interest of strengthening stability and confidence in Europe, should notify each other in advance on the basis of agreed procedures, of major military manoeuvres in specified areas and the exchange observers by invitation at such manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions.[2]

Gromyko's submission on CBMs was almost identical to the original document tabled by the GDR during the preliminary talks and, for Western observers, "was written as though no agreement had been reached during the six months of the preparatory consultations."[3] Disregarding the provisions of the Final Recommendations calling for the Committee and Sub-Committee of the Conference to study the question of the notification of movements and to submit conclusions, the Soviets totally ignored the topic. On the issue of exchange of observers, Moscow's opening position appeared to be that the undertaking should be restricted only to "major" manoeuvres, even though the Final Recommendations had left open the possibility to invite observers at "military" manoeuvres. Finally, the suggestion that the notification measure should apply in "specified areas" also disappointed Western delegates because the Helsinki Final Recommendations said nothing about the zone of application of the CBMs and Moscow's suggestion implied further restriction on the development and application of the measure.[4]

In sharp contrast with the short and dismissive Soviet presentation, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Douglas-Home, provided extensive argumentation in favor of CBMs. Reproduced in a three-page document distributed to all delegations on 5 July, the British restated their general views on the problem of military security in Europe maintaining that even if more detailed aspects of military security were considered elsewhere, it was possible to identify measures of a more political character which could be dealt with by the CSCE.[5] "Major military manoeuvres [were] obvious examples of such politically significant military

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[2] Proposals by the Soviet Union, Agenda Item I, "General Declaration of the Foundations of European Security and the Principles of Relations between States in Europe", CSCE\I\3, Helsinki, 4 July 1973, in CSCE, *Records and Documents - Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE Stage 1, Helsinki, Verbatim Records, July 3-7, 1973.* See also Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 182; Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 215; and Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 138.

[3] Canada, DEA, 17 July 1973.

[4] See Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 182; and Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 215.

[5] Proposal by the United Kingdom Delegation, *Agenda Item 1- Questions Relating to Security in Europe - Confidence Building Measures*, CSCE/I/18, 5 July 1973, in CSCE, *Records and Documents - Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE Stage 1, Helsinki, Verbatim Records, July 3-7, 1973.* [Hereafter: CSCE, *Records and Documents*, CSCE/I/18].

activity" because, as the British asserted:

> They have no immediate relationship to military capacity or force levels but they can reflect political intentions or be deployed to achieve political objectives. A manoeuvre or exercise is designed to test the readiness of the country carrying it out to meet an assumed threat from outside or, in some cases, its ability to launch an offensive against another country. It can also be used as a warning. To a neighbour the objectives of the country carrying out the manoeuvres may often be unclear . . . . He may interpret a manoeuvre designed for a defensive situation as an offensive one. He may assume that it is a warning when it is not. Such ambiguity creates tension and possibly counter moves which can set in train an escalatory process. Effective prior notification of major military manoeuvres would greatly reduce the opportunities for misunderstanding and suspicion.[6]

Reviewing the other CBMs provisions of the Final Recommendations, the British argued that the notification of major military movements was even more important than the notification of manoeuvres because "a movement, even more than a manoeuvre, can in certain circumstances be interpreted as an indication of military activity of a potentially hostile nature. It is above all the unexplained military movement which creates tension."[7]

Finally, while noting that the CBMs would not require verification and would not be legally binding, the British emphasised that their application should nevertheless be considered carefully and that they should involve certain modalities. The content of the notification, for instance, should include:

- the name or description of the manoeuvre or movement;
- the number of personnel involved;
- the time-frame;
- the departure and destination of the participating units and;
- the unit designation and the period of absence of participating units from their normal duty station.[8]

While the Soviet and British presentations underscored that agreement on the Final Recommendations had not closed the distance between East and West, the interventions of the European neutral and non-aligned nations (in particular Sweden and Yugoslavia) made it clear that they were not satisfied with the final results of Helsinki, nor of the opening positions of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Reiterating views previously expressed during the MPT, the NNAs, supported by Romania, maintained that the Conference should do more in the field of security. Sweden suggested that in addition to the three CBMs included in the

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[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] For a text, see UK, FCO, *Selected Documents*, pp. 160-166.

Final Recommendations, the CSCE should consider restraints in the Baltic region and should create a Sub-Committee to examine questions of arms control in Europe.[9] Finland urged the participants to study the question of a "Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone" and "other ideas relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones".[10] Yugoslavia proposed that the Conference develop measures to apply restraints on movement of forces in border areas and limitations on military activities (including ceilings on the size of all manoeuvres held in Europe),[11] while further maintaining that the CSCE CBMs should be applied in the Mediterranean region.[12] Romania, taking the most ambitious stance of all, reintroduced its long list of arms control, disarmament and disengagement proposals, including a call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all European countries; an end to military manoeuvres; an end to military build-ups on the borders of other nations; an end to military blocs; a reduction of military budgets; a reduction of national military forces; a denuclearised zone in Europe, and; the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.[13]

Another divisive issue raised during the MPT which resurfaced during Stage I was the establishment of a link between CSCE and MBFR. Several participating States, including Spain, Romania, Austria and Malta reiterated their interest in the idea.[14] From the NATO countries, Belgium openly favoured a link, while Turkey (slightly more in line with the weak and vague language agreed upon at the MPT) maintained that information on MBFR should be provided regularly to the CSCE.[15] Several delegations also mentioned the principles and the desirability of disarmament, with four countries (Norway, Belgium, Spain and Romania) expressing the view that the CSCE should hold a debate on the subject;[16] something that had been rejected during the MPT with a final compromise formula only suggesting that the Conference bear "in mind the fact that efforts aimed at disarmament complement political détente".

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[9] Canada, DEA, 17 July and 13 September 1973.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] See "Russia Lists Security Principles: Romania Seeks Demilitarization", *IHT*, 5 July 1973; and Canada, DEA, 17 July 1973.
[14] See Canada, DEA, 17 July 1973. See also "U.S., Britain Pressing Europe Talks to Act", *IHT*, 6 July 1973; and "Britain Tells Europe: Act, Not Talk to Safeguard Security", *The Guardian*, 6 July 1973.
[15] Canada, DEA, 17 July 1973.
[16] Ibid.

Most of the proposals advanced by the NNAs went beyond the basic agreement reached during the pre-conference consultations and, when the Foreign Ministers concluded Stage I on July 7, it was clear that many of the compromises reached during the preliminary talks were only superficial and that a number of difficult issues would be re-opened during the main negotiations.

3. STAGE II: GENEVA (18 September 1973 - 21 July 1975)

Stage II of the CSCE opened in Geneva on 18 September 1973 and concluded only twenty-two months later, on 21 July 1975, when consensus was reached on a complete final document. As the long duration of the deliberations suggested, Stage II corresponded to the real negotiations of the CSCE where practical meaning had to be given to the Final Recommendations. Held at expert-level, the work was carried out in different Committees and Sub-Committees corresponding to the agenda items accepted by the parties during the preliminaries. The protracted period of negotiations did not mean, however, intense negotiations throughout. Slow progress followed by long phases of virtual deadlock characterised the proceedings, especially in the field of CBMs where the parties once again began with very differing views on what the Conference should achieve.

3.1 *General debate (18 September - 14 December 1973)*

The initial three months of work in the Sub-Committee on military matters started slowly with a generalised debate in which the participating States probed each other's intentions. This opening phase also saw the tabling of working papers from a number of countries, including Yugoslavia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Romania, Finland, the United Kingdom, Norway and Belgium outlining objectives in the field of CBMs.[17]

As expected from the views expressed by the Foreign Ministers during the first stage of the Conference, several of the proposals put forward by the NNAs went beyond the Helsinki Final Recommendations. The working document submitted by Yugoslavia included an ambitious programme of measures to cover the military aspects of the CSCE.[18] In addition to the three confidence-building measures agreed upon in Helsinki, the Yugoslav government

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[17] Canada, DEA, 18 March 1974. Information on the different papers can be found in Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 183-188 (passim).
[18] See Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 216-217, and p. 311 note 217; and Ferraris, Ibid., pp. 182-183.

proposed that the Conference consider:

1. a reduction in the number, size, and frequency of manoeuvres and their holding in border zones, the flying of fighter planes along frontiers, the movements of naval warship in proximity of the territorial waters of other states, and the testing of weapons in border zones;
2. a restriction of military activities and military movements which might give rise to apprehension and tensions;
3. a reduction of foreign military forces in Europe and in the Mediterranean, and;
4. a general statement on the contribution to efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament.[19]

In addition to Yugoslavia, a number of other participating States also put forward specific measures outside the agreed framework of the Final Recommendations. Romania reintroduced its extensive list of proposals, which included the prohibition of stationing nuclear weapons on foreign territory, closing down foreign military bases, withdrawal of troops from foreign countries and establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.[20] Spain proposed the introduction of a new type of CBMs into the CSCE asking the participating States to engage in exchanges of military missions and exchanges of personnel between military teaching centres.[21] Similarly, Sweden also introduced a new proposal for CBMs suggesting that the Conference devise provisions for the wider publication and dissemination of information on annual defence spending.[22]

Interest in establishing some form of a link between MBFR and CSCE was also reaffirmed during the general debate with Yugoslavia, Norway and Spain suggesting that the final document of the Conference should include principles of force reductions.[23] Spain further maintained that the CSCE should develop principles of disarmament.[24]

In general, the Western governments recognised that the many issues on European security raised by the NNAs "reflected the fact that the CSCE was the only forum available to a number of them to express themselves publicly (and for home consumption) on military matters of concern to them."[25] For the neutral and non-aligned states, the CSCE was also "the only public multilateral European forum to bring pressure to bear on participants in other

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[19] Ibid.
[20] Acimovic, Ibid., p. 217, and p. 311 note 219.
[21] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 183.
[22] Ibid., p. 187.
[23] Canada, DEA, 5 December 1973.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

[arms control and disarmament] fora."[26] Although the NATO states were generally sympathetic to the situation of the non-bloc countries, and some were even willing to endorse certain of their least contentious proposals and supported the issue of a link with MBFR, this was not the case with the Soviet Union who wanted the Conference to conclude as quickly as possible.

The Soviet position on CBMs was re-emphasised at the very beginning of Stage II when, on 19 September, the delegation re-submitted the same text tabled by Gromyko during the Foreign Ministers meeting.[27] In short, the Soviets did not want to discuss the notification of movements and were only willing to recognise the importance of notifying major military manoeuvres and the exchange of observers at some of these manoeuvres without any further elaboration or commitment.

At the conclusion of the presentation of opening positions, the difficulties facing the Sub-Committee were obvious. Taking stock of the developments since the beginning of the negotiations, the British reported in early November that the work of the Sub-Committee on CBMs was already faltering "in the face of a restrictive and defensive Soviet line", while the neutral and non-aligned nations were "disenchanted and silent".[28] One month later, the British observed that although the Western ideas for CBMs "had got off to a promising start", the Soviets had since "adopted a thoroughly restrictive and defensive attitude",[29] and that "the prospects for useful results in this field" did not look bright unless the Soviets could be convinced "that some permanent and effective tests of their military intentions are an integral part of a successful Conference."[30] The Soviets were also showing "deep mistrust" of Western insistence to discuss CBMs and, as interpreted in London, "their main objectives appear to be to limit the amount of Soviet military activity to be included in the CBMs and to leave as many loopholes as possible."[31]

On the eve of the first Christmas recess of the Conference, the general orientation of the three main groupings for the remaining of the negotiations appeared as follow: the West would mostly concentrate on the three measures included in the Final Recommendations; the East would try to exclude any formulation on the notification of movements and limit the

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[26] Ibid.
[27] Ghebali, *La diplomatie de la détente*, p. 147.
[28] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 202.
[29] Ibid., pp.216-217.
[30] Ibid., and p. 227.
[31] Ibid., pp. 226-227.

development of the other two measures to a minimum, and; the neutral and non-aligned would push for a comprehensive development of the measures agreed in Helsinki while also trying to have their own proposals accepted by the Conference.

3.2. *Winter 1974 (15 January - 5 April)*

With nothing of substance achieved in the first three months of negotiations the West decided in early 1974 to present a comprehensive resolution on CBMs. The drafting stage would soon start in the Sub-Committee and, although the Allies and the NNAs had submitted several working papers, only Romania and the Soviet Union had tabled draft resolutions.[32] NATO did not want the drafting of decisions to start on the basis of both of these two documents and, on 4 February, the British delegation tabled a resolution on CBMs.

Two weeks later, on 20 February, six neutral and non-aligned states followed the British initiative with a draft of their own. Co-sponsored by Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Switzerland, Yugoslavia and Finland, the "Draft of the Six", as it became known, was immediately supported by Malta, Romania, and Spain.[33] The initiative of the NNAs was significant not only because the draft resolution excluded or significantly watered down their most ambitious proposals, but also because it was the first time that these states co-operated together in such a manner and the move was expected to force them to co-ordinate their positions and to make the proceedings of the Sub-Committee more structured.[34]

With the tabling of these two draft resolutions, the positions of what were now truly becoming three major groupings at the Conference (NATO, the WTO and the NNAs) became better defined, with important details emerging on each measure. For the West, as proposed in the British draft resolution, the notification measure should apply to all terrestrial or combined military manoeuvres and movements taking place anywhere in Europe when the level of participating troops reached the equivalent of one division.[35] All notifications should be given via diplomatic channels to all participating States, and should be transmitted at least sixty days before the start of the military activity or earlier in the case of military activities

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[32] Ibid., pp. 226-229.
[33] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 191-192; and Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 217.
[34] See Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 91; Acimovic, Ibid., p. 217; and Ferraris, Ibid., p. 192.
[35] For background on the proposal, see Ferraris, Ibid., p. 184; Maresca, Ibid., p. 171; Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 229; and Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, p. 14. It is noteworthy that in his discussion of the British draft resolution, John J. Maresca, a senior member of the US delegation, omitted the proposal for the notification of movements.

organised at shorter notice.[36] The notifications should include:

1. the name and general description of the manoeuvre and movement;
2. the number of personnel involved;
3. the nature of the units involved;
4. the purpose of the activity;
5. the geographical location;
6. specific dates of manoeuvre or movement;
7. the place of departure and destination of the participating units;
8. the period of absence from normal duty station, and;
9. "any other relevant information".[37]

On the exchange of observers, the British draft stipulated that it should be as widespread as possible and that it should not be restricted to major manoeuvres only.[38] Other confidence-building measures, such as those proposed by Spain for the exchange of military missions and exchanges of personnel between military teaching centres were considered worthwhile, and should be studied further by the Conference.[39]

The position of the Warsaw Pact nations (with the exception of Romania) was that only major military land manoeuvres should be notified and that the measure should apply only when the number of participating troops reached the equivalent of an army corps and when the manoeuvres take place in frontier areas not exceeding a zone of 50 kilometres within a national border. The notification should be given five days in advance and should be transmitted only to states adjoining the border area where the manoeuvre is taking place. Regarding the exchange of observers, the position of the Eastern states was that it should be limited to major manoeuvres and should be applied on a strict reciprocal basis.[40] Finally, in the absence of any experience with CBMs, the notification of military movements should not be considered at all, and should only be studied in the future (meaning probably after the CSCE).[41]

As expressed in the draft of the Six, the neutral and non-aligned nations wanted notification to be given for *all* military manoeuvres and movements taking place anywhere in Europe when 18,000 troops or the equivalent of a reinforced division is involved. The notification measure

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[36] Ferraris, Ibid., p. 184.
[37] Canada, DEA, 25 February and 18 March 1974. See also Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, p. 14; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 229.
[38] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 184.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., pp. 184-185.
[41] Ibid., p. 185; Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 140; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 228.

should apply to all military units (whether terrestrial, aerial or naval), and should cover all activities independent or combined (i.e. involving more than one service).[42] In the case of amphibious or airborne troop manoeuvres, the level of notification should be lower and start at one division for airborne forces, and one brigade for amphibious forces.[43] Also, all manoeuvres of combined multinational forces should be automatically notified at *any* level;[44] all military activities that could give rise to apprehension or tension should be notified on a voluntary basis, and; all military activities should be subject to self-restraint.[45] The notification, to be given 30 days in advance,[46] should be transmitted via diplomatic channels to all participating States and should include most of the elements listed in the British draft.[47] Regarding observers, they should be exchanged as widely as possible on the basis of reciprocity.

The position of the West and the NNAs differed in several important areas. While NATO suggested the notification of major land manoeuvres with, when applicable, information on supporting air or naval forces, the neutral and non-aligned wanted separate notification of independent major air and naval manoeuvres. Also, while the Western states proposed only one overall troop level at which the notification measures should become applicable, the NNAs suggested sub-thresholds for amphibious and airborne troops, and added that all manoeuvres of combined multinational forces should be notified at *any* level.

These provisions made the position of the Six more demanding than that of the West. However, on other parameters the Western position was more exacting. For instance, as proposed in the British draft resolution, the Allies wanted the number of days required for the prior notification set at sixty, while the neutrals and non-aligned only requested thirty days. On the overall level of troops at which major manoeuvres or movements would become notifiable, the Allies proposed one division (which, even if not quantified in the original

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[42] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 185.
[43] Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.
[44] Ibid., 18 March 1974.
[45] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 185.
[46] Information on this point is contradictory. Some authors suggest that the proposal requested 30 days advanced notice; others suggest that the number was 50. See for instance, Ferraris, Ibid.; Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, p. 14;; Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 141; Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 281; and Victor-Yves Ghebali, "Considérations sur certains aspects militaires de la détente: les 'mesures de confiance' d'Helsinki", *Défense nationale*, April 1977, p. 28. [Hereafter: Ghebali, "Considérations"].
[47] Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974. The Canadian document noted that draft of the Six omitted information on the unit name, the place of departure and destination of the participating units, as well as what the West considered to be a "catch-all" phrase, i.e. "any other relevant information".

British draft resolution was usually recognised as being approximately 10,000 troops), while the NNAs called for the notification measure to start at 18,000 troops. On the content of the notifications, the Western proposal was more comprehensive than the Six in that the latter did not request information on the name of the participating units, the place of departure and destination of the military activity, nor did it include what the Allies considered to be the "catch-all" phrase, i.e. "any other relevant information."[48]

In spite of these differences, the proposals of these two groups were quite close and had almost nothing in common with that of the Warsaw Pact nations. Both NATO and the NNAs endorsed the notification of movements and judged the Eastern opening position regarding troop levels in manoeuvres requiring notification to be completely unacceptable. Indeed, even if the WTO delegations refused to quantify what they had in mind when using the formula of an army corps, Western estimates suggested that it could be anything between three to six divisions (or 30,000 to 60,000 troops), and NATO maintained that even at a level of three divisions the proposal was excessively restrictive.[49] The Allies argued in the Sub-Committee that with a level of 30,000 troops "only a very few manoeuvres within the Soviet Union and a few multinational manoeuvres by the NATO countries would be subject to notification each year."[50] In practice, the Soviet proposal would virtually exclude all the military activities of other participating States.[51] The Italian delegation pointed out that military manoeuvres with a participation of thirty thousand troops "had not been held in Italy for the last twenty years".[52] The Belgian delegate contended that the military manoeuvres of the armed forces of his country did not exceed two brigades and that accepting the Eastern proposal would mean that Belgium would be excluded from the notification régime.[53] Using much harsher words, the Dutch delegation accused the Soviet Union of trying to reduce the application of the notification measure to such an extent that the desired results would never be attained.[54]

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[48] Ibid.
[49] For various Western estimates, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 297; Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, p. 14; and Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 140. One problem in determining what the formulation might involve in terms of number of troops is that an army corps is not a unit but a command. For a discussion, see Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 186.
[50] Ferraris, Ibid., p. 186.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.

Closely linked to the above criticism of the high threshold at which notification (of manoeuvres only) should start was the Soviet request for the measure to apply only in "specified areas" related to frontiers. Initially, the Soviets refused to indicate how wide an area on each side of a border they had in mind[55] but, for the West, any consideration of "border areas" or "zones" of application had to be discarded. As argued, "any width narrow or deep, would be unacceptable to one state or another either because it would be so narrow as to denigrate the value of notification, or so wide as to favour geographically larger nations by allowing them exemptions denied to smaller ones."[56]

In private, the Allies speculated about Moscow's motivations for such a proposal. Some believed that the Soviets wanted only frontier zones in order "to enable them to carry out manoeuvres with front line troops without providing notification of changes in deployment".[57] Others believed that the proposal underscored a desire to retain the possibility "to mass troops without notification sufficiently close to frontiers so as to be within a few hours of crossing a political boundary."[58] Another possible reason for the proposal was that the Soviets were attempting "to protect the right to carry out training unannounced and without observers well back of their Western border or perhaps the Western borders of NSWP" (Non-Soviet Warsaw Pacts countries).[59] But, regardless of the precise motivation, the Allies believed that the prospect of carrying out a manoeuvre involving 30,000 troops in an area of 50 kilometres was very unlikely.[60] Furthermore, the Soviet idea of notifying only neighbouring countries implied that of all the NATO states only Turkey would possibly ever receive a notification from the Soviet Union.[61] In short, as one Italian delegate concluded, applying the Soviet proposal "would, in effect, have removed the obligation to notify any military activity."[62]

Criticisms of the Soviet position[63] did not alter Moscow's opening stance and, when the drafting stage started at the end of March,[64] the situation looked grim as only minor points

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[55] Canada, DEA, 14 November 1973.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 186.
[61] Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, p. 14.
[62] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 186. The West feared that the Soviets might only need to notify their Allies of manoeuvres held on Soviet territory. See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 281.
[63] Ferraris, Ibid., p. 187.
[64] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 270.

had been agreed upon since the beginning of the deliberations. For instance, the delegations had reached tacit agreement that the notification of manoeuvres might include information such as place, approximate dates and general purposes of the military activity, and that they would exclude sensitive matters such as communications and weaponry.[65] A general understanding was also beginning to form that no restrictions on any military activities would come from the CSCE, although statements that self-restraint in frontier areas should be adhered to were expected to be made.[66] On the exchange of observers, it was agreed that the participating States would invite observers in good faith and on a reciprocal basis.[67] Finally, it was commonly agreed that the language used in the final document to describe the "binding nature" or "level of obligation" of the CBMs should not convey the impression that they were legally binding.[68]

Even if these informal agreements, or understandings, could be recorded as progress, the basic positions of the parties remained unchanged since the opening of the Conference. More significantly, when the drafting stage began in March, the Soviet position was described as thoroughly restrictive in preventing any movement forward.[69] As observed by the British delegation, even if the Soviets were "truly isolated over CBMs" and "unable to provide convincing arguments for their restrictive position", they would not compromise on any issue.[70] In early April, the Soviets continued to be on the defensive and adamantly negative,[71] while their proposals indicated no advance since the opening of Stage II.[72] The Soviets consistently argued for giving notification of manoeuvres only five days in advance and solely to neighbouring countries.[73] They refused to discuss movements and were also resisting the more moderate Spanish and Swedish proposals calling for military exchanges and greater openness in military budgets.[74] As a result, the Military Sub-Committee, which was already dragging behind others when the drafting started, made almost no progress.[75] The Sub-Committee had started recording the different proposals on CBMs, but the process was long and time consuming because the delegations wanted to ensure that their proposals

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[65] Canada, DEA, 13 February and 18 March 1974.
[66] Ibid., 18 March 1974.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 228-229.
[69] See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 255.
[70] See Ibid., p. 269.
[71] Ibid., p. 266.
[72] See Ibid., p. 270.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.

were properly registered.[76] Also, all alternative texts being developed contained so many brackets, emphasising language objectionable to one or more delegations --and especially to the East-- that only Soviet political willingness for compromise could "unblock" the negotiations.[77] By the time of the Easter recess Soviet non-cooperation on CBMs was such that, in the words of the Deputy Head of the German Delegation, one could speak of "mistrust-building".[78]

3.3. *Spring-summer 1974 (23 April - 26 July)*

Eastern intransigence on CBMs continued well into the third session of Stage II until, on 12 June, the Soviets suggested, at an informal meeting of Heads of Delegation, that Moscow could accept two changes to the notification of major manoeuvres. The Soviets would be prepared to accept a zone of application for the CBMs of 100 kilometres (which doubled the initial offer of 50 kilometres), and could accept seven days prior notice instead of the five days previously proposed.[79] One week after this first compromise, the Soviets made another small adjustment to their position by increasing the period for advance notification from seven to ten days.[80]

The concessions were of little consequences and, as the Alliance floor leader on CBMs, the British maintained that the Soviet proposals did nothing to alter the application of the measures to border zones that the NATO states strongly opposed. Also, from a purely national perspective, the British noted that the new proposal "had the particular disadvantage of covering virtually all the UK while imposing no comparable obligation on any of the other major European states."[81] Yet, despite the insignificance of the Soviet offer, several Western governments interpreted the move as suggesting "a willingness to negotiate on military subjects that the USSR had not previously displayed in the CSCE".[82] Also, even if the timing of the Soviet offer was clearly recognised as an attempt to help produce a more positive assessment of the negotiations on the eve of a NATO Ministerial Meeting,[83] most Western

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[76] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 192-193.
[77] Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 270.
[78] Götz von Groll, "The Geneva CSCE Negotiations", *Aussenpolitik*, 25: 2, 1974, p.162.
[79] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, pp. 99-100; Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 297; and Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 141.
[80] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 100.
[81] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 297.
[82] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 100.
[83] Ibid.

delegations believed that they should try to find equivalent compromises.[84]

NATO's response came on 26 June. According to an American official, the Western proposals were "by degrees that were considered roughly proportional to the importance of the Soviet changes".[85] Instead of sixty days advance notice, the West proposed forty-nine days, and rather than one division (or roughly 10,000 troops), the West suggested the possibility of accepting a threshold of notification starting at 12,000 troops.[86] Furthermore, speaking on behalf of the Alliance, the British representative hinted that the Allies might be willing to accept less details in the content of the notification and might consider making exceptions to the "all of Europe" concept for zones far away from other participating States.[87]

NATO's counter-proposals were not well received by the Soviets.[88] In their opinion, they had made two concessions on timing and area, and "had gone as far as they [could] to meet Western demands" while "no comparable gesture [was] involved as far as the West [was] concerned."[89] The Soviets also reiterated that the Western proposals on CBMs were designed "to provide other states with an unwarranted insight into the workings of the Soviet military apparatus".[90] They also argued that "for the Warsaw Pact, secrecy on matters which [were] open knowledge in the West [was] an essential element in the balance of power in Europe."[91]

Despite what appeared to be another important deadlock in the discussions, in the final week before adjournment for the summer recess in late July 1974, the Sub-Committee registered its first progress. A text on exchange of observers at major manoeuvres was mentally registered by the delegations, and the Spanish proposal calling for exchange of military personnel was accepted. The approval of the Spanish measure was noteworthy because this CBM was not included in the mandate of the Helsinki Final Recommendations.[92] Yet, no observer believed that acceptance of the measure was setting a precedent for additional CBMs to be introduced into the CSCE negotiations, because the proposal was of little consequence, only codifying a

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[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid., p. 101.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 193.
[89] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 308.
[90] See Ibid., p. 320.
[91] See Ibid.
[92] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 103.

long-existing practice among many participating States.[93] Also, the Soviets continued to refuse consideration of the Swedish proposal for the publication and wider diffusion of the annual military expenditures of participating States."[94]

Tacit agreement on exchange of observers was also not considered a breakthrough. As all other texts on CBMs under consideration at the time, the wording regarding the nature of the commitment of the measure (i.e. voluntary or otherwise) was still left undefined and in brackets and, more importantly, as one Western delegate observed, the real significance of the measure "would only take its full meaning when the provisions on notification of these maneuvers were agreed".[95]

By the time of the summer recess, the Committee had produced a fifteen-page document registering the different proposals on CBMs, but even after a second reading, in early July, most of the texts remained in brackets as only unnecessary expressions and phrases were removed.[96]

3.4. *Autumn 1974 (9 September - 20 December)*

When the Sub-Committee reconvened in early September, the negotiations were entering into their second year and the need to break the deadlock on CBMs, especially on the notification issue, became more pressing. Following lengthy discussions during the summer recess, the Allies officially indicated in Geneva that they could accept exceptions concerning the zone of application of the CBMs, and "hinted at further flexibility" on the number of days required for advance notification.[97]

The reversal of the Western position on the geographic application of the CBMs came out of the realisation that their opening proposal on the area of application calling for "all of Europe" was not only vague, but that it did not take into consideration that two countries, the Soviet

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[93] Bernd A. Goetze, *Security in Europe. A Crisis of Confidence*, New York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 79-80. [Hereafter: Goetze, *Security in Europe.*]
[94] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 103.
[95] Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 352.
[96] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 192-194.
[97] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 105. For background information on the issue, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 281 and pp. 330-331. Indication that the issue was already being considered by some NATO partners in early 1974 can be found in Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.

Union and Turkey, had territory that extended geographically beyond Europe.[98] Although the Western governments did not want to give up the concept of "all of Europe" as the basis of definition for the area of application of the CBMs, they also recognised they were unlikely to gain all of the Soviet European territory. Moscow vehemently opposed the idea from the start and there was no sign that this would change. As described by one American negotiator, the "Soviets reasoned that the Soviet Union was an enormous country stretching into Asia, and it was therefore unfair to insist that maneuvers throughout the USSR's European territory be notified".[99] Furthermore, even though the Soviets would not make this argument publicly, they had a keen interest in trying to counter-balance the fact that the territory of both the United States and Canada would be exempted from the notification régime.[100]

Initially, the Soviets reacted negatively to the Western concessions, accusing the NATO delegations of seeking military intelligence with their proposals.[101] In early October, the Soviets softened their position by indicating informally that they could accept the "all of Europe" formula as the definition of the zone of application of CBMs provided, as the West had then formally offered, that exceptions could be made to them.[102] At the same time, the Soviet diplomats in Geneva urged their Western counterparts to demonstrate "greater realism about what was possible and acceptable in terms of national security",[103] noting that they could not improve on their existing position.[104]

This fact became obvious in the subsequent two months of negotiations. In November, the British reported that little had changed in the Eastern position.[105] Apart from the fact that they were then willing to concede the application of CBMs to all participating States,[106] no progress on the notification of major military manoeuvres had been registered since the

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[98] Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 10.
[99] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 172.
[100] Ibid., and p. 105. According to Maresca, the Soviets were concerned about making this argument in public because they did not want to claim that they were not Europeans.
[101] Ibid., pp. 105-106.
[102] Ibid., p. 107.
[103] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 333.
[104] See Ibid., p. 334.
[105] See Ibid., p. 345 and pp. 352-357.
[106] See Ibid., p. 345. Soviet agreement for the notification measure to be applied within 100 kilometres from frontiers fell short of the Western objectives, and the Allies continued to be concerned that the Soviets were perhaps trying to exempt large parts of the territory of Poland and the GDR. The Soviets had previously indicated that they might have difficulties including all the territory of their allies, especially Poland and the GDR. The Allies also believed that the Soviet insistence on only a shallow zone along frontier areas might have been connected with the existence of secret training areas, possibly connected with chemical warfare. See Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.

summer.[107] The proposed Soviet threshold for the notification measure (not yet quantified, but still believed to be between 30,000 and 60,000 troops) remained "so high" in Western views "that only a few exceptionally large exercises would qualify".[108] The restriction to apply the measure only in frontier areas and to notify only neighbouring states still meant in practice that the Soviet Union would probably not have to notify any of its manoeuvres to the West.[109] Furthermore, opposition to discussing the notification of movements had remained completely unchanged.[110] The Warsaw Pact nations maintained, throughout 1974, that no experience existed with the CBMs and, hence, that it was premature for a measure of this kind to be considered at the Conference.[111] In line with this position, the only proposal advanced by the East was to suggest that the final conclusions of the CSCE read:

> The participating States have concluded that the consideration of the question of prior notification of major military movements can be resumed later when the climate of détente is reinforced in the European continent and the experience is accumulated of the exercises of the initial measures of strengthening confidence and stability, in particular of such a measure as prior notification of major military manoeuvres.[112]

By the end of 1974 the Eastern delegations noted that they would not discuss further drafting on the issue of movements until, in the words of one Western delegate, there was "a general willingness to accept their completely --and unchangingly-- negative attitude towards any such measure emerging from this Conference".[113] The only potential "concession" on this front, hinted in private by the Bulgarian delegation, was that they might agree to recognise the confidence-building value of the notification of movements providing "that they [could] limit the conclusions of the Sub-Committee to little more than that".[114]

3.5. *The conclusion (20 January- 21 July 1975)*

January 1975 corresponded to the sixteen month of negotiations with no conclusion in sight. By that time, confidence-building measures, and especially the notification of manoeuvres, had taken on more importance for many delegations. No progress had been made, or was expected, on the "other military aspects of security".[115] An agreement on exchange of

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[107] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 352.
[108] See Ibid., p. 353 and pp. 372-373.
[109] See Ibid.
[110] See Ibid. p. 352.
[111] Canada, DEA, 20 December 1974.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid., 19 December 1974.
[114] Ibid.
[115] For an analysis of the state of play in late November 1974 and January 1975, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 355-357 and pp. 372-374.

observers had been reached, but the measure was the least controversial of all and was to be of little value unless decent parameters could be accepted for the notification of major manoeuvres. Also, hope of achieving consensus on the notification of major military movements was becoming increasingly more remote. In this context, many Western Governments began to see the notification of manoeuvres as the only remaining security element of the CSCE.[116] More significantly, perhaps, the need to bring home some achievements in the field of security had increased during the Conference: "The Belgians, Dutch and Danes indicated that satisfactory measures were essential in the context of their domestic efforts to maintain public support for an adequate level of defence spending."[117]

As a means to inject fresh impetus into the discussions, in late January, the Western Alliance decided to add a new element in the negotiations by quantifying the area inside the Soviet territory that they wished the notification measure to apply, and suggested a zone of 700 kilometres.[118] Since the Soviets had already suggested a 100-kilometre zone, the West believed that by also using a numerical formula this could greatly simplify the negotiations.[119] The Eastern states, however, did not react, and the absence of results in the Sub-Committee on CBMs became "so disturbing" that several NATO and neutral delegations warned the Soviets that progress was necessary or the successful conclusion of the CSCE might be compromised.[120] To make their point stronger, the Western and neutral states even cancelled a meeting of the Sub-Committee, but the move had no impact. [121]

Another six weeks elapsed without any progress until, on 13 March, the Head of the Soviet Delegation, Ambassador Kovalev, suggested a number of elements which, in his view, could help break the impasse on CBMs.[122] First, Kovalev reiterated that the Soviets could accept that the notification of manoeuvres should be given to all participants and not only to neighbouring countries, and that the measure could cover both national and multinational manoeuvres. Second, the area of application of the CBMs could be described as "all of Europe" provided, as suggested before by the West, that exceptions were made for the Soviet Union (and Turkey) whose territory extended beyond Europe. Third, Kovalev asserted that

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[116] For comments in the British House of Commons on this subject, see Ibid., p. 373.
[117] See Ibid., p. 373.
[118] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 134.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Ibid., p. 135.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Description of the proposals can be found in Ibid., p. 143; Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 196; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 387.

Moscow would show further flexibility on the different parameters related to the scope of the notification of major manoeuvres noting, however, that this "overall solution" (or package of propositions) was conditional on the acceptance by the other delegations that the commitment to notify major manoeuvres would be of a voluntary nature only.

The Soviet request to make the notification of manoeuvres a simple voluntary undertaking was initially not well received by the West and the neutral and non-aligned delegations.[123] For the latter, in particular, who wanted a comprehensive development of the military aspects of the Conference and a firm commitment on the obligation of CBMs, the request was interpreted as an attempt to deprive the future system of notification of all its usefulness.[124] In the West, after an initial general reluctance to consider the proposal, many delegations concluded that since the final results of the Conference were not expected to be registered in a legally binding document and that, as such, all of its commitments would in fact only be voluntary by nature (i.e. based on a moral or political obligation), it was more important to try to secure appropriate language on a firm political commitment to notify.[125] After almost nine months of stalemate over the notification measure, many participating States were beginning to feel the need to quicken the pace of discussion and few saw any advantages in pursuing the matter further only to risk "more negative results".[126] Also, the idea that Moscow would come up with better parameters on the measure if its proposal on the voluntary nature of the undertaking was accepted had raised a keen interest in several Western capitals to explore the Soviet offer.[127]

Not all neutral and non-aligned nations, nor all Western governments, were immediately convinced of the advisability to show flexibility. As NATO's floor leader on CBMs, the British delegation had to work hard to convince others to "seize the opportunity."[128] After all, as the Americans were noting, "despite its shortcomings, the Soviet position was seen as evidence of a desire to get negotiations on military aspects moving."[129]

As more delegations began to accept informally the voluntary nature of the notification measure, discussions in the Sub-Committee remained at a standstill. The Soviets took the line

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[123] Reactions to the Soviet proposals can be found in Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 219-220; Ferraris, Ibid., p. 197; and Maresca, Ibid.
[124] See Ferraris, Ibid., pp. 196-197.
[125] See Ibid.; Maresca, *To Helsinki,* p. 143 and p. 172; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 387.
[126] Ferraris, Ibid., p. 197.
[127] Ibid.
[128] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 394-395.
[129] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 143.

that they could not discuss any of the new parameters promised by Kovalev until the voluntary nature of the commitment to notify manoeuvres was accepted.[130] The West and the NNAs, on the other hand, wanted reassurance that there would be new parameters submitted to them before discussing the concept of "voluntary basis".[131]

This uncertain situation continued until 11 April when a "gentleman's agreement" was reached that the Sub-Committee would discuss both the voluntary basis and the parameters in parallel,[132] and the Soviets promised to get further instructions from Moscow.[133] Two weeks later, however, the Soviets were still insisting that they would not be specific about the concessions they had hinted at before until the West made a clear statement on their acceptance of the voluntary nature of the notification of major manoeuvres.[134]

Despite these wranglings, the month of April saw two positive developments. Early in the month, the Soviets formally stated in the Sub-Committee that they would accept the concept of "all of Europe" as previously offered with an exception for the Soviet Union.[135] A few weeks later, the Czech delegation stated that the notification of major military manoeuvres could start at a level of 40,000 troops.[136] This was the first time any Eastern delegation provided a numerical figure for the notification threshold, which until then was discussed only in terms of an army corps. These moves, executed without any new Western concession, were seen as further indication that the Soviets were interested in winding up the work of the Sub-Committee.[137] They also presaged the real beginning of the negotiations starting, in early May, with Soviet willingness to negotiate a longer time period of thirteen or fourteen days for advance notification (instead of ten),[138] and a threshold of 35,000 troops.[139] Later, the Soviets adjusted their parameters again by suggesting that they could discuss a level of 30,000 troops, a 150-kilometre zone (rather than their previous offer of 100 kilometres), and eighteen days advance notice.[140] In return, the NATO countries offered to reduce the size of the Soviet territory requiring notification from 700 to 500 kilometres, to reduce the amount of

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[130] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 397; and Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 197-198.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ferraris, Ibid., p. 198.
[134] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 402.
[135] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 146.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid., p. 147.
[139] Ibid., p. 147 and p. 172.
[140] Ibid., p. 172 and pp. 149-150; and Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 198.

time for notification from seven, to six, and then to five weeks, and to increase the threshold of notification from 12,000 to 15,000 troops.[141]

Although the negotiations were then truly engaged and were largely simplified by the use of numerical figures by all sides, the Soviet position remained unacceptable for the West and the NNAs.[142] On 5 June, in an effort to gain further concessions, the British offered a new set of parameters encompassing a zone of 450 kilometres, a notification threshold of 16,000 troops, and four to five weeks advance notice.[143] The following day, addressing the Sub-Committee on military matters, the Soviet Head of Delegation suggested a combination of three different options that, in his view, could solve the issue.[144] All three possibilities involved a time-frame of twenty-one days advance notice, but included trade-offs between the width of the territory to be covered by the application of the measure and the minimum number of troops at which a notification would have to be given. The figures proposed varied between 200 to 330 kilometres, and between 20,000 to 30,000 troops.[145] The Western reply provided by the British Ambassador was that 300 kilometres was the minimum the West could accept for the Soviet exception, and that NATO would not go beyond a threshold of 20,000-22,000 troops.[146]

These positions remained unchanged until June 20 when, in an attempt to bridge the gap, the NNAs put forward a compromise proposal on the parameters suggesting 25,000 troops, 300 kilometres, and three weeks advance notice.[147] Subsequently, on 21-22 June, during informal discussions between the British and the Soviet Heads of Delegation, the latter suggested that Moscow could accept the neutrals' compromise, but with a zone of application of 250 kilometres,[148] while promising to show flexibility on the text relating to the "voluntary basis".[149] During these same meetings, the Soviets also accepted a Swedish proposal, supported by the West, that the area of application of CBMs should not only be measured from frontiers shared with other participating States, but also from those facing other states.[150]

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[141] Maresca, Ibid., p. 149 and p. 172.
[142] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 198-199.
[143] Ibid., p. 199.
[144] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 414 note 3.
[145] See Ibid. Canadian reporting on these figures differed from the above by quoting the Soviet proposal as being "between 200 and 300 kilometres". Canada, DEA, 9 June 1974.
[146] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 414 note 3.
[147] See Ibid., p. 422.
[148] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 166.
[149] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 422-423.
[150] See Ibid., p. 423; and Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 166.

In practice, this meant that the Baltic and Black Sea coasts of the Soviet Union would also be considered zones subject to notification up to 200 kilometres or more.[151]

While the positions between East and West had never been closer, several other elements required final agreement before full consensus could be reached on a final text. The NNAs were still insisting on a commitment to notify independent manoeuvres and wanted a lower threshold of 12,000 troops for amphibious and airborne manoeuvres.[152] The question of the notification of movements remained unresolved, while the "other military aspects of security" made little progress. In early March, a first text had been mentally registered on this latter issue, however, it only referred to "the complementary character of the political and military aspects of security, the possibility of information on the negotiations on disarmament or on the MBFR, but with very vague assurances".[153] Also, on the notification of manoeuvres, Turkey had not yet agreed on the width of the zone of application it would be willing to accept on its territory. Finally, on the last parameters for the notification of major manoeuvres offered by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom believed that even if the offer was reasonable, the West could get more territory inside the Soviet Union, and should continue to aim for 300 kilometres.[154]

Meanwhile, efforts at finding satisfactory language to describe the concept of "voluntary basis" for the notification measure continued with the tabling of several texts from all three sides.[155] For the West and the NNAs it was important that the final document of the Conference contain a clear indication that the undertaking to notify major military manoeuvres (although "voluntary" as requested by the Soviets) did not result in selective or discretionary implementation. The Western states had already tabled a text emphasising "the individual responsibility of each state in the realisation of their common objectives of strengthening confidence through prior notification of major military manoeuvres",[156] which they believed implied a strong moral obligation to notify. Other delegations, including Yugoslavia, were also working on the issue trying to ensure "a firm and unambiguous" commitment to notify.[157]

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[151] See Ibid.
[152] See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 423.
[153] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 196.
[154] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 421-422.
[155] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 198.
[156] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 402. For the views of other delegations on the subject, see Ferraris, Ibid., p. 198.
[157] For a discussion on the Yugoslav position, see Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., pp. 402-403.

Discussions on the definition of the "voluntary basis" ran into difficulties when the Sub-Committee began reviewing a draft document tabled by the British delegation suggesting including in the preambular paragraphs of the notification measure a statement that the measure "derives from political decision and therefore rests upon a voluntary basis".[158] The Romanians, the Dutch and the Turks strongly "argued against acceptance of the voluntary principle" pushing the Soviets to threaten to take away all their proposals on the parameters if the sentence was removed, and to argue strongly for the deletion of the word "therefore".[159] But time was running out. Work in the other Committees had progressed enough that, even if important issues remained, a general consensus was beginning to emerge among the participating States that these could be resolved quickly and in time for a Summit meeting in July.[160] Also, the Finnish host had warned the participants that in order to organise a Summit at such short notice, they quickly needed a decision on a date for the opening of Stage III, hence a swift conclusion of Stage II.[161]

On 3 July, following further unsuccessful attempts to gain a larger zone of territory inside the Soviet Union,[162] the Western delegations decided to accept that the final parameters for the notification measure could be set at 25,000 troops, 250 kilometres and twenty-one days notice. The following day, the Soviets confirmed their mutual acceptance of these parameters.[163]

With assurances of acceptable parameters for all sides, the text on the definition of the "voluntary basis" could be quickly completed. As finally agreed, the text included, as the Soviets requested, a statement recognising that the notification measure "deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis". This provision, however, only appeared in the preambular paragraphs introducing the measure. Furthermore, the text was preceded by two other sentences emphasising the "political importance of prior notification", and the "responsibility" of each of the participating States to implement the measure "in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities".[164] For the Allies, these two phrases made it clear

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[158] See Ibid., pp. 427-428.
[159] See Ibid., p. 428.
[160] See Ibid., pp. 426-427; and Maresca, *To Helsinki,* p. 165.
[161] See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., pp. 426-427 and pp. 435-436; and Maresca, Ibid., p. 144, 146, and pp. 165-167;
[162] See Maresca, Ibid., p. 166.
[163] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 428.
[164] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 199. For an explanation of the meaning of the different provisions, Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, pp. 7-8.

that accepting the "voluntary basis" did not entail accepting selective notification, and that the participating States were expected to abide by all the parameters described in the body of the document.[165] Moreover, the main text of the operative section of the document dealing with the prior notification of major manoeuvres clearly emphasised that the participating States "*will* notify"; a phrase the Western states believed was "further insurance against too liberal an interpretation of the voluntary basis concept in the preamble".[166]

Following final agreement on the notification of major military manoeuvres, several other issues were quickly settled, including the NNAs demands relating to lower thresholds for amphibious and airborne manoeuvres, and the notification of major movements --a subject which the Soviets had until then firmly refused to consider beyond the fact that the question should be re-examined at a later date. Basically, the way to their resolution was to devise language that conveyed a different and lower level of commitment to the provisions than the one used for the notification of major manoeuvres. In the case of the prior notification of major movements, the agreement reached stipulated that the participating States "may, at their own discretion … notify major military movements." The use of the auxiliary verb "*may*", combined with the phrase "*at their own discretion*", clearly indicated that the application of this measure was purely optional and at the discretion of the parties. Concerning the NNAs request for sub-thresholds of notification for amphibious and airborne manoeuvres, the final agreed text did not even provide a specific threshold at which they should be notified. The provision, recorded under the measure for the "Prior Notification of Major Military Manoeuvres", simply gave recognition to the desirability of notifying combined land-air or land-sea manoeuvres below the 25,000 troops threshold, if *significant numbers* of the more mobile amphibious and airborne troops were involved.[167] The auxiliary verb "*can*" was used in the sentence to give it slightly more force that the purely discretionary texts under "major movements", but less force than for the notification of major military manoeuvres, for which the word "*will*" was used.[168]

Regarding the application of restraints on military activities that Yugoslavia, Romania and several other NNAs strongly favoured, the issue was resolved by acceptance of a very vague and non-committal formulation. The final text only suggested that when conducting their military activities, the participating States "will duly take into account and respect" their

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[165] Canada, DEA, 25 July 1975.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid., 6 August 1974.
[168] Ibid.

common objective of building confidence.[169]

A similar minimal outcome was reached on the issue of arms control, disarmament and the "other military aspects of security".[170] The initial request for devising guiding principles for negotiations on arms control and disarmament in Europe were covered by a harmless recognition that the CSCE participating States favoured disarmament and were "convinced of the necessity to take effective measures" towards this end.[171] On the question of establishing some form of a link between MBFR and the CSCE, the final document did not mention any negotiating forum and simply recognised "the importance that participants in negotiating fora see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other States participating" in the CSCE.

Finally, as previously agreed early on in the negotiations, the provisions on exchange of observers contained few specifics apart from the fact that "the inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful." The provisions further noted that the participating States "*will*" invite other participating States, but the obligatory nature of this commitment was greatly diminished by the insertion of the phrase "voluntarily and on a bilateral basis". More positively, the text on exchange of observers did not limit the exchanges to "major" manoeuvres, but suggested the possibility of a greater exchange by mentioning at "military" manoeuvres.

4. STAGE III: HELSINKI (30 JULY - 1 AUGUST 1975)

Stage III of the CSCE was held only nine days after the conclusion of the Geneva negotiations. Attended by Heads of State or Government from all thirty-five participating States, the three-day meeting consisted mainly of speeches. As all the decisions had been taken and the documents comprising the Final Act had been approved by all delegations, no further negotiations were necessary and the Summit only had to officially endorse the Final Act.

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[169] See Maresca, *To Helsinki*, pp. 173-174; and Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 14.
[170] The most comprehensive treatment of these issues can be found in Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 226-230; and Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, pp. 194-201.
[171] For an analysis of the provisions agreed upon, see Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 15.

The last stage of the CSCE provided an occasion for the participating governments to air their views on the commitments undertaken in the Final Act and for the Western countries emphasis was on future implementation. In the field of CBMs, the thirty-five participating States were entering on a new uncharted course. As an integral part of the Final Act, the "*Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament*" set out new rules for the conduct of military activities in Europe, but no one knew exactly how these new procedures were to be applied.

5. CONCLUSION

Two years of difficult negotiations were necessary to achieve final results on CBMs. As for the MPT, only the NATO group could be truly satisfied with the outcome which, once again, basically followed their programme. Throughout the negotiations the NNAs continued to hope that the Conference would consider a wide-range of military issues. But, with both East and West seeing no interest in their ambitious proposals, the non-bloc countries had to accept that the CSCE was not the forum where they would obtain a greater role in determining questions affecting security in Europe.

For the Soviets, the final results were even more disenchanting. If CBMs represented a continuing irritant in prolonging and complicating the Conference, they were also feared by the Eastern governments who admitted during the main negotiations having made a mistake by accepting terms of reference for them at the preliminaries.[172] CBMs went at the heart of military secrecy and concessions on this front were never easy. But, with the consensus rule prevailing and a majority of delegations favouring development of commitments in this field, the East had little choice but to concede.

Undoubtedly, the Warsaw Pact nations did all they could to ensure that only a very vague and non-committal arrangement would come out of the CSCE, and the document finally accepted reflected this position. Most of the provisions on CBMs lacked precise and decisive formulation, and contained only vague language describing the obligations of states. Yet, while the Eastern bloc countries could be easily identified as the primary source responsible for the meagre results achieved by the CSCE, a closer look at the Western negotiating record,

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[172] As recorded by the British Foreign Office, the Soviets "have admitted privately that they made a mistake in agreeing at Helsinki to draw up detailed confidence-building measures at all, even though this was an essential element in the bargain at the time." Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 374.

presented next, reveals that apart from a few NATO partners the majority of Allied governments were satisfied with the final results on CBMs, having only wanted a minimal outcome.

CHAPTER 7

NATO'S NEGOTIATING RECORD: REVISITED

1. INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the CSCE, the outcome of the negotiations on CBMs could be described as a diplomatic success for the West. The measures initially sponsored by the NATO delegations were accepted and many of the specific provisions defining their future application closely reflected the Western positions. But, if the Western governments could take credit for being the architect of the new set of rules affecting the future conduct of major military activities that would be applied throughout most of the European continent, away from the public light, Western success could be questioned as it was much less clear whether the final outcome of the CSCE was the best or the most the West could have attained.

When the CSCE opened in 1973 the Allies were not prepared for detailed discussions on CBMs. Fears that the measures could interfere with MBFR had led to a general understanding among the NATO states that the CBMs to be negotiated should be kept simple and largely undefined. Accordingly, the Allies had not hammered out any of the details related to the eventual operation or application of the measures.

The fact that the mandate agreed upon by the MPT left the door open for a wide range of proposals on the measures, emphasising either a comprehensive or minimal development of CBMs, apparently did not worry the Western delegations or was not judged sufficient to bring about a reassessment of their agreed negotiating position. Similarly, the possibility that the NNAs might wish to reintroduce many of their more comprehensive proposals, or argue for a thorough development of the Western measures, was not considered. Perhaps the superficiality of the initial discussions on CBMs at Dipoli led the Allies to believe that their negotiations in Geneva would follow a similar pattern and that the final results of the Conference might be only marginally more detailed than the Final Recommendations of the preliminary talks. But, regardless of the main reason for NATO's minimal planning, when the negotiations started in Geneva the Allies had no agreed position on many details related to their own proposals and were even less prepared to deal with any other suggestions in the field of CBMs. The absence of adequate preparations meant that several important questions on the nature, scope, or specific modalities of the CBMs had to be addressed at the same time that the negotiations were being pursued.

In this late start in the elaboration of a more comprehensive NATO policy on CBMs, the Allies often found themselves at odds on many issues. This situation, in turn, repeatedly prevented them from reaching agreement on a common negotiating stance, or resulted in the adoption of policies reflecting only the lowest common denominator, which was to simply ask for the minimum. In short, a closer look at NATO's positions at the CSCE indicates that they were often very similar to those advocated by the Eastern bloc. Furthermore, despite a public record suggesting a strong preference for obtaining effective stringent measures, the Allies never had this goal in mind, and never developed a negotiating strategy to support such a position.

2. ABANDONING THE ONLY STRATEGY

The only negotiating strategy devised by the Allies to deal with the negotiation of CBMs pertained to the issue of advanced notification. Based on agreement reached at NATO before the MPT started, the main tactic formulated by the Alliance to tackle the measures at the Conference was to table "illustrative lists" of military activities. When the main negotiations started in 1973, however, the Allies had no agreed "package" of lists. Initial efforts during the MPT to come up with a series of different national examples were problematic. With no precise formulation for the preferred scope of the measures, progress in determining what the national lists should contain was extremely slow, raising more questions than answers. With no clear guidance on what the lists should include, it soon became evident that what one state considered suitable for notification and, therefore, for inclusion on its list, was not necessarily agreeable to others.

While these difficulties underscored the need to give minimum consideration to certain "parameters", such as precisely what type of military activities should be included, at what level troops should be notified, in what area NATO would benefit most from notification, or what details the notification should include, this was not accomplished. Furthermore, disagreement surfaced on a number of basic aspects. On the size of the military activities, for instance, Norway indicated early on in the Geneva phase of the Conference that it wanted small-scale military activities considered,[1] but the general view in Brussels was to support only the notification of large scale activities.[2] Regarding the type of military activities that should be notified, the Americans noted during the MPT that they were beginning to have

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[1] Canada, DEA, 25 October 1973.
[2] Ibid., 26 March 1973.

second-thoughts about the notification of "movements" and, at the beginning of the main negotiations in Geneva, they formally notified their NATO partners that they did not wish to see "movements" discussed in the CSCE.[3]

Divergence of opinion on these, and other fundamental key aspects of the measures, made agreement on a suitable package of lists increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Yet, rather than discarding the lists, the Allies persisted in their elaboration. Too much preparation had gone into the development of the concept. By the time the MPT concluded, preparations in Brussels for discussion on the notification measures at the Conference had only concentrated on the development of illustrative lists.[4] Similarly, the first Alliance guidance paper for the Geneva negotiations also focused on this approach.[5]

As the main negotiations entered a more intense working phase, the difficulties and inadequacies of the Western approach became more evident and significant. When the United Kingdom tabled its draft resolution on CBMs in early 1974, the Allies appeared to have come to grips with a number of important details on their proposals including, for instance, that the notification measures should apply mainly to a land context and that they should start at divisional level. These and many other details, however, were not firm agreements based on any military or technical studies supported by all the Allies, but more the result of loose general understandings backed by a majority. In fact, as will be discussed in the next section, the UK draft resolution on CBMs, perceived by most observers as representing the NATO position on the issue,[6] was only a national contribution because disagreement on some important aspects could not be resolved before tabling it in the Conference room. More worrisome for the successful pursuit of NATO's negotiating strategy were the proposals advanced by the NNAs a few weeks after the British document was tabled. In contrast to the

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[3] Ibid., 1 October 1973.

[4] As recorded in official documentation, at the end of the MPT: "NATO HQ efforts have so far been devoted only to the development of illustrative lists". Canada, DEA, n. d. (The document was drafted between the conclusion of the preliminary talks on 8 June and 13 July 1973). As further noted in another Canadian document, dated 23 May 1973, NATO's only paper on this topic was "attempting to develop an illustrative list of NATO manoeuvres". Furthermore, as reported: "Surprisingly, only one paper is being developed at this time and there are no other studies under way or contemplated." Ibid., 23 May 1973.

[5] Commenting on the elaboration of the only NATO CBMs paper, the Canadians noted in October 1973 that: "Central to the NATO paper [was] the proposal that 'illustrative lists' of annual force movements and manoeuvres". Canada, DEA, 1 October 1973. A few months later, reporting continued to suggest that "NATO tactics relied principally on the tabling of illustrative lists." Ibid., DEA, 18 March 1974.

[6] See, for instance, the record of the Italian negotiator Luigi Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 190.

UK draft resolution which envisaged that notification measures would be applied predominantly to land forces when these forces reached the level of one division, the document of the Six called for all major, single or combined, terrestrial, naval and aerial manoeuvres and movements to be notified at a level of 18,000 troops. Furthermore, the NNAs proposal also envisaged the adoption of sub-thresholds of notification to be applied when amphibious or airborne forces were included.

The more precise and comprehensive scope of application of the CBMs suggested by the NNAs strongly underscored that their proposals would force more detailed discussions than the Allies had prepared for.[7] Indeed, it was doubtful that any Western illustrative lists consisting of mainly land manoeuvres, provided without any specific numerical threshold, could help address the particular requirements of the NNAs to have all military activities notified at a level of 18,000 troops and to apply sub-thresholds for the notification of amphibious and airborne forces.

While the NNAs' proposals exposed the inadequacy of the lists as an effective means for negotiating the notification measures, the Allies were also discovering important flaws in their initial approach. Until the neutrals and non-aligned came up with a specific numerical threshold of 18,000 troops for the notification of major manoeuvres and movements, the delegations in Geneva were commonly discussing the notification measures in terms of formations at brigade, division, or army corps level. In these discussions the Western delegations, who had still not yet determined any numerical threshold for the measure, generally described their proposals in terms of divisions.[8] Yet, the Allies discovered during the first few months of discussions in Geneva that great disparities existed in the strength of divisions between countries (from 7,000 troops for a Soviet Airborne Division, to 20,000 men

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[7] It is noteworthy that the possibility that the neutrals might force the Allies to provide further definitions of their proposals was noted by some delegations as early as October 1973, i.e. one month into Stage II of the negotiations. Canada, DEA, 22 October 1973. Also, the possibility that the NNAs might request lower thresholds of notification was recognised as early as May 1973, even before the MPT concluded. Ibid., 23 May 1973.

[8] The suggestion that a specific threshold should be given to the measure was made at NATO as early as 22 October 1973. Ibid., 22 October 1973. Yet, it was only after the NNAs tabled their draft resolution on 20 February 1974 that the subject was more seriously discussed in Brussels. At that time, reports noted that "a view seemed to be developing among NATO delegations . . . that a compromise at about 15,000 might be acceptable". Ibid., 25 February 1974. In mid-March 1974, further reporting noted that a compromise began to form for a figure of 10,000 troops because "it roughly accords with the size of a Soviet division and is the same level used in parallel measures in MBFR." Ibid., 18 March 1974.

for a US Marine Corps Division),[9] and that keeping such a provision would certainly seriously complicate the negotiations, while making agreement unlikely.

As the elaboration of the lists grew more questionable and problematic, another important consideration for their development was the belief that tabling such lists at the Conference would force the Warsaw Pact to do the same. If the WTO nations refused to reciprocate, the Allies had envisaged providing lists of Eastern military activities they would want the Pact to notify. For reasons that remain unclear, but that were certainly closely linked to the fact that the Allies could not come up with their own selective lists, NATO discarded this idea even before the Geneva phase of negotiations started.[10]

With no agreed package of illustrative lists in hand and with little, if any, reason to pursue their development, the Western governments finally decided, in mid-March 1974, to abandon the idea. By that time, Stage II of the Conference was entering the drafting stage and even if attempts at developing the lists had provided the Allies with important insights into CBMs, the strategy had precluded them from thoroughly reviewing many crucial aspects of the future development and application of the measures. When confronted with specific proposals by other participating States, the Allies repeatedly found themselves at odds over the most appropriate position to advocate, or the most beneficial negotiating stance to put forward. Disagreements in at least five main areas deserve closer attention, not only because they concerned important aspects of CBMs, but also because some directly, and negatively, impacted on the final outcome of the Conference.

3. MANOEUVRES AND/OR MOVEMENTS?

The prior notification of major military movements was an integral and significant part of the NATO CBMs package for the CSCE. Yet, less than four months after the Allies had tabled their CBMs at the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, the Americans noted that they were beginning to reconsider their position on the issue. Because the extent of Washington's

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[9] Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974. The Canadian document mentioned that these numbers were based on a table included in the "*Military Balance*"; a yearly publication produced by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. The year of the publication was not given. According to Victor-Yves Ghebali, even though the East refused to discuss "numbers" in the Conference room for almost 18 months, they had informed the Allies at the start of the negotiations that their divisions were smaller than those of the Alliance. See Ghebali, "Considérations", p. 26.

[10] Canada, DEA, 16 July 1973.

opposition to the notification of movements was never thoroughly discussed at NATO during the MPT, the inherent difficulties deriving from such a position only surfaced as the main negotiations were already in progress.

Signs of differences between the United States and the other members of the Alliance on the issue of movements arose at the very start during Stage I. Addressing the gathering of Foreign Ministers, the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, restricted his comments to a simple endorsement of the Helsinki Final Recommendations which, on the question of prior notification of major military movements, only called for the subject to be studied at the Conference and for conclusions to be submitted.[11] In clear contrast to this minimal approach, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Douglas-Home, emphasised the significance of notifying military movements. In the three-page proposal on CBMs submitted during Stage I, the British noted that:

> The arguments deployed [for the notification of major military manoeuvres] . . . are even more true of major military movements. Certain participants have voiced doubts about the need and feasibility of including prior notification of movements as well as manoeuvres. In our view a failure to provide prior notification of movements while providing such notification on manoeuvres would prejudice this opportunity to create a greater climate of confidence.[12]

This strong and unequivocal endorsement for the CSCE to consider fully the notification of movements certainly did not please the Americans, who had already indicated their general reluctance for the idea; and, just prior to the opening of Stage II, Washington clearly expressed its opposition to the measure. In mid-September 1973, the Americans argued at NATO that the confidence-building measures of the CSCE and the constraints measures envisaged in MBFR were different and that the Alliance should be concerned about the "possible effects the inclusion of movements [in the CSCE] might have on similar measures in MBFR".[13] An overlap between the CSCE measure calling for the advance notification of major military movements, and on movements envisaged as pre-reduction stabilising measures affecting movements of forces in MBFR, could create difficulties in persuading the Soviets to accept mandatory and more exacting provisions regarding movements in MBFR.[14]

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[11] See "U.S. Secretary of State, William Rogers, Addressing the Conference, 5 July 1973", CSCE/I/PV.5, reproduced in CSCE, *Records and Documents - Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE Stage 1, Helsinki, Verbatim Records, July 3-7, 1973.*

[12] CSCE, *Records and Documents*, CSCE/I/18.

[13] Canada, DEA, 3 September 1973.

[14] Ibid., 1 October and 10 September 1973.

As viewed by Washington, the measures envisaged in the force reductions talks would be of greater political and military value for the Alliance because the "negotiation of an MBFR agreement and associated limitations on re-entry of Soviet forces into the guidelines area would impose movement limitation and notification where it [was] most valuable to NATO."[15] For this reason, Washington insisted on a distinction between manoeuvres and movements, and the removal of movements from the CSCE discussions.[16]

The European NATO partners, who had initially shared Washington's concerns about MBFR, did not agree with the US proposal[17] and believed that the Alliance had gone too far on the path of movements to renounce the idea altogether at that late stage.[18] They maintained that the CSCE confidence-building measures were by their nature essentially different from the associated measures and they did not see how the inclusion of movements in the Conference could cause difficulties for MBFR.[19] To reassure Washington, the Europeans argued that if the CSCE made no attempt to reach a precise definition to distinguish between manoeuvres and movements, and if the measures and the terms were left vague and not rigidly defined, the question of overlap would not arise.[20] They further maintained that the NATO countries could "make abundantly clear that their position on the CBMs in the CSCE [were] without prejudice to collateral measures in MBFR."[21]

This European proposal on how movements could be dealt with at the CSCE did not reassure Washington and, with the negotiations already on their way, the need to reach an agreed Alliance policy on the issue became pressing. In late September, the British suggested that since the Soviets could be expected to oppose vigorously the notification of movements in the negotiations, "it would be tactically advisable to leave it to [them] to shoot down any reference to movements".[22] This, they observed, would place "the onus for rejection" upon the USSR, and would prevent the West from alienating the neutral and non-aligned delegations who strongly favoured the proposal.[23]

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[15] Ibid., 18 March 1974.
[16] Ibid., 14 September, 3 September, 13 September, and 1 October 1973.
[17] Ibid., 13 September 1973.
[18] Ibid., 10 September 1973. Canada also shared this position. See, Ibid., 1 October 1973.
[19] Ibid., 1 October 1973.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] The British suggestion was introduced in a document intended to provide guidance in developing a common Alliance position at the CSCE. The document was submitted to the NATO Senior Political Committee on 28 September and to the North Atlantic Council on 3 October. See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 228. Canada, DEA, 14 September and 1 October 1973.
[23] Canada, Ibid., 14 September 1973.

On 6 October, or three weeks after the Geneva negotiations opened, the Americans finally accepted the British suggestion.[24] But the compromise formula, whereby the United States would not officially challenge the discussion of movements in the Conference and would leave it to the Soviets to argue against it,[25] did not solve all the difficulties. In early November the British were reporting that the discussions in the Sub-Committee on military matters were already "beginning to run out of steam". The reasons, they noted, were not only the stubbornness of the Soviet position, but also because the "NATO delegations had little scope to speak in great detail about the modalities of CBMs without entering into matters which were not fully agreed within the Alliance".[26] As reported by another Western delegation, one reason for the limited debate on movements in the Sub-Committee was that "the Warsaw Pact nations were awaiting the views of the *demandeur* on the issue, i.e. NATO", asking whether movements involved movements across the Atlantic, or if those in and out of Europe were also to be included; did movements include troops and equipment, or both?[27]

By mid-December the British reported further difficulties with the CBMs noting that their prospects did not look "bright". The Soviets were on the defensive and the Americans had "cold feet" about the measures because of their possible implications for the MBFR negotiations.[28] According to the British, there was a noticeable change in the US position on the issue.[29] Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, made it clear in private discussions with British officials that he attached "no importance whatsoever to the CSCE" and, as interpreted in London, the Americans probably wanted to end the CSCE "more quickly and on easier terms" than they did.[30]

The split between the United States and the Europeans on the issue of the notification of movements grew more important just before the Christmas recess when the Americans were then being described by other NATO delegations as "going back on their previous

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[24] The United States approved the suggestion on 6 October 1973. Canada, Ibid., 6 October 1973.
[25] Ibid., 14 September, and 6 October 1973.
[26] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 202 note 7. The document also noted that there was no "clear guidance from Brussels on many points on detail".
[27] Canada, DEA, 13 November 1973. One month earlier, the Canadians had observed that "NATO [had] still not arrived at a concerted view on the substance and tactics of the CBMs issue, in part because it [had] not … clarified their relationship to similar MBFR pre-reduction measures." Ibid., 13 September 1973.
[28] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 217.
[29] See Ibid.
[30] See Ibid.

positions".[31] At the time the United Kingdom was contemplating tabling a comprehensive draft resolution on CBMs. The move was considered important not only to retain Western initiative on the issue, but also because the drafting stage of the negotiations was approaching and the West had no formal draft resolution on the table at the Conference.[32] Also, according to the Canadian delegation in Geneva, NATO had not given much thought to what the military content of the final document of the Conference should include and, as the delegation noted, "a Western draft would be most useful, both as an exercise in its own right to try to identify common (and disputed) views among the 15, and as a tactically advantageous paper to be tabled".[33] "To state the obvious", the delegation reported to Ottawa, "the sub-committee will become involved in this exercise sooner or later, and, as yet, we have no idea as to what common position there may be among the 15 on most of the questions at issue."[34]

In mid-January 1974 the NATO caucus in Geneva discussed the British draft resolution. The proposal gained the support of all the Allies except the United States, who objected because it included the notification of movements. The Americans continued to argue that the measure would interfere with MBFR[35] and maintained that it could inhibit their movement of forces within and into Europe and negatively affect "allied deployment in a crisis".[36] The argument, already made in previous discussions,[37] did not change the position of the other partners.[38] In private, some suggested that US opposition to the measure probably also stemmed from the fact that Washington was not interested in being tied-up with a commitment to notify its movements of troops to the flank countries and Spain.[39]

Despite strong American misgivings, the British draft resolution was tabled in Geneva on 4 February. Because of US opposition, however, it could only be submitted as a national contribution.[40] While not endorsed officially by NATO, it was agreed that Alliance members

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[31] See Ibid., p. 224. The split within NATO concerning the issue of movements is also noted in Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 89.
[32] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference,* pp. 226-229.
[33] Canada, DEA, 5 December 1973.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 23 January and 18 March 1974. See also Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 229 note 7.
[36] Canada, Ibid., 23 January 1974. See also Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid.
[37] Such argumentation had been made as early as November 1973. See, for instance, Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 202.
[38] The existence of a British document refuting the American arguments on the issue of movements is mentioned in Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 229 note 7.
[39] Canada, DEA, 1 October 1973.
[40] Reference to "a rather difficult exchange with the Americans" is noted in Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 269.

would generally support the resolution and it was expected that the United States would remain silent on the issue of movements.[41]

The UK draft resolution was well received by a majority of CSCE participating States and, with a similar resolution tabled by the NNAs later in the month, was believed to have increased pressure on the Eastern nations to be more flexible on CBMs.[42] One month after its submission British diplomats were observing that despite all the difficulties at NATO, the West had the Soviets "on the run" on the issue of confidence-building measures and "should keep them there as long as possible."[43] This assessment of the state of play at the negotiations was shared by the other Western European governments and, reinforced by what they perceived to be a tactical advantage, the representatives of the nine countries of the European Community decided, on 19 April, to maintain their position on the notification of movements while the eight NATO members of the group would seek to persuade the Americans to agree.[44] Two weeks later, however, the American administration asked the United Kingdom to take another look at the draft resolution. According to a close associate of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State thought "it would be a mistake to hold up successful completion of a CSCE on what were relatively minor points."[45]

The British were surprised and irritated by Kissinger's request. They did not consider CBMs as "relatively minor points"[46] and believed that their draft resolution had been discussed at length at NATO and represented the results of "a hard fought balance between those in the Alliance who wanted more and those (in particular the Americans) who wanted less."[47] Moreover, apart from the question of movements, the UK believed that the basics of their resolution was what most Western and neutral and non-aligned delegations wanted as a final result of the Conference.[48] The British further believed that if compromise would be tactically wise at some point to meet particular demands of the NNAs, or to get closer to the Eastern position, they did not see why the West should settle prematurely for less than they could achieve in the negotiations.[49] Finally, Kissinger's request was judged to be superfluous

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[41] Canada, DEA, 18 March 1974.
[42] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 269-270.
[43] See Ibid., p. 269.
[44] See Ibid., pp. 272-273.
[45] Ibid., p. 279 note 1. The comment was made on 2 May by Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor in the State Department.
[46] See Ibid., pp. 279-280.
[47] See Ibid., p. 280.
[48] See Ibid.
[49] See Ibid., pp. 279-280.

because the main ideas of the UK draft resolution had already been incorporated into provisionally registered texts in Geneva and was no longer the basis of discussions in the Sub-Committee.[50]

At the time of Kissinger's request, British diplomats observed that the American delegations in Brussels and Geneva had little flexibility in their instructions because it was apparently difficult for them to extract clear instructions from Washington where the Pentagon was taking a "very dim view" of CBMs.[51] Shortly after this observation, however, a member of the US delegation in Geneva told the British that the Pentagon was "in favour of the prior notification of military movements, and that opposition [laid] *only* in the White House".[52] Notwithstanding the clarification, Kissinger's intervention had a chilling effect in London where some high officials began to suggest that the notification of movements should be dropped at the appropriate time.[53]

US disapproval of the British (or West European) negotiating position on CBMs grew more important as signs of impatience over the slow rate of progress in Geneva was felt in the spring of 1974. At that time, the Soviets were increasing calls for an early conclusion of Stage II and for a decision to hold Stage III at Summit level.[54] Within NATO, the United States was also beginning to entertain discussions about concluding the proceedings.[55]

In mid-June, during the semi-annual NATO Ministerial Meeting, Kissinger formally asked the Allies to undertake an examination of what they would consider necessary to quickly conclude Stage II and to hold Stage III at Summit level.[56] According to Kissinger, such a review of NATO's negotiating priorities was especially necessary in the field of confidence-building measures and in Basket III dealing with human rights and human contacts.[57] Kissinger asserted that an overall assessment of NATO's minimum requirements for the CSCE would allow the Allies to concentrate on what was essential and that this would speed up the conclusions of the negotiations, helping to avoid an outcome that could advance the Soviet goal of setting up a new security system to replace the two military alliances.[58]

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[50] See Ibid., p. 280.
[51] See Ibid., pp. 281 note 5.
[52] See Ibid. [Emphasis added].
[53] See Ibid., p. 280.
[54] See Ibid., pp. 277-279.
[55] See Ibid.
[56] See Ibid., pp. 304-306.
[57] See Ibid., pp. 304- 306 and pp. 311-315.
[58] See Ibid., pp. 304-306.

Kissinger further maintained that if the discussions in Geneva were to drag on, the Russians might take a harder line on East-West relations in order to try to extract benefits at the Conference.[59] Finally, while Kissinger denied that the United States had made any bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union to try to accelerate progress at Geneva, or that the two superpowers had already jointly decided to hold Stage III at Summit level,[60] Washington's NATO partners were reluctant to consider the request to reduce Western demands to a minimum, and were suspicious of the reasons behind it.[61]

Impatience over the length of the negotiations continued throughout the summer of 1974. In July, the United States reiterated its demand to drop the notification of movements from the CSCE and, in Allied consultations, the Americans demonstrated reluctance to "cooperate in developing a text on the subject which would be acceptable to all".[62] This exasperated the NATO partners who felt that the mandate of the Helsinki Final Recommendations required the Conference to come up with some text on the notification of movements and that the United States should co-operate in finding some.[63] As interpreted by the British, there had been a clear shift in US policy of late which was directly linked to the Nixon Administration's heightened interest in its relations with the Soviets. While Kissinger's interest in the CSCE had never been great, the British diplomats observed that:

> In recent months . . . it appears that he has come to see the Conference as a positive obstacle to his task of developing Soviet-American co-operation carrying through his negotiations with the Russians to reduce the dangers and costs of the strategic balance. His fears may have been fed by the recurrent hints in Eastern capitals that slow Russian progress at least on MBFR and possibly on SALT are in some way related to the delays in completing the CSCE. At any rate, he had made it very clear that he concurs with the Soviet view that the Western negotiators in Geneva have become too stubbornly immersed in unnecessary detail; and that they need firm guidance from a higher level with the object of bringing the Conference to an early end.[64]

Soviet exploitation of the MBFR negotiations to persuade Kissinger to quickly conclude the

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[59] See Ibid., p. 306.
[60] See Ibid., pp. 304-306. Press reports on this question had already surfaced in late April. See Ibid. p. 278 note 4.
[61] See Ibid., pp. 304-306, pp. 311-315, and pp. 323-324. Earlier in April, the British had noted that the Summit was the only leverage the West had for better position on CBMs and Basket III, and that the results of the negotiations at that time did not justify one. Ibid., p. 268. In late April, the nine countries of the European Community had agreed that the results of the negotiations at that point did not warrant a Summit. See Ibid., p. 277.
[62] Canada, DEA, 18 July 1974.
[63] Ibid. This position was actively supported by Greece, Turkey, the nine members of the European Community, and Canada.
[64] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 323.

CSCE continued in the fall of 1974.[65] In early September, Kissinger reiterated his request for the Allies to reach agreement on minimum Conference results, especially with regard to CBMs and Basket III.[66]

As 1974 drew to a close the outlook for the negotiation of a measure on movements was very bleak. Reviewing the general course of events since September, the British recognised that it was clear that the East was strongly opposed to the issue and that there was no indication that their position would change. Equally significant, the British noted that "as the Americans [were] unhappy about the original Western proposal (they wanted it dropped but reluctantly accepted the tactical arguments for maintaining it), it [was] clear that nothing of substance [would] emerge."[67] However, the majority in NATO still felt the need to find a formula to cover the requirements of the Final Recommendations.[68] At the same time, they recognised that given the opposition of both superpowers, only three options could be considered:

1. to accept no reference to movements at all;
2. to include a negative conclusion, or;
3. to try to obtain some minimal conclusions.[69]

Most at NATO considered the first option completely unacceptable because it went against the letter and the spirit of the Final Recommendations of Helsinki, which clearly stated that the subject had to be studied by the Committee/Sub-Committee of the Conference and that some conclusions needed to be drafted in this regard.[70] Furthermore, a sentence had been provisionally agreed in the Sub-Committee that the issue had been studied by the Conference.[71]

The second option which, as proposed by the Soviets, could be expressed by the formulation that "the participating states have concluded that no arrangements for the prior notification of major movements was "at present practicable" created problems for two reasons.[72] First, it would not reflect the fact that most CSCE states were willing to implement the measure.[73] Second, the formulation could be potentially more harmful than anything else, because it

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[65] See Ibid., p. 340.
[66] See Ibid., p. 330.
[67] See Ibid., p. 352.
[68] See Ibid., pp. 352-353.
[69] Canada, DEA, 19 December 1974.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.

would "tend to undercut alliance position in MBFR."[74] As argued in Allied discussions, if the West accepted such a formulation and agreed with the Soviets that détente had not developed to a point where CBMs on the prior notification of movements was feasible, or realistic, such an argument "could be used by the [WTO] in countering alliance demand for stabilizing measures governing notification and size of military movements in MBFR".[75] Finally, any other formulation suggesting, or implying, that "the participating states were unable to reach any common conclusion on the subject" was also judged unacceptable because it would represent a step backward from the Final Recommendations "which by implications at least accepted that the notification of movements was a confidence-building measure that could be discussed at the Conference".[76]

The third option calling for minimal conclusions was the only viable one. As discussed a few months earlier when the Allies were looking for an alternative position that could satisfy Washington,[77] this option could involve three elements:

1. that the question had been studied;
2. that some recognition be given to the value of the notification of movements, and;
3. that it should be left to the discretion of the participating States to provide notification.[78]

Given the strong Soviet opposition to the notification of movements, and the inability of the NATO states to request more because of Washington's similar dislike of the measure, the most the CSCE could achieve on this issue was recognition of these three weak elements. Indeed, in early 1975, the United States was still reiterating to Allies clear opposition to the notification of movements and requested no further public statements linking better progress on CBMs with further progress elsewhere in other areas of the Conference.[79] The Soviets continued to resist any language on the issue beyond the fact that the question could be studied later.

The fact that the Conference concluded by accepting any positive text on the notification of movements was because the superpowers found themselves completely isolated on this

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[74] Ibid., 27 March 1975.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid., 19 December 1974.
[77] References to such discussions can be traced as far back as April 1974. See Ibid., 24 April 1974.
[78] Canada, DEA, 19 December 1974. Similar recommendations had been made in August by the nine members of the European Community. Ibid., 20 August 1974.
[79] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 376-377.

question. A vast majority of Western and neutral and non-aligned states strongly favoured this kind of notification. Furthermore, the NNAs were denied anything of substance on their own security proposals, which placed the superpowers in an even more difficult position *vis-à-vis* these states.

Interestingly, within NATO, the United States was not the only delegation to seek a minimum agreement on the notification of movements. While the Americans kept silent on the issue in the Conference room, towards the end of Stage II of the proceedings, the French began to openly challenge some of the compromises being discussed in the Sub-Committee. In one section of the text on the notification of movements dealing with the optional nature of the measure, one of the sentences under final consideration stipulated that: "*the* participating States may, at their own discretion … notify their major military movements". The French delegation unsuccessfully argued in the Sub-Committee that the word "*the*" should be deleted from the sentence so that not all CSCE participating States would necessarily be covered by the provision.[80] Also, in one paragraph dealing with the possibility of developing the measure at a later date, the stipulation was made that further consideration would be given to the issue "bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the *initial* measures" set forth in the CBMs document.[81] At the request of the French delegation, the word "*initial*" was deleted from the final version in order "to avoid any inference that there would necessarily be further CBMs".[82]

Obviously, the minimal results of the CSCE on the issue of notification of movements ensued not only from opposition by the Soviet Union. The repeated American demands for the issue to be dropped from the CSCE, or not to be used as a leverage in the negotiations, never allowed the West to present a strong united front, which might have yielded a better outcome. From an Allied perspective, this situation was unfortunate because a clear commitment on the issue could have been beneficial to NATO. As noted in a Canadian document a few months before the conclusion of the Conference when the issue was still being negotiated:

> The only substantive military measure envisaged in the CSCE on which there exists unanimous agreement within NATO (i.e. CBM relating to prior notification of military manoeuvres) would in itself be of little military value to the Alliance. Measures covering all forms of military activity which might constitute prelude to or part of concentration of ground forces (i.e. manoeuvres and movements) might under appropriate circumstances provide NATO with some additional warning

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[80] Canada, DEA, 24 July 1975.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.

time in event of impending WPO offensive.[83]

While the notification of movements was valuable to the NATO countries, the fact that the West had contributed to reduce the measure to a bare minimum without ever thoroughly examining all of its implications was regrettable. But, this was not the only case where the absence of comprehensive knowledge or proper preparations and a breakdown in Alliance unity impacted the final results of the CSCE.

4. AREA OF APPLICABILITY

Another important aspect of CBMs on which NATO failed to prepare adequately, and which resulted in tearing Alliance unity mid-way during the negotiations, was on the geographic area of application of the measures. As originally proposed by the West, the Allies wanted the notification measure to be applied to a single area of application described as "all of Europe".

The Western position on the area of application for the CSCE CBMs was based on at least three considerations. First, the Allies were convinced that the introduction of any zone, large or small, would be discriminatory to one state or another.[84] Second, the issue of a single area of application (in effect, the establishment of a system that would cover all participating States in Europe) was of fundamental importance to some members states especially those who, like Germany, were to be singled out by the smaller area of application of the mutual force reductions.[85] Finally, the Allies wanted to ensure that all states in Europe and, especially, all Warsaw Pact countries, would be covered by the system of notification.[86] Indeed, a few months into the negotiations, the Soviets indicated in private that they might have difficulties including all the territories of their Allies, especially those of Poland and the GDR, and this had reinforced the Western view for insisting on a single area of applicability for the measures, which would apply to all states.[87]

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[83] Ibid., 16 January 1975.
[84] Ibid., 14 November 1973.
[85] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 281 and p. 373. As noted in the British archives: "For domestic political reasons [the Germans] needed arrangements which would, without discrimination, cover all the participating states in Europe as a counter-balance to the concentration in MBFR upon a particular part of Central Europe." Ibid., p. 373.
[86] Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.
[87] Ibid. The possibility that large parts of Poland and the GDR might be excluded from a final agreement continued to be of concern to the British. For such concerns raised in November 1974, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 345 note 4.

Although the Allies agreed on these general considerations, the implications of the formulation "all of Europe" used to describe the area of application of the CBMs had never been thoroughly reviewed by them. As for other important aspects of the general or specific scope of the CSCE CBMs, NATO had adopted the catch-phrase of "all of Europe" hoping to avoid long discussions on the definition of a specific area of application for the measures. But, as the Allies soon realised, the vagueness of the phrase created its own difficulties, especially for Malta and Cyprus who, with their geographic location in the Mediterranean, were concerned that the formulation could exclude them in some way.[88] Furthermore, the formulation was too vague to appropriately cover (or exclude as applicable) the territories and the overseas possessions of many participating States, including several NATO members.[89] Finally, and more significantly for the development and the final outcome of the negotiations, the formulation did not take into consideration that two participating States, the Soviet Union and Turkey, had territory extending geographically beyond Europe into Asia.

From the very beginning of the negotiations the Soviets argued against the proposal maintaining that they had an enormous territory extending into Asia and that it was unfair to ask them to notify "all the way to the Urals".[90] The Soviet position on the area of application of the CBMs remained intractable and, as early as February 1974, the Allies began to realise that they were unlikely to obtain all Soviet European territory and that some exceptions would have to be made for states having territory far away from other participants.[91] In the NATO caucus at Geneva, the Western delegations came to the conclusion that if a significant portion of the Soviet European territory would be covered and all the rest of Europe would be included, this would resolve the question satisfactorily.[92] In line with this conclusion, the Allies subsequently announced in September 1974 that they were willing to make an exception for the Soviet Union.[93] Difficulties for the NATO states began, however, when Turkey told its Western partners that it wanted a similar exception.[94] Although the Allies had already generally accepted the principle that some form of exception would have to be made for the Turkish territory bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria (all non-European non-participating CSCE States), the idea of giving Turkey the same exception as the USSR undermined "one of

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[88] Canada, DEA, 24 July 1975.
[89] According to the interpretation given to the formulation, this had direct implications for the UK, Portugal, Denmark and France. See Ibid., 20 December 1974.
[90] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 105 and p. 172.
[91] Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.
[92] Ibid.
[93] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 330-331.
[94] Canada, DEA, 25 October 1974. For a discussion, see Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 172.

the fundamental pillars of the NATO position".[95] Furthermore, as described by the British, the problem was that Ankara was insisting that large parts of Central Anatolia be excluded from the CBMs régime.[96] This not only made it "harder for the West to put pressure on the Russians to include a substantial portion of the European part of the Soviet Union"[97] but, as London noted, it was regrettable that:

> The Turks wanted to have excluded that part of the coast from which they had invaded Cyprus; that they were trying to make notification along their Aegean and Mediterranean coastline dependent upon Soviet agreement to notify along the northern shore of the Black Sea; and that in determining the depth of the coastal strip, in which they might be prepared to make notification, they were insisting on a depth proportional to what the Russians would give and then defined by 'some fairly arbitrary co-ordinates.'[98]

As the Allies began work on language that would adequately define the Soviet exception, difficulties with the Turks increased because Ankara insisted on numerous changes in the text with a view to exempt much of Anatolia.[99] Concerned that the Turkish request might greatly complicate the course of the negotiations, the Allies suggested to the Turkish delegation in late December 1974 "to pattern themselves on the USA precedent for movement [and to] keep silent until the shape of the eventual agreement [was] more clear."[100]

NATO's plea to the Turks succeeded in keeping the issue dormant for awhile, but only as long as the question of area of application was not really touched upon in the Conference. Indeed, as soon as the Soviets began to show willingness to discuss the different parameters for the notification measure, the Turkish delegation asked that the issue be reopened immediately. On 3 June 1975, the Turks informed their NATO partners that they could only accept a zone of application of 100 kilometres from the borders of other participating States.[101] "This", as the British remarked, "seemed likely to damage Western chances of securing a 'respectable width of Soviet territory agreed by the Russians'".[102] Indeed, the Soviets had already proposed a zone of 100 kilometres one year earlier[103] and, in early June

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[95] Canada, Ibid.
[96] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 353.
[97] See Ibid.
[98] See Ibid. Other Western countries believed that the area of Central Anatolia which the Turks wanted exempted was one in which there were many large lakes used by the military to practice amphibious manoeuvres. Canada, DEA, 4 July 1975.
[99] Ibid., 20 December 1974.
[100] Ibid.
[101] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 423.
[102] See Ibid.
[103] See Ibid., p. 297; Maresca, *To Helsinki;* pp. 99-100, and Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 141.

1975, were discussing an area of application of 150 kilometres.[104] Also, the official position of the NATO states had been, until the month of April, to ask for a zone of 700 kilometres, which they had subsequently reduced, in May, to only 500 kilometres.[105] Furthermore, when, on 5 June, the West offered to reduce the zone to 450 kilometres,[106] the Soviets almost immediately indicated that they could discuss an area between 200 to 330 kilometres.[107]

Undoubtedly, any official Turkish request for a zone much smaller than what NATO was trying to negotiate, and more than half the size of what the Soviets were then willing to accept, would have seriously damaged the Western negotiating position, and the Turks were once again momentarily "dissuaded from proceeding with their formula"[108] while the British delegation tried to find a compromise solution.[109]

At an informal meeting of the Sub-Committee, on 28 June, the British tabled a draft paper framed on similar lines as the Turks had given them earlier in the month, but without specifying any parameters.[110] The reaction in the Committee was truly negative. Three of the Mediterranean countries, Spain, Greece and Cyprus strongly objected, claiming that they did not see why Turkey should receive special treatment, or specific parameters, for its territory shared with European states.[111] Most delegations were also against the proposal, and even the Soviet Union opposed giving Ankara such special treatment. Aware of the Turkish request for a zone of only 100 kilometres, Moscow was also critical of the small area.[112]

Convinced that most CSCE participating States would agree to a special arrangement for the non-notification of manoeuvres taking place in proximity to non-CSCE participating States (which, for Turkey, would cover its manoeuvres close to Syria, Iran and Iraq), the British believed that making such an offer would also satisfy the Turks because it would exclude their "supply bases for Cyprus".[113] But Ankara refused to modify its position. And, even after the British and the Soviets confirmed, on 4 July, their mutual acceptance of a final parameter of application of 250 kilometres,[114] the Turks insisted that the zone of application

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[104] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 198; Maresca, Ibid., p. 172; and Klein, Ibid., p. 147.
[105] Maresca, Ibid., p. 149 and p. 172.
[106] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 199; and Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 147.
[107] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 414 note 3.
[108] See Ibid., p. 423; and Canada, DEA, 24 June 1975.
[109] Ibid.
[110] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 427-428.
[111] See Ibid., p. 428.
[112] See Ibid.
[113] See Ibid., p. 428.
[114] See Ibid.

of CBMs should be only 150 kilometres.[115]

Given the late stage in the negotiations it was clear that granting Turkey the same exception that had been drafted for the Soviet Union would be inevitable. But, as the Turks finally accepted the 250 kilometres exception zone negotiated by the Soviets because it excluded much of Anatolia, it did not exempt Ankara from having to notify its manoeuvres taking place close to Iran, Iraq and Syria.[116] For this, Turkey requested a further exception, "an exception to the exception",[117] whereby the obligation to notify would not apply when the area of 250 kilometres was "also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State".[118] The proposal, which would have excluded Turkey's frontiers with Syria, Iran and Iraq, as well as Soviet areas contiguous with Iran, created difficulties for Cyprus because part of the Turkish coastline, which faced Syrian territory, included the two major ports of Mersina and Iskenderun which were used for the intervention in that country the previous year.[119] More specifically, the Cypriot delegation objected to the non-definition of the word "contiguous", as it could be subject to interpretation and could exempt Turkey from giving notification of the two major ports.[120]

After initially refusing to accept the exception, the Cypriot delegation then aimed at ameliorating the exception clause.[121] But both the Turks and the Cypriots maintained their position to the extent that many delegations believed that the conclusion of the negotiations was in jeopardy.[122] The Turkish-Cypriot disagreement was, in fact, the last issue to be settled by the participating States before the delegations adopted the Final Act and agreed upon the opening date of Stage III.[123] Cyprus did not want to be held responsible for delaying the Conference and finally conceded to the exception expressing, in a formal statement, the conviction that no participating State would abuse the exception and would normally notify their manoeuvres.[124]

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[115] See Ibid., p. 432. By July 16, the Turkish delegation was still awaiting instructions to approve a zone of 250 kilometres. See Ibid., p. 440.
[116] Ghebali, "Considérations", p. 28.
[117] Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975.
[118] See Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 10.
[119] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. XXXII; and Ghebali, "Considérations", p. 28.
[120] Ghebali, "Considérations", p. 28.
[121] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 443; and Canada, DEA, 25 July 1975.
[122] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 201; and Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975.
[123] For a discussion of the Turkish-Cypriot difference in the final hours of the Geneva negotiations, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 435-443 and pp. 447-448 (passim).
[124] See Ibid., p. 443; Ghebali, "Considérations", p. 28; and Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 10

The Cypriot concession saved NATO from further embarrassment over what was basically a lack of proper Alliance preparations and common agreement on a basic, but fundamental, aspect relating to the scope of application of the CBMs. Perhaps more significantly, Ankara's strong stance on the other exception for its European territory, asking for less than what had already been accepted by the Warsaw Pact nations, could have jeopardised many of the deals already struck with the East and could have resulted in a complete breakdown of the negotiations. But while Cyprus avoided a dangerous standstill at the very end of the CSCE, and Ankara's reluctant acceptance of the 250 kilometres exception zone only reinforced Moscow's position for a minimal area of application of the CBMs, other aspects of the negotiations on CBMs was more directly affected by a breakdown in Alliance unity.

5. PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION

Another important aspect of the discussions on which NATO could not maintain a unified position and which, in the views of many, negatively impacted the final outcome of the negotiations, concerned the parameters negotiated for the notification of major manoeuvres. As with the Turkish exceptions, the problem in this case did not necessarily only stem from NATO's crude preparations for CBMs, the absence of clear and firm agreed positions, or a lack of co-ordination, but from one partner breaking ranks.

As reviewed in the negotiations, at the beginning of June 1975, the Western position on the notification of major military manoeuvres was to request a zone of application of 450 kilometres, a threshold of 16,000 troops, and four to five weeks advance notice.[125] On 6 June, during discussions in the Military Sub-Committee, the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Kovalev, suggested the possibility of finding a final solution to the parameters issue by considering a combination of three options. All three options involved twenty-one days advance notice with related troop thresholds ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 men in an area between 200 to 330 kilometres."[126] These parameters, Kovalev later told the British, had been suggested to him by the US Head of Delegation in Geneva, Mr. Sherer.[127] What Sherer had apparently told the Soviets was that they could choose from three options involving twenty-one days advance notice with the following possible combinations: 330 kilometres and 30,000 troops;

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[125] Ferraris, *Report on a Negotiation*, p. 199; and Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, p. 147.
[126] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 414; and Canada, DEA, 9 June 1975
[127] See Ibid.

25,000 troops and 250 kilometres; or 200 kilometres and 20,000 troops.[128]

The following day, in Washington, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin called on Henry Kissinger and suggested figures of 250 kilometres, 30,000 troops and eighteen days, which Kissinger immediately accepted.[129] When Sherer later reported the Washington conversation to his British counterpart in Geneva, Sir David Hildyard, the reaction of the British was both "stupefaction and horror."[130] As NATO floor leader on CBMs, the British had been in difficult discussions with all parties for a compromise solution on the parameters for notification.[131] On 6 June, when Kovalev presented his three options, Sir David had argued that a zone of application of 300 kilometres and a threshold of 20,000 to 22,000 troops would be the minimum the West would accept.[132]

British assessment of NATO's minimum fallback position was based on a number of considerations. First, the Germans had only very recently and very reluctantly accepted to decrease the exception zone to 300 kilometres[133] and, while it was unclear that a further concession could be extracted from them, the Germans were not the only ones in NATO to consider the 300 kilometres parameter to be "a matter of vital importance".[134] Furthermore, the British strongly believed that they could extract such a parameter from the Soviets.[135] Second, the Dutch had not yet agreed to the Soviet request to make the notification a voluntary undertaking[136] and would certainly be against any further relaxation of the Western position on notification. Finally, a threshold of 30,000 troops worried the British who believed that mainly Soviet manoeuvres would eventually qualify for notification and, therefore, that the Soviets would take most of the credit for what remained a Western initiative.[137]

In the light of these considerations, the British were convinced that the "Washington parameters" (as they were dubbed) were unlikely to be accepted by the other Allies, and they

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[128] Canada, DEA, 9 June 1975.
[129] Ibid.; and Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 163.
[130] The most comprehensive accounts of the events from a British and American perspective can be found, respectively, in Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 419-422; and Maresca, Ibid., pp. 163-164.
[131] Maresca, Ibid., p. 164.
[132] Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 414.
[133] See Bennett and Hamilton, ibid., p. 420.
[134] See Ibid., p. 421.
[135] For the position of the British Head of Delegation on 18 and 23 June, see Ibid., pp. 421- 422.
[136] See Ibid., pp. 420-421.
[137] See Ibid.

complained in private that Kissinger's swift unilateral acceptance of lower parameters than what was then being discussed in Geneva had cut across the Alliance's negotiating position.[138]

On 9 June, the American Head of Delegation conveyed the British reactions to Washington where, according to a senior member of the US delegation in Geneva, the account "caused some concern in the upper reaches of the State Department".

> On June 10 we received telephone instructions to tell the allies that our acceptance of the 'Washington parameters' had been conditional on acceptance by our allies. If they did not like the 'Washington parameters,' the United States would tell the Soviets flatly at a high level that these parameters would not sell. At a NATO caucus that afternoon, we repeated all this to our allies. The allies were strongly opposed to the 'Washington parameters' and deeply resentful that their negotiating position had been undercut.[139]

Three days later, on 13 June, the Americans received new instructions. They had to disregard the "Washington parameters" and tell the Soviets that they should show flexibility by perhaps considering a compromise formula, then in preparation by the neutrals, calling for parameters of 25,000 troops, 300 kilometres, and twenty-one days.[140]

According to an American version of the events, after losing a few days, "the negotiation was back on track and the United States had recovered from a serious error, which could have developed into a major split with [their] allies".[141] Versions from other delegations suggest, however, that Washington's NATO partners were "very upset" by Kissinger's intervention,[142] and that some seriously questioned whether the US Secretary of State had "merely indicated passive acceptance [of the parameters] or [if, in fact, he had] agreed to bring pressure to bear on [the] Allies."[143] "Certainly", as the Canadian delegation reported to Ottawa, "performance in the past two weeks by the US representative in the caucus indicate[d] his instructions [were] to speed conclusion of the problems, regardless of size of parameters."[144] As for the suggestion, as Sherer confessed to the British, that the parameters he gave Kovalev on June 6,

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[138] See Ibid., pp. 419-420 note 4. Hildyard reported to London that "the Americans had cut the ground from under our feet".
[139] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 164.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.
[142] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 420.
[143] Canada, DEA, 9 June 1975.
[144] Ibid.

had been taken "off top of his head",[145] the Canadians remarked that "such a practice would be totally out of character with Sherer and the US delegation performance to date."[146]

Later on, several Western negotiators concluded that the West could have obtained more if Kissinger had not basically foreclosed the debate by putting pressure on the Allies.[147] As the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Jim Callaghan, wrote to Sir David on 19 June, it was clear that "while you were continuing to insist on 300 kms, 20/22,000 men and 21 days, the Soviet Union knew that certain Western countries supported their proposal for 250 kms, 30,000 men and 18 days."[148] As the British concluded at the end of the CSCE, "Dr. Kissinger's discussions on Confidence Building Measures were widely considered unhelpful, and may indeed have led to the West obtaining rather less than they could have expected on Prior Notification of Military Manoeuvres."[149]

6. BINDING NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION

A fourth area of disagreement within NATO that complicated the development of a common negotiating position concerned the level of obligation and the binding nature of the CBMs. Before the drafting stage began in March 1974 the Sub-Committee on military matters reached verbal consensus that the obligation of the measures would be of a "moral and political nature, rather than juridical".[150] Defining language to reflect such a commitment, however, proved very difficult for the West.

In the draft of the Six submitted on 20 February 1974, the sponsors suggested that the wording of the CSCE final document concerning the notification measures should be that the participating States "shall" notify their manoeuvres and movements. The British resolution tabled earlier in the same month proposed, in contrast, that the text read: "the participating States have decided that they *will* notify".[151] The problem within NATO arose when the United States announced, two weeks after the tabling of the UK resolution, that it could not accept the word "will" and that it favoured using other formulations, such as "the participating

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[145] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 414; and Canada, DEA, 9 June 1975.
[146] Canada, Ibid.
[147] See Ghebali, "Considérations", p. 28.
[148] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 419.
[149] See Ibid., p. 452.
[150] Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.
[151] Ibid. Emphasis added.

States declare their intention to notify".[152]

The US position was rather startling for the NATO partners because the Americans had already accepted stronger wording in Western documents on Basket III.[153] Furthermore, the formulation advanced by the British had less binding force than the one suggested by the NNAs and, more significantly, had already been accepted by the Soviets who had indicated in the Sub-Committee that they considered "will" a suitable term.[154] Hence, the formula advocated by the Americans meant proposing language less binding than what the Soviets had already accepted.[155] As argued in the NATO caucus, "the substance of the CBMs that could eventually be agreed by the Conference would be so minimal that the US should not have problems accepting the language proposed in the British draft."[156] But the Americans maintained that the word "will" entailed a legal obligation and that if it appeared in the final document of the CSCE they would have to clear the document with Congress.[157]

In the following months, the Americans sustained their objection to the introduction of the word "will" and continued to press the Allies to adopt alternative language.[158] Most Western states argued in turn that while the exchange of observers, the exchanges of military missions and, eventually, if agreement could be reached, the notification of major movements of troops could only be conceived as a voluntary undertaking, the notification of major manoeuvres should be based on a more precise and constraining obligation exemplified, or depicted, by the use of the word "will".[159]

The NATO caucus returned to the question of the nature of obligation in December 1974. At that time, the majority in the Alliance continued to strongly favour the word "will", but the Americans maintained they could only accept it if it was preceded by some introductory language along the line that "the participating States '*intend*' or '*firmly intend*'."[160] Given the impasse, many began to suggest that after almost ten months of stalemate on the issue the only possible compromise might be to accept '*firmly intend*' as a fallback position.[161]

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[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.; and Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 228-229.
[155] Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid., 25 February and 20 August 1974.
[158] Ibid., 20 August 1974.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.

Agreement on this matter, however, was far from complete. As the Canadians observed, "this was unrealistic because the Soviets [had] announced they could accept 'will'."[162] Furthermore, as Ottawa had argued a few months earlier, "we fail to see who at the Conference might take on the role of *demandeur* to fall back to anything less than 'will' . . . [or] what member of the Fifteen would wish to publicly indicate that he feels both the UK document and the Soviet position are too binding?"[163]

Later in the month, with no resolution in sight, the French suggested taking the issue to the Sub-Committee early in the New Year.[164] Any such discussion carried out in the Conference room would have immediately exposed NATO's internal differences on the issue. More importantly, it could probably reopen Soviet acceptance of the wording "will", while creating serious difficulties with the neutrals and non-aligned who were asking for a stronger commitment to the measure.

While the French were dissuaded from taking the issue to the Sub-Committee,[165] the discussion on the overall binding nature of the measure took a completely different turn in mid-March 1975 when the Soviets announced that agreement on the notification of major manoeuvres could only be possible if the commitment to notify was only "voluntary". After initial hesitation, most Western governments came to the conclusion that since any final document approved by the Conference would be, in any case, only voluntary, they could work on this basis. But not all Allies supported the move. In April, the British noted that while the NATO states found the Soviet proposal "generally acceptable", the Dutch were showing "some inflexibility".[166] Two months later, the Soviets complained to the British about the rigidity of their position on CBMs, but the British had to explain that, on this issue, only one member of the Alliance was holding back.[167] As explained in an internal memorandum, "the Dutch had 'bolted', and had made it clear in one of the NATO coordination meetings that they could not be counted upon to go along with the voluntary basis."[168]

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[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid., 25 February 1974.
[164] Ibid., 20 December 1974.
[165] Ibid.
[166] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 397. Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, p. 220, also notes the opposition of Canada to the request.
[167] See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 420.
[168] See Ibid., pp. 420-421.

NATO's lack of an agreed policy on the issue came into the open during the last weeks of the negotiations when, on 1 July 1975, the Dutch and the Turks, opposed a British draft text on the voluntary basis of the measure supported by the Soviets.[169] In reaction, the Soviet delegation threatened to withdraw all of their proposals on the parameters if a solution was not found.[170] If carried through, such a threat could have brought the entire negotiations to a standstill, if not provoke their complete breakdown. As finally agreed by all delegations, the compromise was a package of weak provisions closely linked to one another. The verb "*will*" was used in almost all sentences of the operative text of the notification measure on major manoeuvres. But, in line with Washington's concern that this language might entail some sort of legal obligation, the United States tabled a formal statement at the end of the Conference stressing that the document on CBMs accepted by the CSCE was not legally binding.[171] The statement was rather unnecessary because, as the Americans conceded in an internal memorandum circulated at NATO, the "obligation to notify was not legal in nature, by virtue of the overall disclaimer in the CSCE Final Act".[172] Furthermore, as the Americans also conceded, the decision to notify was not even clear in the Final Act.[173] Indeed, although the West introduced language in the preambular text of the measure emphasising "the political importance of prior notification" and the "responsibility" of each participating State to implement the measure, the third and last preambular paragraph of the measure read that the "measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis". As Washington recognised, this clause "may be understood to mean either that the decision to undertake the measure was voluntary, or freely made (Western view); or that the decision to implement the measure will be voluntary, or discretionary (Warsaw Pact view)."[174]

Clearly, more detailed preparatory work on the part of the Western states could have avoided much of the internal wrangling over the description of the nature and the level of the commitment of the measure, which might have been useful in preventing such an ambiguous final result at the Conference for what remained the most important CBMs agreed upon by

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[169] Romania also opposed the Soviet request. See Ibid., pp. 427-428 note 2.
[170] Ibid., p. 428.
[171] See Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 17 note 17; and Ghebali, "Considérations", p. 29 note 9.
[172] Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975 (The US document was dated 5 August 1975). One of the most significant disclaimers can be found in the concluding provisions of the Final Act stipulating that its text was "not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to its circulation to all members of the Organization as an official document of the United Nations". For a discussion on the legal character of the Final Act, see Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, pp. 57-59; and Arie Bloed (ed.), *From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990, pp. 11-12.
[173] Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975 (The US document was dated 5 August 1975).
[174] Ibid.

the CSCE.

7. INDEPENDENT AND SMALL-SCALE MANOEUVRES

Two other aspects of CBMs on which the Allies had no position before the Conference started and could not agree upon during the proceedings concerned the notification of independent naval and air manoeuvres, and the notification of airborne and amphibious forces at lower levels than those for land forces.

During the general debate in Geneva in the autumn of 1973 several states expressed their interest for the separate notification of independent naval and air manoeuvres (i.e. manoeuvres not connected with any land exercises).[175] Virtually all the NNAs favoured this type of notification[176] and, as formally proposed in the draft of the Six of late February 1974, wished to see these manoeuvres notified in the same way as those related to land forces.

The NNAs proposal created difficulties for NATO who, as an Alliance, had entered the negotiations without a position. Having concentrated on keeping the measures simple, the Allies never reviewed the implications of such type of notifications and only belatedly started looking into the issue.

When the NATO caucus in Geneva discussed the British draft resolution on CBMs in January 1974 before being tabled in the Conference, the Norwegians advocated that reference should be made to the notification of "major independent air and naval manoeuvres".[177] However, no mention of these manoeuvres was incorporated in the draft because the United Kingdom was opposed to such notification.[178] Surprisingly, but as a clear indication of the lack of thorough preparation that also existed in different capitals, the British delegation in Geneva did not even know the rationale behind London's rejection of the proposal.[179]

By mid-March the British reported to London that they were beginning to be "isolated on the issue."[180] Soon after the NNAs formally made their proposal, a number of NATO countries,

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[175] Canada, DEA, 13 February 1974.
[176] Ibid., and 25 February 1974.
[177] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 229.
[178] Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 270.

including Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey and Greece indicated interest for such notification.[181] In another report to London in early April, the British delegation was noting that despite playing "an unexpectedly prominent role" in the discussions on CBMs, their position could be damaged if they could not try to address the concerns of some of the NATO flank countries and the neutral and non-aligned delegations, and show flexibility on the issue.[182]

Finally, in late April 1974, the British received new instructions. Although still not accepting any commitment to separate notification, the British informed their NATO colleagues that they could go along with a clause encouraging the participating States to notify such manoeuvres if they so wished.[183] But, as the British finally came on board on the issue of separate notification, Italy, in a reversal of its previous position, stated that it could not accept such a proposition.[184]

In the spring and summer 1974, Norway took the lead within NATO in trying to seek Alliance backing for separate notification, but with little success.[185] By late August, the Allies had still not reached an agreed position, however, as the Belgians noted, the NATO delegations had in practice already opted for the smallest common denominator, which was to exclude this type of notification.[186] This position was unfortunate because the Military Committee of the Alliance, who had been belatedly instructed in January 1974 to look into the issue of separate notification of independent naval and air manoeuvres, was then agreeing on the usefulness of such notification for all zones, except the Mediterranean.[187]

Trying to improve NATO's negotiating position, the Belgians argued that given the positive conclusions of the Military Committee and the fact that it would be in the West's interest to remain on the side of the NNAs on this issue, the Allies should try to reach a common agreement based on two points. First, the Alliance should admit to the principle of the notification of all types of manoeuvres.[188] Second, it should decide that these notifications

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[181] Ibid., p. 270; and Canada, DEA, 13 and 25 February 1974.
[182] Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 270.
[183] Canada, DEA, 13 August 1974.
[184] Ibid., 26 April 1974.
[185] Ibid., 26 July 1974.
[186] Ibid., 20 August 1974.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Ibid.

would be made essentially on a voluntary basis.[189] By late December 1974 all the NATO member states could accept some compromise text along these lines, except Italy who remained adamantly opposed.[190]

With only six months remaining in the negotiations, the Allies never came to fully support the NNAs' proposal for separate notification of independent air and naval manoeuvres, and the final outcome of the negotiations was less than satisfactory. The Document on confidence-building measures of the Final Act only indirectly referred to the idea, noting that "the participating States also recognise that they may notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them".

Another aspect of the final results of the Conference, which was weakened by NATO's late start and indecisiveness on CBMs, concerned the notification of amphibious and airborne forces at lower levels than land forces. The question of amphibious and airborne forces differed from separate notification of naval and air manoeuvres because of the potential to seize and occupy territory. As maintained by several delegations during the negotiations, "the presence (or absence) of a significant number of ground troops in aircraft or ships has a direct effect on the extent to which the ships or aircraft pose a threat to sovereignty".[191] Reflecting concerns over such threats, the main objective of the NNAs in submitting their proposal for lower thresholds of notification was to cover "amphibious and airborne forces that might not otherwise fall within an agreement covering land forces only".[192]

Within NATO the issue was also of importance to the flank countries. At the very beginning of Stage II, Greece and Turkey expressed the fear that more than two amphibious brigades in the Black Sea constituted destabilising factors.[193] Because of its particular geographic location, Norway also expressed concerns for its Northern region and had requested that the Alliance solicit the notification of smaller-scale exercises with as many details as for the major manoeuvres.[194] Several NATO partners recognised the legitimate concerns of the flank states with regard to amphibious and airborne exercises and believed that attempts should be

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[189] Ibid.
[190] Ibid., 20 December 1974.
[191] Ibid., 25 February 1974.
[192] Ibid., 13 February 1974.
[193] Ibid., 6 October 1973.
[194] Ibid., 25 October 1973.

made to meet their concerns.[195] But, as in the case of the separate notification of naval and air manoeuvres, the British draft resolution of February 1974 made no mention of these forces because London did not concede on this point.[196]

Attempts to modify the Alliance's opening position proved very difficult. Norway again took the lead in NATO in pressing the other partners to accept, at a minimum, to "recognise the desirability" of such notification.[197] But, by August 1974, or one year into the negotiations, the idea of supporting such notification at sub-threshold levels, even on a voluntary basis, was still not acceptable to all.[198] As for the separate notification of independent air and naval manoeuvres, the Allies never fully supported the NNAs initiative and the final results of the negotiations were equally weak on this question. The issue was covered by a sub-clause inserted in the provisions for the measure on major military manoeuvres stipulating that in the case of combined manoeuvres which did not reach the 25,000-troop threshold "but which involve land forces together with *significant* numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification *can* also be given". The meaning of the word "*significant*" was not defined, and the sentence did not even specifically apply only to amphibious and airborne forces, but to combined manoeuvres that include land forces.[199]

8. OTHER ISSUES

In addition to the above issues, several other aspects of CBMs found the Allies unprepared, unable or unwilling to present the most far-reaching position. One case in point concerned the amount of information NATO should request in the notifications. Early on during the Geneva negotiations the United States contended that information should only be minimal.[200] The Americans argued that the CBMs were political and psychological not military and, accordingly, should not have details.[201] The US maintained this position throughout the negotiations and, when the NATO caucus discussed the UK draft resolution prior to tabling it in the Sub-Committee, the Americans contended that fewer details should be requested for the

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[195] Ibid., 18 March 1974.
[196] Suggestions to reference these forces in the UK document were rejected by the British delegation. Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974.
[197] Ibid.
[198] Ibid., 20 August 1974.
[199] Ibid., 24 July and 6 August 1975. For a discussion of the meaning of the provisions, see Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 9.
[200] Canada, DEA, 16 November 1973.
[201] Ibid., 19 November 1973.

notifications.[202] The United States also initially refused to consider the Spanish proposal calling for exchange of military personnel arguing that there was no advantage in discussing the issue at the CSCE.[203]

Clearly, the above positions reflected a desire to limit the number and scope of the CSCE measures, and the United States was not the only NATO member state having reservations about the overall value of CBMs. France was equally uninterested in a thorough development of the measures and was often much more outspoken about its reservations. On the NNAs' request for adopting restrictions on a number of military activities, France played a key-role in having the Conference accept only a vague reference to "self-limitation".[204] Furthermore, the final text, which simply noted that when conducting their military activities the participating States would "duly take into account and respect" their common objective of building confidence, was still too maximal for the French and, in order to diminish even more the significance of the statement, France strongly argued against any title being given to this portion of the document, making it the only section of the Final Act introducing a new topic without a title. Similarly, while all thirty-four participating States would have preferred the main title of the "*Document on confidence-building measures*" to also include the phrase "*and military aspects of security and disarmament*", France adamantly refused any formulation that included the word "*military*",[205] claiming that the CSCE had not really dealt with this kind of issue.[206] At French insistence the word "*military*" was replaced by "*certain*", and the only part of the Final Act dealing with "military" issues was simply entitled "*Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.*"[207]

Finally and, by far, the most surprising aspect of NATO's preparations for the negotiation of CBMs was that the delegations in Geneva had no information concerning the size and frequency of Soviet manoeuvres until the beginning of 1975, i.e. more than two years after they had tabled their proposals on CBMs, and less than five months before the conclusion of

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[202] Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 270. Canada, DEA, 25 February 1974. According to the Canadian document, the US also wanted to omit specific reference to the number of troops involved.
[203] Canada, DEA, 9 November 1973.
[204] See Acimovic, *Problems of Security*, pp. 224-225.
[205] Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 5. Canada, DEA, 25 July 1975. See also, Ghebali, "Considérations", pp. 24-25.
[206] Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 5.
[207] Canada, DEA, 25 July 1975.

the CSCE.[208] Indeed, the first study undertaken on this subject was only commissioned in December 1974, and the first results reached the delegations in Geneva in mid-February 1975.[209]

If this single fact leaves no doubt that the West never conceived the CSCE CBMs to have any military significance, it also underscores that the different parameters put forward by the Allies for the notification measure were developed without thorough knowledge of the level, the frequency and, even, the precise area where the Warsaw Pact nations were conducting their military manoeuvres. Certainly, the different national delegations had their own data and analysis on the subject, but the NATO caucus in Geneva never developed its negotiating positions based on an Alliance-wide comprehensive assessment of these issues. In fact, the primary reason for undertaking the study in Brussels was not even prompted by a recognition of the usefulness or necessity of such critical knowledge, but by the fact that the discussions on CBMs had been in a logjam for several months and that a better understanding of the ramifications of the parameters submitted by the Allies could perhaps help to develop fallback positions which could unlock the negotiations.[210]

Understandingly, the reactions of the Western negotiators in Geneva, who acknowledged being ill-informed about the precise purpose of the study undertaken by the Military Committee, were that "the study would have been most useful many months, or years, ago", and that they wished the "subject had never arisen".[211] Fortunately, and to the surprise of most, the conclusions of the military study were rather positive for the Alliance. As noted in an internal document of the Canadian government at the end of the negotiations, "the original NATO position calling for notification at a level of one division might justifiably [have been] criticized as having been unrealistic, and the outcome as agreed [was] all that could reasonably have been demanded of the Soviets".[212] Indeed, as further noted, the "information rather clearly indicated that the normal level of activity of Soviet troops for exercises [was] two divisions, and most manoeuvres [were taken] place near frontiers".[213]

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[208] Ibid., 22 July 1975.
[209] Ibid., 12 February, 1975.
[210] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 372.
[211] Canada, DEA, 12 February, 1975.
[212] Ibid., 22 July 1975.
[213] Ibid.

9. WESTERN SUCCESS REASSESSED

The image that the Western states did everything they could in Geneva to obtain the most comprehensive outcome possible on CBMs at the Conference, and that the Soviets were principally, if not only, to blame for the meagre results of the CSCE is considerably tarnished by a review of NATO's negotiating stance. As clearly established, on a number of occasions, one or more of the Allies shared, if not backed, the same restrictive approach as the Soviets. In some cases, they argued for less than was acceptable or already accepted by the Eastern bloc. In one clear case, outside unilateral interference by one Ally directly undercut the Western bargaining position, resulting in less than could have been expected.

Undoubtedly, many of the numerous breakdowns in Alliance unity arose because one state defended purely national interests. But while it is evident that any complex negotiations in which fifteen nations have to agree on objectives, strategy and tactics would invariably see the national interests of the different states surface at one point or another, this factor alone does not explain all of NATO's shortcomings at the CSCE. A strong case can be made that many of the poor performances and difficulties experienced by the West during the negotiations could have been avoided with better preparations. As the sponsor of the CBMs, one might have expected that the Allies would have at least developed a comprehensive common position on their own proposals. But this was not done. On significant basic points proposed by the NATO states themselves, they opened the negotiations with a position they could not sustain. This was the case of the geographic area of application of CBMs and the notification of major military movements which, although supported by all at the onset, were later repudiated by one partner to the detriment of a unified Western front.

Arguably, both Ankara's demand to obtain an exception for its territory shared with other European participating States and US repeated requests to its Allies to drop movements from the negotiations can be seen as simple changes of national positions of the respective parties. Yet, this does not change the fact that the Allies had only superficially prepared for these issues and only subsequently, and belatedly, discovered problems in their own proposals.

On the area of application of the measures, for instance, the NATO governments never recognised that their catch-all phrase of "all of Europe" not only posed problems for Turkey but also for other member states having overseas possessions or territories. Similarly, on the type or size of the military activities to be notified, the Alliance never studied what precisely

would be desirable to notify, at what level, or in what area. While the US alone can be blamed for backtracking on the issue of movements, it is worth emphasising that other member states raised equally strong objections on other aspects of the general policy line initially put forward by a majority of partners. Norway and others, for instance, strongly disagreed with the non-inclusion of independent naval and air manoeuvres in the UK draft resolution, clearly highlighting that, as for most basic elements of the "Western" policy on CBMs, these subjects had never been thoroughly discussed or researched in Brussels.

While it is evident that the Allies arrived ill-prepared for the negotiations, it is also clear that their lack of a unified comprehensive policy was not the result of an oversight, or a lack of time or resources to develop agreed positions. Indeed, even if the NATO governments initially had no interest in CBMs and had been pressed to choose the topic in order to ensure that they would have a security proposal to present at the start of the Conference, they also made the decision at a later stage not to develop the measures. Certainly, several member states changed their views on CBMs in the course of the negotiations and would have been willing to develop a more detailed agreement on a number of more exacting measures, but this never became the policy of the Alliance as a whole. As noted during the final months of negotiations, the views of the Allies varied greatly:

> Norway regards the CSCE-CBMs as having military value and as a means of improving its security. The UK and the FRG see CBMs as politically important, but they do not attach much significance to their military value. Finally, for the USA, they seem to have no positive interest and their only concern seems to be that the CBM regime not inhibit their present freedom to move forces to and from Europe.[214]

Given such varied and conflicting approaches, it is understandable that the Allies never managed to develop any common comprehensive policy on CBMs. Yet, another important consideration which always prevented them from arguing for far-reaching CBMs was the opposition of France and, especially, the United States to any stringent measures coming out of the CSCE. As reported in Canadian documentation, "a further complication which impeded NATO from going beyond the illustrative list concept was the strong opposition on the part of the USA to any obligation arising out of CSCE which would require notification of the movement of forces within and into Europe."[215]

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[214] Ibid., 27 March 1975.
[215] Ibid., 18 March 1974.

10. FAILURE OR SUCCESS? THE POLITICAL USE OF CBMs

If the positions defended by the NATO governments during the negotiations were much less commendable than usually believed, and never aimed at developing measures that would be useful in the military field, introduction of the CBMs in the CSCE nevertheless served a number of other purposes for the Allies. Generally speaking, CBMs helped the West to keep the upper-hand throughout the entire negotiations by providing a tool to prevent Soviet propaganda on "European security"; please Western public opinion, and; gain the invaluable support of the NNAs while also avoiding their criticism and the consideration of their most demanding proposals.

Long before the CSCE got on the way, the Allies feared that the Soviets would use the Conference for all kinds of propaganda they would have difficulties countering. As described in a memorandum of the British Foreign Office, in early 1972, Western public opinion was not receptive to any warnings about potential military threats from the East and was not responsive to any arguments for an effective defence. "So strong is the prevailing current of opinion", the FCO document remarked, "that few Ministers in the West make speeches about the nature of the threat or the need to counter it."[216] The main problem, as argued in the document, was that after twenty-five years of peace in Europe and a general background of warming in East-West relations, people wanted to hear that the Cold War was coming to an end and strongly believed that time had come for East and West to "kiss and make friends."[217] Such views, the British contended, were difficult to influence and few NATO partners were willing to try it. As noted, the Western governments did not want to "admit that a European security conference would probably turn out to be a jamboree of propaganda, whose result could strengthen the Russian grip on Eastern Europe while weakening the cohesion of Western Europe."[218]

At the start of the negotiations, the Allies feared that the Soviets might successfully maintain that agreement on a declaration on the non-use of force would solve the military problems in Europe, and that Western public opinion would "buy" this, resulting in even more pressure to

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[216] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 17.
[217] For the assessment of the British Foreign Office regarding the views of Western public opinion and influence on the development of policies, see Ibid., pp. 16-17.
[218] Ibid., p. 16.

lower their defence. Fearing a propaganda war they believed they might not win,[219] Western governments needed concrete proposals to present at the Conference. In this regard, CBMs represented a useful tool to help focus the CSCE debate on security on more concrete issues than on a grand declaration on the non-use of force, which the West believed would basically only repeat similar commitments undertaken at the United Nations or in other fora. As suggested in a Canadian document on the eve of the Conference, CBMs could help "translate any broad principles of security which will be forthcoming into specific military measures which would be a clear demonstration and reinforcement of the common desire to promote mutual confidence and security in Europe."[220]

In addition to helping move the debate away from broad sweeping statements on security, CBMs were also seen as providing a practical "test" of the political will of the Warsaw Pact on arms control. This goal, acknowledged very early on in NATO's discussions,[221] continued to be of importance to some delegations throughout the negotiations. In 1975, for instance, the West Germans "continued to attach primary importance to obtaining arrangements which would show that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were in principle ready to be included in arrangements in the military field."[222] In short, as suggested in a paper produced by Belgium in late 1973, CBMs were "designed to promote common sense and practical arrangements in an area which provides, in a way understandable to public opinion, a test of the goodwill of the Warsaw Pact and of their desire to promote confidence in their military intentions."[223]

Another important way in which CBMs played a useful role for the Alliance was in ensuring that the East "paid a price" for the CSCE. Already in 1969, at the time when the Allies were

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[219] References to the propaganda aspect of the Conference abounded in Western assessments of the time. As noted by the British Foreign Office in 1972: "They [the Soviets] see the Conference as an occasion for declarations, statements of principles and propaganda of all kinds designed better to establish their hold on the East and weaken the coherence of the West". Other views of the Soviet objectives at the Conference included that they were "mainly interested in propaganda and atmosphere". See Bennett and Hamilton, Ibid., p. 59, and p. 61 note 2.

[220] Canada, DEA, 13 September 1973.

[221] As noted in a Canadian document at the beginning of the main negotiations: "CBMs were introduced into the CSCE largely as a means of testing the political will of the WPO on arms control measures in Europe, and of drawing public attention to the disparity between military forces in East and West. It was thought that it would be valuable to inject into CSCE more substantive measures than simple declarations on the non-use of force". Ibid.

[222] See Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, p. 373.

[223] Ibid., p. 227. The British concurred with this assessment noting that this was "an area where we can put Soviet good intentions to the test in a way understandable to public opinion." Ibid., p. 223.

forced to start considering the Conference project, NATO had adopted this approach by requesting that the East fulfil a number of pre-conditions before the CSCE could take place. Once the negotiations started, the Allies still believed that the Conference would only be advantageous to the East and, as acknowledged by the British Foreign Office, Western strategy at the start of the CSCE was "to minimise the undesirable political results of the Conference while forcing the Russians to pay a substantial price for those results."[224] "In this overall strategy", as the document further noted, the West advocated some CBMs in the military field "as a test of Eastern good intentions".[225]

Given the nature of CBMs, and their implications for attacking the strong veil of secrecy that had always prevailed in the conduct of the military affairs of the Communist countries, it was clear that the measures would be strongly objected to by the East and, in this sense, would represent good bargaining chips for the West. Acknowledgement that CBMs could be good bargaining chips was made even before the Allies agreed to introduce such measures in the Conference. As early as April 1972, at the time when the UK was trying to "sell" CBMs to the French and the Americans, the British had argued that they could be exchanged for concessions in other fields.[226] Later, during the negotiations, CBMs continued to be seen as having important trade-off value. In December 1973, for instance, the British delegation was reporting to London that the three Western CBMs had "so far paid a useful dividend"[227] and, even if recognising that the issue of movements may never be negotiated at the CSCE, the British delegation was arguing that the Allies should continue to push for the measure because, as they noted, "if, later, we have to drop it, we should expect concessions in return."[228]

When pressure began to build during the negotiations for a quick conclusion of the proceedings at Summit level, CBMs became even more useful especially in helping to hold off a Summit meeting most Western delegations (apart from the US perhaps) believed was premature and not justified. The UK made no secret of this view. As publicly stated in the British Parliament in January 1975: "We see confidence-building measures as an essential part of a conference which we hope will produce results of sufficient content and value to

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[224] See Ibid., p. 214.
[225] See Ibid.
[226] See Ibid., p. 39.
[227] See Ibid., p. 226.
[228] See Ibid., p. 228.

justify a summit Stage III."[229]

By that time CBMs had also taken on political currency. Being the only tangible security aspect discussed at the CSCE, the Western governments noted the "significance which public opinion attache[d] to these measures, which were the only real security element left in the Conference".[230] Undoubtedly, public opinion did not pay much attention to CBMs, but the Western governments knew that, without them, they would probably have to accept discussions on other aspects of military security and this was never a Western consideration for the CSCE.

Lastly, another use of CBMs which could not be fully appreciated at the start of the negotiations but which, arguably, proved to be of great significance for the Allies was that they provided a good platform to meet the NNAs "half-way". Indeed, by proposing a few modest measures in the field of security, the West could gain NNA support for their programme while avoiding strong criticism on their refusal to consider any of their proposals. As argued at the start of the negotiations:

> Tactically, it would … seem wise to put the USSR (or France) in the position at CSCE of having to reject the proposals which the neutrals and non-aligned are expected to raise. For this reason, it would be wise not to indicate to the Soviets our fears about CBMs jeopardizing MBFR, but rather to indicate our strong support for CBMs. In this way we may be able to avoid having the Soviets believe that they have a common interest with us in limiting the stringency of the CBMs which will be proposed by the neutrals and non-aligned.[231]

This objective was certainly fulfilled at the CSCE because the Soviets took the brunt of the blame for rejecting the proposals sponsored by the neutrals, even if the Allies had no more interest in seeing any of their proposals realised. At the same time, the Western governments gained the unconditional support of the NNAs for their modest measures, hence putting even more pressure on the East to concede on this front.

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[229] See Ibid., p. 373.
[230] See Ibid., p. 232.
[231] Canada, DEA, 13 September 1973.

11. CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the advocacy of CBMs served a number of useful political purposes for the West throughout the negotiations, but this is not the same as saying that the negotiating positions of the NATO countries reflected a desire to obtain stringent and effective measures that would be useful in their own right. Basically, as long as the measures remained simple and undefined, the West had no interest in the specific content of any agreement emerging from the CSCE. NATO came to CBMs because of a lack of agreement on MBFR and later aimed at restricting their development mainly because of MBFR.

The irony, which was to become more obvious as years passed by, was that MBFR never reached any agreement in the more than 19 years of unsuccessful negotiations, while CBMs were to remain in effect for more than a decade, only to be replaced by another set of similar but more demanding measures. In 1975, of course, no one could have predicted such a development and, while the West had never been prepared for their negotiations, the NATO countries were also unprepared for their application. As noted by the Canadian government in late July 1975, little time was left before implementation and it was advisable that "NATO [did] a study on many points of detail in the implementation of CBMs".[232]

[232] Ibid., 21 July 1975.

CHAPTER 8

CBMS IMPLEMENTATION: A REVEALING RECORD

1. INTRODUCTION

When the CSCE participating States negotiated the CBMs of the Final Act, no one knew they were introducing new rules for the conduct of military activities in Europe which would remain in force for more than a decade. Throughout most of the negotiations in Geneva, the question of the continuation of the CSCE remained uncertain, and what would subsequently happen with the commitments being developed there was even less clear.

At the start of the Conference, the Soviets had insisted on the creation of a permanent body by the CSCE and had even successfully introduced an agenda item in this regard.[1] But, the more the negotiations progressed, with inclusion of obligations in the field of human rights and CBMs, the more the East became disenchanted with the idea and the less they insisted on it.

On the Western side, initial views on any continuation of the CSCE, and the creation of any organ or institution to pursue the process, were very negative. For the Allies, the idea was always associated with the permanent body the Soviets sought to set up since the 1950s for establishing a new collective security régime in Europe, and they only reluctantly agreed to consider the issue. Like the East, however, though for opposite reasons, the Western position gradually changed during the course of the negotiations. The more their demands were being considered and approved by the Conference, the more the Allies developed an interest in having some follow-up meetings to review implementation of the CSCE commitments.

With the NNAs always strongly supporting the continuation of the Conference, the parties agreed to a compromise calling for one Follow-Up Meeting to be held two years after the conclusion of the CSCE. As further agreed, though never fully discussed at the Conference, the meeting would review progress of the implementation of the commitments of the Final Act, discuss further steps or proposals to enhance the objectives of the Document and decide on further meetings.

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[1] For background on the issue of continuation of the Conference and the evolving positions of all three main groupings at the CSCE, see Maresca, *To Helsinki*, pp. 201-204. For a more complete and detailed account, see the archival material of the British government, as presented by Bennett and Hamilton in *The Conference*.

The meeting, held in Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978, took place against a background of degradation in East-West relations.[2] More significantly, following the election of US President Jimmy Carter and his commitment to human rights, the proceedings were dominated by heated exchanges on human rights issues by the United States and the Soviet Union, with the former strongly criticising the poor Eastern record of implementation in this field. Discussion on CBMs was much less controversial, but despite a number of proposals advanced by all three major groupings, no new initiative could be agreed upon.[3] The Soviets negatively reacted to the virulent attacks of the human rights record of the Eastern states and opposed having a final document that would make reference to shortcomings in implementation or include any proposals aimed at improving implementation. As a result, the Belgrade Meeting barely managed to reaffirm the validity of the Final Act, though, on a more positive note, the participants agreed on another Follow-up Meeting to be held in Madrid two years later.

The Madrid Follow-Up Meeting (11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983) also took place at a difficult time in East-West relations with the deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles aimed at Europe; the non-ratification of SALT II; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the suppression of the Solidarity movement and the imposition of martial law in Poland; and the downing of a South Korean civilian jetliner by a Soviet fighter plane. Despite long intermissions in the negotiations and Western questioning about their continuation, the Meeting concluded by calling for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) to be held in Stockholm. As drafted in Madrid, the mandate of the CDE was to develop a second-set of CBMs, renamed Confidence- and *Security*-Building Measures, or CSBMs. As conceived, the new measures were to improve on the Helsinki régime and were to be militarily significant, politically

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[2] In contrast to the CSCE itself, documentation on Follow-Up Meetings (including those held in Belgrade, Madrid, and Stockholm which most relevant here) is abundant. For a comprehensive overview emphasising the negotiations on CBMs, see Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, pp. 160-193; Klein, *Sécurité et désarmement*, pp.125-227; Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, pp.16-33; and Carl C. Krehbiel, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. The Stockholm Conference*, New York: Praeger, 1989, pp. 7-11. [Hereafter: Krehbiel, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe* .

[3] In addition to the literature mentioned above, see *The Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Report and Appraisal*, Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe transmitted to the Committee on International Relations, 17 May 1978, US House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978, 105 pages. See also John D. Toogood, "Military Aspects of the Belgrade Review Meeting", *Survival*, XX: 4, July-August 1978, pp. 155-158. [Hereafter: Toogood, "Military Aspects"]. Toogood was the Chairman of the NATO caucus on security matters dealing with CBMs at Belgrade.

binding, adequately verifiable and applicable to all of Europe, including the entire European Soviet territory. [4]

The Stockholm Conference (17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986) successfully negotiated improvement on the original Helsinki measures and, after formal approval of its final document at the start of the third CSCE Follow-Up Meeting held in Vienna, (4 November 1986 to 19 January 1989), the CSBMs replaced the Helsinki measures on 1 January, 1987.

Hence, for almost twelve years, the original measures embodied in the Final Act remained in effect. But, as suggested, the continuation of the CBMs (like that of the Conference itself) was never fully anticipated by the CSCE participating States and even less concretely planned for. When the CSCE concluded in 1975, all 35 participants had signed on to commitments in this field, but probably an equal number of views existed on how these should be carried out. The Final Act provided little specificity on the matter, leaving the participating States with a wide array of interpretations. Before assessing the implementation record of the parties, a more comprehensive review of the provisions of the CBMs Document is necessary.

2. THE FINAL ACT CBMS PROVISIONS

The *Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament* consisted of twelve preambular paragraphs followed by three main sections. Part II and III, respectively entitled "Questions Relating to Disarmament" and "General Considerations", dealt very briefly and in general terms with questions of security in Europe. The text of these sections arose from the demands of the NNAs and Romania for a wider range of security issues to be considered by the Conference, but the other nations did not accept their proposals and the provisions agreed upon contained no firm commitment to undertake any particular action.

Only Part I of the Document (untitled) contained recommendations on CBMs. It was divided into five main sections: 1) Prior notification of major military manoeuvres; 2) Prior notification of other military manoeuvres; 3) Exchange of observers; 4) Prior notification of military movements and; 5) Other confidence-building measures. Two paragraphs, separated

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[4] For a discussion focusing on the new character of these measures see, for instance, Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, "Developing a Confidence-Building System in East-West Relations: Europe and the CSCE", pp., 92-119; and Rolf, Berg, "Military Confidence-Building in Europe", pp. 31-49 published in Allen Lynch (ed.), *Building Security in Europe*, East-West Monograph Series Number Two, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986.

from the above sections, concluded the provisions of the Helsinki CBMs régime.

2.1 *Prior notification of major military manoeuvres*

The prior notification of major military manoeuvres was the only measure of the CBMs Document containing specific stipulations. The notification of major military manoeuvres was also considered the only "mandatory" measure of the Helsinki régime. Although the Final Act was not a treaty but a political commitment, it was widely recognised (predominantly in the West) that the Helsinki CBMs Document carried different levels of obligations stemming from the usage of qualifying language throughout the text. The employment of different formulae like the participating States "*will* notify" (when referring to major military manoeuvres), or that they "*may* notify" (when referring to smaller-scale manoeuvres) created different levels of obligations described by most analysts as obligatory and permissive, or mandatory and voluntary.[5] Since the CSCE participating States agreed that they "*will* notify" their major military manoeuvres, this measure was usually considered as carrying a higher degree of obligation than the other CBMs.

What constituted a "major military manoeuvre" was not defined in the Document. It followed from the text, however, that they were "manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components". In this context, the word "troops" not only referred to land forces but also included amphibious and airborne troops. Following from the above, one could identify four types of major manoeuvres falling under the cover of "mandatory" notification: independent manoeuvres of land troops, independent manoeuvres of amphibious troops, independent manoeuvres of airborne troops, and combined manoeuvres.[6]

In the case of combined manoeuvres, the Document contained a specific provision noting that "combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification *can* also be given" [emphasis added]. This sentence gave recognition to the desirability of notification of combined land-air or land-sea manoeuvres below the 25,000-troop threshold if there were "significant" numbers of amphibious or airborne troops. However, the meaning of the word "significant" was not given and, as clearly expressed by

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[5] See, for instance, Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 8.
[6] See Ibid., p. 9.

the use of the verb "*can*", the commitment to notify such manoeuvres was discretionary.[7] Naval and air force manoeuvres conducted independently or combined with each other was not covered by any of the above provisions.

The type of major manoeuvres to be notified was further qualified as being those "which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space." While it followed from this provision that the territory of the United States, Canada and the overseas possessions of the European states were not covered by the notification régime, at the express request of the Soviet Union and Turkey, an explicit exception was made for States whose territory "extends beyond Europe".[8] In these cases, "notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in the area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating States". The Document further stressed (at the insistence of Turkey) that these States "need not give . . . notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State."[9] No definition of the meaning of "contiguous" was provided.

The time parameter for giving notification of major manoeuvres was established at twenty-one days in advance of the start of the activities, or "in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date". Although it was recognised as extremely unlikely that any manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops would be arranged at shorter notice than 21 days, except during a crisis, it was felt desirable to leave it open to states to notify after the deadline had passed.[10] The statement, however, represented an important "escape clause" from the obligations of the provision and, for this reason, all participants solemnly avowed that it should not and would not be used to circumvent the 21 days provision.[11]

Concerning the notifications, the Document determined that they would be made "to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels". Until the very end of the negotiations, Warsaw Pact representatives resisted the provision concerning "usual diplomatic

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[7] Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975.
[8] Ibid.
[9] For a discussion see Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 10. See also Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1976*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976, pp. 324-235. [Hereafter: *SIPRI Yearbook 1976*].
[10] Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975.
[11] Ibid., 24 July 1975.

channels" arguing that they did not have diplomatic relations or representations with all CSCE States.[12] However, on the understanding that the formulation could include communications through UN representatives, protecting powers, as well as direct exchanges of notes in capitals, the Soviets and others ultimately withdrew their objections.[13] According to Western interpretations, "diplomatic channels" ensured that notices would be government to government, rather than by other means such as press releases as was espoused by the WTO nations during the negotiations.[14]

For the content of the notification, the Document stressed that information "*will*" be given on the following items:

1. the designation, if any, of the manoeuvre;
2. the general purpose of and the countries involved in the manoeuvre;
3. the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged;
4. the area and the estimated time-frame of its conduct.

Additionally, and in clear contrast to the high degree of obligation given to the above notifiable items, the CSCE participants further agreed that they "will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces". The meaning of all these items was not defined in the Document, but background information on their negotiations provides useful insights as to the reasons for their inclusion, and what the West expected from them.

The "designation", for instance, was nothing more than the usual administrative tool of giving a manoeuvre a name so that references back and forth could be made.[15] The Warsaw Pact nations were initially very suspicious that this statement concealed an attempt to determine code-names of manoeuvres. However, by the end of the negotiations, they finally realised that the requirement was rather innocuous, and agreed to its inclusion.[16]

"The general purpose of a manoeuvre" referred to the main objectives for the conduct of the activity. The degree of precision to give in this regard was not discussed in the negotiations and, thus, it was left to the discretion of each participant to determine how vague or specific to

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[12] Ibid., 6 August 1975.
[13] The USSR had no diplomatic relations with Spain and no representation in Monaco. Ibid.
[14] Ibid., 25 July 1975; and Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 8.
[15] Canada, DEA, 21 July 1975.
[16] Ibid.

be in this regard.[17]

The item requiring the notification of the "states involved" in a manoeuvre was included to cover multinational manoeuvres. In this case, the participating State providing the notification would also indicate what other countries were involved in the manoeuvre. However, even if the provision was meant to ensure that the receiver of the notification would be aware of what countries were involved in any manoeuvre, the Document did not discuss who would actually transmit the notification.[18]

The phrase "type or types of forces" was intended to encourage a breakdown of the components of the forces engaged rather than merely saying "land forces", for example.[19] Once again, in the absence of any further precision on the issue, states could determine the extent to which they wished to be precise when providing this information.

"Numerical strength" referred to a general numerical figure of the troops involved. Although attempts were made during the negotiations to have this term read plural to encourage even further a breakdown of the components of the forces in the manoeuvre, this could not be agreed. Accordingly, the participating States could either provide only a single overall number, or breakdowns if they wished.[20]

The item concerning "the area" where the manoeuvre was conducted could not be defined more closely to make it specific as to what area was being utilised. Consequently, the signatories were free to decide how specific they wished to be when giving this information.[21]

"Estimated time-frame". The word "estimated" was included to ensure that in the event of a slippage of planning dates a notifying state would not have to abrogate the Final Act. According to NATO's interpretative texts circulated in Brussels at the conclusion of the CSCE, it was clear that "time-frame" was not a magic word and that it was "intended only to reflect dates."[22]

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[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.

Until the final days of the Conference, the text ended with the provision on "additional relevant information", and the phrase was intended only to open the way for any other practical information that a state might wish to offer. This could have been a simple warning that dates were not firm or that additional units might be added, etc. At the end of the CSCE, the phrase was still understood by the West as having that meaning, despite the fact that the sentence continued with "the period of involvement of these forces."[23] This later stipulation was enclosed to encourage further information on the dates of involvement beyond merely the dates of the manoeuvre itself and was thus directly related to information on the movement of troops before or after a manoeuvre.[24]

2.2 *Prior notification of other military manoeuvres*

This section contained provisions on smaller-scale military manoeuvres and "other" manoeuvres. Unlike the stipulations for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, no parameter (i.e. time, size, area, etc.) was established for the notification of those manoeuvres, and the undertakings were entirely voluntary.

The first paragraph of this section simply suggested that to contribute further to the building of confidence, the participating States "may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres". No procedure of any kind was included regarding what information such notification should contain, or when it should be delivered. In fact, the only procedure included, or implied, with respect to the notification of smaller-scale manoeuvres related to the recipients of the notification. In this respect, the phrase "other participating States" established that, unlike the notification of major manoeuvres which needed to be given to *all* other CSCE participants, the notification in this case could be given to selected recipients.

What constituted a "smaller-scale manoeuvre" was not defined and one could only assume that following the stipulations on major military manoeuvres, smaller-scale manoeuvres were those falling below the agreed parameter set for the "mandatory" notification of major manoeuvres, i.e. 25,000 troops. Whether one could further assume that the smaller-scale manoeuvres that "*may*" be notified were those of the same type as the major military manoeuvres was unclear, but became irrelevant by the subsequent following provisions.

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[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.; and Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 11.

Indeed, the second and last paragraph of this section stipulated that the signatories "may notify other military manoeuvres conducted by them". In the absence of definition of this phrase, one could assume that "*other military manoeuvres*" referred to all those manoeuvres not covered by the other provisions of the CBMs Document: independent air and/or naval manoeuvres; airborne and/or amphibious manoeuvres; combined manoeuvres in which the total of troops was less than 25,000, and; manoeuvres taking place outside the geographic area defined in the Document.[25] Recognising the ambiguity created by the lack of any reference to geographic limits in the above provisions, the United States issued a statement at the end of the Conference that neither paragraph should be considered as applying outside the zone of application agreed for the measures on the prior notification of major manoeuvres.[26]

Finally, it is noteworthy that the provisions on "other manoeuvres" were even more lacking in detail than the provisions for smaller-scale manoeuvres, as they did not mention who should be notified. The phrase "other military manoeuvres" was all that remained of the idea expressed by the neutral and non-aligned and some NATO states (Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Turkey and Greece) for notification of separate naval and air manoeuvres, which was strongly opposed by a number of participating States.[27]

2.3. *The exchange of observers*

With the prior notification of major military manoeuvres, the invitation of observers to attend military manoeuvres was generally considered as the most important measure of the Helsinki CBMs régime. Unlike the notification measure, however, this provision was not mandatory. Indeed, even if the text indicated that the participating States "will" invite observers, the binding force of this provision was completely lost by the stipulation that the invitations were to be done "voluntarily", "on a bilateral basis", and "in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill".

With regard to the type of military manoeuvres to which observers could be invited, the Document did not list any. In this regard, the Helsinki CBMs régime did not recognise any link (or obligation) between a "mandatory" notification of major manoeuvres and the invitation of observers.[28] However, the provisions did not limit the invitation of observers exclusively to these (major) manoeuvres. In fact, the only type of military activities covered

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[25] See Ghebali, Ibid., pp. 11-12.
[26] Ibid., p. 17 note 24.
[27] Canada, DEA, 24 July 1975.
[28] See Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 12.

by the Helsinki régime which seemed to be excluded from this provision related to the movement of troops, because the text only referred to the possibility of sending observers to attend "military manoeuvres".

Finally, it should be noted that the CBMs Document was very explicit in relation to the fact that the "inviting" States had all the latitude concerning the procedures and conditions in which an observation was to take place: "The inviting State will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality."

2.4. *Prior notification of major military movements*

The section on the prior notification of major military movements emphasised that the participating States had studied the question and that the signatories "*may* at their own discretion", notify their major military movements. The limited character of the text emphasised the fact that both superpowers were unwilling to provide notification of their movements, and constituted a double protection against any firm commitment to provide such notification. The statement, inserted at the request of a majority of CSCE delegations, enabled the participating States to decide the extent to which they wished to volunteer notification. No procedure was included to define how this should be done, what such a notification might contain or, even, what constituted a military movement. It can be noted, however, that the word "*major*" always preceded the word "*movement*" suggesting that the level at which notification might start was the same as that for "major military manoeuvres', and that smaller-scale movements were not covered by the agreement. Yet, in the absence of definition, the provision enabled each state to determine for itself how low it might wish to go.

This section concluded by mentioning that further consideration would be given to this question "bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures" which were set in the Document, hence opening the way for a later development.

2.5. *Other confidence-building measures*

While indirectly recognising that the Helsinki régime did not exhaust the list of CBMs that could be undertaken by the participating States, this section of the Document only

recommended the promotion of exchanges among military personnel, including visits by military delegations. Apart from mentioning that this should be done with a view to better mutual understanding and with due regard to reciprocity, no other indication was provided as to when or how these exchanges should take place. Introduced at the request of Spain, no discussion on its implementation was held during the negotiations, and the undertaking was seen as a purely bilateral effort.

Finally, the last two paragraphs of Part I of the CBMs Document dealt with the concept of "self-restraint" in military activities, and the further development of CBMs. The first paragraph simply recognised that to make a fuller contribution to the objective of confidence-building, the participating States would take account and respect this objective when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres. The paragraph stemmed from a much more detailed Yugoslav proposal concerning the application of certain restraints on military activities, but with both East and West opposed to such a consideration, the result was this generalised formulation on self-restraint with no description of the meaning of the commitment involved.

The second and final paragraph left open the possibility of a further development of CBMs at a later stage, but simply noted in this regard that the participating States recognised that "the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth [in the Document], together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence."

As illustrated by the review of the CBMs régime, most of the measures were strictly voluntary in character and the procedures describing how they should be implemented were often very vaguely defined or simply non-existent. Soon after the conclusion of the Final Act, some analysts argued that because most provisions of the Document were "so vague and non-committal" it would be "difficult to ascertain whether they [were] actually being fulfilled."[29] In contrast, the NATO governments who sponsored the measures took the view that "while no part of the Final Act [was] legally binding and CBM's [sic] were explicitly "voluntary", the political commitment was clear and the implementation record, involving as it [did] specific events and numbers, lend[ed] itself to *objective* assessment" [emphasis added].[30] The

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[29] *SIPRI Yearbook 1976*, p. 327.

[30] US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *First Semiannual Report by the*

Warsaw Pact nations never really engaged in comparison of compliance behaviour. During the Belgrade and Madrid Meetings, the Eastern states criticised some of the manoeuvres conducted by NATO as being contrary to the spirit of the agreement but, beyond such general remarks, the Eastern bloc nations never entertained any detailed discussions on compliance. Therefore, the following review of the record of implementation of the CSCE CBMs is based predominantly on Western sources.

3. THE MIXED RECORD OF COMPLIANCE [31]

As illustrated in Appendix I, and in the table below depicting the overall record of implementation of the Helsinki CBMs régime (from the signing of the Final Act on 1 August 1975 to 1 January 1987 when the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures entered into force), the CSCE participating States gave prior notification of 135 military manoeuvres and invited other signatories to send observers on 73 occasions.[32]

	NOTIFICATIONS	INVITATION OF OBSERVERS
NATO	80	48
NNAs	23	14
WARSAW PACT	32	11
TOTAL	135	73

All three major groups of states represented at the CSCE (NATO, NNAs and WTO) took part in implementing the "mandatory" provisions of the CBMs Document and made some use of

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President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Report submitted to the Committee on International Relations, US Congress, 94th Congress, 2d Session, December 1976, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976, p. 18. [Hereafter: US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *First Semiannual Report*].

[31] Unless specified otherwise, all data, figures and estimates in this section are based on the information used to produce the tables presented in Appendix I.

[32] There are no definite accepted figures in open literature on the number of notifications or invitations of observers provided under the Helsinki régime. More troublesome, it appears that even the CSCE participating States had different accounts of their number. "According to the figures of the Polish delegation to the Madrid Meeting, in the period between the Helsinki Conference and October 1980, CSCE states notified a total of 63 maneuvers (35 in the major category). According to the figures of the Finnish delegation . . . there were in the same period 59 notifications (28 maneuvers involving over 25,000 troops) . . . . Other sources also indicate certain differences which may be due either to counting the same maneuvers notified by different countries separately or to misunderstandings arising out of the simultaneous organization in a single country (e.g., West Germany) of several major maneuvers." Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, "CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid: Theory and Experience", in F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe, *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, East-West Monograph Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983, p. 129 note 30. [Hereafter: Rotfeld, "CBMs Between Helsinki and Madrid"]. The figures presented here are based on the information used to produce the tables presented in Appendix I.

its discretionary clauses. No state, however, gave voluntary notification of military movements, or of any "other" military manoeuvres, such as independent naval or air manoeuvres. On the other hand, countries representing the interests of all three groups participated in exchanges of military personnel as called for in the Document under the provision "other confidence-building measures". Review of the implementation record of this measure, however, will not be considered here. Available information on this CBM is very scarce and does not allow the compilation of sufficient data to present an overall record of implementation.[33] While unfortunate, it can be noted that this type of measure was not new or unique to the CSCE process. Exchanges of military personnel and military delegations occurred long before the CSCE came into being. Furthermore, because the CBMs Document only required the "promotion" of such undertakings, a thorough analysis of the compliance record would necessitate information on previous exchanges in order to assess the degree to which the Final Act objective to "promote" such exchanges was fulfilled. Information on these exchanges is also not readily available. As a general assessment of the overall usefulness of the measure, however, one Western participant to the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting noted in 1984 that:

> [t]here appears to have been a considerable increase in such bilateral exchanges between Eastern and Western countries immediately following the signing of the Final Act in 1975. . . suggesting that the inclusion of this CBM in the Final Act was successful in giving further impetus to a long-standing practice in East-West relations. At the same time, however, reports suggest that this increase may have been reversed in subsequent years, and that this decline reflected periods of tension in broader issues affecting East-West relations.[34]

Beyond these general considerations, the compliance behaviour of each of the three groups involved in the CSCE requires a more detailed analysis.

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[33] For partial information on the implementation of this measure principally covering American activities, see the first thirteen semiannual reports on implementation prepared by the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (complete references are provided in the bibliography). See also by the Commission, *Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki*, Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, August 1, 1980, 96th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980, pp. 294-296 [Hereafter: US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki*]; and *Fulfilling our Promises: The United States and the Helsinki Final Act. A Status Report*, Washington D.C.: GPO, November 1979, pp. 315-316. For a partial list of military exchanges between the US and the Warsaw Pact countries between 1975 and 1979, see Hans Gunther Brauch, "CBMs and the CSCE", *Arms Control Today*, 10: 10 November 1980, p. 3.

[34] Goetze, *Security in Europe*, pp. 79-80.

3.1. *NATO*

Of the three main groups represented at the CSCE, the Western states accounted for the highest recurrence of prior notifications of manoeuvres and invitations to observers. During the period under review, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance notified 37 major manoeuvres involving between 25,000 and 132,000 troops. In all cases, the required 21 days advance notice was observed and in 18 instances the period was longer -- up to 34 days in one case.

With regard to the content of notifications, the Western states almost always provided the information required by the Helsinki Document, which is to say: the designation of the manoeuvre (if any); the general purpose of the exercise; the countries involved; the category of troops engaged; the numerical strength of forces engaged; the area of the manoeuvre; and the estimated time-frame of its conduct.[35] Furthermore, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance often supplemented the required information with further details on the activities. In addition to the total number of troops, for example, several Western notices provided information on the breakdown of the units, their type, and even in many cases their designation.[36] On several occasions, the Western notifications included, "as appropriate", details on "any direct link with other allied maneuvers" as well as "any air or naval support."[37] Also, the NATO states often supplemented information on the time-frame of the conduct of the manoeuvres with disclosures on the period of transition of troops to and from the exercise. Although not considered as implementation of the voluntary Helsinki CBMs provisions on the prior notification of major military movements, these voluntary disclosures were in keeping with a section of the CBMs provisions on the prior notification of major military manoeuvres calling upon participating States to provide "if possible . . . additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces." Finally, it is noteworthy that most large-scale manoeuvres held by NATO were often notified by more than one ally, and it was not uncommon for the different participating nations to issue separate but identical notifications or, alternatively, to

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[35] This information is noted by Goetze in *Security in Europe*, p. 80. In contrast, Victor-Yves Ghebali contends that, on three occasions, Western notifications failed to provide the precise dates for the beginning and end of the manoeuvre. According to Ghebali, the 1975 US notification of the *Reforger* exercise indicated only "October-November 1975", and the 1982 FRG notifications of the *Carbine Fortress* and *Starke Wehr* exercises reported the information on the time-frame for the conduct of the manoeuvres as "September 1982". Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, p. 159 note 1.

[36] Toogood, "Military Aspects",. p. 155.

[37] Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 80. Since Goetze was writing in 1982, this information should be considered valid only until that year. However, there is no indication that the reporting changed at a later date.

detail further the participation of national troops.[38]

In addition to the above notifications, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance issued 43 notices of smaller-scale manoeuvres involving troops numbering between 4,000 and 24,000. In the vast majority of cases, the notices were given 21 days or more before the start of the manoeuvres, even though the Final Act did not specify any time-frame for reporting these activities. With regard to the content of these notifications, the Western states reportedly applied the same criteria as for reporting their major military manoeuvres, "although the information provided was sometimes less detailed".[39]

As regards foreign observation of their manoeuvres, the NATO countries extended invitations to other states to send observers to 32 of their 37 notified major manoeuvres and to 16 of the 43 notified smaller-scale manoeuvres.[40] Invitations were extended either to all CSCE participating States or to a large number representing the interest of each of the three main CSCE groupings. Observers at Western military activities were given ample facilities to follow properly the manoeuvres.[41] As a general rule, observers were provided with detailed briefings, means of transportation, experienced escorts, fixed and mobile observation posts, telephone liaison with their embassies, and binoculars. Observers were also authorised to visit the actual exercise area and make contacts with officers and/or troops.

Looking at the overall implementation record of the Western states over the twelve years of the Helsinki régime, it appears that the Allies held an average of three major manoeuvres each year (from two in 1977 and 1984, to four in 1978, 1983 and 1984), with a somewhat higher

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[38] As observed by Johan-Jorgen Hölst, the Western authorities often separately notified different phases of their multinational manoeuvres: "They follow the practice . . . of announcing separately various phases of co-ordinated Alliance exercises which involve the territories of several NATO countries". Johan-Jorgen Hölst, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", *Survival*, XXV: 1, January-February 1983, p. 7. [Hereafter: Hölst, "Confidence-building Measures"].

[39] Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 80. On NATO's reporting of smaller-scale manoeuvres, Ghebali notes that the notifications of *Red Claymore* (UK, 1981), *Farfadet* (France, 1981) and *Langres* (France, 1982), only provided the month as information on the time-frame for the conduct of the manoeuvres. Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, p. 159 note 1.

[40] The total number of invitations may have been higher. Information on three manoeuvres is either contradictory or not available. See Appendix tables.

[41] See Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 81. See also US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki*, Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, November 1982, 97th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1982, p. 29. [Hereafter: US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki*].

average of smaller-scale exercises though, in this case, the difference between years varied more greatly (ranging from one to six). Almost all of NATO's major manoeuvres, and two-thirds of its smaller activities, took place in the autumn. Thirty of the 37 notified major manoeuvres, for example, were held in September alone.

With the exception of the year 1975, when a total of six notifications were issued but observers were invited to attend only one manoeuvre, the Western states extended a minimum of three invitations each year. More significantly, with one possible exception (*Eternal Triangle*, for which available information is inconclusive), the NATO states invited observers to all their major manoeuvres held between 1979 and 1986.

Interestingly, while the treatment of observers was described through the entire period as being very satisfactory, it was reported in 1977 that "as NATO states have gained experience in accommodating the needs of observers, the quality and frequency of the opportunities extended for observation . . . have been markedly enhanced."[42] No indication suggests that similar improvements may have taken place in regard to their notifications. This, however, may be due to the fact that, as early as 1976, "NATO allies have worked closely together to insure that the Alliance follow[ed] common modalities for CBMs",[43] and it is plausible that these modalities were considered sufficiently satisfactory not to require changes.

3. 2. *Neutral and Non-aligned*

The compliance record of the Neutral and Non-aligned nations with the Helsinki régime was comparable to that of NATO. Although states associated with this group did not co-operate as closely as the other two major CSCE groupings, they had a keen interest in the Helsinki agreement and implemented the CBMs provisions in a forthcoming and liberal fashion.

Between 1975 and 1986, the NNAs notified ten major manoeuvres varying in size from 25,000 to 40,000 troops. Seven of these manoeuvres were carried out by Switzerland, two by Austria, and one by Spain.[44] In addition, the NNAs announced thirteen manoeuvres

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[42] US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Third Semiannual Report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. June 1 - December 1, 1977*, Special Report No. 39, December 1977, Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, p. 6.

[43] US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *First Semiannual Report*, p. 18.

[44] Spain has been included in this group because the notification of its participation in the two exercises was made before it officially joined the integrated command of NATO in May 1982.

involving less than 25,000 troops (six by Sweden, three by Yugoslavia, three by Austria, and one by Spain). For all 23 manoeuvres, the advance notices were never less than 21 days (varying, in fact, between 21 and 53 days).

As for the content of the NNAs notifications, it was generally considered satisfactory although, in some cases, the reporting could have been improved. In six notifications, for example, the designation was omitted and, in another two instances, the time-frame for the conduct of the manoeuvre was reported without beginning and end dates.[45] It can be noted, however, that in most cases detailed information was included on the other notifiable items. It is worth mentioning as an example that the Swiss notification of November 1975 (provided without a designation) was issued 31 days before the start of the manoeuvre and contained data on the participating units and equipment even including the number of horses.[46] It is also noteworthy that, like the NATO states, the NNAs on several occasions supplemented the information on the time-frame for the conduct of a manoeuvre with details on the movement of the participating troops.

The NNAs invited observers to attend eight of their ten notified major manoeuvres and six of their thirteen smaller ones. The invitations were extended to a substantial number of countries representing all three CSCE groupings, and observers were granted the opportunity to carry out their tasks effectively.[47]

Finally, given the fact that the NNAs did not hold bilateral or multinational exercises,[48] a review of their overall record of implementation assessing, for example, patterns of military practice is irrelevant. As a general remark on their implementation relating to the invitation of foreign observers, however, it can noted, that while the states associated with this group issued less notifications than NATO or the WTO states, in proportion, they invited more observers than the Eastern states.

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[45] According to Ghebali, the Swiss notification of the *Cresta* manoeuvre only quoted "October 1981", and the Swedish notification of *Sydfront*, "September 1982". Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, p. 159 note 1.

[46] See J. D. Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade: What Happened to the Confidence Building Measures?", *Canadian Defence Review*, 8: 2, Fall 1978, p. 13. [Hereafter: Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade"].

[47] See, Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 90.

[48] The only exception is Spain, who conducted a bilateral manoeuvre with the United States (*Crisex-81*) just before joining NATO in 1982.

3.3. *Warsaw Pact*

In contrast to the other two groups represented at the CSCE, the Warsaw Pact's implementation of the Helsinki CBMs was poor. In general, the Eastern states did the minimum to stay in compliance with the provisions of the Final Act and, on two occasions, they were charged with breaching its provisions.

During the period under review, WTO member states issued notifications for twenty-seven major military manoeuvres. The vast majority of these manouevres involved less than 30,000 troops, although the number of participating troops reached, on one occasion, 100,000 men and varied, in five instances, between 40,000 and 60,000. Until 1984, notifications were issued precisely twenty-one days before the start of the manoeuvres --the minimum time-frame required by the Final Act. Later, the notifying period was prolonged on several occasions --up to 28 days in two cases.

The content of the WTO notifications was never thorough. In contrast to the Western and non-bloc countries, who frequently provided details on the breakdown of units, their type, or name, the Eastern notifications only indicated the gross number of the forces engaged.[49] In at least 14 cases (or more than half the total number of the major manoeuvres notified), no designation was provided. In three instances, the time-frame for the conduct of the manoeuvre was reported without precise dates.[50] In two notifications, the participating countries were not named.[51] In seven instances, the information relating to the geographic area of the manoeuvre was worthless: the notifications of *Brotherhood in Arms* (GDR, 1980), *Shield-82* (Bulgaria), *Shield-84* and *Druzba-86* (Czechoslovakia), for example, reported only the name of the country.[52]

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[49] See Toogood, "Military Aspects", p. 155.

[50] The notification of *Tarcza-76* by Poland reported only "Early September", and the notification of *Shield-84* by Czechoslovakia, the "Beginning of September". See Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, p. 159. The GDR notification of the 1980 *Brotherhood in Arms* exercise reported only: "First-half of September". See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1981*, London: Taylor and Francis, 1981, p. 495, Appendix 17 A. [Hereafter: *SIPRI Yearbook 1981*].

[51] According to Ghebali, the notifications of *Shield-82* and *Shield-84* only mentioned "with forces from the Warsaw Pact". See Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, pp. 158-159.

[52] The information on *Brotherhood in Arms* is from *SIPRI Yearbook 1981*, Appendix 17A, p. 495. Information on the other manoeuvres is from Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, p. 159. Ghebali also notes that the two "unnamed" Soviet exercises of June-July 1983 and June-July 1984 reported zones of, respectively, 90,000 and 50,000 square miles. The notification of *Zapad-81* which did not include a designation or the number of participating troops identified a manoeuvre area comparable in size to three times the territory of Czechoslovakia, or some 150,000 square miles.

As noted, imprecision of this type occurred in some of the notifications given by other participating States. Unlike the WTO practice, however, these imprecisions were never frequent, they did not concern numerous notifiable items for the same manoeuvre, and they did not necessarily occur in the notifications for the largest military activities, as was frequently the case for the Eastern notifications. It is noteworthy that six of the seven vague reportings of the WTO relating to the geographic area of the manoeuvre were found in the notifications for the exercises involving the largest number of troops. In addition, the notifications for the two largest multinational manoeuvres, held by Pact nations between 1975 and 1986 (*Shield-82* and *Shield-84*), not only failed to specify precise locations but also the countries involved and the beginning and end dates for their conduct.[53] In the notification of another large-scale WTO multinational manoeuvre (*Brotherhood in Arms*, 40,000 troops), the time-frame was simply identified as "first-half of September", and its location described as "the GDR and adjacent territory".[54]

Foreign observation of WTO manoeuvres was a rare event. Observers were invited to attend only nine of the twenty-seven notified major manoeuvres and the invitations were never addressed to all the CSCE participants. Until 1977 the invitations were extended only to a select number of states in geographical proximity to the manoeuvre area, or to neutral or non-aligned countries. In July 1977 (for the *Karpatia* manoeuvre), the geographical distribution of observers was broadened but did not include all the CSCE participants. From the completion of the 1979 *Neman* exercise to the 1985 *Kavkaz* manoeuvre, no CSCE observers apart from Pact nations were invited to attend any of the eleven notified large-scale Soviet/Pact manoeuvres held during this period. Finally, for the last manoeuvre observed under the Helsinki régime (*Druzba-86*), invitations were extended to states representing all three CSCE groupings but, again, not to all participants.

The opportunities and facilities extended for observation at Warsaw Pact military activities were never satisfactory. For the first three manoeuvres observed by other CSCE states, "observers had been given the opportunity to see very little" and what they reported was thus "of minimal interest".[55] At the fourth observed manoeuvre (*Karpatia*), the quality of maps and briefings was poor, the provision of mobile observation posts and opportunities to make

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[53] Ibid., pp. 158-159.
[54] See *SIPRI Yearbook 1981*, p. 495 Appendix 17A.
[55] Toogood, "Military Aspects", p. 156.

contact with the troops still non-existent.[56] Observation time for the February 1978 *Berezina* exercise was limited and the observers were not allowed to use their own equipment and were provided with faulty binoculars.[57] Reports of the *Neman* manoeuvre held in July 1979 noted that observers "were shown demonstration rather than actual exercise activity."[58] Finally, as can be noted by an official US report on the 1986 Czech *Druzba* manoeuvre (the last one for which observers had been invited under the Helsinki régime), the opportunities were still "severely restricted":[59]

> The US and a number of other signatories were invited to send two observers . . . . Czechoslovak authorities limited actual observation time during the three-day period to a total of about three hours. In addition to this general restriction, specific limitations on the use of personal binoculars, tape recorders, and cameras existed, affecting the ability of observers to judge the nature of the activity. After discussions, the Czechoslovak authorities relented somewhat and permitted some use of recorders. They also supplied high-quality binoculars but remained adamant in their prohibition of photography. In spite of assurances to the contrary, the Czechoslovak hosts did not permit access to troops, unit commanders, or command posts. Western observers reported information gaps in briefings about the exercise. Unbriefed subjects included, but were not limited to, the location, size, and origin of participating units as well as basic questions of deployed equipment. Observers had at their disposal neither an overall printed scenario nor a list of attendees by country.[60]

The Eastern states' implementation of the voluntary provisions of the Helsinki Document concerning the notification of small-scale manoeuvres did not detract from the uniformly poor record of compliance with the other confidence-building measures. Even when applying very loose criteria as to what should constitute a proper notification under the Helsinki régime, a total of only five notifications of small-scale manoeuvres were recorded: four by Hungary and one by the Soviet Union. It remains questionable, however, whether the four notifications issued by Hungary could be considered as fulfilment of the Helsinki voluntary provisions. According to available information, the first two "unnamed" small-scale manoeuvres carried

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[56] J. D. Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade", p. 13. Toogood notes, however, some improvements in the permission granted to observers to use binoculars.

[57] See Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, p. 158. See also Aurel Braun, "Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament", in Robert Spencer (ed.), *Canada and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*, Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1984, p. 226 note 21. This was the first Eastern manoeuvre for which the United States was invited to send observers.

[58] US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *Findings and Recommendations Five Years After Helsinki*, p. 26. Although invited, the United States did not send any observers to the *Neman* manoeuvre because it was held in Lithuania.

[59] Ibid.

[60] US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Twenty-first Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. April 1, 1986 - October 1, 1986*, Special Report No. 154, n. d., Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, pp. 31-32. [Hereafter: US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *Twenty-first Semiannual Report*].

out by Hungary in April and October 1976 were announced, in the first case, the day before the commencement of the exercise and, in the second instance, on the same day. These two "notifications" were not given in writing but orally to accredited attachés in Budapest.[61] The notification of *Dyna 1980* was also verbal and, like the two 1976 manoeuvres, the advance warning was very short, in this case, the day before the beginning of the exercise.[62] All three notifications of smaller-scale manoeuvres provided "very limited details about the nature and scope of the activities taking place".[63] Finally, the notification of the 1979 "unnamed" manoeuvre (referred to in the West as *Shield-79*) was slightly better.[64] The announcement was reportedly made on May 3, and the time-frame for the manoeuvre identified as "Mid-May".[65] The number of troops involved was disclosed as amounting to "fewer than 25,000", but the notification was again made orally.[66]

As previously discussed, the Final Act did not specify any parameter for reporting smaller-scale manoeuvres. While the Hungarian announcements of incoming manoeuvres may have been considered by Budapest as fulfilment of the voluntary CBMs provisions, the Western countries held a different view on the matter. During the Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting, the NATO states did not acknowledge the first two smaller-scale notifications given by Hungary before the meeting. Apparently, "the Hungarian delegation drew attention to two other smaller-scale 'notices', but did not press the point when Western participants pointed out that a brief, oral announcement given without specific details on the same day that the manoeuvre began was not really in the same category as the written, detailed advance notices given by others."[67]

The only other effort made by WTO nations to implement the voluntary provisions of the Final Act on the prior notification of small manoeuvres was made by the Soviet Union in 1983.[68] Issued precisely twenty-one days before the start of the manoeuvre, the notification

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[61] See Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 89; and Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade", p. 13, Table A note 3.
[62] Goetze, Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Observers were apparently invited. However, no available information indicates whether the invitations were extended to other CSCE participating States or only to Warsaw Pact nations.
[65] Holst, Johan Jörgen, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", *Survival*, XXV: 1, January-February 1983, p. 10, Table 1 note (b). [Hereafter: Holst, "Confidence-building Measures"].
[66] Ibid.
[67] Toogood, "Military Aspects", p. 155.
[68] For the views of the United States on the reporting of small-scale manoeuvres by the Warsaw Pact nations, and background on their notifications see US, Commission on Security and

of the *Dniestr* exercise was similar in style to the Soviet reporting on large-scale manoeuvres. It is worth mentioning, however, that NATO and NNA observers were invited to attend this exercise, which for the Western countries represented the only occasion to observe an East European manoeuvre between 1979 and 1985.[69]

Undoubtedly, the most disturbing aspect of the Soviet/Pact record of implementation of the Helsinki agreement came in 1981 when important military activities taking place during the internal political crisis in Poland were either improperly notified or not notified at all. Indeed, in March of that year, the Soviet Union failed to announce several important military activities taking place in Poland claiming that these operations, code-name *Soyuz-81*, were either a command/staff exercise, or that they did not involve more than 25,000 troops.[70] Ambassador Max Kampelman, the US representative at the Madrid Conference, dismissed both explanations suggesting that a review of texts of Warsaw Pact radio broadcasts clearly indicated that:

- four armies were involved
- concurrent activities took place in three different military districts in Poland . . . .
- there was at least a partial mobilization of reservists in both Poland and the GDR . . . .
- virtually every branch of the ground forces of the GDR and Poland were exercised at the unit or sub-unit level.[71]

These reports strongly suggested the involvement of a number of troops, exceeding the CSCE notifiable numerical threshold. Furthermore, as Kampelman asserted, Eastern reports on the use of napalm were very difficult to reconcile with the explanation that the military activities of *Soyuz-81* were only a command/staff exercise.[72]

Cooperation in Europe, *Fourteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. December 1, 1982 - May 31, 1983*, Special Report No. 109, n. d., Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 14; *Fifteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. June 1, 1983 - November 30, 1983*, Special Report No. 113, n. d., Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 17; and. Basket *I* -- *Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings Eleven Years After Helsinki*, Report by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe submitted to Congress, November 1986, 99th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987, p. 38. [Hereafter: US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *Basket I*].

[69] Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, p. 158.

[70] *Three Years at the East-West Divide. The Words of U. S. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman at the Madrid Conference on Security and Human Rights*, edited by Leonard R. Sussman, New York: Freedom House, 1983, p. 54. [Hereafter: *Three Years at the East-West Divide*].

[71] Ibid., p. 55.

[72] Ibid., p. 54.

In the fall of 1981, the Soviet Union openly violated the provisions of the Final Act by failing to properly notify the largest military activity held by any CSCE state since the signing of the Final Act. The notification for the manoeuvre code-name *Zapad-81*, held between 4-12 September in the Byelorussian and Baltic military districts and on the Baltic Sea, did not include the number of troops and the type of forces engaged as specifically required by the Final Act, nor did it contain "information on the designation (if any)."[73] On September 5th, the second day of the manoeuvre, the Soviet news agency *TASS* identified the designation of the manoeuvre as "*Zapad-81*", and revealed that "approximately 100,000 troops" were involved.[74] Interestingly, the Soviet state-controlled newspaper *Izvestiya* had reported two days before the start of the manoeuvre that it would involve only "a very limited" number of troops.[75]

Looking at the overall Eastern states' record of implementation of the Helsinki CBMs régime, it appears that the yearly occurrence of WTO manoeuvres varied much more greatly than that of NATO. While no notification of any kind was made in the second half of 1975 (immediately after the signing of the Final Act in August), that was followed by five notifications in 1976 and continued to vary significantly with, for example, only one notification in 1981 and four in 1986.

Of the 27 large-scale military manoeuvres notified, about half (13) were national Soviet exercises; seven were multinational manoeuvres involving some, or all, Pact members; four were joint exercises with the participation of the Soviet Union and another WTO ally and; three were Soviet exercises in the GDR with no apparent involvement of East German troops. The recurrence of the different types of manoeuvres did not indicate any pattern in Eastern military practice. Multinational manoeuvres of Pact forces, for example, occurred once in 1976, 1980 and 1986, and twice in 1982 and 1984. As another example, the Soviet Union held one or two national exercises every year, but reported none in 1975, 1980, 1982 and 1984.

The size of all the manoeuvres also varied distinctively. With the exception of three Soviet

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[73] See Ibid., pp. 54-55.
[74] See US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Eleventh Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. June 1, 1981 - November 30, 1981*, Special Report No. 89, n. d., Washington D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 14.
[75] See Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, p. 29.

national exercises,[76] all the largest manoeuvres held by the Eastern states[77] were multinational in character, though not all the multinational exercises involved large numbers of troops.[78] In addition, while no manoeuvres with more than 35,000 troops took place before 1980, activities involving or exceeding a total of 40,000 troops were carried out every year after that --with the sole exception of 1985 when the three notified large-scale manoeuvres reported that year did not exceed 25,000 troops. More than half (14) of the 27 major manoeuvres held by the East reportedly involved 25,000 troops which corresponded exactly to the Final Act numerical threshold for "mandatory" notification.

Looking at the overall record for the invitation of observers, it appears that while WTO states notified at least one manoeuvre every year, no observers were invited in 1980, 1982 and 1984. More importantly (with the sole exception of the 1983 small-scale Soviet *Dniestr* manoeuvre),[79] no Western observers were invited between 1979 and 1985.[80] Also, while the NATO states were invited to only nine of the 32 manoeuvres notified by the East under the Helsinki régime, with the exception of the two multinational WTO manoeuvres *Tarcza-76* and *Druzba-86*, all invitations were for national Soviet exercises taking place on Soviet territory. It is also noteworthy that the largest manoeuvre attended by Western observers (*Tarcza-76*) only involved 35,000 troops.

With regard to the notification of the manoeuvres, Soviet/Pact practice differed from the other CSCE participants in that they "were not sent --as laid down by the Helsinki Final Act-- through 'usual diplomatic channels', in other words from Foreign Ministry to Foreign Ministry, but through the Ministry of Defence to the military attachés of the CSCE countries."[81]

Finally, with regard to Eastern states' observation of foreign manoeuvres, it is worth mentioning that until the second half of 1977, all the WTO countries declined NATO's invitations to attend their manoeuvres. Furthermore, while Moscow accepted its first Western invitation in September 1977, it was reported that, with only one exception (*Tayfun-77*), the

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[76] *Zapad-81* (100,000 troops); the June-July 1983 unnamed manoeuvre (50,000 troops); and *Zapad-86* (50,000 troops).
[77] Eight manoeuvres involved the participation of 40,000 troops or more.
[78] The multinational exercises *Druzba-82* and *Druzba-86* held in Czechoslovakia numbered only 25,000 troops.
[79] The United States, along with other NATO and NNA counties, were invited to send observers.
[80] Ghebali, *Diplomatie de la détente*, p. 158.
[81] Ghebali, Ibid., p. 159; and Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, p. 21.

Soviet Union was the only WTO nation to attend any NATO manoeuvre until at least 1982 -- the last year for which information is available.[82]

4. THE PURPOSE OF CBMs

As illustrated above, the compliance behaviour of all three groups varied greatly. In general, however, the CSCE participating States expressed satisfaction with the way the system was being implemented and the progress recorded over the years. Even the Soviets asserted at times that the CBMs were contributing "to promote the strengthening of confidence and military détente".[83] But, precisely what the Helsinki CBMs system was supposed to achieve in the first place remains unclear.

The Final Act ascribed three objectives to the CBMs provisions:

(1) eliminate the causes of tension;
(2) strengthen confidence and to contribute to increase stability and security, and;
(3) reduce the danger of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities, particularly in a situation where a state lacks clear and timely information about the nature of such activities.

The incongruence between these lofty objectives and the reality of the Final Act's provisions had more to do with conference rhetoric than with any specific objectives for CBMs advocated by the Western governments at the CSCE. Apart from a number of general statements, made on the margins of the negotiations, the Alliance never provided a comprehensive written explanation on the precise meaning of these objectives or how the measures could attain them.[84] Western officials, in fact, were quick to play down the military value of CBMs, suggesting instead that they were political and psychological in nature.[85]

Perhaps because of the absence of any clear policy statement on their purpose, numerous interpretations of the goals and objectives of CBMs emerged after the Conference.

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[82] See Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 89.
[83] As noted by Brauch in "CBMs and the CSCE", p. 2, the Soviets accepted the rationale that such measures could prevent misperceptions and thus reduce tensions.
[84] This is particularly striking if one compares the well-documented positions of the West during the 1958 Conference on Surprise Attack. Though many of the favourable arguments used by the West in the CSCE can be found in this earlier documentation, no similar effort was undertaken, at the time of the CSCE to explain what the measures were to achieve. For the documents issued during the 1958 Conference, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,* pp. 1213-1319.
[85] Such views were widely held by Western negotiators. See, for instance, J. D. Toogood, "Helsinki 1975: What Was Achieved in the Field of Confidence-Building Measures?", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 5: 2, Winter 1975, p. 29. For a similar observation almost ten years later by a participant to the Stockholm Conference, see Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 78.

Eventually, in the late-1970s, a "theory" took hold in the West. In essence, it argued that because military exercises in Europe were conducted in secrecy, they could be mistaken for potentially hostile actions and could trigger responses that might lead to confrontation or armed conflict. Observance of "traffic rules" for routine activities could reduce such risks[86] as they could "help separate unambiguous signals of hostile intent from the random noise of continuous military activity."[87] Any major deviations from the agreed parameters could provide time to clarify the situation or take appropriate actions.

Implicit from the above reasoning on the role of CBMs was that the ultimate goal of the measures was to reduce the risk of surprise attack.[88] Indeed, even though the prevention of conflicts arising from misunderstanding or miscalculations were the only contingencies described in the Final Act, the underlying assumption was that a benign activity would be misinterpreted and trigger an undesirable reaction out of fear of surprise attack: the worst-case scenario from a Western perspective.

Also implicit from the "theory" was that information and knowledge about military activities could clarify their true nature, including any underlying intentions.[89] The Final Act recognised that the danger of misinterpretation was particularly significant "in a situation where a state lacks clear and timely information about the nature of such activities."

Another goal ascribed to the measures was to inhibit the threat, or use of force, for coercion purposes. According to Bernd Goetze, a participant at the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting: "When Western preparations for the military security aspects of the CSCE began in 1972, the NATO states decided that it was essential to focus attention on the major sources of instability in Europe (as, for example, the Soviet tendency to exert military pressure on other European states)".[90] A beneficial role of CBMs in this regard was to deter the display of large military

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[86] See Berg, "Military Confidence-Building in Europe", p. 50.
[87] Jonathan Alford, "The Usefulness and Limitations of CBMs", in William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld (eds.), *New Directions in Disarmament*, New York: Praeger, 1981, p. 135.
[88] That surprise attack was central to Western support for the development of the Helsinki CBMs and an important element of the thinking on the issue is evidenced in the statement made by the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, to the Helsinki opening talks in 1973: "We have given support to these measures because we believe greater confidence can result from sharing such military information in order that the margin for surprise can be substantially reproduced.", in: CSCE, *Records and Documents*, CSCE/I/PV.5.
[89] According to Jonathan Alford: "What CBMs should do . . . is permit both sides to differentiate clearly between actions intended to be seen as hostile and those that are not." Alford, "The Usefulness and Limitations of CBMs", p. 134.
[90] Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 78.

forces for political intimidation, or raising the political cost of any Soviet-led intervention in Eastern Europe.

This somewhat idealised conception of what confidence-building measures could and should accomplish was, of course, developed in the West. NATO had more to gain from transparency than the Warsaw Pact because of the extreme secrecy in which the WTO operated. Surprise attack was the foremost threat to the Atlantic Alliance during its first forty years of existence, hence its prominence in a developing theory based on measures devised to make sudden, large military operations more difficult to initiate or conceal. The Soviet Union had a long history of intervening in the domestic affairs of its "allies" when they strayed from Moscow's orthodoxy. Sudden military "exercises" were a convenient way for the Kremlin to intimidate the Eastern European states and discourage any nascent tendencies to depart from its orbit. Hence, by forcing the Soviet Union to announce its "exercises" in advance, CBMs could constrain Moscow's ability to resort to threat, or use of force, to dominate its neighbours.

It is doubtful that any of these goals were attained, even partially.

4.1. *Surprise attack*

For many years, the possibility of a conventional surprise attack by Warsaw Pact forces was considered as the most likely contingency for a military conflict in Europe and a key issue in NATO's defence planning. Yet what the CSCE CBMs could have done to prevent such a scenario from unfolding, or even simply to disrupt offensive preparations, remains extremely difficult to ascertain. In theory, the prior notification of exercises could help create patterns of military activities that would make abnormalities stand out, providing, as a result, valuable warning time for clarifying the situation or building up defence. In practice, however, there were a number of ways in which plans for surprise attack could have been carried out and in which CBMs would have been of little help if not simply counter-productive. It is interesting to note in this regard that at the time when the Helsinki CBMs were being negotiated, serious concerns were raised over the possibility that with improved Soviet military strength the East could launch an unreinforced standing-start attack on the West, with estimated warning time as short as two days.[91] By 1983, one could read that:

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[91] See Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability", *International Security*, 5: 4, Spring 1981, pp. 140-141. Betts also points out that this estimate was later changed for an alert time of between 8 to 15 days.

> Soviet forces in being are already sufficiently large and of such a character that they do not need to move into exercise areas to launch a surprise attack. *In fact, nowadays the very attempt to do so is a warning indicator in itself.* Soviet forces can mobilize within their barracks, and most barracks in the German Democratic Republic are no more than 120 miles from the inner-German border.[92]

Given the above assessments,[93] there is little doubt that if an unreinforced attack had been planned the system of prior notification of military manoeuvres would have been of no use in providing additional warning time to NATO. Indeed, in such a scenario, the potential assailant would have had no need to notify any manoeuvre, except maybe, to divert attention to other activities. But even assuming that the above estimates were incorrect, or that the preferred choice of the Eastern states would have been that of a more traditional scenario calling for a large number of troops to move westward, there were still many reasons to question any role for CBMs in such a situation.

First, as a result of superpower opposition during the CSCE negotiations, the CBMs régime authorised the largest concentration of troops not to be notified. Indeed, movement of troops was only a voluntary provision in the Final Act and the practice of all three main groups (and particularly that of the Warsaw Pact nations which never provided information on the absence of troops from garrison) never allowed any regular pattern to develop in this regard. Furthermore, since the CBMs document recognised that manoeuvres arranged at shorter time than the mandatory twenty-one days advance notice only had to be notified at "the earliest possible opportunity" before the start of the event, it legitimised the notification of manoeuvres at very short notice. These two loopholes in the Final Act Document sanctioned the non-notification of very large concentrations of troops and short warning time that could have been easily exploited by a potential assailant.

Still, even contemplating a scenario of proper notification of all military activities, an important element often downplayed in Western literature, and non-existent in official pronouncements, related to the possibility of deception. As one military analyst rightly pointed out:

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[92] Berg, "Military Confidence-Building in Europe", p. 52.

[93] It should be mentioned that much debate surrounded the question of Soviet capability to launch a surprise attack and the amount of warning time NATO could expect to have before the outbreak of hostilities. The debate, largely fuelled by a report submitted to the US Armed Services Committee by Senator Sam Nunn in the mid-1970s, divided Western defence analysts over the seriousness of the threat and NATO's preparedness to meet a conventional attack in Europe. For a sample of the writings suggesting that the threat was overrated, see the article by House Representative, Les Aspin, "A Surprise Attack on NATO - Refocusing the Debate", in *NATO Review*, 25: 4, August 1977, pp. 6-13.

> It goes without saying that a surprise attack [would] be accompanied by a deception plan. The military planner [might] be annoyed by the necessity to avoid responses triggered by CBMs. On the other hand, a good planner [would] be delighted by the opportunity to manipulate standardized procedures. He might cover some preparation steps by providing notice of out-of garrison or alert activities. He could attempt to calm the opposing Alliance by inviting observers in accordance with the agreement, if necessary permitting observation of specially staged exercises designed to give a normal peacetime appearance. Reinforcements might be moved surreptitiously under the cover of such maneuvers.[94]

Manipulations of the CBMs Helsinki régime could have been numerous. Even when in strict adherence with the provisions for notification and observation, the system could have been easily exploited. As described in the review of the WTO treatment of observers under the Helsinki régime, it is doubtful that a typical observation of an Eastern manoeuvre would have ever demonstrated anything unusual. On the contrary, it was common that Western observers were allowed only a few hours of observation, were transported and accompanied at all time by Soviet personnel, were unable to go to the actual site of the manoeuvre, were not provided with proper equipment or good briefings. All this, in the observation of an Eastern manoeuvre, would only have confirmed normal practice, not offensive preparations.

Finally, as Richard K. Betts noted, the main problem with surprise attack was not necessarily the absence of warning but the absence of response to warning: "If history teaches anything, . . . it is that warning in itself is often not sufficient to protect a victim from surprise. There are powerful psychological and political incentives for decision-makers to misinterpret warning or delay the necessary response".[95] Short of clear and unambiguous indications of hostile intent, differing assessments of different "signals" will always occur and decision-makers would most likely want to avoid or delay moves that could be perceived as provocative or escalatory. It is noteworthy in this regard that during the crisis leading up to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Western officials reacted differently to the large military activities held in and around the country: "While some officials in Europe and the United States were alarmed by these . . . movements of forces, others did not consider them so worrisome because the Soviet Union did not try to conceal them; indeed they were fully announced."[96] Moreover, despite these unambiguous "warnings", NATO did nothing to increase its military readiness, reportedly because intelligence assessments indicated that the

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[94] Jim E. Hinds, "The Limits of Confidence", in John Borawski (ed.) *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age. Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, p. 192.

[95] Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability", p. 117.

[96] Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982, p. 82.

Soviet preparations were directed against the Czechs, not against the West.[97] In fact, the Allied response at the time was to avoid any moves that could have been seen as provocative, including redeploying a pre-planned Western exercise near the Czech border.[98] Undoubtedly, the absence of response to warning in this case was most likely due to the fact that Western decision-makers believed Soviet reassurances that the action was directed only at Czechoslovakia but, as Betts further argued, "this … would [have been] a natural part of the deception plan if the Soviets [intended] to wheel westward."[99]

Whatever lessons may be drawn from the Soviet intervention in Prague in 1968, what the crisis underscores is that ambiguity about intentions may never be removed, and what the Helsinki measures could have done in this regard, or in any situation of planned surprise attack, only seems to be working in one direction: increased ambiguity. As noted, Eastern states' implementation of the CBMs provisions never allowed the emergence of a clear pattern of military activities from which anomalies could really stand out. Also, because the CBMs requirements left open the possibility of short notice and non-notification of movements of troops, it served to legitimise such practice. Furthermore, even assuming a scenario with prior notification, no unambiguous signal would have ever emerged from an Eastern notification that did not include a precise location or time-frame for a large-scale manoeuvre. The invitation of observers, on the other hand, if not used to communicate false signals of non-hostile intent, might not have clarified the situation at all. Recognised as a gesture of goodwill under the régime, it could probably only have created more uncertainty about a given situation. Moreover, as one observer noted: "It is quite certain . . . that groups of multinational observers, trained to varying degrees and armed with national information perhaps not fully shared, will arrive at differing conclusions. Some of the conclusions are bound to be misleading, and findings are likely to be ambiguous unless there is very clear violation."[100] In such a case: "One can imagine a situation in which response to warning would be *delayed* because of disagreement within the Alliance as to whether a CBM had been violated. The debate would be particularly difficult if a proper response to warning would

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[97] See Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability", p. 117.
[98] See Betts, *Surprise Attack*, p. 85.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Hinds, "The Limits of Confidence", p. 193. Ambiguous findings can relate to numerous aspects of the observation, including ascertaining the number of troops taking part in a manoeuvre. Writing in 1978, Graham Turbiville observes that: "As trained observers will attest determining the number of troops and units participating in as fluid and complex an event as a military exercise spread over many square miles of terrain can be as difficult as counting beans in a jar --and sometimes no more accurate." Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers: Recent Exercise Patterns and Their Implications for European Security", *Military Review*, LVIII: 8, August 1978, pp. 32-33. [Hereafter: Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers"].

itself require violation or abrogation of an agreement".[101]

If anything, the above considerations only pointed to a counter-productive role of the Helsinki measures in relation to warning or to disruption of planned surprise attack. As demonstrated, the idea that CBMs could have any role in relation to surprise attack should be discarded.

4.2. *Openness; transparency; predictability; stability*

> A manoeuvre or exercise is designed to test the readiness of the country carrying it out to meet an assumed threat from outside or, in some cases, its ability to launch an offensive against another country. It can also be used as a warning. To a neighbour the objectives of the country carrying out the manoeuvre may often be unclear. He may interpret a manoeuvre designed for a defensive situation as an offensive one. He may assume that it is a warning when it is not. Such ambiguity creates tension and possibly counter moves which can set in train an escalatory process. Effective prior notification of major military manoeuvres would greatly reduce the opportunities for misunderstanding and suspicion.[102]

This view, expressed in the British proposal submitted at the opening of the CSCE in July 1973, and representing one of the most developed Western official explanations given at the time for CBMs, suggested a number of roles or objectives for the measures. Among the several propositions that have evolved from such expositions was that the provision of more information about military activities could correct the problem of ambiguity, because it would reduce the danger that a benign exercise was misinterpreted for a belligerent act or, alternatively, that a hostile activity was perceived as a routine phenomenon. In short, notification would establish patterns from which abnormal (or hostile) activities could stand out and would, in fact, show the exercises for what they were. In this sense more "transparency" and "openness" would make these military activities more predictable, bring stability which, in turn, would help build confidence.

But, if more information was seen as the obvious remedy to clarify the nature of military activities in Europe, remove ambiguities and build confidence, it had to be balanced with the following considerations which suggested that, at best, the information provided by the Warsaw Pact nations under the CBMs régime was irrelevant and, at worse, deceiving. Evidence suggested, for example, that at the beginning of the CSCE process, the Soviet Union actually reduced the amount of information it had previously made public about its

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[101] Hinds, "The Limits of Confidence", p. 193.
[102] Text in CSCE, *Records and Documents*, CSCE/I/18.

military activities. Indeed, at the time when the CBMs régime was being negotiated at Helsinki, "a sharp reduction in the publication of all information on the system of [WTO] joint exercises" took place in the East.[103] For an attentive observer of Eastern manoeuvres, this contrasted sharply with past practice, particularly since in addition to military training, multinational WTO exercises had an important political function of displaying solidarity amongst Socialist states and were often widely publicised for that purpose.[104]

In addition to curtailment of publicity on the system of joint Warsaw Pact exercises, Graham Turbiville noted a decrease in publicity related to all Soviet and Pact manoeuvres beginning as early as 1972, when CBMs were first brought up in the CSCE discussions. Turbiville observed that "beginning in the early 1960s and continuing to 1972, the USSR --either unilaterally or jointly with other Warsaw Pact states-- carried out at least one well-publicized military maneuver a year".[105] According to the US Army intelligence officer, the completion of *Shield-72* "marked the last of those widely publicized 'traditional joint exercises' and of well publicized, large-scale Soviet/pact exercises generally for several years."[106] Furthermore, "the next three years saw an uncustomary silence on the part of the Warsaw Pact nations regarding their maneuvers".[107] By way of explanation, Turbiville suggested that:

> It seems likely . . that the Soviets --greatly desirous of the CSCE-- decided sometime in late 1972 to curtail publicity sharply on their exercises and to present, as much as possible, a picture of relative military inactivity throughout Eastern Europe. Also, the Soviets were apparently unenthusiastic over the prospect of exercise prenotification provisions becoming a part of any agreement, and may well have wished to down-play their continued importance in order to negotiate the most favorable --and least specific-- arrangement for the confidence-building measure provisions under the CSCE.[108]

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[103] Christopher Jones, "The Warsaw Pact: Military Exercises and Military Interventions", *Armed Forces and Society*, 7: 1, Fall 1980, p. 7. [Hereafter: Jones, "The Warsaw Pact"].

[104] According to Malcolm Macintosh: "From 1961 onwards the Pact organized a series of multi-lateral military exercises, many of which were well publicized . . . most of them amounting in practice to large-scale politico-military demonstrations emphasizing the enthusiasm, interalliance solidarity and friendship of the component national armies". Malcolm Macintosh, "The Warsaw Pact Today", *Survival*, May-June 1974, p. 122, quoted in Jones, Ibid., p. 30 note 70.

[105] Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 20. Commenting on the three most publicised Soviet or Soviet/Pact exercises conducted prior to 1971, P. H. Vigor remarks that the Soviet radio and television carried out very comprehensive coverage of the manoeuvres and that books were published on them. According to Vigor, the publicity element was so important that during the 1967 *Dnieper* exercise, for instance, "operations were stopped for hours at a time to allow the proper photographs to be taken". P. H. Vigor, "Soviet Military Exercises", (A lecture given at the R.U.S.I. on 31st March 1971), *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, No. 663, September 1971, p. 27. [Hereafter: Vigor, "Soviet Military Exercises"].

[106] Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 26. According to Turbiville, the subsequent *Vertes-73* and *Lato-74* exercises were given only very limited review in Eastern media.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid., p. 27.

Eastern publicity surrounding Soviet/Pact manoeuvres re-appeared with the first notifications made under the Helsinki régime. *Kavkaz-76* and *Sever-76* (both involving 25,000 troops) were not considered large manoeuvres by Soviet standards and "several years earlier, they would not have attracted much attention if indeed the Soviets would have mentioned them in the media at all." For Turbiville, "the implication was that these maneuvers were the largest that the Soviets had held since August 1975".[109] But, while this was probably the case, the fact remains that this developing "pattern" of military activities under the Helsinki régime did not correspond to past practice.

The exact size of the Soviet/Pact manoeuvres prior to the Helsinki régime was not well documented. Available information suggests, however, that at least one very large-scale manoeuvre was carried out every year between 1966 and 1972. Western estimates of the number of troops involved in the *Shield-72* Pact manoeuvre, for example, were as high as 100,000.[110] The summer 1971 Soviet *Yug* exercise, taking place close to the Romanian border, reportedly involved an estimated 10 divisions.[111] In the spring of 1970, the Soviet *Dvina* exercise was registered at ten to eleven divisions.[112] The 1969 *Oder-Niesse* Pact manoeuvre, described in Soviet literature published in 1975 as the largest WTO exercise ever held, was thus bigger than the *Shield-72* exercise totalling more than 100,000 troops.[113] Finally, notwithstanding the exercises that preceded the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was estimated to have involved 200,000 to 500,000 troops,[114] the 1967 *Dnieper* exercise numbered seven divisions,[115] while the 1966 *Vltava* manoeuvre was reported to have been of the same scale than *Shield-72*.[116]

With the exception of *Zapad-81*, Eastern manoeuvres of this size were never held under the

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[109] Ibid., p. 29. Turbiville also notes that the following manoeuvre *Shield-76* (or *Tarcza-76*) was the first widely publicised in four years.
[110] B. J. Erickson, "'Shield-72': Warsaw Pact Military Exercises", *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies,* December 1972, p. 32.
[111] Major John F. Meehan III, "Soviet Maneuvers. Summer 1971", *Military Review*, LII: 4, April 1972, p. 17.
[112] Vigor, "Soviet Military Exercises", p. 24. It can be noted that while John Meehan gave a figure of 10 divisions for the 1971 *Yug* manoeuvre, the author also suggests that in 1971 (hence including the *Yug* manoeuvre), "there were no large-scale maneuvers such as *Dnepr* (fall 1967) or *Dvina* (spring 1970)". Meehan III, Ibid., p. 14.
[113] See Jones, "The Warsaw Pact", p. 18. Jones refers here to a volume on the WTO edited by the Pact Commander, Marshall I. I. Iakubovskii, published in Moscow in 1975.
[114] See Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul. The Soviet Style of Invasion", *International Security*, 5: 2, Fall 1980, p. 135.
[115] Vigor, "Soviet Military Exercises", p. 24.
[116] Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 28.

Helsinki régime. Moreover, in the first five years of application of the CBMs régime (i.e. before the events in Poland), the largest exercise held in the East only involved 35,000 troops (*Tarcza-76*). What this clearly suggested was that in addition to the curtailment of publicity given to the manoeuvres, Moscow had diminished the size of its exercises.[117] As maintained by Christopher Jones: "Whatever the intentions of those who drafted the sections on confidence-building measures, the result [was] the Soviet reduction of the size of most tactical and operational-strategic exercises to a figure below 25,000".[118] It is worth noting in this regard that from the introduction of the system of joint exercises in 1961 to 1975, a minimum of 62 large-scale Soviet/WTO exercises were reported.[119] By contrast, during the twelve years of the Helsinki régime, only 32 (major and small) manoeuvres were notified and, of this total, more than half were exercises involving 25,000 troops or less.

In addition to the curtailment of publicity and the reduction in the size and the number of exercises, two other changes were noted in Eastern exercise practices following the introduction of the CBMs Document. For the fourteen years prior to the Final Act for which information is available, the Soviet Union held only three national manoeuvres on its territory.[120] In contrast, during the twelve years of the Helsinki régime almost half (13) of all the notified large-scale manoeuvres (27) were of this same type and held exclusively on Soviet territory. While this implied that fewer manoeuvres were held on Pact nations territory (as opposed to Soviet territory), it also pointed to a decrease in the number of combined exercises. In fact, in the first five years of the Helsinki régime only one manoeuvre involving more than two Pact nations was held (*Tarcza-76).* One cannot discard, of course, that some,

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[117] Official documentation suggests that while there was "no confirmed evidence that the Soviets or other Pact countries may have deliberately shaved their exercises to put them just below the 25,000 mark . . . there appears to have been a trend in the last several years toward smaller maneuvers." Canada, DEA, 29 October 1975.

[118] Jones, "The Warsaw Pact", p. 7.

[119] This figure is taken from the list of 71 Pact exercises held between 1961 and 1979 compiled by Christopher Jones, based on several Soviet and East European sources as well as an original list of 45 exercises catalogued by Graham Turbiville covering the period 1961-1977. The number of 62 manoeuvres quoted above excludes the exercises taking place after 1975 as well as naval exercises, since such manoeuvres were not covered by the CBMs régime of notification, and are not included in the figure of 32 notified manoeuvres used as a comparison here. It can be noted that Turbiville emphasised that his list "should in no sense be regarded as a complete listing of those Soviet and Warsaw Pact maneuvers held from 1961-77 and discussed in the Soviet/Pact media, but only as a compilation of some of the more prominent ones." Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 23 note 1. Similarly, Jones suggested that his list of 71 exercises was "probably short of the true total of the larger tactical, operational, and strategic exercises". Jones, "The Warsaw Pact", p. 7. Jones's complete list can be found in Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe*, New York: Praeger, 1981, pp. 301-309, Table 1.

[120] Figure taken from the list compiled by Turbiville, Ibid., pp. 22-23.

or all of the changes noted in the size, number, character or location of Soviet or Soviet/Pact manoeuvres may have been implemented for reasons not related to the CBMs régime. Yet, it is difficult to completely discard any link between the numerous (and almost concurrent) changes and the beginning of the Helsinki régime. At the same time, it appears very difficult to entertain the idea that the Helsinki provisions may have had a positive impact on stability or openness. Indeed, in terms of stability, predictability and confidence-building, one can wonder what was really achieved when, for the first five years of the régime, the East European states gave the impression of carrying out only relatively small-scale exercises, only to come out in 1981 with an unannounced manoeuvre involving some 100,000 troops.

The same can be said about openness. In this case, of course, one could note that the Eastern states had announced their incoming manoeuvres for the first time. But in terms of the nature of the information given under the régime, one can really question the value of some estimated time-frame, vague location or gross number of participating troops for an incoming large manoeuvre. Even when observers were invited, the restrictions for the observation of Warsaw Pact manoeuvres "not only prevented observers from gaining a clear understanding of the purpose of the maneuvers, but made it impossible to formulate any realistic appreciation of the tactical capabilities or operational readiness of the troops involved."[121]

The Final Act encouraged states to provide a wide range of information regarding their impending exercises. When expectations and practice do not correspond, anxiety is the result, and in this way a poor or irregular pattern of compliance can actually create mistrust and increase tension. In this regard, it is significant to note that while the Warsaw Pact did not report any military exercises for five months following the signing of the Final Act, "reports abounded in the West European press that the Soviets were, in fact, carrying out exercises in excess of 25,000 troops and simply not announcing them."[122] Also, as clearly expressed by the US Ambassador Kampelman following the improper notification of *Zapad-81*:

> The maneuver notification . . . was . . . unduly vague and unrevealing, not at all consistent with the very purpose of the CBM concept, which is to build mutual confidence among states. Rather than build confidence, the apparent Soviet disdain

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[121] Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p. 89.

[122] Turbiville, "Soviet Bloc Maneuvers", p. 28. In December 1975, NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns indicated that the Soviet Union had not given notification of recent troop manoeuvres. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1975*, Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1976, p. 120. A few months earlier, in Copenhagen, Luns had complained that the East had failed to live up to their obligations concerning CBMs. For this and complaints from West German officials, see European Cooperation Research Group (EUCORG), "Helsinki Plus Four Months", Report 8, London, November 1975, p. 14.

for the notification requirement generated suspicion and mistrust.[123]

4.3. *Coercive potential; intervention*

Large-scale military manoeuvres and movements of troops have always constituted important means for exerting political pressure on a weaker neighbour and have been used in the past to cover plans for intervention. Because CBMs required the prior notification of manoeuvres before they began, many Western analysts held the view that they lessened the opportunity of sudden activation of military forces during a crisis. CBMs, it was argued, could raise the threshold against military intervention because "transgression would constitute a challenge to the integrity and purpose of the arrangements themselves."[124]

Hence, in theory, the role of CBMs in inhibiting the use of military exercises to exert political pressure or cover plans of military intervention was a deterrent one. Few would argue, however, that the Final Act deterred Moscow from trying to influence and bully its allies during the Helsinki CBMs régime. At the Madrid Meeting, US Ambassador Max Kampelman made it clear that the non-notified *Soyuz-81* exercise held at a peak point during the internal crisis in Poland "had as one of its purposes the intimidation of a neighbouring state".[125]

But what exactly the Soviets intended to achieve with their pattern of notification and non-notification during the 1980-1981 Polish crisis remains unclear. It was sometimes argued before the events in Poland, that because preparations for manoeuvres took longer than the twenty-one days required by the Final Act, it was possible that "notification according to CSCE rules could in some circumstances serve to amplify threatening or warning signals, thus enabling pressure to be exerted more quickly than in the absence of the system of prior notification".[126] In fact, the Soviets were apparently making the case then that "advance notification of exercises could be used to threaten or coerce even without the exercises taking place, provided that the warning period was sufficiently long. The signal conveyed would be made more convincing because it would be made under the CSCE arrangements."[127]

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[123] *Three Years at the East-West Divide*, p. 54.
[124] Holst, "Confidence-building Measures", p. 3.
[125] *Three Years at the East-West Divide*, p. 54.
[126] Johan-Jörgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence-building Measures", *Survival*, XIX: 4, July-August 1977, p. 148.
[127] Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects", in Jonathan Alford (ed.), *The Future of Arms Control: Part III. Confidence-Building Measures*, Adelphi Papers No. 149, London: IISS, 1979, p. 8.

The first military exercise usually considered in the West as having been staged in reaction to the developments in Poland was the September 1980 *Brotherhood in Arms* exercise, announced the day after the beginning of the strike in the city of Gdansk which gave birth to the Solidarity movement.[128] The exercise, involving some 40,000 troops, was properly notified by the GDR, although as noted in the review of implementation, with only vague information on a number of notifiable items.

In March 1981, Moscow decided not to notify the *Soyuz* manoeuvre. At the same time, however, the Eastern-controlled media gave the exercise unusually wide publicity with more than 50 reports over the course of the three-week exercise.[129] When questioned about the military activity, the Kremlin offered two different explanations. Both reasons were in clear contradiction to the comprehensive and numerous Eastern broadcasts of the events.

For the September *Zapad-81* exercise, Moscow decided to give notification to other CSCE participants (and thus comply with the Helsinki agreement), but provided an incomplete notification and was immediately accused of breaching the agreement. The notification did not include information on the number of participating troops, but included precise information on the time-frame for the conduct of the manoeuvre as well as information on its location which, although vague enough to raise complaints by the other CSCE states, was not too vague as to point out that the exercise would take place in the vicinity of Poland. The day after the manoeuvre had started, *TASS* reported that it involved 100,000 men. This, however, was not until another state-controlled Soviet media, *Izvestiya*, had reported that it would involve only "very limited" forces.[130]

Was the non-notification of *Soyuz* meant to emphasise to the other CSCE participating States that this was an internal affair, and the publicity surrounding the operations only to amplify threatening signals to the Polish people? Then why notify *Zapad*? Because the large number of troops involved could not have been concealed? If so, why not include the information in the notification itself? Was the information on the timing and the area for the conduct of the manoeuvre considered sufficient enough (particularly after the *Soyuz* activities) to provide a warning to the Poles while avoiding what would certainly have been an outcry in the West if the large number of troops had been revealed before the start of the manoeuvre? Was *Zapad*

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[128] US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki,* p. 19.
[129] *Three Years at the East-West Divide*, p. 55.
[130] See Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals*, p. 29.

initially planned for an intervention, or a rehearsal for an action to come at a later date if things did not cool down? As one observer noted, "whatever the intent, the effect was to introduce an unnecessary note of East-West uncertainty into what had otherwise been a relatively unambiguous situation."[131] Indeed, what the events in Poland clearly emphasised was that the Eastern pattern of notification of *Brotherhood-in-Arms*, non-notification of *Soyuz-81*, and incomplete notice of *Zapad-81* did not deter Moscow from displaying military force as a means of intimidation, and did not result in less ambiguity about Soviet intentions. In fact, it was later reported that "the combination of Soviet military actions and harsh rhetoric, plus an inadequate grasp of what was actually taking place in the border regions around Poland, resulted in U.S. military intelligence issuing an 'alert memorandum' contending that the Soviet invasion had already begun."[132] As argued by one analyst: "For those who stress[ed] the 'miscalculation avoidance' aspect of confidence- and security-building measures, this [was] a classic example of how a lack of clear and timely information about military activities [could] lead to worst-case analysis, with the potential for incalculable consequences."[133]

5. FAILING PROMISES

As clearly illustrated above, the implementation of confidence-building measures never matched up with the expectations raised with regard to the benefits ascribed to them. In view of the apparent changes in the exercise pattern of the Eastern states and their limited supply of information under the CBMs provisions, it is highly questionable that openness or transparency in this case brought more predictability or stability. Indeed, to start with, the WTO's record of implementation pointed to some sort of false, or deceiving, openness. Scenarios for planned surprise attack have obviously never provided a test for the measures, but it appears evident from the above analysis that the potential role of CBMs in this regard could only have been counter-productive. Finally, as demonstrated during the Polish crisis, the CBMs régime did nothing to inhibit Moscow from using military exercises to exert pressure on another CSCE participating State in a manner inconsistent with the principles set forth in the Final Act and, as recognised by several Western officials, the misuse of CBMs

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[131] Richard E. Darilek, "Reducing the Risks of Miscalculation: The Promise of the Helsinki CBMs", in F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds.), *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, East-West Monograph Number One, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983, pp. 80-81.

[132] Krehbiel, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures*, p. 38. See also US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki*.

[133] Ibid.

only contributed to more uncertainties and ambiguities than would have been the case without the measures.

While it is difficult to understand why CBMs raised so many great expectations over the years, it can be emphasised that these were not necessarily advocated by the NATO governments, who never really spelled-out any specific goals for the CBMs and who, overall, remained satisfied to simply equate implementation of the measures with success.

6. WESTERN ASSESSMENT

In general, Western appreciation of CBMs has always been rather positive. The initial five month silence from the Warsaw Pact nations, regarding the conduct of their manoeuvres, raised fears that the Eastern countries would not co-operate with the Helsinki provisions, which could bring about the collapse of the new CBMs régime.[134] Once implementation started, however, all states could begin to look forward and, for the West, the evaluation of the system boiled down to comparing degrees of co-operation, which were perceived as reflecting different levels of attachment to the régime. Until the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting, for instance, it was common to describe the WTO states' compliance record by the formula of strict adherence to the "letter" of the provisions rather than to its "spirit". Improvements, it was felt, could obviously take place but, as best described by the Chairman of the NATO caucus on security matters dealing with CBMs at Belgrade, "the system was working".[135]

Even after the Soviet violations during the Polish crisis, one could still read in official documentation that the Eastern states were showing some improvements regarding their notifications (presumably simply because it was taking place);[136] that no return to past unacceptable practice was noted (there were no other so blatant violations of the agreement after 1981);[137] or that the Eastern record of compliance continued to be largely limited to the "letter" of the Final Act, and rarely to its "spirit".[138]

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[134] See Toogood, "From Helsinki to Belgrade", p. 12.
[135] Ibid.
[136] US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Sixteenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of Helsinki Final Act. December 1, 1983 - May 31, 1984*, Special Report No. 117, n. d., Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 15.
[137] See US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Seventeenth Semiannual Report. Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. April 1, 1984 - October 1, 1984*, Special Report No. 119, n. d., Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, p. 15.
[138] US, Commission on Security and Cooperation, *Twenty-first Semiannual Report*, p. 31.

Throughout the decade of implementation of the Helsinki Document, there was in fact a clear tendency in the West to avoid offending the Eastern countries over their poor and deceiving record of implementation. As noted by one US government official, the Americans were the only NATO partners to openly challenge the Soviets on their violations during the Polish crisis:

> The U.S. State Department issued a statement accusing the Soviet Union of violating the Helsinki Final Act. . . . But the 'concern' of the other signatories of the Final Act was not very deep. One mere statement was all the West had to offer to counter the huge Soviet military maneuver, and the Soviets were able to control the situation by having the Polish government impose martial law. . . . Although the threatening Soviet military maneuvers and imposition of martial law --both gross violations of the Helsinki Final Act-- took place during the Madrid CSCE Review Conference, which eventually produced the Mandate for the CDE, not even these actions could affect the 'see-no-evil' mindset of the Western Europeans.[139]

The Americans were also the only ones to openly question the general value of the régime and to recognise that the system was not working. In this regard, the words of Kampelman in Madrid were unequivocal:

> [I]t is clear that there is something wrong with a system under which military activities . . . are either not reported or not required to be reported by technical definitions. . . . The threat or possible use of military force in a surprise military attack in Europe is of direct concern to all of us. . . . Our goal is to diminish the danger that armed conflict might result from misunderstanding or misinterpretation of military activities. The record of ZAPAD-81 and SOYUZ-81 is not encouraging in that regard. We cannot accept a result which has most of us believing that the notification provisions are requirements, while the Soviet Union dismisses them as mere guidelines. We cannot and should not accept a result under which a state can define the presence of 100,000 troops in the field as an 'extremely limited' number not worthy of proper disclosure in a notification. We cannot support a result where widespread and intense combined-arms military activity involving all military branches and specialists, during a period of political tension, falls through the cracks of a CBM system because it can be billed as a 'command and staff exercise.'[140]

But, while the Americans strongly denounced the CBMs violations during the political crisis in Poland, Washington did not necessarily always adopt such a critical attitude throughout the entire period of the Helsinki régime. As noted by Carl C. Krehbiel, a US government participant in the negotiations of the CSBMs in Stockholm, there was clear Western reluctance to point out the deficiencies of the Eastern record. Discussing how the Warsaw Pact nations used the many loopholes and vague provisions of the Helsinki CBMs Document

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[139] Krehbiel, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures,* p. 39.
[140] *Three Years at the East West Divide*, p. 56.

to circumvent proper implementation, Krehbiel gave the following example with regard to the notification of major military manoeuvres. As stipulated in the Final Act: "The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces." According to Krehbiel, this commitment called for few ambiguities in the compliance behaviour of the participants:

> Obviously the nation that stages the maneuver knows which components of forces are engaged, and the period in which the maneuver is scheduled to take place. Major troop units do not stage 'major military maneuvres' on a whim. And of course it is possible to provide this information. . . . But the Warsaw Pact members seldom, if ever, provided this information in their notifications.[141]

For Krehbiel, the West preferred to ignore this type of issue. Commenting on how such questions have been handled by the "politicians", Krehbiel observed that:

> Since providing this information certainly was possible in every case, it would [have been] perfectly reasonable to label each instance in which the information was not provided a violation of the Helsinki Final Act. Unfortunately, Western governments chose instead to look the other way. For example, repeated efforts by certain U.S. government officials to have the State Department office responsible for compiling the series of semiannual reports on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act call attention to these violations were invariably met with the excuse that the phrase 'if possible' meant that the Warsaw Pact members really were not required to provide the information. Of course they were, because it *was* 'possible'. But the imprecise terminology of the Final Act CBM enabled those Western officials who choose to 'see no evil' when Soviet violations of arms control agreements [were] involved to pretend that the Soviets were complying with the letter of the agreement.[142]

The frankness of the comments by this US military officer are particularly interesting not only because they described how many issues like this may have been handled at the political level and how, from a military viewpoint, this only made the CBMs useless, but also because they highlight one of the many flaws in the Document which the Western states had accepted as the final results of the CSCE. Understandably, perhaps, the NATO governments were never inclined to strongly denounce or condemn Eastern disregard for the CBMs provisions. Exception to this, as noted, was the US criticism of Soviet behaviour during the Polish crisis. But, even in this case, the West was on shaky grounds to persuasively argue for the CSCE CBMs. One example clearly illustrating this fact can be found in a comment made by Kampelman in Madrid which was widely used afterwards to criticise the Eastern approach to CBMs. Relating Western attempts to obtain from the Soviets further information concerning

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[141] Krehbiel, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures*, pp. 49-50.
[142] Ibid., p. 50.

Zapad-81, Kampelman forcefully remarked at the Conference that it was unacceptable that the West was "told that the provisions of the Act on notification of major maneuvers were, after all, only 'guidelines,' not requirements!"[143] Yet, despite the Ambassador's obvious discontent with the Eastern reply, the fact remained that the Americans had privately conceded this point at the conclusion of the CSCE negotiations when they acknowledged that the obligation to notify was far from having been clearly established in the Final Act. In their interpretative paper on the CSCE CBMs distributed to all NATO countries in August 1975, the Americans noted that the last preambular paragraph of the notification measure, which read that the "measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis", could be understood "to mean either that the decision to undertake the measure was voluntary, or freely made (Western view); or that the decision to implement the measure [was to be] voluntary, or discretionary (Warsaw Pact view).[144] The other Western delegations also shared this view by noting that the paragraph completely failed to state "whether it [was] the undertaking of the commitment that [was] voluntary, or the implementation of it."[145]

Given such obvious ambiguity in the agreement, well known by the Western governments and accepted by them at the signature of the Final Act, it may not be surprising that the Allies always avoided harsh criticism of the Eastern record, preferring instead to start arguing, from the early 1980s, for a new set of measures that would be politically binding, adequately verifiable, militarily significant and applicable to all of Europe.

7. CONCLUSION

The record of implementation of the CSCE CBMs leaves no doubt about the fact that the most prominent goals ascribed to the measures were never met in practice. As noted, however, Western governments had little to do with the many promises that were widely attributed to the régime after the signature of the Final Act, and which evolved mainly in the world of non-practitioners. Also, to their credit, the NATO delegations never knew during the main negotiations that they were devising procedures that were to remain in force for so long. From the drafting of general mandates in Helsinki to the negotiations of the main provisions in Geneva, the future of the measures (like that of the CSCE) was always uncertain because no decision on the continuation of the Conference process was made until very late in

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[143] *Three Years at the East-West Divide*, p. 54.
[144] Canada, DEA, 6 August 1975. (The US document was dated 5 August 1975).
[145] Ibid., 25 July 1975.

the proceedings, and no one could anticipate how such a process would eventually evolve.

As John J. Maresca observed in 1985: "It is clear now, ten years after the Helsinki Summit, that the Final Act would have had little lasting significance had it not included follow-up provisions of some kind."[146] As explained by this senior American negotiator at the CSCE: "Immediately after the Helsinki Summit, no one was interested in the CSCE. Administration policy officials considered it as an event that had provoked a hostile domestic reaction and was best forgotten. This attitude infected the entire bureaucracy, though a thorough working-level effort was made to monitor compliance with the Helsinki commitments".[147] Yet, as further acknowledged by Maresca: "Public attitudes toward Helsinki underwent a slow evolution. Gradually, the Final Act came to be less seen as a Western confirmation of the status quo in Europe and more as a potentially useful weapon for supporting human rights in the communist countries. The CSCE increasingly appeared as a unique basis for raising human-rights-related issues with the USSR and the East European governments and a unique forum for discussion of these issues."[148]

Although Maresca's comments on the initial (official and public) reactions toward the CSCE process and the signing of the Final Act relates more specifically to the views and attitudes of the American Administration and American public opinion, it nevertheless generally describes the outlook of the other NATO governments, as well as the primary reasons explaining their subsequent change of perspective on its potential value. As suggested by Maresca, the main reason explaining the interest of the Western states in the process came in reaction to public opinion which began to focus on the human rights provisions of the Final Act after the Communist régimes started a series of crackdowns on dissident groups and individuals who were using the Document to promote their programme of reforms.[149]

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[146] Maresca, *To Helsinki*, p. 201.
[147] Ibid., p. 207.
[148] Ibid.
[149] As best described by a high-level American official:
"When the long negotiations ended at the Helsinki summit, most Western observers thought and said that the Soviets had gotten the best of the bargain. The West acceded to the legitimacy of Communist conquest in Europe. In return, the East made undertakings to respect human rights and dignity but without the expectation that it could be held to the promises it made. What happened, instead, was a remarkable turning of the tables. It was accomplished not by any brilliant strategists in Washington or at NATO but by a small band of intrepid Soviets citizens who began to say out loud --so that the rest of the world could hear-- that the Soviet Union must make good on its own laws and its Helsinki commitments. Their demands made us respond. It was they . . . who made the West aware of the value of Helsinki."
Dante B. Fascell, Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, reproduced in "Human Rights: The United States at Belgrade", *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1978, pp. 39-41.

This fact alone goes a long way in explaining the general attitude of the Western governments toward implementation of the CBMs régime. Indeed, for the NATO governments, who never chose the measures in recognition of any potential contribution to European security and who contributed to limit their development during the Conference, their implementation was of little interest, especially after the conclusion of the CSCE when all aspects of the process rated very low in Western policy priorities.

Later on, as it became clear that the CSCE was to continue with Follow-Up Meetings, interest increased but, again, not because of any expectations related to the possible enhancement of the security of the participating States. The Western governments, who had endorsed the weak Document on CBMs and who were fully aware of the many deficiencies of the measures, could do nothing to change them. At best, as the NATO states chose to do from the early 1980s, they could start arguing for a new set of measures to replace the Helsinki-CBMs provisions. Whether this represented a belated recognition of the potential value of confidence-building measures is yet to be fully ascertained. What is clear, however, is that in sharp contrast to a widespread belief that the Western governments may have had a keen interest in the application of CBMs, their continuation remained, for the longest time, of no more significance than their initial negotiations.

Congressman Fascell was Deputy Chairman of the US Delegation to the Belgrade Meeting and Chairman of the Joint Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe). For a comprehensive background discussion on the evolution of the US attitude towards the CSCE, see Davy, "The United States", pp. 3-15. For general background, including the views of other NATO partners and their subsequent discontent over the strong approach taken by the United States during the Belgrade Follow-Up meeting with regard to the human rights abuse in the East, see Edwards, "Quo Vadis?", especially p. 462 and p. 470; Davy -"No progress at Belgrade", pp. 128-135 (passim). For the views of the British Foreign Office, see Bennett and Hamilton, *The Conference*, pp. 486-492.

CONCLUSION

A comprehensive examination of the development and application of the CSCE Confidence-Building Measures highlights a number of important aspects that have frequently been overlooked in assessments of this endeavour. It is common to portray this first ever multinational experience with CBMs as very positive, and to credit this success to the Western states who originally proposed their negotiations at the Conference. Yet, while it is undeniable that the introduction of CBMs into Europe was significant, a thorough examination of the origins, negotiations and implementation of the Helsinki CBMs shows that the positive assessments of the experience, as well as Western contributions to it, are overrated and based on a number of generalisations or assumptions not necessarily confirmed by systematic analysis.

A closer look at the background of the introduction of CBMs into the CSCE reveals that the Western states had no genuine interest in the measures and found little intrinsic value in them. Moreover, the negotiating record indicates several instances where the positions of the Western governments were neither the most comprehensive nor the most inclined to reach the best possible agreement. Finally, the implementation record of the Warsaw Pact nations clearly points to a general pattern of failure rather than success, with several important and potentially dangerous breaches of the most basic provisions.

The way the NATO governments came to accept the Conference and select CBMs as a topic for negotiation goes a long way in explaining their later resistance to push for a comprehensive agreement on the measures. From the first Soviet appeals for a Conference in 1954, the West concluded that the project was designed to further Soviet interests at the expense of Western security and, despite a more conciliatory offer from Budapest in 1969, the Allies never seriously entertained the proposal. With improving East-West relations, however, strict opposition or simple indifference to the project could no longer be NATO's only response and, facing the prospect of being accused of rejecting détente in Europe, the Allies eventually agreed to a cautious reply.

The problem for the NATO governments was that they saw no benefit in a Conference, and simply did not want one. Their reply from Washington, in April 1969, had been "imposed" and, in fact, this was all they knew for certain. Soon after the Washington Ministerial Meeting committing the West to start looking at potential issues of discussions, the Allies

began formulating pre-conditions for their participation in a Conference, but this did not alter the fact that there was no long-term view concerning the project, and no strategy on how to move forward towards East-West negotiations. Not surprisingly, in the three-year dialogue with the Warsaw Pact, which began with the Washington reply, every aspect of the Conference became a subject of dissent in Brussels and divergent views became more pronounced as national positions evolved. As months and years elapsed, more European governments began to question the purely negative position of the US towards the Conference, but without necessarily developing an agreed policy of their own. Consistently, Allied decisions on the CSCE were last-minute compromises barely supported by all.

The decision to propose "certain military aspects of security" as a suitable topic for discussion at the Conference certainly fit the pattern of half-supported, half-understood, and last minute policy decisions on the CSCE. As the record clearly establishes, the proposal advanced during the December 1971 Ministerial Meeting was adopted without common agreement on what that subject might entail. Certainly, the issue underscored the strong desire of a majority of Western European partners (and especially of Germany at that time) to introduce certain elements of MBFR into the Conference, but the MBFR-CSCE link was neither then, nor afterwards, accepted by the whole of NATO. From the beginning of 1972, however, the Allies were committed to introducing military issues into the Conference, and with the preliminaries approaching, the need to agree on a topic became more pressing. CBMs, first only mentioned as a means to get around French reluctance to accept "certain aspects of military security", soon became the only option that could allow the Allies to fulfil their public commitment to take the lead on military issues at the CSCE. However, as highlighted by the historical record, no NATO member state was sincerely interested in the measures, and the fact that the US subsequently took the lead on the issue does not detract from this, though the decision was certainly not accidental.

MBFR was of great importance to the Americans and they were not ready to see these talks derailed or retarded by the involvement of some thirty participants --as was implied by the proposal to introduce elements of force reductions into the CSCE. By advancing a subject on which all partners could eventually agree upon, Washington certainly hoped to sidetrack discussions on linkage between the two negotiations and solve NATO's predicament regarding its public commitment to "certain aspects of military security". The long-term implications of this move were significant.

The document tabled by the Americans in July 1972 was neither an in-depth analysis of CBMs, nor an endorsement for the development of concrete and meaningful measures that could increase security. More or less a rehash of a general overview of the subject prepared by NATO a few months earlier, the US paper was extremely general, lacking technical and military details, and presenting and mixing, in less than five pages, objectives, rationale, criteria and caution for only two illustrative measures.

Despite its obvious deficiencies (or perhaps because of it), the Allies spent the remaining three months before the opening of the MPT reviewing the document, focusing on its weaknesses. This exercise resulted in a composite Alliance *Draft Agenda/Guidelines on CBMs* for the CSCE which, contrary to what its title suggested, provided no real guidelines. Questions such as why the West should propose CBMs in the CSCE, what could be gained, what objectives should be pursued, or how these could be attained during the negotiations were not further explained or elaborated in the document.

On the eve of the opening of the multilateral talks in November, the Western governments hastily agreed that only the notification of major military manoeuvres and movements, and the exchange of observers (the two measures initially suggested by Washington), should be proposed for negotiations. However, as a direct result of the absence of detailed discussion on the issue, the Allies immediately disagreed on how these measures should be presented. Furthermore, the view that the measures should only be broadly defined prevailed. Strongly favoured by the Americans, and more or less unchallenged by a majority, the predominant (if not only) reason for wanting to keep the CSCE CBMs simple and undefined was to avoid problems in MBFR. Ever since the tabling of the US paper in July, the Americans had warned that negotiations of CBMs in the CSCE could jeopardise the negotiations of associated measures in MBFR and, without much consideration of the full implications of this position, the Alliance accepted it as the basis of their CBMs policy.

On the eve of the MPT, the Allies further agreed that the only strategy that could reconcile the need to avoid comprehensive development and definition of the CSCE CBMs, while at the same time trying to reach agreement on them at the Conference, was to develop illustrative lists of Western military activities that could be compared with similar lists, provided by the East, in hopes of reaching a general agreement on the issue.

In short, from the moment the Western governments began developing their policy and negotiating strategy for the CSCE CBMs, they were less concerned with the actual content of any agreement reached at the Conference, than with avoiding difficulties with MBFR. Therefore, when the Allies entered the multilateral preparatory negotiations they were unable, and unwilling, to precisely define what they wanted, having only one goal in mind: keeping the measures meaningless.

Acceptance of the confidence-building measures sponsored by the Western governments during the Multilateral Preparatory Talks of the CSCE was mainly due to the fact that Allied proposals in the field of military security constituted the "middle of the road" position of all the programmes presented by the different participants. Indeed, the role of the NNAs in getting CBMs on the agenda of the Conference was of much greater significance not only because these states forcefully argued for a number of comprehensive measures (and, by implication, supported the Western proposals), but because this left the Eastern states completely isolated on this issue. The Warsaw Pact nations came to the Conference with no proposals of their own in the field of military security and found themselves in an untenable position. With no counter-proposal, they had no bargaining chip and it proved impossible to systematically argue against every proposal put forward by other participating States. Being the *demandeur* of the Conference and wanting the preliminary discussion to proceed to the next stage of negotiations where they hoped for approval of a Summit meeting, the Soviet Union, and its closest allies, could not sustain their purely negative attitude throughout the consultations without risking the collapse of the negotiations even before they had actually started. The Soviets realised they had to accept something in the military field and (not unlike the Americans before them) ultimately concluded that confidence-building measures was the most innocuous item to negotiate.

The significance the top Soviet leadership attached to the Conference and the Summit cannot be overstated. Judging by the important concessions made by the East at Helsinki, not only by agreeing to consider CBMs but also human rights issues, agreement on a Conference ranked very high on Moscow's priorities. From this perspective, the question can be asked whether the West had not lost an important opportunity to argue for more comprehensive measures and much tighter terms of reference for the negotiations, especially on the notification of movements, an issue which enjoyed the unconditional support of the NNAs.

Unfortunately, the Allies did not have such priorities at the MPT. In the field of military security, the Helsinki Consultations accepted their programme and the NATO states did not have to concede on the more demanding proposals tabled by the NNAs. Most Allies were satisfied with this result which fulfilled the existing Alliance policy on CBMs; a policy still strongly influenced by concerns about MBFR and one that called for only a cautious endorsement for some general measures. In fact, almost at the same time as the Soviet Union agreed to consider confidence-building measures in early 1973, the United States began to argue in Brussels that the West's package of CBMs was too comprehensive and that the Soviets were correct by refusing the notification of movements.

Why the United States repudiated its own proposal, formulated only eight months earlier, remains unclear except for the possible explanation of simple oversight. As discussed, the original US paper on CBMs presented at NATO in July 1972 did not examine the measures in-depth and did not differentiate between the terms movements, manoeuvres, and exercises. Without any technical or military analysis supporting the elaboration of the document, the implications of the proposal for the notification of movements were probably not discerned at the time.

Nevertheless, from the moment the United States realised the full ramifications of their proposal they became extremely concerned that obligations in this field would hinder movement of troops to Europe and adopted the position that movements should be stripped from CSCE discussions and NATO proposals.

The implications for the development of any far-reaching Alliance policy on CBMs were significant. The Americans would not agree to go beyond the concept of illustrative lists and refused precise definitions or specific parameters for the measures. As a result, from the moment the Allies needed to accelerate work on illustrative lists, until March 1974 when the strategy had been clearly overtaken by events in the Conference room and was finally abandoned, the Alliance struggled to find examples agreeable to all. Yet, with no common guidelines or extensive research identifying what would be desirable to notify or what should be negotiated, the exercise proved futile and NATO never managed to adopt any lists that could be tabled in the CSCE.

More significant for the final outcome of the Conference and the future application of CBMs, the Allies never succeeded in developing a comprehensive policy on CBMs. In this regard,

the greatest impact of NATO's early decision to keep the CSCE measures simple and undefined was that Allies never even determined for themselves what this meant. From this perspective, the most important failure of the Alliance was not necessarily to have adopted a negative policy towards CBMs whereby the main goal was to limit their development, but not to have elaborated a common negotiating strategy that would have upheld the minimum they wanted to achieve. No debate, research, comprehensive technical or military study was ever undertaken to fully assess the implications of their own proposals, and even less those of the other participating States. Not surprisingly, in several instances during the main negotiations, the Allies found themselves at odds over many basic issues which could have been avoided with better preparation.

Better preparation could have also helped the Western delegations to present a more forthcoming position and unified front on several important issues. One of the most disconcerting aspect of NATO's negotiating position was their inability to support the NNAs' proposal for the notification of independent air and naval manoeuvres since the only Alliance study on the issue resulted in a positive conclusion but came too late to alter their long-standing negative position.

Closer co-ordination on CBMs might have also avoided embarrassing situations such as the last minute bilateral dealings between the Soviets and Americans on the final parameters of notifications of major military manoeuvres. A fact, the British later acknowledged, resulted in the West achieving less than they could have.

Clearly, many of the breakdowns in Alliance unity during the main negotiations resulted from purely national interests. In this regard, complex negotiations involving 15 partners, each with separate national interests, will never see absolute commonality of views. Yet, in the case of the negotiation of the CSCE CBMs régime, it is obvious that if greater interest had been placed in the measures, the Allies could have developed a more coherent and articulated negotiating position that might have produced a better outcome.

One may wonder how much the Soviets were aware of the divisions within the Alliance and how this might have reinforced their views that they could maintain their negative attitude and that, by "hard-bargaining", all participants would agree to only the strict minimum. The fact that the Eastern bloc never wanted confidence-building measures is undeniable. The Soviets acknowledged having made a mistake by accepting the drafting of terms of reference at

Helsinki, and throughout the negotiations in Geneva continuously attempted to limit the development of the measures to the lowest common denominator. Whether Moscow could have been persuaded to accept more stringent CBMs in the Final Act cannot, retrospectively, be answered with any certainty. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Soviets wanted a successful conclusion to the proceedings at Summit level and compromised greatly to achieve this goal. Furthermore, from a Western perspective, it is evident that the Allies could have tabled almost any proposal on CBMs and would have been fully supported by the neutrals and non-aligned. As for the multilateral talks, however, the Alliance's major objective throughout the main negotiations was not to obtain agreement on numerous exacting measures with detailed, demanding applications. Although a number of Allies argued for more concrete and effective CBMs, this view never became Alliance policy.

Many of the weaknesses and shortcomings which found their way into the Final Act were either unchallenged by the majority in NATO or, alternatively, as in the case of weak provisions adopted for the notification of movements and independent manoeuvres, were fully supported by some, or many of the Allies. Understandably, perhaps, Western evaluation of the application of the CBMs régime was never to be too harsh or too negative. The initial silence of the Warsaw Pact raised concerns at the beginning about what might be expected next, if anything at all. But, once the East began reporting manoeuvres, everyone could claim the system was working. How the system was working and for what purpose, however, is less clear.

From the beginning the Eastern bloc demonstrated little interest for the CSCE commitments. Eastern states notified major manoeuvres, but always in a manner that raised more questions than provided answers. The measure on exchange of observers was implemented but also only in a manner to their liking and in a way that suited their purposes: sometimes by inviting only countries in border areas; frequently by excluding Western countries; and, very often by ignoring Western invitations to observe NATO manoeuvres. Furthermore, access given to foreign observers was always restricted and limited to viewing only well-orchestrated, well-rehearsed exercises of no value.

While one can argue that the East did participate in the CBMs régime and that the system was working, beyond this general observation reality was a completely different matter and an equally compelling argument can be made that the régime resulted in few concrete benefits. In terms of increased transparency or stability, it is questionable that anything was gained by

the notification of upcoming major manoeuvres that provided only the name of a country and an approximate time-frame. Similarly, what was truly achieved, at a time of increased tension and uncertainty during the Polish crises, when the East decided either to simply provide incomplete notifications or not to notify at all? From a Western perspective, deception and manipulation characterised the experiences with the régime.

The reasons why the Allies argued for a new set of measures rather than strongly challenge the East over their poor, deceptive, and manipulative record of implementation certainly ensued from a number of motivations though, perhaps, the West had few other options available. The provisions of the Final Act were extremely vague, filled with loopholes and very often simply lacking any explanations about what was expected from the participating States, leaving open the possibility for differing interpretations or applications. If the East took the view that the provisions of the document were merely guidelines and that implementation of the measures was voluntary, the NATO governments could register their disapproval, but that was about all they could do, knowing very well that this could be a "legitimate" interpretation of the Document. The West had contributed to this final outcome and, in this sense, any claims that the NATO states should be praised for their important role in the making of CBMs should not be exaggerated.

In fact, most of the "success" attributed to the NATO partners was simply achieved by default and not by design. This is true of the decision to propose that the Conference deal with "certain military aspects of security", which was primarily motivated by increasing questions about how MBFR negotiations should be carried out. This is also true of the decision to propose CBMs at the CSCE, which only came about as a by-product of the inconclusive debate on the establishment of a link with MBFR.

The fact that CBMs were chosen only as a second "best-choice" to fill in the military security aspects of the CSCE might not have been so unfortunate, except that their future development was also to be curtailed, again because of preoccupations with MBFR. The irony, of course, was that the MBFR negotiations never produced any agreement, while the CSCE CBMs were to remain in force for more than a decade.

While the development of effective and substantive CBMs was never of significance to the Western states, the importance they attached to their later application was equally insignificant. As acknowledged by Western officials, interest in the implementation of the

Final Act's commitments only emerged after public opinion focused on its human rights provisions. In this regard, any claims of "significant" Allied interest for a thorough application of the measures should be considered with caution. Western appreciation of the CBMs developed primarily because of a recognition that the measures were to stay and not because they were viewed as meaningful tools that could improve the East-West security environment.

Arguably, the main achievement of the CSCE CBMs was that they remained in operation for so long, but this cannot be considered an indicator of success, nor can it be credited solely to the West. From the start, NATO never gave much consideration to confidence-building measures and, in this regard, any contention that the Allies were always strong advocates of effective measures should be more carefully assessed in view of the historical record, which clearly establishes that their interest was at best, minimal, and at worst, non-existent. In many ways, CBMs rarely attracted the attention of governments who, from the start, had only adopted the topic to fulfil a public commitment too hastily made and then opted to confine themselves to only a general endorsement for their negotiations.

APPENDIX I

Notifications of Military Manoeuvres in Compliance with the CSCE Final Act : 1975-1987

NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES: NATO					
Duration of manoeuvre	Notifying country\ countries	Designation of manoeuvre	Number of troops	Advance notice (days)	Observers invited
15-19 Sept 75	FRG\USA\CA\FR	Grosse Rochade*	68,000	23*	N
Early Oct-Late Nov 75	USA	Reforger 75	53,000[1]	21	N
14-23 Oct 75	FRG\USA\CA	Certain Trek	57,000	34*	Y
6-10 Sept 76	FRG\USA	Grosser Bär*	50,000	21	Y
7-11 Sept 76	USA\FRG	Gordian Shield	30,000*	21	N
13-17 Sept 76	USA\FRG\CA	Lares Team	44,000	21	Y
12-15 Sept 77*	FRG	Standhafte Shatten*	38,000	21	Y
13-23 Sept 77	USA\FRG	Carbon Edge	58,700*	21*	Y
17-21 Sept 78	FRG\USA	Blaue Donau*	46,000	24*	Y
18-28 Sept 78	USA\FRG	Certain Shield	56,000	24*	Y
18-29 Sept 78	USA\FRG\NL	Saxon Drive	32,500*	24*	Y
19-22 Sept 78	FRG\DA	Bold Guard 78	65,000	32*	N
30 Jan-6 Feb 79*	USA\FRG	Certain Sentinel	66,000	26*	Y
10-21 Sept 79	FRG\USA\CA	Constant Enforcer*	29,000	21*	Y
17-21 Sept 79	FRG	Harte Faust*	60,000	21	Y
15-19 Sept 80*	FRG	St.Georg*	44,000*	24	Y
15-24 Sept 80	USA\FRG\CA	Certain Rampart	40,000	21*	Y
15-25 Sept 80*	UK\FRG	Spearpoint*	90,000*	24	Y
14-18 Sept 81	FRG\CA	Scharfe Klinge*	48,000	21*	Y
14-23 Sept 81	FRG\USA	Certain Encounter*	70,000	24*	Y
13-17 Sept 82**	FRG	Starke Wehr*	45,000*	24*	Y
13-23 Sept 82**	USA\FRG\CA	Carbine Fortress*	73,000	24*	Y
20-24 Sept 82	FRG\DA	Bold Guard 82*	47,200*	24*	Y
19-21 Sept 83*	FRG	Wehrhafte Löwen	50,000	21	Y
20-29 Sept 83	USA\FRG	Confident Enterprise	62,000	21	Y

NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES: NATO					
Duration of manoeuvre	Notifying country\ countries	Designation of manoeuvre	Number of troops	Advance notice (days)	Observers invited
20-29 Sept 83	FRG\NL	Atlantic Lion	41,000	21	Y
27 Oct-2 Nov 83	FRG\UK	Eternal Triangle	25,000	21	Y\N
16-21 March 84*	Norway	Avalanche Express	25,000	28*	Y
3-29 Sept 84	FRG\UK	Lion Heart	132,000	24	Y
13-20 Sept 84	FRG	Flinker Igel	55,000	22	Y
17-28 Sept 84	USA\FRG	Certain Fury	50,000	21	Y
21-31 Jan 85	USA\FRG	Central Guardian	72,000	21	Y
2-13 Sept 85	UK	Brave Defender	65,000	28	Y
12-21 Sept 85	FRG	Trutzige Sachsen	60,000	21	Y
20-30 Jan 86	USA\FRG	Certain Sentinel	73,000	27	Y
22-25 Sept 86*	FRG	Fränkischer Schild	58,000*	21*	Y
22-26 Sept 86	FRG	Bold Guard 86	65,000	21	Y

NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES : NNA					
Duration of manoeuvre	Notifying country\ countries	Designation of manoeuvre	Number of troops	Advance notice (days)	Observers invited
10-18 Nov 75	Switzerland	----	40,000	31*	Y
5-9 March 79	Switzerland	Nutcracker	34,000*	28*	Y
1-6 Oct 79	Switzerland	Forte	27,000	31*	Y
19-22 Nov 79	Austria	---- (Area Defence Exercise 79)*	27,500	42*	Y
12-22 Oct 81**	Switzerland	Cresta*	25,000	33	N
26 Oct-4 Nov 81	Spain	Crisex-81	32,200*	21*	Y
15-19 Nov 82	Switzerland	Panzerjagd	30,000	38	Y
7-17 Oct 85	Switzerland	Tornado	25,000	42	N
9-17 Oct 86	Austria	Raumverteidigung Herbstübung 86	30,000	43	Y
3-21 Nov 86	Switzerland	Dreizack 86	40,000	43	Y

NOTIFICATIONS OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES: WARSAW PACT					
Duration of manoeuvre	Notifying country\ countries	Designation of manoeuvre	Number of troops	Advance notice (days)	Observers invited
25 Jan-6 Feb 76*	USSR	Kavkaz	25,000	21*	Y
14-18 June 76	USSR	Sever	25,000	21	Y
9-16 Sept 76**	Poland	Tarcza-76	35,000	21	Y
31 March-5 April 77	USSR	----	25,000	21*	N
11-16 July 77	USSR	Karpatia	27,000*	21	Y
6-10 Feb 78	USSR	Berezina	25,000	21*	Y
3-8 July 78	USSR\GDR	---- (Tarcza-78)	30,000	21	N
5-12 Sept 78*	USSR	---- (Kavkaz II)	25,000	21	N
2-7 Feb 79	USSR\CZ	Druzba-79	26,000	21*	N
2-7 April 79	USSR	----	25,000	21	N
23-27 July 79	USSR	Neman	25,000	21	Y
10- 16 July 80	USSR	----	30,000	21	N
4-12 Sept 80**	GDR	Brotherhood in Arms	40,000	21*	N
4-12 Sept 81	USSR	----[2]	----[3]	21	Y
25-30 Jan 82	USSR\CZ	Druzba-82	25,000	21	N
25 Sept-1 Oct 82	Bulgaria	Shield-82	60,000	21	N
29 June-4 July 83*	USSR	-----	50,000	21*	N
25-30 July 83	USSR	----	26,000	21	N
28 June-5 July 84*	USSR	----[4]	60,000	22*	N
9-14 Sept 84**	CZ\PL	Shield-84	60,000	21*	N
25-31 May 85	USSR\CZ	----	25,000	25	N
6-14 July 85	USSR\GDR	----	25,000	23	N
15-21 July 85	USSR	Kavkaz-85	25,000	21	Y
10-17 Feb 86	USSR	--- (Zapad-86)	50,000	24	N
17-21 Feb 86	USSR	--- (Kavkaz-86)	25,000	21	N
8-12 Sept 86	CZ	Druzba-86	25,000	28	Y
8-13 Sept 86	USSR\GDR	---	25,000	24	N

NOTIFICATIONS OF SMALL-SCALE MILITARY MANOEUVRES: NATO					
Duration of manoeuvre	Notifying country\ countries	Designation of manoeuvre	Number of troops	Advance notice (days)	Observers invited
12-28 Sept 75	Turkey\UK	Deep Express*	18,000	21*	N
3-7 Oct 75	Norway	Batten Bolt 75*	8,000	21*	N
28 Oct-6 Nov 75	Netherlands	Pantser Sprong*	10,000	14	N
24 Feb-23 March 76*	Norway	Atlas Express*	17,000	21*	N
20-24 Sept 76*	Norway	Team Work 76	13,500*	21*	Y
4-5 Oct 76	Turkey	Tayfun 76	15,000	?	?
11-21 Oct 76*	DA\FRG\USA	Bonded Item*	11,000*	21*	N
2-11 Nov 76*	UK	Spearpoint	18,000	21*	Y
1-8 May 77	USA	Certain Fighter	24,000	23*	N
12-23 Sept 77*	Belgium	Blue Fox	24,000*	21	N
19-23 Sept 77	Denmark	Arrow Express 77	16,000	21*	Y
24 Sept-1 Oct 77	Netherlands	Interaction	12,000	21*	Y
13-14 Oct 77	Turkey	Tayfun 77	15,000	30	Y
1-6 March 78	Norway	Arctic Express*	15,300	30	Y
22-26 Sept 78	Norway	Black Bear	8,200	30	N
17-22 March 79	Norway	Cold Winter 79*	10,000	30	N
28 Sept-14 Oct 79	Turkey	Display Determination 79	18,000	22*	N
1-7 Oct 79**	France	Saône-79	16,000*	21	Y
15-27 Oct 79	UK	Keystone*	18,000	21	N
14-19 March 80	Norway	Anorak Express*	18,200	30*	N
18-24 Sept 80	Norway	Team Work 80*	16,800	28	Y
6-10 Oct 80	France	Marne 80	17,000	11*	N
13-18 March 81	Norway	Cold Winter 81	11,000	22*	N
18-23 Sept 81	Norway	Barfost 81	9,000	21	N
20-25 Sept 81	Denmark	Amber Express 81*	22,000	23*	Y
October 81	France	Farfadet	4,000	14	N
1-23 Oct 81**	FRG\UK	Red Claymore*	22,500*	21*	N
12-24 Oct 81*	FRG\BE	Cross Fire*	21,000	21*	N
12-17 March 82	Norway	Alloy Express*	14,200	28*	N
19-20 Sept 82**	France	Langres 82	17,000	3*	N

NOTIFICATIONS OF SMALL-SCALE MILITARY MANOEUVRES: NATO

Duration of manoeuvre	Notifying country\ countries	Designation of manoeuvre	Number of troops	Advance notice (days)	Observers invited
11-17 March 83	Norway	Viking 83	10,000	21	N[5]
11-17 March 83	Norway	Cold Winter 83	10,000	21	N[6]
16- 24 Sept 83*	France	Moselle 83	22,000	24*	Y
20-24 Sept 83*	Denmark	Ample Express	10,000	20*	Y
24 Oct-5 Nov 83	UK\FRG	Eternal Triangle	21,000	21	N[7]
8-14 Sept 84	France	Doubs-84	20,000	31*	Y
14 Sept 84	France	Damoclès	7,500	?	Y
15-20 Sept 84	Denmark	Bold Gannett	21,000	22	N
15-21 March 85*	Norway	Cold Winter 85	10,000	21	Y
11 June 85	France	Jourdan	5,000	?	Y
6-12 March 86	Norway	Anchor Express	20,000	28	Y\N
9-15 Sept 86	Norway	Express Barfost	11,000	50	N
9-15 Sept 86	Norway	Blue Fox 86	23,000[8]	?	Y

NOTIFICATIONS OF SMALL-SCALE MILITARY MANOEUVRES: NNA

Duration of manoeuvre	Notifying country\ countries	Designation of manoeuvre	Number of troops	Advance notice (days)	Observers invited
21-25 Oct 75	Yugoslavia	---- (Division in Action)*	18,000	22*	N
20-23 Sept 76	Yugoslavia	Golija-76*	24,000	34*	Y
2-6 Oct 76	Sweden	Poseidon	12,000	30*	N
5-9 March 77*	Sweden	Vönn 77	10,000	30*	Y
8-15 Oct 77	Spain	Podenco	8,000	53	Y
11-19 Nov 77	Austria	---(Herbstübung 77)	12,000	38*	N
13-17 Nov 78	Austria	----	5,000	21*	N
28 Feb-11 March 82*	Sweden	Norrsken *	23,000	30*	Y
23-29 Sept 82**	Sweden	Sydfront*[9]	24,000*	34*	N
15-22 Oct 82	Austria	---- (Area Defence Exercise 82)	14,000	46	N
13-15 Sept 83	Yugoslavia	Unity 83	22,000	39*	Y
25 Sept-5 Oct 83*	Sweden	Ostkust	20,000	31	N
18 Feb-5 March 85	Sweden	Västgräns	22,000	42	Y

NOTIFICATIONS OF SMALL SCALE MILITARY MANOEUVRES: WARSAW PACT					
Duration of manoeuvre	Notifying country\ countries	Designation of manoeuvre	Number of troops	Advance Notice (days)	Observers invited
6-9 April 76	Hungary	----	10,000*	1[10]	N
18-23 Oct 76	Hungary	----	15,000*	0[11]	N
Mid-May 79	Hungary	---- (Shield-79)	25,000[12]	--[13]	Y
23-30 Aug 80	Hungary	Dyna 80	18,000	1[14]	N
5-10 Sept 83	USSR	Dniestr	23,000	21	Y

KEY

BE = Belgium
BU = Bulgaria
CA = Canada
CZ = Czechoslovakia
DA = Denmark
FR = France
FRG = Federal Republic of Germany
GDR = German Democratic Republic
NL = Netherlands
PL = Poland
UK = United Kingdom
USA = United States
USSR= Soviet Union

METHODLOGY AND SYMBOLS USED

A cautionary word: The tables provided above can by no means be considered as definitive because the national notifications issued by the CSCE participating States are not in the public domain. Unless specified otherwise, the data used to compile the tables are from three main sources: the first twenty-two *Semiannual Reports on Implementation* of the US Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; various SIPRI *World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbooks*; and the study from Victor-Yves Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph.* (Complete references are provided in the bibliography and have been marked by an *).

The use of several sources was necessary because none of the above references indicated whether the original national notifications issued by the CSCE participants were their primary source of information, and none provided a complete coverage of the Helsinki CBMs régime. If combination of all the data was the only way to offer the most comprehensive record of implementation, this highlighted numerous discrepancies between the sources which could not always be easily explained. This problem was compounded by the fact that none of the references explained their reporting procedures. To ensure accuracy, as much as possible, each source has been confirmed by a separate source of information. In some cases, however, all sources provided different information and, in other instances, only one source was available.

Explanation of the methodology for the compilation of the tables as well as the different symbols used to highlight discrepancies between the sources follows.

DURATION OF MANOEUVRE

One "*" after a quoted figure indicates different reporting in the sources consulted. In most cases, the difference was only of a few days.

Two "**" following a given date, indicates that one or more of the sources reported an imprecise time-frame for the duration of the manoeuvre only quoting, for instance, "early September". Whenever a precise date was available it has been used in order to facilitate the calculation of the number of days of prior notice.

NOTIFYING COUNTRY\COUNTRIES

All available information on notifying states has been included, though no specific order of presentation has been used. Accordingly, the first country listed should not be regarded as reflecting its status as a sponsoring state, nor do the entries in the column "Duration of Manoeuvres" necessarily correspond to the dates given by that state. Indeed, it can be noted that the NATO member states have often separately announced various phases of their multinational exercises, and that several member states have sometimes provided separate notification for the participation of their national troops only. Hence, discrepancies between sources can be numerous.

DESIGNATION OF MANOEUVRE

One "*" after a given designation indicates that details on the movement of troops to and/or from the manoeuvre have been included, but consistent reporting on this item, has only been done by SIPRI, and only until 1982.

When a designation appears in parenthesis after this symbol "----", it indicates different reporting between the sources. In this case, it is unclear whether the designation listed was indeed provided, or if the name reported in one or more sources only referred to the way the manoeuvre subsequently became known. This later point is particularly relevant for the Warsaw Pact manoeuvres which often omitted official designation, while Western experts, when referring to those manoeuvres, used the "likely" designation.

NUMBER OF TROOPS

One "*" after a quoted figure indicates discrepancies between sources. In most cases, the difference was less than 2,000 troops. In some instances, however, the difference was quite significant. The Swiss exercise Nutcracker, for example, was reported as involving 34,000, 47,000 and 51,000 troops. Yet, in only one case (the Sydfront exercise held by Sweden in 1982), the difference affected the possible classification of the manoeuvre and, in this case, the smallest figure has been retained and the exercise is listed under small-scale manoeuvres.

ADVANCE NOTICE

One "*" after a quoted figure indicates non-congruence between sources, or the possibility for a different reporting of the data.

The calculation of the number of days for advance notice is inclusive of the date the notification was issued, but exclusive of the start of the manoeuvre as recorded under "Duration of Manoeuvre". In most cases where the issuance of the notification was unknown, the figure quoted is from Ghebali.

INVITATION OF OBSERVERS

"Y/N" (YES/NO) indicates contradictory reporting.
"?" indicates that no information was available.

NOTES

[1] *SIRPRI Yearbook 1976* reports only the involvement of 10,000 troops. Although not specified as such, it is possible that this number refers to the contribution of forces by the United States only. It is to be noted, however, that the *First Semiannual Report on Implementation* of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe does not mention the *Reforger* exercise as part of its review of the implementation record of the Helsinki CBMs for this period. Since the designation *Reforger* itself refers to the annual return of continental US-based forces to the Federal Republic of Germany for the fall season exercises, the information provided here (and only reported by Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*) may be misleading as it could actually duplicate the number of troops participating in other NATO exercises taking place during the same period in the FRG. It was not uncommon for NATO to have the same troops participated in more than one manoeuvre.

[2] Unnamed in the notification but designated as *ZAPAD-81*. *TASS*, 5 September 1981.

[3] Number of troops not provided in the notification but reported by *TASS*, 5 September 1981 as involving "approximately 100,000 troops".

[4] Unnamed manoeuvre; referred to in the West as *ZAPAD-84*.

[5] This information is from US, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Basket I*, p. 39.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] This exercise has been reported by Ghebali, *Paragraph-by-Paragraph*, as involving 25,000 troops. It has been listed here under the small-scale exercise because the other two sources consulted reported it at 23,000 and 24,000 troops.

[10] Notification made orally. See Goetze, *Security in Europe*, p.89.

[11] Notification made orally. See *Ibid.*

[12] Although the number of troops is indicated as being 25,000 troops, this manoeuvre has been included in this section because all the sources consulted reported that the notification indicated "fewer than 25,000 troops", thus qualifying it as a smaller-scale exercise.

[13] Notification given orally on May 3, 1979. See Holst, "Confidence-building Measures", pp.8-10.

[14] Notification given orally. See Goetze, *Security in Europe,* p.89.

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